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Thesis  abstract 
Kantian  constitutivists  argue  that  normativity  can  be  derived  from  particular  elements  of  what  is 
constitutive  of  our  nature.  In  “Agency  Shmagency:  Why  Normativity  Won’t  Come  From  What  Is 
Constitutive  of  Action”,  David  Enoch  argues  that  constitutivism  cannot  serve  as  a  foundation  for 
objective  normativity.  The  first  section  of  this  thesis  analyses  and  develops  the  constitutivist 
David  Velleman’s  response  to  this  challenge.  The  second  section  explores  the  way  in  which  the 
epistemic  and  metaethical  claims  made  by  the  Kantian  constitutivist,  Christine  Korsgaard,  can 
be  used  to  reject  Enoch’s  claim.  This  exploration  of  constitutivism  reveals  that  a  key  Kantian 
claim  utilised  by  the  constitutivist  approach  allows  for  the  development  of  a  scalar  deontology. 
Hence,  the  third  section  of  the  thesis  explains  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  where 
our  obligation  to  be  coherent  is  something  that  we  pursue  more  or  less  successfully,  rather  than 
a  task  at  which  we  succeed  or  fail. 
 
Enoch  (2006)  argues  that  the  constitutivist  approach  cannot  deliver  objective  normativity  by 
deriving  normativity  from  elements  of  our  constitution  because  how  we  are  constituted  is 
contingent.  The  problem,  according  to  Enoch,  is  that  any  norms  derived  from  agents’ 
constitutions  require  a  justification  that  cannot  be  derived  from  an  appeal  to  our  constitution: 
being  constituted  in  a  particular  way  does  not  entail  that  one  ought  to  endorse  being  constituted 
in  this  way.  To  reply  to  Enoch,  Velleman  needs  to  deviate  significantly  from  constitutivism’s 
Kantian  foundations,  and  Korsgaard  has  not  responded  to  Enoch’s  critique.  I  provide  two  replies 
to  Enoch’s  critique.  The  first  is  consistent  with  key  elements  of  Velleman’s  constitutivism  but, 
unlike  Velleman’s  response,  does  not  deviate  from  constitutivism’s  Kantian  foundations.  The 
second  reply  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  is  derived  from  Korsgaard’s  solution  to  a  different 
criticism  of  Kantian  constitutivism.  These  two  replies  demonstrate  that  Kantian  constitutivism 
can  overcome  Enoch’s  critique  by  appealing  to  the  epistemic  and  metaphysical  roots  of  the 
Kantian  tradition.  In  both  replies,  I  demonstrate  that  Enoch’s  argument  appeals  to  an 
understanding  of  objectivity  that  is  not  shared  by  the  Kantian  constitutivists  he  critiques.  In  the 
Kantian  tradition,  transcendental  arguments  are  utilised  to  derive  objective  claims  about 
normativity  from  necessary  elements  of  our  cognitive  faculties.  By  identifying  that  Enoch’s 
critique  is  a  dispute  with  the  Kantian  tradition  rather  than  the  constitutivist  approach  as  such,  I 
demonstrate  that  Enoch  fails  to  introduce  new  problems  for  Kantian  constitutivists. 
 
Examining  the  role  of  Kantian  claims  regarding  the  nature  of  autonomy  and  the  source  of 
normativity  in  Kantian  constitutivism,  reveals  that  one  of  the  key  Kantian  claims  utilised  by 
constitutivists  allows  for  the  development  of  a  scalar  deontology:  scalar  deontology  is  a 
formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  which  explains  that  our  obligation  to  constitute 
ourselves  coherently  is  an  aim  which  we  always  ought  to  pursue  and  something  that  we  pursue 
more  or  less  successfully.  Kantian  moral  theory  argues  that  our  autonomy  is  derived  from  our 
ability  to  control  our  own  actions  through  the  use  of  our  rational  faculties.  According  to  the 
Kantian  argument  we  have  control  over  our  own  actions  when  our  will  is  the  cause  of  our 
actions.  Kantian  constitutivists  develop  this  argument  by  explaining  that  the  rational  constitution 
of  our  will  obligates  us  to  act  coherently.  This  obligation  to  make  decisions  that  are  coherent 
with  the  demands  of  our  rational  faculties  is  our  obligation  to  constitute  ourselves  coherently. 
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Scalar  deontology  develops  this  line  of  argument  further  by  identifying  that  our  obligation  to 
constitute  ourselves  coherently  is  an  ongoing  aim  that  governs  all  of  the  moral  decisions  we 
make  and  explaining  that  this  ongoing  obligation  to  constitute  ourselves  coherently  is  not 
something  that  we  are  strictly  successful  or  unsuccessful  at  achieving  but  something  that  we  are 
in  the  process  of  pursuing  more  or  less  successfully.  From  the  position  of  a  subject  that  is 
exercising  their  autonomy,  this  obligation  to  constitute  oneself  coherently  is  something  that  the 
subject  is  in  the  process  of  pursuing  and,  thus,  from  the  perspective  on  an  agent  engaged  in  its 
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0.1  Thesis  overview 
Kantian  constitutivism  argues  that  normativity,  what  we  are  obligated  to  do  and  why  we  have 
such  obligations,  can  be  derived  from  particular  elements  of  what  is  constitutive  of  our  nature. 
Christine  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  in  The  Sources  of  Normativity  that  our  obligation  to  obey 
the  categorical  imperative  is  derived,  necessarily,  from  the  reflective  structure  of  our  own  mind 
(pp.  92-94,  97-98,  103-105).  She  argues  that  deciding  what  to  do  requires  using  our  faculty  of 
reflection  and  the  laws  governing  that  faculty  obligate  us  to  be  coherent.  Therefore,  because  of 
what  is  constitutive  of  our  faculty  of  reflection,  we  are  obligated  to  use  that  faculty  to  become 
coherent  and,  in  order  to  do  that,  we  must  obey  the  categorical  imperative.  David  Velleman 
(2004)  makes  a  similar  claim  in  “Précis  of  the  Possibility  of  Practical  Reason”  where  he 
summarises  the  aim  of  action  as  pursuing  knowledge  about  oneself  (p.  236).  Velleman  means 
that  when  we  try  to  decide  what  action  to  take,  we  do  so  by  trying  to  make  ourselves  intelligible 
to  ourselves.  We  do  this  by  being  motivated  by  aims  that  are,  when  considered  in  the  context  of 
our  other  aims  and  motivations,  understandable  to  ourselves  in  a  sense  that  makes  ourselves 
coherent.   David  Enoch  (2006)  critiques  this  approach  in  “Agency  Shmagency:  why  Normativity 1
Won’t  Come  From  What  is  Constitutive  of  Action”  by  arguing  that  identifying  how  we  are 
constituted  does  not  entail  an  obligation  to  endorse  our  constitution  (pp.  177-180).  His  point  is 
that  even  if  Velleman  and  Korsgaard  are  correct  about  our  constitution,  and  what  it  entails,  they 
still  have  not  established  that  we  ought  to  endorse  what  follows  from  our  constitution.  We  might, 
for  example,  choose  to  endorse  a  hypothetical  alternative  constitution  (which  Enoch  presents  as 
a  ‘shmagent’)  and,  regardless  of  what  constitution  we  endorse  (our  own  or  some  alternative), 
whatever  reason  there  is  to  endorse  any  particular  constitution  will  not  itself  be  derived  from  that 
constitution  because  that  would  be  arbitrary  and  circular.  The  reason  to  endorse  our  constitution 
cannot  be  simply  because  it  is  our  constitution,  because  that  would  be  arbitrary:  any  creature 
constituted  in  any  way  could  provide  the  same  argument  for  their  own  constitution.  
 
The  solution  to  Enoch’s  critique,  the  shmagency  problem,  is  to  appeal  to  the  epistemic  and 
metaphysical  roots  of  the  Kantian  tradition.  Enoch  argues  that  normativity  derived  from  our 
constitution  cannot  be  objective  because  any  norm  derived  from  such  a  source  is  contingent  on 
the  particulars  of  our  constitution;  our  constitution  could  hypothetically  have  been  otherwise,so 
any  normative  claims  derived  from  the  particulars  of  our  constitution  could  have  been  otherwise. 
The  Kantian  reply  to  this  point  is  to  explain  that  the  elements  of  our  constitution  from  which 
morality  is  derived  are  not  the  elements  that  could  be  otherwise.  Enoch’s  critique  does  not 
threaten  the  objectivity  of  the  normativity  established  by  Kantian  constitutivists  if  normativity  is 
derived  from  elements  of  our  constitution  that  are  not  contingent.  Karl  Schafer  (2019)  argues  for 
a  related  point  in  “Kant:  Constitutivism  as  Capacities-First  Philosophy”  where  he  posits  that 
Kantian  philosophy  in  general  is  constitutivist  in  the  sense  that  it  derives  claims  about  what 
exists  and  the  nature  of  knowledge  from  features  of  our  rational  faculties  (p.  4).  Carl  Posy 
(2010)  explains  in  “Man  is  the  measure:  Kantian  Thoughts  on  the  Unities  of  Self  and  World”  that 
what  makes  an  action  coherent,  rational,  moral,  or  unified,  must  be  measured  with  reference  to 
1  This  point  is  also  present  in  his  earlier  work  The  Possibility  of  Practical  Reason  (1989)  (pp.  719-722), 
but  clarified  in  his  later  work  How  We  Get  Along  (2009)  (pp.  26-28,  80-85) 
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elements  of  ourselves  because  it  is  only  from  this  perspective  that  the  role  of  practical  reason 
can  rendered  coherent  (pp.  124,  134,  140-142).  My  point,  and  the  solution  to  the  shmagency 
problem  for  Kantian  constitutivism,  is  that  transcendental  arguments  work  by  deriving  the 
objectivity  of  claims  from  non-contingent  elements  of  what  we  provide  to  the  construction  of  our 
experience  of  the  world  and,  therefore,  Kantian  constitutivism  is  not  an  appropriate  target  for 
Enoch’s  critique  of  the  constitutivist  approach. 
 
Providing  this  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem  involved  exploring  the  relationship  between 
Kantian  constitutivism  and  autonomy,  and  this  identifies  the  scope  for  the  development  of  a 
scalar  deontology.  Developing  this  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  required  examining 
the  source  of  normativity  put  forward  by  Velleman  and  Korsgaard.  In  both  cases,  as  in  Kantian 
moral  theory,  our  obligation  to  ourselves  (normativity)  is  derived  from  our  autonomy.  By 
“autonomy”  I  mean  our  control  over  our  own  actions  and,  therefore,  our  freedom.  Velleman 
(2000)  argues  for  a  type  of  epistemic  freedom  in  The  Possibility  of  Practical  Reason  where  he 
explains  that  freedom  has  similar  metaphysical  qualities  to  colour  in  the  sense  that  it  accurately 
describes  the  world  from  the  position  of  a  subject  that  is  experiencing  it  (pp.  32-44).  He 
describes  this  as  an  “epistemic  freedom”  because  it  justifies  claims  about  our  control  over  our 
own  actions  provided  those  claims  are  understood  as  pertaining  to  the  relevant  frame  of 
reference.  Korsgaard  (1996a)  makes  a  similar  point  in  Creating  the  Kingdom  of  Ends  where  she 
argues  that  understanding  the  world  requires  identifying  the  sense  in  which  a  subject  has 
control  over  their  own  actions  and  the  sense  in  which  the  subjects  actions  are  determined  by  the 
relevant  causal  forces  (p.  205).  She  explains  that  the  agent  is  a  causal  force,  a  will,  and  that 
freedom  exists  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  identification  of  the  self  with  that  force.  Both  Velleman 
and  Korsgaard  are  developing  the  point  made  by  Immanuel  Kant  (1785/2011)  in  Groundwork  of 
the  Metaphysics  of  Morals  where  he  argues  that  intelligent  beings  must  regard  themselves  as 
simultaneously  belonging  to  the  world  of  sense  and  the  world  of  understanding  (4:452).  The 
idea,  utilised  by  Kant,  Korsgaard,  and  Velleman,  is  that  understanding  our  position  as  subjects 
requires  understanding  our  control  over  our  own  actions  (the  sense  in  which  we  belong  to  the 
world  of  understanding)  even  though  our  actions  can  also  be  explained  by  reference  to  the 
relevant  causal  forces  (the  way  in  which  we  belong  to  the  world  of  sense). 
 
This  claim  that  the  source  of  normativity  requires  understanding  autonomy  from  the  position  of 
the  subject,  as  it  identifies  with  the  control  it  has  over  its  own  actions,  allows  for  the 
development  of  a  scalar  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative.  Kantian  constitutivism  argues 
that  our  obligation  to  ourselves,  our  duty,  is  to  constitute  ourselves  coherently  (or,  as  Velleman 
puts  it,  intelligibly).  From  the  position  of  a  subject  actively  involved  in  that  project  of 
self-constitution  the  pursuit  of  coherence  of  the  self  is  an  ongoing  project,  not  something  that  is 
completed  or  failed.  Rather,  it  is  best  understood  from  the  position  of  the  subject  that  is  in  the 
ongoing  pursuit  of  constituting  themselves  and,  from  this  position,  the  contributing  decisions  that 
makeup  this  project  provide  a  scalar  contribution  to  the  aims  of  the  pursuit.  My  argument  for 
scalar  deontology  is  that  the  categorical  imperative  is  scalar  in  the  sense  that  our  constitution  of 
ourselves  as  coherent,  our  pursuit  of  unity,  is  an  ongoing  aim  we  pursue  to  a  greater  or  lesser 
8 
degree  of  success  and  our  obligation  to  ourselves,  to  be  coherent,  is  fulfilled  to  the  extent  that 
we  are  succeeding  in  that  pursuit.  
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0.2  Constitutivism 
Constitutivism  is  the  metanormative  attempt  to  derive  normativity  from  elements  of  the  subject. 
This  is  accomplished  by  determining  what  one  ought  to  do  by  appealing  to  the  constitution  of 
agency  and  action.  The  idea  is  that  the  norms  that  govern  our  behaviour  can  be  derived  from  an 
examination  of  what  we  are.  Establishing  this  claim  is  undertaken  by  inviting  a  subject  to 
undertake  an  examination  of  their  own  nature  and  then  explaining  that  what  they  find  in  such  an 
examination  is  not  merely  an  explanation  of  what  they  are  but  also  prescriptions  about  what 
they  should  do.  This  constitutivist  approach  to  establishing  the  foundations  of  normativity  can  be 
explained  by  an  analogy  to  the  normativity  of  the  objects  that  makeup  the  world  around  us:  to 
determine  what  an  object  should  do,  or  what  makes  an  object  a  good  object  of  its  kind,  you  first 
undertake  an  analysis  of  what  is  constitutive  of  the  object  in  question.  For  example,  a  good 
backpack  is  one  that  is  capable  of  safely  carrying  goods  because  its  ability  to  perform  this 
function  is  what  makes  it  a  backpack.  This  function  is  constitutive  of  being  a  backpack  and, 
therefore,  the  normativity  of  being  a  backpack  is  derived  from  its  ability  to  perform  it.  Similarly, 
the  normativity  of  what  I  should  do  is  determined  by  what  is  constitutive  of  being  what  I  am  and 
the  norms  that  govern  my  life  are  founded  in  (derived  from)  whatever  it  is  that  makes  me  count 
as  the  type  of  thing  that  I  am. 
 
In  “Agency  Shmagency:  why  Normativity  Won’t  Come  From  What  is  Constitutive  of  Action” 
Enoch  (2006)  explains  constitutivism  as  the  attempt  to  derive  the  normativity  that  governs  us 
from  those  elements  of  our  constitution  that  make  us  the  type  of  thing  that  we  are: 
“The  intuitive  idea  can  be  put,  I  think,  rather  simply:  In  order  to  know  what  it  takes  for  a 
car  to  be  a  good  car,  we  need  to  understand  what  cars  are,  what  their  constitutive 
functions  are,  and  so  on.  A  good  car  is  just  a  car  that  is  good  as  a  car ,  good,  that  is,  in 
measuring  up  to  the  standards  a  commitment  to  which  is  built  into  the  very  classification 
of  an  object  as  a  car.  Analogously,  then,  perhaps  in  order  to  know  which  actions  are 
good  (or  right,  or  reason  supported,  or  rational,  or  whatever),  all  we  need  is  a  better 
understanding  of  what  actions  are,  or  perhaps  of  what  it  is  to  be  an  agent,  someone  who 
performs  actions.  Perhaps  the  normative  standards  relevant  for  actions  will  fall  out  of  an 
understanding  of  what  is  constitutive  of  action  just  as  the  normative  standards  relevant 
for  cars  fall  out  of  an  understanding  of  what  is  constitutive  of  cars.”  (p.  170).  
If  this  approach  is  successful,  understanding  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  would  both  explain 
the  source  of  normativity  and  how  we  are  to  derive  normative  content  from  that  source. 
 
Constitutivism  is  an  approach  to  solving  the  metaethical  and  epistemological  problem  of 
normativity,  by  ‘problem  of  normativity’  I  mean  the  difficulties  associated  with  explaining  in  what 
sense,  if  any,  normativity  exists,  how  we  are  able  to  know  things  about  normativity,  and  what,  if 
anything,  makes  normativity  objective.  Constitutivism  and  the  motivations  that  give  rise  to  the 
constitutivist  approach  are  inexorably  linked.  Constitutivism  is  a  method  of  explaining  why 
normativity  exists  and  how  we  can  access  knowledge  about  it.  To  clarify,  this  does  not  entail  that 
constitutivists  are  necessarily  moral  realists,  although  they  can  be:  constitutivism  provides  an 
explanation  of  why  we  encounter  normativity  during  our  reflection  and  decision  making  process 
and,  in  this  sense,  explains  its  existence  (this  may,  or  may  not,  involve  further  claims  about 
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realism  and  the  nature  of  this  existence).  It  is,  in  this  sense,  that  constitutivism  is  an  attempt  to 
provide  the  foundations  of  morality.  Matthew  Silverstien  (2015)  explains  in  “The  Shmagency 
Question”  that  the  constitutivist  strategy  places  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  (what  makes  one 
count  as  an  agent)  in  the  role  of  the  foundation  of  moral  theory  (pp.  1127-1129).  Constitutivism 
provides  a  foundation  for  morality  by  attempting  to  answer  the  epistemic  and  metaphysical 
questions  related  to  the  nature  of  normativity  and  how  we  access  knowledge  about  it. 
 
In  “Shmagency  Revisited”  David  Enoch  (2011)  describes  constitutivism  as  motivated  by  the 
desire  to  provide  an  answer  to  those  skeptical  about  the  possibility  of  answering  moral 
questions  by  providing  an  explanation  of  the  source  of  morality  that  removes  a  troubling  element 
of  mystery  from  the  notion  of  morality  as  such.  As  Enoch  (2011)  explains: 
“The  promises  of  constitutivism  are  significant.  Perhaps  chief  among  them  are  the  hope 
of  providing  some  kind  of  answer  to  the  skeptic  about  morality  or,  perhaps,  practical 
reason,  and  the  hope  of  securing  for  practical  reason  a  kind  of  objectivity  that  is 
consistent  with  its  practical,  motivationally  engaged  nature.  The  former  philosophical 
motivation  for  constitutivism  -  most  clearly  present  in  much  of  Korsgaard’s  relevant  work 
-  relies  on  the  fact  that  constitutive  norms  seem  to  be  less  mysterious  than 
not-clearly-constitutive  norms.  There  is  arguably  nothing  mysterious  about,  say,  the 
norms  of  certain  reasonably  well-defined  activities,  such  as  building  a  house,  or  playing 
chess.”  (p.  208) 
This  attempt  to  reduce  the  mysteriousness  of  the  source  and  our  access  to  normativity  prompts 
constitutivists  to  derive  the  answers  to  the  metaphysical  and  epistemic  questions  related  to 
normativity  from  elements  of  how  we  are  constituted.  
 
The  idea  is  that  how  we  are  constituted  governs  what  we  should  do  and,  therefore,  is  the  source 
of  normativity.  In  “The  Magic  of  Constitutivism”  Michael  Smith  (2015)  explains  constitutivist 
approaches  to  explaining  the  source  of  normativity  as  sharing  a  commitment  to  the  claim  that 
normativity  can  be  derived  from  elements  of  our  constitution: 
“Constitutivism  is  the  view  that  we  can  derive  a  substantive  account  of  normative 
reasons  for  action  -  Perhaps  a  Kantian  account,  perhaps  a  hedonistic  account,  perhaps 
a  desire-fulfillment  account,  this  is  up  for  grabs-  from  abstract  premises  about  the  nature 
of  action  and  agency.  Constitutivists  are  thus  bound  together  by  their  conviction  that 
such  a  derivation  is  possible,  not  by  their  agreement  about  which  substantive  reasons 
can  be  derived,  and  not  by  agreement  about  the  features  of  action  and  agency  that 
permit  the  derivation.”  (p.  187)  
The  key  constitutive  element  of  constitutivism  is  the  derivation  of  norms  from  how  elements  of 
how  subjects  are  constituted.  Using  our  constitution  to  perform  this  derivation  situates  how  we 
are  constituted  as  the  foundation  of  normativity  in  the  sense  that  our  constitution  is  the  source  of 
normativity.  As  the  source  of  normativity  our  constitution  is  also  the  source  of  solutions  to 
metaphysical  and  epistemic  problems  that  relate  to  the  nature  of  normativity:  our  constitution 
explains  where  normativity  comes  from  and  how  we  access  that  knowledge. 
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Christoph  Hanisch  explains  this  common  feature  of  constitutivism  in  “Constitutivism  and 
Inescapability:  A  Diagnosis”  where  he  explains  that  this  approach  explaining  the  source  of 
normativity  is  a  ‘constitutivist  maneuver’  that  shares  a  two-level  structure  which  appeals  to  an 
identifiable  phenomenon  experienced  by  a  subject  and  then  grounds  that  phenomenon  in 
prescriptive  propositions  that  relate  to  the  functions  of  the  agent  (pp.  1156-1157).  Constitutivism 
derives  the  source  of  normativity  from  how  we  are  constituted  by  explaining  that  as  subjects 
with  particular  elements  present  in  our  constitution  we  encounter  normativity  in  our  interactions 
with  the  world  and  when  those  encounters  are  traced  back  to  their  roots  we  find  that  those  roots 
are  elements  of  our  own  constitution.  This  is  how  the  constitutivist  maneuver  demonstrates  to 
the  subject  that  they  themselves,  or  at  least  elements  of  their  constitution,  are  the  source  of 
those  prescriptions  that  govern  what  they  ought  to  do.  
 
By  identifying  elements  of  our  own  constitution  as  the  source  of  the  normativity  that  we 
encounter  in  our  experience  of  being  a  subject  (interacting  with  the  world,  taking  actions, 
making  decisions,  and  so  on)  the  hope  is  that  this  constitutivist  maneuver  has  provided  answers 
to  questions  that  are  otherwise  difficult  to  reconcile.  Luca  Ferrero  (2019)  explains  constitutivism 
in  “The  Simple  Constitutivist  Move”  as  tending  to  share  a  similar  move: 
“At  first  approximation,  what  seems  to  be  common  to  various  forms  of  constitutivism  and 
constitutivist  arguments  is  the  following  move:  a  subject  is  under  a  certain  set  of 
normative  pressures  because  these  pressures  are  constitutive  of  a  certain  activity  or 
item.  And  if  one  fails  to  yield  to  these  pressures,  one  would  bring  about  the  loss  of  the 
activity  or  the  item  in  question  -  a  price  that,  presumably,  one  is  unwilling  to  pay.”  (pp. 
146-147) 
So,  constitutivism  explains  the  source  of  norms  by  referring  to  the  constitutive  elements  of  the 
subject.  It  explains  the  force  of  those  prescriptions  by  explaining  that  ignoring  them  causes 
some  disjunction  or  disharmony  with  the  elements  of  the  subjects  constitution  from  which  they 
are  derived .  Ferrero  continues  this  explanation  with  an  analogy  often  used  by  constitutivists: 2
“The  move  is  usually  first  introduced  in  terms  of  the  constitutivist’s  most  beloved  game: 
chess.  The  illustration  goes  something  like  this:  A  chess  player  must  move  the  bishops 
along  the  diagonals  because  this  is  required  by  a  constitutive  norm  of  chess.  If  a 
purported  chess-player  does  not  abide  by  these  constitutive  norms,  she  thereby  fails  to 
be  a  chess-player.  Hence,  as  long  as  one  has  reason  to  be  playing  chess,  one  ought  to 
abide  by  the  constitutive  norms  of  chess.  Generalizing:  as  long  as  one  has  reason  to 
engage  in  some  activity  or  with  some  item,  one  ought  to  comply  with  the  constitutive 
standards  of  that  activity  or  item.”  (p.  147) 
Constitutivism,  broadly  defined,  is  an  exploration  of  the  nature  of  what  makes  one  a  subject  and 
utilising  key  elements  of  that  nature  (our  constitution)  to  explain  the  source  of  normativity  and, 
by  doing  this,  solve  metaphysical  and  epistemic  problems  related  to  the  existence  of  normativity 
and  our  access  to  knowledge  about  it. 
 
2  The  implications  for  the  constitutivist  position  of  a  subject  who  claimed  they  were  willing  to  pay  this 
price,  to  accept  disharmony  or  disjunction  with  the  elements  of  their  constitution  that  prescribe  norms,  is 
explored  in  §  0.5  where  I  explain  the  shmagency  problem. 
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Constitutivism  is  frequently  discussed  in  terms  of  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  or  action  while 
the  explanation  I  have  just  given  extends  this  terminology  to  elements  of  the  constitution  of  a 
subject  in  general.  Earlier  explanations  of  constitutivism,  such  as  the  explanation  from  Enoch 
that  I  began  this  section  with  refer  to  agency  and  action  because  the  constitutivist  literature 
begins  with  Kantian  constitutivists  who  talk  in  these  terms.  Ferrero  (2019)  explains  that 
constitutivism  has  become  a  broader  project  than  the  one  begun  by  Kantian  (and,  perhaps, 
neo-aristotelian  in  the  case  of  Korsgaard)  constitutivists  (p.  146).  Ferrero  explains  that 
constitutivist  attempts  to  explain  the  source  and  nature  of  normativity  now  include  appeals  to 
elements  of  our  constitution  beyond  our  agency  and  the  nature  of  action  (p.  157).  While  I  have 
provided  a  broad  explanation  of  the  constitutivist  approach  to  solving  the  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  problem  of  normativity,  it  is  not  within  the  scope  of  my  thesis  to  explore 
non-Kantian  constitutivist  positions  in  any  detail. 
 
My  exploration  of  Kantian  constitutivism  focuses  on  the  work  of  David  Velleman  and  Christine 
Korsgaard.  Velleman  and  Korsgaard’s  projects  are  attempts  to  solve  the  problem  of  normativity 
via  the  constitutivist  method:  this  means  that  they  appeal  to  elements  of  our  constitution  to 
explain  why  normativity  exists  (why  we  experience  it),  by  which  I  mean  why  there  is  such  a  thing 
as  normativity,  and  how  we  have  access  to  knowledge  about  normativity.  The  hope  is  that  by 
explaining  the  nature  of  normativity  they  can  develop  substantive  claims  about  what  we  ought  to 
do  and,  by  doing  so,  explain  the  nature  of  morality.  In  §  1  I  explain  and  explore  Velleman’s 
constitutivist  theory  and  Korsgaard’s  in  §  2.  For  both  philosophers  their  motivation  in  developing 
their  constitutivist  positions  is  to  provide  answers  to  this  broad  set  of  problems  that  I  have 
described  as  the  problem  of  normativity.  I  have  described  the  problem  of  normativity  as  referring 
to  the  metaphysical  and  epistemological  underpinnings  of  morality,  but  one  might  explain  the 
same  problem  as  the  task  of  outlining  a  metaethical  position:  explaining  what  you  are  referring 
to  when  you  speak  about  morality.  In  either  case,  the  role  of  constitutivism  is  to  provide  the 
foundations  required  to  have  a  discussion  about  the  nature  of  morality  and  to  justify  the  claims 
made  about  the  content  of  a  moral  theory.  
 
Velleman  and  Korsgaard  develop  constitutivist  positions  to  explain  the  nature  of  morality:  why 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  morality,  how  it  relates  to  normativity  more  broadly  understood,  and  how 
we  have  access  to  knowledge  about  normativity.  The  positions  provided  by  Velleman  and 
Korsgaard  differ  in  both  the  Kantian  constitutivist  positions  they  develop  and  the  type  of 
explanation  they  provide.  Velleman  is  attempting  to  explain  why  moral  skepticism  is  partially 
justified  while  Korsgaard  is  attempting  to  demonstrate  that  moral  skepticism  is  an  error.  So, 
Velleman  provides  a  theory  that  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  morality  is  objective  in  a  limited 
sense  that  is  compatible  with  elements  of  skepticism  while  Korsgaard  is  attempting  to 
demonstrate  that  morality  is  objective  without  such  a  limitation.  
 
In  How  We  Get  Along  Velleman  (2009)  explains  that: 
“My  metaethics  is  rationalist  in  that  it  grounds  morality  in  social  phenomena  that  are 
themselves  supported  by  practical  reasoning.  But  morality  is  thus  supported  by 
rationality  at  one  remove;  and  so  its  underpinnings  are  less  secure  than  is  generally 
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claimed  in  rationalist  metaethics.  In  my  view,  practical  reason  is  not  in  itself  moral;  it  is 
merely  pro-moral,  in  that  it  has  encouraged  us  to  develop  a  moral  way  of  life.  There  was 
no  antecedent  guarantee  that  such  a  way  of  life  would  develop  among  rational  agents, 
much  less  that  moral  conduct  will  be  rationally  required  of  every  agent  at  all  times.  The 
most  that  metaethics  can  do  in  this  regard  is  to  show  how  the  moral  aspects  of  our  way 
of  life  can  be  seen  retrospectively  as  a  rational  development,  a  form  of  progress.”  (p.  2) 
In  §  0.4  I  explain  that  the  Kantian  tradition  derives  the  objectivity  of  particular  claims,  such  as 
those  regarding  morality,  from  the  nature  of  the  subject  and  throughout  §  1  I  explore  the  debate 
between  Enoch  and  Velleman  regarding  the  objectivity  of  the  normativity  that  Velleman  is 
attempting  to  establish  in  his  theory.  Velleman  (2009)  explains  that  he  is  to  some  extent  a  moral 
skeptic: 
“There  is  an  even  deeper  level  at  which  I  am  skeptical  about  mortality:  I  doubt  whether  it 
exists  in  the  form  traditionally  envisioned  by  philosophers.  In  my  view,  there  is  no  unitary 
point  of  view,  source  of  reasons,  or  deliberative  principle  to  which  the  term  ‘morality’ 
refers.”  (p.  3) 
Velleman  is  not  arguing  for  morality  that  is  objective  in  the  same  sense  that  I  explain  in  §  0.3  or 
in  the  sense  that  Enoch  understands  objectivity  in  the  context  of  morality.  
 
In  §§  1.1,  1.2,  1.3,  and  1.5  I  explain  that  Velleman  and  Enoch  disagree  about  what  it  means  for 
morality  to  be  objective.  Enoch  critiques  Velleman  (see  1.1,  and  1.2)  on  the  grounds  that   his 
theory  cannot  provide  objective  normativity  because  it  entails  that  different  types  of  subjects  will 
provide  different  answers  to  the  same  moral  questions  and,  therefore,  the  morality  provided  by 
Velleman’s  theory  is  contingent  on  elements  of  the  subject  (see  §  0.5).  Vellman’s  reply  (see  §§ 
1.4  and  1.5)  is  that  his  theory  provides  ‘objective’  answers  to  moral  questions  in  the  sense  they 
provide  answers  that  are  true  in  a  particular  context:  so,  in  the  context  of  being  a  particular  type 
of  subject  there  are  particular  answers  to  moral  questions.  In  §  1.6  I  provide  an  alternative  reply 
to  Enoch’s  critique  that  allows  key  elements  of  Velleman’s  theory  to  argue  that  the  answers  to 
moral  questions  do  not  vary  depending  on  contingent  elements  of  the  subject.  By  providing  this 
alternative  answer  I  demonstrate  that  key  elements  of  Velleman’s  theory  are  compatible  with  the 
elements  of  the  Kantian  tradition  that  I  explain  in  §§  0.4  and  1.6.  Velleman’s  theory  does  not 
provide  objective  normativity  in  the  Kantian  sense  of  objectivity  that  I  explain  in  §§  0.3  and  0.4, 
but  this  is  not  a  failure  of  his  theory  so  much  as  an  acknowledgement  that  this  is  not  what  his 
theory  is  intending  to  do. 
 
The  solution  to  the  problem  of  normativity  provided  by  Korsgaard’s  theory  (explored  in  §  2)  is 
attempting  to  provide  objective  normativity  in  the  sense  I  explain  in  §§  0.3  and  0.4.  In  “The 
Sources  of  Normativity”  Korsgaard  (1996)  explains: 
“It  is  often  thought,  though  obscurely,  that  the  normativity  of  ethics  poses  a  special 
problem  for  modern  moral  philosophers.  The  Modern  Scientific  World  View  is  supposed 
to  be  somehow  inimical  to  ethics,  while  in  different  ways,  the  teleological  metaphysics  of 
the  ancient  Greek  world  and  the  religious  systems  of  medieval  Europe  seemed  friendlier 
to  the  subject.  It  is  a  little  hard  to  put  the  point  clearly  and  in  a  way  that  does  not  give  rise 
to  obvious  objections,  but  both  of  these  earlier  outlooks  seem  to  support  the  idea  that 
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human  life  has  a  purpose  which  only  is  or  can  be  fulfilled   by  those  who  live  up  to  ethical 
standards  and  meet  moral  demands.  And  this  is  supposed  to  be  sufficient  to  establish 
that  ethics  is  really  normative,  that  its  demands  on  us  are  justified.  They  are  justified  in 
the  name  of  life’s  purpose.  While  the  Modern  Scientific  World  View,  in  depriving  us  of  the 
idea  that  the  world  has  a  purpose,  has  taken  this  justification  away.”  (p.  18) 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  is  an  attempt  to  explain  why  we  experience  normativity  and  why 
moral  demands  are  justified.  She  situates  herself  as  arguing  against  competing  explanations  for 
why  we  experience  normativity  developed  by  modern  philosophers   (Korsgaard,  1996,  pp. 
18-48).  
 
Korsgaard  situates  herself  as  solving  problems  facing  substantive  moral  realists.  Substantive 
moral  realists  argue  that  a  belief  in  normative  truth  is  established  by  the  nature  of  normative 
entities  external  from  ourselves  (Korsgaard,  1996,  p.  44).  She  argues  that  this  position  is 
vulnerable  to  skepticism  because  it  is  not  clear  that  such  externally  entities  exist  (pp.  45-46). 
Korsgaard  (1996)  describes  the  attempts  to  defend  substantive  as  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
nature  of  normativity: 
“Contemporary  defences  of  substantive  moral  realism  almost  always  arise  in  the  same 
way.  They  are  always  initiated  by  somebody  else ,  a  self-proclaimed  spokesperson  for 
the  Modern  Scientific  World  View.  Whether  this  person  really  exists,  or  only  haunts  the 
anxious  dreams  of  the  moral  philosopher,  does  not  really  matter.  Armed  with  the 
distinction  between  facts  and  values,  or  brandishing  Ockham’s  razor  like  a  club,  the 
spokesperson  for  the  Modern  Scientific  World  View  declares  that  there  cannot  be  ethical 
knowledge,  that  we  can  explain  the  moral  phenomena  without  positing  the  existence  of 
moral  entities  or  facts,  or  that  intrinsically  normative  entities  are  just  too  queer  to  exist. 
And  the  moral  philosopher,  frantic  with  the  sense  of  impending  loss,  rushes  to  the 
defence  of  ethical  knowledge.  And  almost  noby  pauses  to  ask  whether  knowledge  of 
ethical  objects,  or  indeed  any  sort  of  knowledge  at  all,  is  really  what  we  want  in  the  first 
place.”  (p.  47) 
Her  point  is  that  normativity  is  not  derived  from  normative  entities.  Rather,  she  argues  that 
normativity  is  derived  from  necessary  elements  of  our  constitution.  
 
By  providing  a  constitutivist  explanation  of  the  source  of  normativity  Korsgaard  is  attempting  to 
establish  that  the  nature  of  ethical  knowledge  and  our  access  to  it  does  not  rely  on  externally 
existent  normative  entities  that  are  vulnerable  to  skeptical  arguments.  Korsgaard  (1996)  argues 
that: 
“To  raise  the  normative  question  is  to  ask  whether  our  more  unreflective  moral  beliefs 
and  motives  can  withstand  the  test  of  reflection.  The  Platonic  realist  thinks  that  we  can 
answer  that  question  by  taking  a  closer  look  at  the  objects  of  our  beliefs  and  motives,  to 
discover  whether  they  are  really  the  True  and  the  Good.  Nagel  thinks  we  should  take  a 
closer  look  at  the  beliefs  and  motives  themselves,  to  discover  whether  they  are  really 
reasons.  But  no  such  discovery  is  ever  made.  The  realist’s  belief  in  the  existence  of 
normative  entities  is  not  based  on  any  discovery.  It  is  based  on  his  confidence  that 
beliefs  and  desires  are  normative.”  (pp.  47-48) 
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Korsgaard’s  argument  is  that  we  are  right  to  be  confident  that  beliefs  and  desires  are  normative, 
in  the  sense  that  there  really  are  things  we  ought  to  do  (that  we  really  do  have  obligations).  She 
argues  that  this  confidence  is  not  justified  by  an  appeal  to  substantively  real  externally  extant 
normative  entities,  but  by  an  appeal  to  elements  of  our  constitution  (see  §  2  for  further 
development)  .  Korsgaard  develops  a  constitutivist  position  in  an  attempt  to  explain  why 
normativity  is  something  we  provide,  rather  than  something  we  discover  out  in  the  world.  
 
Kantian  constitutivists  undertake  the  constitutivist  approach  by  focusing  on  the  rational  faculties 
constitutive  of  agency.  By  “rational  faculties”  I  refer  to  our  capacity  for  reasoning  and  ability  to 
decide  what  to  do  according  to  the  dictates  of  that  capacity.   Luca  Ferrero  (2009)  explains  in 
“Constitutivism  and  Inescapable  Agency”  that  the  authority  of  reason  and  the  categorical 
authority  of  normativity  are  related  because  of  the  necessity  of  agency  (pp.  306-307).  This  line 
of  argument  is  utilised  by  Kantian  constitutivists  to  demonstrate  that  normativity  is  objective 
because  it  is  an  application  of  reason:  I  explain  the  objectivity  of  normativity  further  in  §  0.3.  The 
constitutive  element  of  the  self,  according  to  Kantian  constitutivism,  is  our  faculty  of  reason  and, 
hence,  to  determine  what  we  ought  to  do  we  need  to  undertake  an  examination  of  this  element 
of  ourselves  and  derive  norms  from  it.  The  idea  is  that  being  an  agent  and  taking  actions  means 
having  rational  faculties  and  utilising  them  to  control  which  decisions  you  make.  This  means  that 
our  rational  faculties  are  constitutive  of  agency  and  action.  The  constitutive  role  of  our  rational 
faculties  means  that,  according  to  the  constitutivist  approach,  the  norms  that  govern  our 
behaviour  are  derived  from  those  rational  faculties. 
 
The  Kantian  tradition  provides  support  for  the  claim  that  our  rational  faculties  are  constitutive  of 
what  we  are  as  subjects  that  take  actions,  that  is,  as  agents.  The  constitutivist  approach 
explains  why  this  constitutive  element  of  our  identity  entails  that  our  rational  faculties  are  the 
foundations  for  normativity.  In  §  0.3  I  explain  the  nature  of  objectivity  as  it  relates  to  normativity 
and  the  discussion  of  both  constitutivism  and  the  shmagency  problem:  according  to  Kantian 
constitutivists  establishing  that  normativity  is  derived  from  a  necessary  element  of  our 
constitution  is  sufficient  to  justify  its  objectivity.  In  §  0.4  I  explain  the  relationship  between  the 
constitutive  role  of  our  rational  faculties  and  the  Kantian  tradition:  according  to  the  Kantian 
tradition  reason  gives  us  control  over  our  own  actions  and  is,  therefore,  the  source  of  our 
autonomy.  As  the  source  of  our  autonomy,  these  rational  faculties  comprise  our  agency  (see  § 
0.4  for  further  explanation).  Hence,  Kantian  constitutivists  derive  normativity  from  necessary 
elements  of  our  constitution  and  those  necessary  elements  are  constitutive  of  our  autonomy. 




0.3  Objectivity 
The  objectivity  of  normative  facts  is  the  key  point  of  contention  in  the  shmagency  problem 
disagreement  between  Enoch  and  Kantian  constitutivists.  Despite  this  being  the  focus  of  the 
disagreement,  the  literature  surrounding  the  shmagency  problem  does  not  always  clarify  what 
“objectivity”  means.  Throughout  §§  1  and  2,  I  explain  that  the  disagreement  between  Enoch  and 
Kantian  constitutivism  is  a  disagreement  about  the  nature  of  objectivity  as  it  regards  normative 
facts.  Enoch  critiques  the  constitutivist  approach  for  deriving  normativity  from  elements  of  our 
constitution  by  arguing  that  norms  derived  in  this  manner  cannot  be  objective  because  these 
elements  of  our  constitution  are  contingent.  Kantian  constitutivism  is  predicated  on  the  assertion 
that  objective  norms  can  be  derived  from  elements  of  our  constitution  by  restricting  the  elements 
utilised  for  this  derivation  to  necessary  elements  of  our  constitution.  This  disagreement  is  a 
dispute  about  the  possibility  of  a  transcendental  argument  establishing  objective  facts  by 
determining  what  must  be  the  case  based  on  elements  of  our  constitution.  My  aim,  in  §§  1  and 
2,  is  to  establish  that  this  disagreement  underlies  Enoch’s  critique  of  the  constitutivist  approach. 
To  facilitate  this  I  need  to  explain  that  the  term  “objectivity”  is  utilised  by  both  Enoch  and 
constitutivists  in  a  manner  that  allows  them  to  have  some  meaningful  discussion. 
 
The  term  “objectivity”  is  problematic  in  the  shmagency  problem  debate  because  it  is  used  in  a 
manner  that  facilitates  some  level  of  meaningful  discussion  while  also  disguising  the  significant 
underlying  disagreements  that  lead  to  my  conclusions  in  §§  1  and  2  that,  when  it  comes  to 
Kantian  constitutivism,  Enoch  is  arguing  against  the  Kantian  strategy  rather  than  the 
constitutivist  approach.  In  Taking  Morality  Seriously  (2011b),  Enoch  argues  that  constitutivist 
and  Platonist  theories  handle  moral  disagreement  in  the  same  way  in  the  sense  that  neither 
type  of  theory  allows  for  the  variation  of  acceptable  answers  to  moral  questions  due  to  matters 
of  preference  (p.  29-30).  His  point  is  that  a  theory  purporting  to  establish  objective  moral  facts 
will  have  some  method  of  explaining  why  moral  disagreements  can  be  solved  by  referring  to 
some  element  of  the  moral  problem  that  makes  some  solution  to  the  disagreement  correct 
without  appealing  to  something  arbitrary  or  contingent.  Enoch  explains  this  in  terms  of  theories 
that  are  response-dependent  or  response-independent.  Theories  that  are  response-dependent 
imply  that  the  answers  to  moral  questions  depend  on  the  response  of  the  subject,  and  so  the 
answers  can  vary  from  one  person  to  another.  Theories  that  are  response-independent  entail 
that  the  answers  to  moral  questions  depend  on  something  other  than  the  response  of  the 
subject.  This  characterisation  of  the  role  objectivity  plays  represents  the  difficulty  associated 
with  the  use  of  the  term  “objectivity”  in  the  shmagency  problem  debate  because  of 
“response-dependent”  shortcomings  as  an  explanation  of  subject-dependent  theories  of  moral 
objectivity.  Enoch’s  point  is  that  subject-dependent  theories  of  morality  cannot  be  objective, 
because  they  entail  that  moral  norms  depend  on  the  response  of  subjects  and  that  means  they 
can  vary,  except  when  the  response  of  those  subjects  is  constrained  in  some  manner  that 
prevents  the  norms  from  varying.  So,  according  to  Enoch,  in  cases  where  theories  that  derive 
morals  from  subjects  but  measure  the  correctness  of  those  responses  by  something  that  does 
not  vary,  such  as  reason  or  rationality,  the  response-dependent  theories  are  ”not  different  from 
that  of  the  response  in dependence,  objectivist,  Platonist”  theories  (p.  30).  The  difficulty  arises 
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from  there  being  a  sense  in  which  Enoch  is  correct  to  equate  response-dependent  theories  and 
response-independent  theories  in  regards  to  their  attempts  to  establish  objectivity  and  a  sense 
in  which  this  equivalence  is  inaccurate.  
 
Enoch  is  correct,  in  the  narrow  sense  that  he  does,  to  equate  response-dependent  and 
response-independent  theories  about  morality  in  the  sense  that  both  can  appeal  to  the 
invariability  of  correct  responses  to  moral  questions  to  justify  their  objectivity,  but  it  is  inaccurate 
to  couch  response-dependent  as  opposed  to  objectivity.  Remember  that  the 
response-dependent  theories  Enoch  draws  this  equivalence  for  are  deriving  the  answers  to 
normative  questions  from  elements  of  the  subject  but  not  elements  of  the  subject  that  permit 
variance  in  correct  answers  to  normative  questions  (so,  not  subjectivists  who  are  not  trying  to 
put  forward  objective  normativity  such  as  emotivists).  The  problem  is  that  there  is  an  epistemic 
and  metaphysical  divergence  between  response-dependent  and  response-independent  theories 
that  can  be  obscured  by  merely  identifying  the  sense  in  which  they  are  equivalent,  and  it  is  this 
difference  that  causes  the  disagreement  between  Enoch  and  Kantian  constitutivism.  I  should 
clarify  that  I  am  not  arguing  that  Enoch  himself,  in  Taking  Morality  Seriously  or  other  works, 
does  not  understand  the  difference  between  response-dependent  objectivity 
(response-dependent,  in  Enoch’s  terms);  I  think  his  argument  that  response-dependent  theories 
that  do  not  allow  for  variability  of  correct  answers  are  equivalent  to  response-independent 
theories  is  accurate  and  allows  scope  for  understanding  the  important  differences.  Such 
important  differences  include,  crucially,  the  Kantian  approach  to  establishing  objectivity  by 
grounding  the  truth  of  answers  in  elements  of  the  subject  (see  §  0.4).  My  point  is  that  when  both 
response-dependent  and  response-independent  theories  are  asserting  models  of  moral 
objectivity,  the  difference  between  the  two  positions  is  subtle  enough  that  it  can  get  lost  in 
discussions  which  are  not  explicitly  comparing  response-dependent  and  response-independent 
theories  of  moral  objectivity. 
 
The  shmagency  problem  debate  is  an  indirect  comparison  of  response-dependent  and 
response-independent  theories  of  morality.  Or,  at  least,  elements  of  such  a  comparison 
underwrite  the  more  difficult  elements  of  the  debate.  In  §  0.5  I  explain  that  Enoch’s  argument 
against  constitutivism  is  that  deriving  normativity  from  elements  of  our  constitution  entails 
deriving  normativity  from  something  that  is  contingent  in  a  sense  that  precludes  it  from 
delivering  normativity  that  is  objective.  There  are  two  things  that  this  might  mean:  it  might  mean 
that  constitutivists  have  derived  normativity  from  contingent  elements  of  our  constitution,  or  it 
might  mean  that  there  are  only  contingent  elements  of  our  constitution.  In  either  case,  Enoch’s 
argument  entails  that  constitutivism  is  deriving  normativity  from  contingent  elements  of  our 
constitution,  but  in  the  latter  case  a  further  claim  is  made.  The  difference  between  these  two 
possible  meanings  is  crucial  to  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  I  develop  in  §  1.6, 
because  there  I  explain  that  the  Kantian  strategy  involves  utilising  transcendental  arguments 
that  establish  claims  as  objective  by  deriving  them  from  necessary  elements  of  what  we  provide 
to  the  construction  of  experiences.  As  I  develop  and  explain  in  §§  1.6,  2.6,  and  2.7,  particular 
elements  of  our  constitution  are  the  source  of  objectivity,  according  to  the  Kantian  tradition.  This 
is  significant  regarding  the  use  of  the  term  “objectivity”,  because  if  Enoch  is  claiming  that 
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constitutivists  fail  to  deliver  objective  normativity  because  they  derive  normativity  from 
contingent  elements  of  our  constitution,  he  is  making  a  different  argument  than  if  he  is  claiming 
that  our  constitution  only  has  contingent  elements.  The  former  is  an  argument  against  the 
constitutivist  approach  while  the  latter  is  an  argument  against  Kantian  epistemology  and 
metaphysics.  
 
I  do  not  think  Enoch  would  agree  with  me  that  an  argument  targeted  at  the  constitutivist 
approach  in  particular  requires  the  weaker  claim  that  constitutivism  utilises  contingent  elements 
of  our  constitution,  while  making  the  stronger  claim  that  all  elements  of  our  constitution  are 
contingent  requires  engaging  with  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  directly.  I  explain  in  §§  1.8 
and  2.7  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  critique  does  ultimately  amount  to  a  critique  of  the 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  although  he  presents  it  as  a  critique  of  the  constitutivist  approach 
as  such.  
 
In  this  thesis  I  will  use  the  term  “objectivity”  to  refer  to  the  necessity  of  the  claim  in  question:  a 
fact  is  objective  if  it  is  necessary  that  it  is  true.  By  using  the  term  in  this  way  I  intend  to  make  no 
assertion  regarding  whether  this  necessity  is  established  because  of  a  transcendental  argument 
based  on  some  element  of  what  the  subject  provides  to  the  creation  of  experience,  by  reference 
to  an  externally  extant  factual  entity,  or  any  other  method  of  establishing  the  necessity  of  a 
claim.  In  particular  contexts  it  may  be  the  case  that  the  objectivity  in  question  is  established  by 
one  of  these  positions  rather  than  the  other,  for  example  when  discussing  the  objectivity 
established  by  a  transcendental  argument,  but  in  those  cases  I  intend  it  to  be  the  context  rather 
than  the  mere  use  of  the  term  “objective”  that  establishes  that  particular  connotation.  By  using 
the  term  in  this  manner  I  hope  to  appeal  to  the  functional  sense  of  the  term  -  the  role  the  term 
plays  of  referring  to  the  truth  of  the  matter  in  particular  epistemic  and  metaphysical  contexts. 
This  is  the  sense  in  which  objectivity  is  the  same  for  response-dependent  and 




0.4  Objectivity  and  the  Kantian  tradition 
In  the  Kantian  tradition,  objectivity  is  derived  from  elements  of  what  the  subject  provides  to  their 
experience  of  the  world;  I  made  this  claim  in  §  0.3  to  explain  the  distinction  between  critiquing 
constitutivism  as  such  or  critiquing  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge.  In  §§  1.3,  1.6,  1.7,  2.2,  2.7, 
and  3.1  I  develop  this  claim  further  by  explaining  that  the  subject  provides  a  necessary  role  in 
the  Kantian  tradition  in  establishing  the  objectivity  of  factual  claims.  While  these  explanations 
are  provided  throughout  my  thesis,  they  utilise  one  particular  claim  made  by  Kantian  philosophy 
that  I  outline  here:  the  claim  that  understanding  the  world,  the  nature  of  knowledge,  and  our 
access  to  knowledge  of  all  kinds  is  response-dependent  in  the  sense  that  the  role  of  the  subject 
is  indispensable.  The  purpose  of  this  explanation  is  to  establish  that  the  claim  that  objectivity 
can  be  derived  from  particular  elements  of  a  subjects  constitution  is  a  foundational  claim  of  the 
Kantian  tradition  (at  least,  the  Kantian  tradition  as  it  is  utilised  by  Kantian  constitutivists).  
 
Immanuel  Kant  (1781-1787/1996)  argues  in  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  that  it  is  the  nature  of  the 
subject  that  allows  them  to  undertake  a  particular  type  of  examination  of  their  own 
consciousness  and  experiences  to  solve  metaphysical  and  epistemological  problems  (A92-98, 
B125-129,  B132-136).  This  examination  is  a  transcendental  apperception,  an  analysis  of  one’s 
own  consciousness  and  the  experiences  of  one’s  consciousness  according  to  the  laws  of 
reason  in  order  to  determine  what  the  solution  to  these  problems  must  be  given  the  nature  of 
one’s  consciousness  and  experiences.  This  type  of  transcendental  argument  is  possible 
because  of  the  guarantee  provided  by  those  laws  of  reason.  The  idea  is  that  we  can  utilise  our 
own  rational  faculties  to  determine  answers  to  metaphysical  and  epistemological  questions, 
such  as  what  knowledge  is  and  what  exists,  because  the  rules  that  govern  our  rational  faculties 
(the  rules  of  reason  or  logic)  are  uniquely  qualified  to  justify  claims  related  to  such  matters.  This 
approach  entails  that  it  is  what  the  subject  provides,  their  rational  faculties,  that  justifies  claims 
about  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  what  exists.  My  point  is  that  because  the  Kantian  approach 
to  solving  metaphysical  and  epistemological  problems  utilises  transcendental  apperception,  it 
places  the  constitution  of  the  subject  in  the  position  of  being  a  required  element  of  solving 
metaphysical  and  epistemological  problems,  rather  than  treating  all  elements  of  the  constitution 
of  the  subject  as  contingent.  
 
One  might  wonder  whether  this  description  of  the  role  of  our  rational  faculties  is  distinctly 
Kantian,  or  whether  non-Kantians  might  agree  that  the  rules  that  govern  our  rational  faculties 
are  uniquely  qualified  to  justify  claims  related  to  the  solutions  to  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  problems.  To  clarify,  my  exploration  of  the  Kantian  position  as  it  relates  to 
Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  shmagency  problem  does  not  demonstrate  that  non-Kantian 
positions  cannot  provide  similar  arguments.  While  this  thesis  makes  frequent  use  of  the  Kantian 
tradition  this  is  not  because  only  the  Kantian  tradition  is  capable  of  supporting  the  positions  I 
explore.  Rather,  I  engage  with  the  Kantian  tradition  because  it  informs  the  positions  of  Christine 
Korsgaard  and  David  Velleman  whose  work  I  focus  on  during  my  exploration  of  Kantian 
constitutivism,  the  shmagency  problem,  and  the  prospects  for  the  Kantian  constitutivist  position 
broadly  understood. 
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In  §§  0.3,  1.8,  and  2.7,  I  explain  that  the  role  of  the  constitution  of  the  subject  in  solving 
metaphysical  and  epistemological  problems  is  the  point  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem 
ultimately  targets,  rather  than  the  constitutivist  approach  as  such.  Explaining  what  the  Kantian 
means  when  they  claim  this  role  for  the  subject’s  constitution  allows  me  to  clarify  my  argument 
regarding  the  shmagency  problem.  This  clarification  requires  explaining  both  the  nature  of 
Kantian  response  dependance,  which  I  refer  to  throughout  this  thesis,  and  the  argument  that  I 
am  making  in  §§  1.8  and  2.7.  Explaining  the  Kantian  claim  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem 
targets  allows  me  to  explain  the  sense  in  which  both  Velleman  and  Enoch  are  correct  in  their 
claims  during  the  shmagency  problem  debate  (§  1.5),  develop  a  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  that  preserves  key  elements  of  Velleman’s  theory  (§§  1.6,  1.7,  and  1.8),  and  provide  a 
reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  in  defence  of  Korsgaard’s  Kantian  constitutivism  (§  2.7). 
Explaining  this  Kantian  claim  requires  explaining  both  the  role  of  the  subject  in  Kantian 
epistemology  and  metaphysics  and  how  this  relates  to  Kantian  constitutivism.  
 
According  to  the  Kantian  tradition,  and  as  utilised  by  Kantian  constitutivism,  the  epistemic  and 
metaphysical  role  of  the  subject  is  not  merely  that  they  are  the  one  who  knows  things  and 
accesses  the  world  (and  knowledge  about  the  world).  The  claim  is  that  they  are  the  one  who 
knows  things  about  the  world  and  because  of  the  role  they  play  in  the  process  that  allows  them 
to  have  knowledge.  Particular  elements  of  their  faculties  are  reliable  in  a  special  sense  that 
allows  these  faculties  to  be  used  to  determine  solutions  to  metaphysical  and  epistemological 
problems  (such  as  questions  about  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  how  we  access  it).  Notice  that 
Enoch’s  critique  that  constitutivism  derives  normativity  from  contingent  elements  of  our 
constitution  is  incompatible  with  this  approach  if  the  Kantian  is  claiming  that  those  elements  of 
our  faculties  that  are  reliable  in  this  special  way  are  the  same  elements  from  which  they  derive 
normativity  (this  point  is  developed  further  in  §§  1.7  and  2.7).  My  argument  that  Enoch’s  critique 
targets  this  point  is  not  claiming  that  Enoch’s  critique  of  the  role  of  the  subject  in  constitutivism 
entails  that  he  is  arguing  knowledge  is  possible  without  being  a  subject  of  some  kind  or  another. 
Enoch  may  believe  that  some  version  of  this  type  of  claim  is  true  (in  the  form  of  externally 
existent  factual  entities  which  constitute  knowledge  independently  of  any  interaction  with  them), 
but  that  is  not  relevant  to  my  analysis.  My  argument  is  that  Enoch’s  critique  of  the  role  of  the 
subject  in  constitutivism  entails  that  particular  elements  of  the  constitution  of  the  subject  cannot 
be  reliable  in  the  manner  required  to  be  able  to  derive  objective  metaphysical  (in  this  case, 
metaethical)  claims  from  them.  
 
Remember  that  I  am  not  intending  to  claim  that  the  Kantian  position  is  distinct  in  its  ability  to 
make  the  claims  required  to  solve  the  shmagency  problem  or  develop  a  constitutivist  position.  In 
§  1.6  and  throughout  §  2  I  explain  that  the  Kantian  tradition  provides  the  tools  required  to  solve 
the  shmagency  problem,  but  I  do  not  take  this  to  entail  that  this  would  not  be  possible  for 
competing  positions.  My  caution  in  limiting  my  claims  in  this  regard  is  not  shared  by  Kant 
(1781/1787/1996)  who  claims  that: 
“We  have  sufficiently  proved  in  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  that  everything  intuited  in 
space  or  time,  and  hence  all  objects  of  experience  possible  for  us,  are  nothing  but 
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appearances.  I.e.,  they  are  mere  presentations  that  -  in  the  way  in  which  they  are 
presented,  viz.,  as  extended  beings,  or  as  series  of  changes  -  have  no  existence  with  an 
intrinsic  basis,  i.e.,  outside  our  thoughts.  This  doctrinal  system  I  call  transcendental 
idealism .  The  realist  in  the  transcendental  meaning  of  this  term  turns  these  modifications 
of  our  sensibility  into  things  in  themselves.”  (A419  B519) 
Kant’s  point  is  that  his  theory  establishes  that  we  only  have  access  to  the  appearances 
generated  by  us  during  the  process  of  experience  creation.  This  establishes,  according  to  Kant, 
that  all  claims  are  dependent  on  these  appearances.  This  includes  the  solutions  to  metaphysical 
and  epistemological  problems,  which  must  be  solved  without  access  to  anything  beyond  these 
presentations  (including  what  is  provided  by  our  faculties  during  their  creation).  So,  in  the 
Kantian  tradition,  establishing  why  we  encounter  normativity  and  how  we  access  knowledge 
about  it  is  done  within  the  context  of  the  appearances  generated  by  us  during  the  process  of 
experience  creation. 
 
This  means  that,  for  the  Kantian  tradition,  solving  the  shmagency  problem  must  be  done  without 
appealing  to  externally  existent  normative  entities.  If  the  problem  cannot  be  solved  within  the 
context  of  this  restriction  then  the  shmagency  problem  would  have  succeeded  in  demonstrating 
that  Kantian  constitutivism  cannot  solve  it.  As  Kant  (1781/1787/1996)  explains: 
“[O]bjects  of  experience  are  never  given  in  themselves ,  but  are  given  only  in  experience 
and  do  not  exist  outside  it  at  all.  That  there  may  be  inhabitants  on  the  moon,  although  no 
human  being  has  ever  perceived  them,  must  indeed  be  conceded;  but  it  signifies  no 
more  than  that  in  the  possible  advance  of  experience  we  could  come  upon  them.  For 
anything  is  actual  that  stands  in  a  context  with  a  perception  according  to  laws  of 
empirical  progression.  Hence  those  inhabitants  are  actual  if  they  stand  in  an  empirical 
coherence  with  my  actual  consciousness,  although  they  are  not  therefore  actual  in 
themselves,  i.e.,  outside  this  advance  of  experience.”  (A493  B521) 
The  idea  is  that  we  must  deal  with  objects  of  experience  as  they  are  given  to  us  and  this  limits 
ourselves  to  dealing  with  them  as  objects  of  appearance  and  never  supposing  that  what  is  given 
amounts  to  a  thing  in  itself.  Kant  continues  this  explanation  by  arguing  that: 
“Nothing  is  actually  given  to  us  but  perception  and  the  empirical  advance  from  it  to  other 
possible  perceptions.  For  appearances,  as  mere  presentations,  are  in  themselves 
actually  only  in  perception;  perception,  in  fact,  is  nothing  but  the  actuality  of  an  empirical 
presentation,  i.e.,  appearance.  If  an  appearance  is  called  an  actual  thing  prior  to 
perception,  then  this  signifies  either  that  in  the  progression  of  experience  we  must  come 
upon  such  a  perception,  or  it  has  no  signification  at  all.  For  that  the  appearance  exists  in 
itself,  without  reference  to  our  senses  and  to  possible  experience,  could  indeed  be  said  if 
we  were  talking  about  a   thing  in  itself.  But  we  are  talking  merely  about  an  appearance  in 
space  and  time,  and  both  space  and  time  are  determinations  not  of  things  in  themselves 
but  only  of  our  sensibility.  Hence  what  is  in  space  and  time  (viz.,  appearances)  is  not 
something  in  itself;  rather,  appearances  are  mere  presentations,  which,  if  they  are  not 
given  in  us  (in  perception),  are  not  encountered  anywhere  at  all.”  (A493-494  B521-522) 
Kant  is  arguing  here  that  we  do  not  encounter  entities  as  they  exist  externally  from  ourselves 
and  we  only  encounter  what  we  are  given.  For  this  reason,  according  to  Kant’s  argument,  we 
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could  never  deal  in  externally  existent  normative  entities  because  the  truth  of  such  entities 
would  depend  on  those  entities  as  they  actually  existed  externally  from  ourselves  and  not 
merely  upon  what  we  are  given. 
 
So,  in  the  context  of  the  Kantian  tradition  any  position  which  supposes  that  we  can  solve 
problems  of  any  kind,  including  metaphysical  and  epistemological  problems,  by  utilising  things 
as  they  exist  externally  from  ourselves  cannot  succeed.  Providing  solutions  that  are  not  derived 
from  either  what  we  provide,  to  the  process  of  experience  creation,  or  what  we  are  given  means 
providing  a  solution  that  assumes  access  we  cannot  have.  Notice  that  in  the  event  that  a 
problem  cannot  be  solved  within  the  context  of  this  restriction,  this  failure  would  not  demonstrate 
that  the  shmagency  problem  cannot  be  solved,  merely  that  it  cannot  be  solved  in  the  confines  of 
the  Kantian  tradition. 
 
This  does  not  entail  that  the  Kantian  tradition  supposes  we  solve  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  problems  with  only  what  we  provide  to  the  process  of  experience  creation.  For 
Kant,  the  idea  that  we  are  given  something  during  this  process,  from  an  external  world  that  is 
not  directly  accessible,  is  important.  Kant  (1782/1787/1996)  argues: 
“Our  power  of  sensible  intuition  is,  in  fact,  only  a  receptivity,  i.e.,  a  capacity  to  be  affected 
in  a  certain  way  with  presentations.  The  relation  of  these  presentations  to  one  another  is 
a  pure  intuition  of  space  and  time  (which  are  nothing  but  forms  of  our  sensibility);  and 
insofar  as  these  presentations  are  connected  and  determinable  in  this  relation  (i.e.,  in 
space  and  time)  according  to  laws  of  the  unity  of  experience,  they  are  called  objects .” 
(A494  B522) 
Kant’s  point  is  that  while  we  only  have  access  to  the  appearances  of  objects,  these 
appearances  contain,  as  representations,  elements  of  both  what  we  have  provided  to  the 
process  of  experience  creation  and  what  we  have  received  externally  from  ourselves.  My  point 
in  explaining  this  is  to  clarify  that  Kant  is  not  claiming  that  only  the  subject  and  what  it  provides 
exists.  There  is  something  external,  we  just  do  not  have  access  to  it  beyond  the  awareness  that 
what  we  receive  comes  from  somewhere.  Kant  continues  to  explain  that: 
“We  may,  however,  call  the  merely  intelligible  cause  of  appearances  such  as  the 
transcendental  object,  just  so  that  we  have  something  that  corresponds  to  sensibility, 
which  is  a  receptivity.  To  this  transcendental  object  we  may  attribute  the  whole  range 
and  coherence  of  our  possible  perceptions,  and  about  it  we  may  say  that  it  is  given  in 
itself  prior  to  all  experience.  But  appearances  are  given,  in  conformity  with  the 
transcendental  object,  not  in  themselves  but  only  in  this  experience.  For  they  are  mere 
presentations,  which  signify  an  actual  object  only  as  perceptions:  they  do  so,  viz.,  if  such 
a  perception  coheres  with  all  others  according  to  the  rules  of  the  unity  of  experience.” 
(A495  B523) 
Kant’s  argument  is  that  what  we  are  given  establishes  that  there  is  something  external  from 
ourselves  providing  what  we  are  given.  However,  this  does  not  entail  any  access  to  the  thing  in 
itself  that  is  providing  what  we  are  given  because  what  we  have  access  to  is  limited  to  what  is  in 
conformity  with  the  combination  of  what  we  have  provided  with  what  we  are  given.  
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In  the  context  of  the  Kantian  tradition  we  rely  upon  both  what  we  are  given  and  what  we  provide 
to  the  process  of  experience  creation.  In  this  context  we  cannot  appeal  to  the  objects  in 
themselves  or  completely  exclude  the  process  of  experience  creation  from  our  understanding . 3
This  is  how  Kant  situates  himself  in  contrast  to  rival  positions  that  might  suppose  access  to 
objects  as  they  exist  in  themselves  or  that  stipulate  we  alone  provide  everything  with  no  input 
from  an  external  world.  To  clarify,  I  do  not  intend  to  argue  here  or  elsewhere  in  this  thesis  that 
Kant’s  position  provides  a  solution  to  epistemic  and  metaphysical  positions  that  might  not  be 
emulated  by  rival  positions.  Rather,  I  intend  to  present,  explore,  and  explain  the  implications  of 
the  Kantian  tradition  in  the  context  of  Kantian  constitutivism. 
 
Kant  argues  that  the  subject  provides  the  rules  of  understanding  during  the  process  of 
experience  creation.  His  point  is  that  our  faculty  of  reason  is  a  fundamental  part  of  what  makes 
us  who  and  what  we  are.  This  point  is  developed  by  Kant  when  he  argues  that  discovering  the 
nature  of  knowledge  and  our  access  to  the  world  is  fundamentally  an  activity  of  introspection: 
“And  it  is  a  call  to  reason  to  take  on  once  again  the  most  difficult  of  all  its  tasks  — -viz., 
that  of  self-cognition-  and  to  set  up  a  tribunal  that  will  make  reason  secure  in  its  rightful 
claims  and  will  dismiss  all  baseless  pretensions,  not  by  fiat  but  in  accordance  with 
reason’s  eternal  and  immutable  laws.  This  tribunal  is  none  other  than  the  critique  of 
reason  itself:  the  critique  of  pure  reason .”  (Kant,  1781/1996,  Axi) 
The  subject  undertaking  this  activity  of  introspection  is  capable  of  examining  its  own  faculties 
because  it  is  a  rational  being.  The  subject’s  ability  to  use  reason  provides  the  possibility  of 
answering  questions  about  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  our  access  to  the  world.  As  Kant 
outlines  from  the  beginning  of  his  project,  reason  is  capable  of  such  an  act  of  apperception 
because  its  laws  are  eternal  and  immutable.  It  is  the  absolute,  and  in  this  sense  objective, 
nature  of  the  laws  of  logic  which  enables  the  rational  being  to  utilise  them  as  tools  of  reliable 
measurement  even  when  (carefully)  turned  upon  themselves.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  critique 
of  pure  reason  is  both  an  activity  of  introspection  and,  through  this  introspection,  an  exploration 
of  these  immutable  laws: 
“By  critique  of  pure  reason,  however,  I  do  not  mean  a  critique  of  books  and  systems,  but 
I  mean  the  critique  of  our  power  of  reason  as  such,  in  regard  to  all  cognitions  after  which 
reason  may  strive  independently  of  all  experience .  Hence  I  mean  by  it  the  decision  as  to 
whether  a  metaphysic  as  such  is  possible  or  impossible,  and  the  determination  of  its 
sources  as  well  as  its  range  and  bounds  — -  all  on  the  basis  of  principles.”  (Kant, 
1781/1996,  Axii) 
To  explore  reason  is  to  explore  the  limits  of  these  immutable  laws  and  to  explore  the  nature  of 
the  rules  of  understanding.  The  rules  of  understanding  are,  for  Kant,  elements  of  ourselves 
which  can  be  uncovered  by  introspection  when  such  apperception  is  undertaken  in  accordance 
3  Notice  that  this  makes  Kant’s  position  incompatible  with  transcendental  realism  and  subjective  idealism 
which  will,  respectively,  either  require  access  to  the  things  in  themselves  or  fail  to  account  for  what  is 
beyond  ourselves  that  is  providing  what  we  are  given.  To  clarify,  my  explanation  of  where  Kant  situates 
himself  in  relation  to  these  rival  positions  is  provided  merely  to  explain  his  position  but  not  to  endorse  it  or 
provide  a  full  exploration  of  these  rival  positions  (such  an  exploration  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  my 
thesis. 
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with  the  immutable  and  eternal  laws,  which  is  a  way  of  saying  that  reason  can  be  used  to 
evaluate  itself  if  it  is  used  appropriately.  In  this  sense,  elements  of  our  own  constitution  can  be 
used  to  reveal  the  nature  of  reason  itself  and  in  doing  so  answer  epistemic  and  metaphysical 
questions.  By  elements  of  ourselves,  as  he  explains  in  his  transcendental  aesthetic,  Kant 
means  that  human  beings  are  defined  as  rational  beings  because  they  have  access  to  these 
immutable  and  eternal  laws;  which  is  to  say,  the  defining  feature  of  a  rational  being  is  to  have 
this  type  of  access  to  logic  (Kant,  1781,  A19-49,  B33-73).  This  is  how  his  project   establishes 
the  mind's  ability  to  transcend  the  apparent  limits  of  our  experience  of  the  world  by  deriving  the 
nature  of  knowledge  and  how  we  access  it  from  what  we  provide  to  the  creation  of  those 
experiences.  
 
The  deduction  from  what  our  faculty  of  reason  provides  to  the  creation  of  our  experiences  is 
possible  because  of  the  necessary  nature  of  the  rules  of  understanding.  The  difficulty  of  such  a 
task  is  directly  or  indirectly  the  focus  of  Kant’s  introspections  throughout  the  Critique .  He  argues 
that  we  can  deduce  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  our  access  to  the  world  because  the  eternal 
and  immutable  laws  that  our  faculty  of  reason  provides  are  the  necessary  laws  by  which  our 
rational  cognition  must  operate  (it  is,  in  fact,  the  government  of  these  laws  which  identifies 
rational  cognition  as  rational ).  According  to  Kant  it  is  these  laws  that  unify  our  consciousness, 
which  leads  him  to  argue  that  only  the  unity  of  consciousness  is  objectively  valid  (1787/1996, 
B141).  This  entails  that  all  other  objective  claims  are  derived  from  the  objective  validity  of 
consciousness.  Another  way  of  explaining  this  point  is  that  everything  a  subject  knows  must  rely 
on  the  unity  of  their  consciousness  because  it  is  the  rules  of  reason  that  facilitates  that 
knowledge.  This  is  the  manner  in  which  Kant  establishes  the  necessity,  and  therefore  reliability, 
of  the  rules  of  reason  that  a  subject’s  faculty  of  reason  provides  to  its  experience  of  the  world. 
Notice  that  this  does  not  entail  the  claim  that  one’s  faculties  are  necessarily  reliable:  it  entails 
that  one’s  faculty  of  reason  is  necessarily  reliable  provided  it  is  appropriately  utilised ,  which 
means  utilised  according  to  the  same  rules  that  it  provides  (the  laws  of  reason).  
 
Kant’s  point  is  that  the  elements  of  what  the  subject  provides  to  the  creation  of  their  experience 
of  the  world  are  reliable,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  necessary,  because  the  subject  provides  the 
laws  of  reason.  Kant  explains  this  claim  by  arguing  that  we  know  ourselves  by  identifying  what 
we  provide  to  the  creation  of  our  experience  of  the  world: 
“Our  cognition  arises  from  two  basic  sources  of  the  mind.  The  first  is  [our  ability]  to 
receive  presentations  (and  is  our  receptivity  for  impressions);  the  second  is  our  ability  to 
cognize  an  object  through  these  presentations  (and  is  the  spontaneity  of  concepts). 
Through  receptivity  an  object  is  given  to  us,  through  spontaneity  an  object  is  thought  in 
relation  to  that  [given]  presentation  (which  [otherwise]  is  a  mere  determination  of  the 
mind).  Intuition  and  concepts  therefore,  constitute  the  elements  of  our  cognition.”  (Kant, 
1781/1787/1996,  A74  B50) 
Kant’s  point  is  that  we  identify  ourselves  with  the  faculty  that  undertakes  the  categorisation  of 
the  world  and,  by  undertaking  this  categorisation,  understand  the  world  that  we  experience.  We 
are,  in  this  sense,  our  ability  to  understand  the  world.  He  then  goes  on  to  support  this  argument 
by  explaining  that  the  rules  of  reason,  in  the  form  of  the  categories,  are  the  only  manner  by 
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which  our  consciousness  could  be  unified  (1781/1996,  B146).  Our  consciousness  could  only  be 
unified  by  the  rules  of  reason  because  these  rules  are  necessary,  which  means  that  any  attempt 
at  unification  that  did  not  adhere  to  the  rules  of  reason  would  be  a  failed  unity  (a  subject  not 
adhering  to  the  rules  of  reason  would  not  be  coherent,  because  failing  to  adhere  to  the  rules  of 
reason  is  to  be  incoherent). 
 
It  is  from  this  same  faculty  of  understanding  that  Kantian  constitutivists  derive  normativity.  As  I 
explain  in  §§  1.2,  2.1,  and  3.3,  Kantian  constitutivism  derives  normativity  from  our  ability  to 
utilise  our  faculty  of  reason  to  decide  what  to  do.  In  §§  3.1,  3.3,  3.7  and  3.8,  I  explain  that 
Kantian  constitutivism  simultaneously  derives  normativity  from  our  ability  to  understand  the 
world  (our  faculty  of  reason)  and  our  autonomy  (our  freedom  and  the  free  will).  The  explanation 
that  I  develop  in  these  sections  is  that  these  are  the  same  faculty  in  the  sense  that  our 
autonomy  (and,  therefore,  our  freedom  and  the  free  will)  is  our  ability  to  utilise  our  faculty  of 
reason  to  reflect  upon  a  decision  and  decide  what  to  do.  My  point  is  that  because  our  autonomy 
is  derived  from  our  faculty  of  reason,  deriving  normativity  from  our  autonomy  entails  deriving 
normativity  from  our  faculty  of  reason.  Our  autonomy  is  derived  from  our  faculty  of  reason  in  the 
sense  that  our  autonomy  is  our  faculty  of  reason  in  action.  Practical  reason  is  the  application  of 
our  faculty  of  reason  to  the  problem  of  deciding  what  to  do  and,  therefore,  practical  reason  is 
also  our  autonomy  (our  ability  to  control  ourselves)  in  action.    So,  the  relationship  between 4
Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  strategy  of  deriving  epistemic  and  metaphysical  claims 
from  the  nature  of  the  subject  is  that  both  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  strategy  derive 
their  claims  from  the  same  necessary  element  of  the  subject  (I  discuss  this  claim  further  in  § 
3.3).  This  is  the  relationship  between  objectivity  and  the  Kantian  tradition. 
 
Karl  Schafer  (2019)  puts  forward  a  similar  argument  about  the  relationship  between  Kantian  and 
constitutivism  when  he  argues  that  Kant  is  a  constitutivist  because  he  is  “convinced  that  human 
insight  bottoms  out  in  a  set  of  basic  faculties  —  faculties  which  cannot  be  explained  in  more 
fundamental  terms,  but  which  nonetheless  provide  a  non-arbitrary  basis  for  further  explanations” 
(p.  4).    Schafer  explains  that  Kant’s  use  of  our  basic  rational  faculties  as  the  foundations  for  his 5
system  of  philosophy,  in  particular  his  foundational  epistemic  and  metaphysical  claims  about  the 
nature  of  knowledge  and  existence,  commits  him  to  a  form  of  capacities-first  constitutivism 
when  that  foundational  approach  is  applied  to  normativity;  he  summarises  this  form  of 
capacities-first  constitutivism  as  “Reason-First  Constitutivism”,  which  means:  “The  most 
fundamental  norms  that  apply  to  us  are  grounded  in  our  nature  as  rational  beings  or  creatures 
with  the  capacity  of  reason. ”  (p.  11).  By  “capacities-first  constitutivism”  he  means  that  our 
capacities  must  be  the  grounding  of  all  epistemic  and  metaphysical  claims.  Schafer’s  point  is 
the  same  as  my  own,  which  is  that  Kant’s  derivation  of  epistemic  and  metaphysical  claims  from 
some  foundational  element  of  our  faculties  results  in  the  same  foundations  being  used  for  both 
Kant’s  epistemic  and  metaphysical  claims  and  the  Kantian  constitutivist  claims  about  the  source 
(or  foundation)  of  normativity.  Crucially,  for  the  scope  and  focus  of  this  thesis,  this  common 
4  See  §  3  (in  particular  §§  3.1,  3.3,  3.7  and  3.8)  for  further  explanation. 
5  Schafer  explains  this  further  on  pp.  2,  4-6,  and  9-10. 
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foundation  is  the  key  relationship  between  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  broader  Kantian 
tradition  (this  point  is  expanded  upon  further  in  §  3.3).  
27 
0.5  The  shmagency  problem 
David  Enoch  (2006)  posed  the  shmagency  problem  as  a  critique  of  the  constitutivist  approach 
in  “Agency,  Shmagency:  Why  Normativity  Won’t  Come  From  What  Is  Constitutive  of  Action”. 
Enoch  argues  that  constitutivism  cannot  ground  normativity  because  there  is  at  least  one 
normative  question  that  constitutivism  cannot  answer  (p.  187).  The  critique  is  demonstrated  by 
the  shmagency  problem  question:  ‘Why  be  an  agent?’.  To  answer  this  question  the  agent  must 
purportedly  appeal  to  something  beyond  what  is  constitutive  of  its  own  agency,  but  making  such 
an  appeal  proves  that  what  is  constitutive  of  their  agency  cannot  be  the  grounding  for  all 
normativitive  facts:  if  there  is  a  reason  to  be  an  agent,  it  will  be  something  other  than  the  fact 
that  one  is  already  an  agent.  
 
Constitutivism  attempts  to  ground  normativity  in  what  is  constitutive  of  action  or  agency.  This  is 
accomplished  by  arguing  that  what  one  ought  to  do  is  determined  by  what  is  constitutive  of 
one’s  agency.   According  to  the  constitutivist  approach,  for  agents  to  understand  the  nature  of 6
normative  facts,  they  must  first  understand  what  it  is  to  be  an  agent  so  that  they  can  understand 
what  functions  are  constitutive  of  their  own  nature.  In  §0.2  I  provide  an  explanation  of  the 
constitutivist  position;  as  a  reminder  consider  this  excerpt  where  Enoch  (2006)  explains 
constitutivism  as  the  attempt  to  derive  the  normativity  that  governs  us  from  those  elements  of 
our  constitution  that  make  us  the  type  of  thing  that  we  are: 
“The  intuitive  idea  can  be  put,  I  think,  rather  simply:  In  order  to  know  what  it  takes  for  a 
car  to  be  a  good  car,  we  need  to  understand  what  cars  are,  what  their  constitutive 
functions  are,  and  so  on.  A  good  car  is  just  a  car  that  is  good  as  a  car ,  good,  that  is,  in 
measuring  up  to  the  standards  a  commitment  to  which  is  built  into  the  very  classification 
of  an  object  as  a  car.  Analogously,  then,  perhaps  in  order  to  know  which  actions  are 
good  (or  right,  or  reason  supported,  or  rational,  or  whatever),  all  we  need  is  a  better 
understanding  of  what  actions  are,  or  perhaps  of  what  it  is  to  be  an  agent,  someone  who 
performs  actions.  Perhaps  the  normative  standards  relevant  for  actions  will  fall  out  of  an 
understanding  of  what  is  constitutive  of  action  just  as  the  normative  standards  relevant 
for  cars  fall  out  of  an  understanding  of  what  is  constitutive  of  cars.”  (p.  170).  
If  this  approach  is  successful,  understanding  what  is  constitutive  of   agency  would  both  explain 
the  source  of  normativity  and  how  we  are  to  derive  normative  content  from  that  source. 
 
The  purpose  of  the  shmagency  problem  is  to  demonstrate  that  constitutivism,  on  its  own,  does 
not  provide  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  source  of  normativity.  It  accomplishes  this  by  showing 
that  constitutivism  must  refer  to  a  source  of  normativity  beyond  what  our  constitution  as  agents 
6  An  explanation  of  Velleman’s  constitutivism  follows  later.  For  further  explanation  and  examinations  of  the 
constitutivist  approach  see:  Kathryn  Lindeman’s  (2017)  “Constitutivism  Without  Normative  Thresholds”  in 
which  she  explains  the  relationship  between  metaphysical  kinds  and  the  constitutivist  grounding  of 
normativity,  Christoph  Hanisch’s  (2016)  “Constitutivism  and  Inescapability:  A  Diagnosis”  in  which  he 
explains  the  constitutivist  maneuver  as  sharing  a  two-level  structure  in  that  appeals  to  an  identifiable 
phenomenon  in  the  experiences  of  an  agent  and  then  grounds  that  phenomenon  in  prescriptive 
propositions  that  relate  to  inescapable  functions  of  the  agent  (pp.  1156-1157),  and  Michael  Smith’s  (2015) 
“The  Magic  of  Constitutivism”  in  which  he  argues  that  normatitivity  must  be  grounded  in  what  is 
constitutive  of  ideal  agents  (pp.  193-194).  
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can  provide  to  answer  at  least  some  questions.  The  extent  of  this  problem  is  summarised  by 
Bertea  (2013)  in  “Constitutivism  and  Normativity:  a  Qualified  Defence”  where  he  explains  that: 
“There  is  nothing  about  constitutivism  that  can  demonstrate  why  we  ought  to  be  agents. 
But,  insofar  as  we  have  no  special  normative  reason  to  be  agents,  the  standards 
constitutive  of  agency  ultimately  fail  to  provide  us  with  a  normative  standpoint. 
Constitutive  standards,  thus,  prove  to  be  by  themselves  unable  to  issue  normative 
requirements,  namely,  requirements  we  ought  to  follow  on  the  basis  of  their  being 
justified  by  virtue  of  agency  itself.”  (p.  84) 
The  nature  of  the  problem  is  such  that  the  inability  to  answer  the  shmagency  problem  question 
undermines  the  ability  of  a  constitutivist  approach  to  answer  any  normative  question.  This  is 
because  the  reasons  we  have  to  be  an  agent  underwrite  whatever  normativity  agency  itself 
provides.  
 
To  explain  further,  if  the  constitutivist  tells  us  that  being  an  agent  provides  us  with  a  reason  to 
hold  a  particular  belief  or  take  a  particular  course  of  action  then  we  will  reply  that  we  have  not 
yet  been  provided  the  full  explanation  of  why  we  ought  to  hold  that  particular  belief  or  take  that 
particular  course  of  action.  We  might  provide  this  reply  because  the  constitutivist’s  explanation 
is  not  yet  finished,  they  must  still  account  for  why  we  ought  to  do  what  an  agent  ought  to  do. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  it  could  not  be  the  case  that  agents  ought  to  do  exactly  what  constitutivists 
assert:  rather,  the  problem  is  that  the  reason  we  ought  to  do  what  agents  ought  to  do  must  be 
because  we  have  a  reason  to  be  an  agent.  As  Enoch  (2006)  explains  the  problem  in  “Agency, 
Shmagency:  Why  Normativity  Won’t  Come  from  What  Is  Constitutive  of  Action”: 
“Perhaps  I  cannot  be  classified  as  an  agent  without  aiming  to  constitute  myself.  But  why 
should  I  be  an  agent?  Perhaps  I  can’t  act  without  aiming  at  self-constitution,  but  why 
should  I  act?  If  your  reasoning  [Korsgaard,  and  constitutivists  in  general]  works,  this  just 
shows  that  I  don’t  care  about  agency  and  action.  I  am  perfectly  happy  being  a  shmagent 
-  a  non  agent  who  is  very  similar  to  agents  but  who  lacks  the  aim  (constitutive  of  agency 
but  not  of  shmagency)  of  self-constitution.  I  am  perfectly  happy  performing  shmactions  - 
nonaction  events  that  are  very  similar  to  actions  but  that  lack  the  aim  (constitutive  of 
actions  but  not  of  shmactions)  of  self  constitution.”  (p.  179) 
The  constitutivist  appears  to  have  nothing  to  say  in  response  to  such  a  position  because  their 
argument,  that  normativity  is  found  in  what  is  constitutive  of  agency,  flatly  cannot  extend  to  this 
position.  The  position  of  questioning  the  normativity  of  agency  itself  (‘why  be  an  agent,  rather 
than  a  shmagent’)  is  fundamentally  beyond  the  scope  of  constitutivism  because  it  is  precisely 
the  dictates  sources  in  agency  which  are  in  question;  and  so  cannot  be  used  to  solve  the 
problem  yet  are  all  that  constitutivism  can  provide.  As  Enoch  (2006)  summarises  the  situation 
the  shmagency  problem  puts  the  constitutivist  in: 
“Notice  that  the  problem  is  not  that  action  does  not  have  a  constitutive  aim,  or  that  there 
are  no  motives  and  capacities  constitutive  of  agency.  Indeed,  I  am  here  granting  these 
claims  for  the  sake  of  argument.  Nor  is  the  problem  that  such  constitutive  aims,  motives, 
and  capacities  are  philosophically  uninteresting.  For  all  I  am  about  to  say,  they  may  be 
able  to  explain  much  that  is  philosophically  important  as  well  as  interesting.  The  problem 
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is  just  that  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  constitutivist  strategy  can  serve  to  ground  normativity 
or  to  solve  the  metanormative  problems  it  was  supposed  to  solve.”  (p.  180) 
The  problem  posed  by  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  that  rules  constitutive  of  particular 
activities  (such  as  being  an  agent)  cannot  prescribe  whether  you  ought  to  undertake  that 
activity. 
 
Rawls  (1955)  presents  the  explanation  of  a  similar  problem  in  “Two  concepts  of  rules”: 
“This  point  is  illustrated  by  the  behavior  expected  of  a  player  in  games.  If  one  wants  to 
play  a  game,  one  doesn't  treat  the  rules  of  the  game  as  guides  as  to  what  is  best  in 
particular  cases.  In  a  game  of  baseball  if  a  batter  were  to  ask  "Can  I  have  four  strikes?" 
it  would  be  assumed  that  he  was  asking  what  the  rule  was;  and  if,  when  told  what  the 
rule  was,  he  were  to  say  that  he  meant  that  on  this  occasion  he  thought  it  would  be  best 
on  the  whole  for  him  to  have  four  strikes  rather  than  three,  this  would  be  most  kindly 
taken  as  a  joke.  One  might  contend  that  baseball  would  be  a  better  game  if  four  strikes 
were  allowed  instead  of  three;  but  one  cannot  picture  the  rules  as  guides  to  what  is  best 
on  the  whole  in  particular  cases,  and  question  their  applicability  to  particular  cases  as 
particular  cases.”  (p.  26) 
The  problem  Rawls  identifies  is  that  there  is  a  gap  between  rules  which  are  regulative  and  rules 
which  are  constitutive.  Rules  which  are  regulative  (describe  what  you  ought  to  do)  are  subject  to 
further  normative  questions  whenever  they  are  deployed.  Which  is  to  say,  when  you  put  forward 
an  ought  statement  there  is  a  further  story  to  give  in  terms  of  other  normative  claims.  Rawls 
does  not  relate  this  problem  to  constitutivism  (his  work  predates  constitutivism  as  such),  but  it  is 
relevant  to  the  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  because  the  constitutivist  is  arguing  that  regulative 
rules  ultimately  rest  on  a  constitutive  rule  or  a  set  of  constitutive  rules  (  they  argue  that  the  rules 
constitutive  of  agency  or  action  are  the  source  of  normativity).  Deriving  the  regulative  from  the 
constitutive  has  presented  the  constitutivist  with  a  particular  problem:  the  shmagency  problem. 
Constitutive  rules  are  treated  as  authoritative  in  a  particular  context,  such  as  within  the  context 
of  the  game  that  they  constitute,  and  the  shmagency  problem  attempts  to  demonstrate  that 
deriving  rules  to  regulate  our  lives  from  our  constitution  can  only  be  justified  if  we  are  provided  a 
reason  to  endorse  our  constitution.  Just  like  one  only  has  a  reason  to  obey  the  rules  that  are 
constitutive  of  baseball  if  one  first  has  a  reason  to  play  baseball,  Enoch  argues  that  one  only 
has  a  reason  to  obey  the  rules  that  are  constitutive  of  agency  or  action  if  one  first  has  a  reason 
to  be  an  agent  or  act.  This,  according  to  Enoch,  demonstrates  that  the  reason  to  endorse 
agency  or  action  (and  therefore  the  rules  that  follow  from  agency  or  action)  is  contingent  on 
whatever  reason  we  have  to  give  that  endorsement. 
 
One  might  think  that  there  are  two  distinct  problems  being  posed  by  Enoch’s  shmagency 
problem:  that  one’s  reason  to  endorse  agency  must  involve  an  appeal  to  something  beyond 
what  the  subject  provides  (something  external)  and  that  the  normativity  entailed  by  our 
constitution  is  as  contingent  as  the  nature  of  agency.  The  difference  between  these  two 
problems  is  that  the  former  makes  a  claim  about  what  normativity  must  be  (something  beyond 
the  subject)  while  the  latter  makes  a  claim  about  the  shortcomings  of  constitutivism.  This 
understanding  of  the  shmagency  problem  might  arise  because  the  shmagency  problem  can  be 
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characterised  as  arguing  that  any  reason  we  have  to  be  an  agent  will  be  something  other  than 
that  fact  that  we  are  already  agents.  This  might  lead  one  to  assume  that  the  shmagency 
problem  relies  upon  an  appeal  to  normativity  that  is  beyond  whatever  can  be  provided  by 
subjects  and,  therefore,  upon  something  external  to  subjects.  To  avoid  confusion  I  want  to  clarify 
that  the  shmagency  problem  does  not  require  that  the  objectivity  of  normativity  involves  an 
appeal  beyond  the  subject.  Enoch  may  well  believe  that  this  is  the  case  and,  perhaps,  his 
posing  of  the  shmagency  problem  is  motivated  by  such  a  position.  However,  the  shmagency 
problem  as  such  is  not  an  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  normativity  must  involve  an  appeal  to 
something  external  from  what  subjects  provide .  Rather,  the  shmagency  problem  is  an  attempt 7
to  demonstrate  that  constitutivism  cannot  provide  objective  normativity:  the  claim  about  what 
can  do  so  is  not  required  for  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  argument  (the  shmagency  problem 
only  seeks  to  demonstrate  that  constitutivism  cannot  do  so). 
 
Enoch  argues  that  the  constitutivist  approach  to  grounding  normativity  in  what  is  constitutive  of 
agency  cannot  be  successful  because  the  nature  of  agency  is  contingent.  He  argues  that  the 
possibility  (regardless  of  whether  it  is  hypothetically  or  actually  possible)  of  the  constitution  of 
one  agent  being  different  from  another  entails  that  normativity  derived  from  the  constitution 
agency  could  also  vary.  His  point  is  that  if  my  constitution,  as  an  agent,  is  contingent  in  the 
sense  that  it  could  have  been,  or  could  be,  other  than  it  is  then  any  normativity  I  derive  from  that 
constitution  will  be  contingent  too:  if  normativity  comes  from  agency,  then  normativity  is  as 
contingent  as  the  nature  of  agency.  Another  way  to  explain  this  point  is  that  the  shmagency 
problem  critique  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  agents  can  ask  normative  questions  about  their 
own  constitution  which  cannot  be  answered  with  reference  to  that  constitution.  In  this  way, 
Enoch  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  even  if  the  constitutivist  approach  grounds  answers  for  the 
majority  of  normative  questions,  it  cannot  provide  an  objective  answer  to  the  question  ‘Why  be 
an  agent?’,  because  the  answers  provided  by  constitutivism  assume  agency.  So,  any 
constitutivist  answer  to  questions  about  how  we  are  constituted  would  be  merely  assuming  the 
answer  rather  than  providing  an  appropriate  grounding  for  the  answer.  While  it  may  not  be  the 
case  that  any  one  of  us  could,  in  fact,  cease  being  an  agent,  we  can  ask  whether  we  ought  to 
be  an  agent,  and  the  hypothetical  case  of  a  subject  who  is  not  an  agent,  a  shmagent, 
demonstrates  that  there  is  at  least  one  normative  question  to  which  agency  itself  cannot  provide 
an  answer  (‘Why  be  an  agent?’).  Enoch  points  out  that  it  follows  from  constitutivism  that 
differently  constituted  subjects  could  give  different  answers  to  normative  questions  because 
they  are  differently  constituted .  Once  we  have  imagined  such  a  variation  of  constitution  between 
subjects,  we  can  consider  whether  we  ought  to  be  differently  constituted  ourselves,  and  we 
cannot  find  the  answer  to  that  question  in  what  is  constitutive  of  ourselves.  8
7  Enoch  (2011b)  does  provide  an  argument  for  this  position  in  “Taking  Morality  Seriously:  A  Defence  of 
Robust  Realism”,  but  this  a  project  in  its  own  right  and  should  not  be  conflated  with  the  shmagency 
problem. 
8  Allan  Gibbard  (1999)  poses  a  similar  criticism  of  constitutivism  in  “Morality  as  Consistency  in  Living: 
Korsgaard's  Kantian  Lectures”  targeted  at  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  where  he  argues  that  her  theory 
forgoes  objectivity  by  deriving  normativity  from  foundations  that  do  not  entail  sensible  or  decent  normative 
prescriptions  (p.  159).  He  argues  that  valuing  oneself  in  the  manner  Korsgaard  envisions  might  entail 
valuing  one’s  own  reasons  but  that  it  does  not  entail  valuing  the  reasons  of  other  agents  because  there  is 
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The  shmagency  problem  leverages  the  distinction  between  non-normative  necessity  and 
normative  necessity  to  demonstrate  that  constitutivism  cannot  ground  all  normativity  even  if 
agency  is  necessary.  An  agent  may  ask  normative  questions  about  their  own  agency  regardless 
of  whether  agency  is  necessary  or  not.   The  constitutivist  approach  derives  normativity  from 9
agency  and  so,  as  the  shmagency  problem  demonstrates,  the  normativity  that  constitutivism 
derives  is  as  contingent  as  agency:  hence,  the  shmagency  problem  is  derived  from  the 
contingency  of  our  agency.  So,  a  constitutivist  might  reply  that  one  is  necessarily  an  agent  and 
therefore  questions  which  entertain  alternative  possibilities  are  irrelevant.  If  the  contingency  of 
agency  entails  the  shmagency  problem,  then  the  solution  might  be,  as  some  constitutivists  have 
hoped,  to  simply  point  out  that  agency  is  not  in  fact  contingent:  rather,  agency  is  inescapable.  A 
hope  which,  as  I  will  explain  later,  can  be  realised  by  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  that  I  present  §  1,6.  This  inescapability  response  to  the  shmagency  problem  is 
anticipated  by  Enoch  (2006)  (pp.  187-191)  and  a  summary  of  why  it  persists  despite  this  is 
given  by  Luca  Ferrero  (2009)  in  “Constitutivism  and  the  Inescapability  of  Agency''  who  explains 
why  the  inescapability  of  agency  might  be  considered  a  special  case  which  does  not  allow  for 
the  consideration  of  hypothetical  alternatives  (pp.  308-312).  
 
Enoch  (2006)  argues  that  normative  necessity  cannot  be  established  on  the  grounds  of 
non-normative  necessity  (pp.  187-191).  This  did  not  stop  replies  to  the  shmagency  problem 
from  putting  forward  this  line  of  argument.  These  replies  establish  the  normative  necessity  of 
agency,  on  the  basis  of  the  non-normative  necessity  of  agency,  by  positing  some  relationship 
between  agency  and  normativity.  Velleman’s  reply,  given  later  in  this  paper,  is  one  example  of 
this  approach.  The  normative  necessity  of  agency  is  established  in  this  manner  by  arguing  that 
it  is  not  problematic  for  normativity  to  be  contingent  on  agency.  Velleman  accomplishes  this  by 
accepting  relativist  foundations  for  normativity.  Another  example  is  Connie  Rosati  who  does  this 
in  “Agents  and  Shmagents”  by  arguing  that  grounding  answers  to  normative  questions  in  our 
own  constitution  is  not  problematic,  even  when  those  questions  are  about  the  same  constitution 
being  used  to  ground  normativity  (p.  203).  Rosati’s  argues  that  while  Enoch  has  demonstrated 
that  constitutivism  is  circular,  because  there  are  normative  questions  about  our  constitution,  he 
has  not  demonstrated  that  this  circularity  is  vicious.  The  idea  is  that  this  solves  the  problem 
because,  when  it  comes  to  epistemic  foundations,  some  circularity  is  not  problematic.  Rosati’s 
point  is  that  Enoch’s  challenge  can  be  considered  as  simply  outside  the  scope  of  normativity: 
one  cannot  ask  whether  one  should  be  an  agent,  because  those  questions  are  not  within  the 
purview  of  normativity.  However,  this  solution  requires  explaining  why  those  questions  are  not 
an  explanatory  gap  between  what  constitutes  a  coherency  requirement  and  the  actual  reasons  for  action 
manifested  by  any  particular  argent  (p.  132).  It  is  possible  that  this  explanatory  gap  between  the 
coherency  requirement  of  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  reasons  for  action  of  any  particular  agent  could 
be  reconstructed  as  a  similar  critique  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem.  If  so,  then  the  solutions  to  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  that  I  provide  in  §§  1.6  and  2.7  may  also  apply  to  Gibbard’s  critique. 
9  Eric  Wiland  (2012)  explains  this  point  in  a  similar  manner  in  Reasons  where  he  summarises  the  point  of 
the  shmagency  problem  as  identifying  a  substantive  value  claim  that  must  come  before  the  constitutivist 
maneuver  and  which  the  constitutivist  maneuver  depends  on  (p.  137). 
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within  the  purview  of  normativity  (which  is  one  of  the  solutions  my  Kantian  reply  to  the 
shmagency  problem  provides  in  §1.6). 
 
The  inescapability  response  to  the  shmagency  problem  argues  that  agency  is  not  contingent 
because  we  must  be  agents.  However,  this  reply  is  unsuccessful  because  it  erroneously 
conflates  normative  necessity  and  non-normative  necessity:  it  is  not  the  case  that  something 
being  necessary  entails  that  it  ought  to  be  the  case.  The  necessity  of  something  does  not, 
simply  because  of  that  necessity,  entail  that  it  ought  to  be  the  case.  So,  even  if  one  is 
necessarily  an  agent  that  does  not,  at  least  not  simply  for  the  reason  that  it  is  necessary,  entail 
that  one  ought  to  be  an  agent.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Enoch  (2006)  argues  the  shmagency 
problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  demonstrates  that  agency  is  normatively  contingent 
(might  be  good  or  bad,  right  or  wrong,  justified  or  unjustified)  and  so  cannot  be  the  grounding  for 
normativity  (pp.  177-179  and  187-191).  The  problem  is  that  a  normative  theory  needs  to  be  able 
to  answer  normative  questions  about  how  we  are  constituted  and  being  able  to  answer  those 
kinds  of  questions  requires  being  able  to  justify  (or  critique)  our  own  constitution. 
 
Normative  theories  need  to  be  able  to  answer  normative  questions  about  how  we  are 
constituted  because  those  questions  can  intelligibly  be  asked.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that 
a  complete  normative  theory  will  be  able  to  answer,  or  account  for  in  some  sense,  all  normative 
questions.  Hence,  because  there  are  normative  questions  about  how  we  are  constituted, 
normative  theories  have  to  explain  where  the  answers  to  those  questions  come  from  (how  they 
are  grounded,  what  makes  the  answers  to  those  questions  count  as  right  or  wrong).  This  is  a 
problem  for  constitutivism  in  particular,  because  it  requires  that  our  own  constitutions  ground  the 
answers  to  all  normative  questions  and  that  requires  that  how  we  are  constituted  is  not 
contingent,  because  if  how  we  are  constituted  is  contingent  the  normativity  grounded  in  it  will 
also  be  contingent.  While  our  agency  may  be  non-normatively  necessary  (and  so  not  contingent 
for  non-normative  purposes),  the  fact  that  there  are  still  normative  questions  to  ask  entails  that  it 
is  normatively  contingent  on  whatever  the  answers  to  those  questions  are.  It  is  normatively 
contingent  in  the  sense  that  it  may  be  justified  or  unjustified  (right  or  not,  good  or  not)  depending 
on  the  answer  to  the  question  at  hand,  which  is  the  question  of  whether  it  is  justified.  This 
problem  is  exacerbated  by  the  circularity  that  this  entails  for  constitutivism;  if  the  justification  for 
how  we  are  constituted  (why  we  should  endorse  our  constitution  so  that  we  can,  in  turn, 
endorse  the  normativity  derived  from  it)  is  itself  grounded  in  how  we  are  constituted,  then  our 
own  constitution  is  normatively  contingent  and  so  are  the  prescriptions  derived  from  it  (so  the 
justification  for  our  constitution  is  contingent  on  the  prescriptions  derived  from  that  same 
constitution). 
 
The  distinction  between  normative  necessity  and  non-normative  necessity  entails  that  the 
non-normative  necessity  of  agency  cannot  be  used  to  derive  the  normative  necessity  of  agency. 
This  is  the  reason  that  the  hypothetical  variation  of  responses  between  subjects  demonstrates 
that  the  constitutivist  approach  cannot  provide  objective  solutions  to  all  normative  questions.  As 
Enoch  (2011a)  argues  in  “Shmagency  Revisited”,  even  if  the  shmagent  itself  is  impossible,  even 
if  we  could  never  be  a  shmagent  or  even  if  they  could  never  exist  at  all,  the  hypothetical 
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question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  still  makes  sense  and  is  still  an  example  of  a  normative  question 
to  which  constitutivism  cannot  provide  the  answer  (p.  225).  Hypothetical  questions  about  what 
ought  to  be  the  case  (normative  questions)  can  make  sense  even  if  the  actualities  entertained  in 
the  question  are  not  feasible  and  therefore  the  shmagency  problem  undermines  the 
constitutivist  approach  even  if  agency  is  inescapable.  
 
In  summary,  the  shmagency  problem  establishes  that  how  we  are  constituted  cannot  ground 
normativity  because  it  cannot  answer  all  normative  questions.  Constitutivism  cannot  answer 
normative  questions  that  relate  to  our  constitution,  which  means  that  the  normative  questions 
constitutivism  cannot  answer  are  particularly  problematic  because  they  are  questions  about  how 
we  are  constituted:  hence,  constitutivism  cannot  justify  the  source  of  normativity  that  it 
proposes.  This  puts  constitutivism  in  the  position  of  having  to  explain  why  the  shmagency 
problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  is  unanswerable,  or  why  it  is  not  problematic  to  answer  it 
with  reference  to  the  same  thing  that  is  in  question  (our  constitution).  So,  the  constitutivist  must 
justify  a  circular  answer  or  critique  the  possibility  of  asking  such  questions. 
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0.6  Thesis  structure 
This  thesis  is  divided  into  three  sections,  with  the  first  covering  Velleman’s  constitutivism  and 
the  shmagency  problem,  the  second  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  and  the  shmagency  problem, 
and  the  third  section  developing  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology.  While  these  three  topics 
are  distinct  enough  that  they  could  have  been  written  as  stand  alone  pieces,  they  explore  the 
same  core  areas  of  inquiry,  which  allows  them  to  be  efficiently  presented  as  connected  pieces 
of  research.  The  common  areas  of  inquiry  are:  the  nature  of  objective  knowledge  claims  about 
normative  facts,  the  metanormative  project  of  the  Kantian  strategy  (using  transcendental 
arguments  to  establish  claims  about  the  nature  of  normativity)  and  the  constitutivist  approach 
(deriving  claims  about  normativity  from  how  we  are  constituted),  and  the  developments  of 
Korsgaard  and  Velleman’s  constitutivist  theories.  The  first  two  sections  develop  responses  to 
Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  critique  and  take  advantage  of  the  common  areas  of  inquiry  to 
minimise  the  explanation  of  shared  topics,  while  also  providing  a  contrast  between  these  two 
types  of  Kantian  constitutivism.  The  third  section  puts  forward  my  argument  for  scalar 
deontology  and  refers  to  the  common  areas  of  inquiry  developed  in  the  first  two  sections  to 
demonstrate  why  scalar  deontology  follows  from  the  core  claims  of  Kantian  constitutivism. 
 
Section  1:  Velleman’s  constitutivism  and  the  shmagency  problem 
This  section  explains  why  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  does  not  apply  to  Velleman’s 
constitutivism  and  presents  this  as  the  results  of  the  debate  between  these  two  philosophers. 
The  shmagency  problem  does  not  apply  to  Velleman’s  constitutivism  because  Velleman  and 
Enoch  do  not  mean  the  same  thing  when  they  refer  to  ‘objective  moral  facts’.  This  becomes 
clear  during  the  debate  between  Velleman  and  Enoch  when  Velleman  expands  on  his  claims 
about  the  foundations  of  morality  and  puts  forward  a  position  that  purports  to  establish  objective 
norms  with  relativist  foundations.  Velleman  (2013)  attempts  to  establish  this  position  in 
Foundations  For  Moral  Relativism  by  arguing  that  moral  facts  are  objective  within  particular 
frames  of  reference  but  that  those  frames  of  reference  are  relative  (pp.  47-53).  My  summary  of 
the  results  of  the  debate  between  Velleman  and  Enoch  clarifies  the  positions  of  the  two 
philosophers  on  what  counts  as  objectivity  about  normative  facts:  they  disagree  about  what 
objectivity  means,  with  the  position  on  the  nature  of  normativity  of  each  philosopher  being 
correct  within  the  particular  definition  of  objectivity  that  they  espouse.  With  the  results  of  this 
debate  established,  I  explain  why  Velleman’s  commitment  to  relativist  foundations  is  a 
substantial  deviation  from  the  Kantian  tradition  and  argue  that  key  elements  of  his  constitutivist 
theory  can  be  defended  from  the  shmagency  problem  without  forgoing  the  Kantian  roots  to  this 
extent.  I  develop  a  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  that  is  similar  to  Velleman’s  reply  to 
the  extent  that  it  involves  arguing  that  Enoch  means  something  different  by  objectivity  than  the 
Kantian.  I  establish  this  by  explaining  that  deriving  objective  knowledge  from  necessary  and 
constitutive  elements  of  our  rational  faculties  is  how  objectivity  is  established  in  Kantian 
epistemology.  This  demonstrates  that  Enoch’s  critique,  when  applied  to  Kantian  constitutivism, 
is  not  so  much  a  critique  of  the  constitutivist  approach  as  such  but  a  critique  of  the  entire 
Kantian  epistemic  project.  By  identifying  that  Enoch’s  critique  attacks  this  Kantian  theory  of 
knowledge  rather  than  constitutivism  in  particular,  I  show  that  utilising  the  constitutivist  approach 
does  not  introduce  any  new  problems  for  the  Kantian. 
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Section  2:  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  and  developing  a  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem 
Korsgaard  does  not  provide  a  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem,  but  in  this  section  I  argue  that 
she  does  provide  a  solution  in  the  sense  that  she  has  already  developed  the  tools  required  to 
solve  it.  Korsgaard  indirectly  provides  this  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem  when  she  replies 
to  the  bad  action  critique  of  her  constitutivism  presented  by  Gerald  Cohen  (1996)  in  “Reason 
Humanity  and  the  Moral  Law ”  where  he  argues  that  because  Korsgaard  derives  norms  from  our 
constitution,  she  has  no  method  of  convincing  a  subject  to  obey  the  norms  derived  from  one 
element  of  their  constitution  over  norms  derived  from  another  element  (pp.  178-184). 
Korsgaard’s  reply  to  this  critique  is  that  the  particular  element  she  derives  normativity  from  is 
privileged  over  other  elements  that  could  provide  competing  norms,  because  the  element  she 
derives  normativity  from  is  the  same  element  that  facilitates  reflective  endorsement  in  the  first 
place.  My  argument  is  that  this  reply  to  Cohen  also  serves,  with  some  clarification  and 
development,  as  a  reply  to  Enoch.  The  argument,  as  it  applies  to  Enoch’s  critique,  is  that  the 
necessity  of  the  constitutive  elements  Korsgaard  derives  normativity  from  allows  those  elements 
to  be  suitable  candidates  for  a  transcendental  argument  while  disallowing  potential  competing 
constitutive  elements  from  being  both  in  conflict  with  them  and  necessary. 
 
Section  3:  Scalar  deontology 
Both  Velleman’s  and  Korsgaard’s  approaches  to  Kantian  constitutivism  derive  normativity  from 
autonomy  and  argue  that  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  is  the  attempt  to  constitute  oneself  in 
particular  ways  according  to  the  obligations  placed  upon  oneself  by  one’s  faculty  of  reason.  This 
entails  that  normativity  either  exists,  or  needs  to  be  understood,  in  the  context  of  a  particular 
position  -  the  position  of  a  subject  that  is  making  a  decision  (a  subject  using  their  faculty  of 
reason).  Understanding  normativity  in  this  context  allows  us  to  understand  the  ongoing  project 
of  self-constitution  and  derive  norms  from  the  constitutive  elements  of  that  project.  Because 
these  norms  are  derived  from  this  position,  features  of  that  position  determine  the  nature  of 
those  norms  and,  therefore,  the  nature  of  normativity  as  such.  In  this  section  I  argue  that 
understanding  one’s  project  of  self-constitution  as  an  ongoing  process  that  is  pursued  to  varying 
levels  of  success,  rather  than  something  that  is  either  a  failure  or  a  success,  allows  the 
development  of  a  scalar  deontology.  By  a  “scalar  deontology”  I  mean  a  formulation  of  the 
categorical  imperative  which  identifies  that  our  obligation  to  ourselves,  our  duty  to  constitute 
ourselves  coherently,  is  something  we  fulfil  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent.  My  argument  is  that 
normativity  must  be  formulated  in  a  manner  that  is  understandable  from  the  position  of  the 
subject  that  is  exercising  their  autonomy,  because  it  is  autonomy  that  normativity  is  derived 
from.  Formulating  normativity  so  that  it  can  be  understood  by  a  subject  exercising  their 
autonomy  requires  developing  a  scalar  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  that  explains 
why  our  obligation  is  something  that  we  are  capable  of  pursuing  even  if  we  do  not  eventually 










1.0  Enoch  and  Velleman’s  shmagency  debate 
Analysing  the  shmagency  problem  debate  between  David  Enoch  and  David  Velleman  clarifies 
the  epistemic  and  metaphysical  claims  underlying  their  positions.  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem 
critique  is  successful  when  one  accepts  a  realist  theory  of  knowledge  that  allows  for  normative 
questions  that  are  external  from,  and  independent  of,  the  nature  of  any  subject  (the  qualities 
that  make  the  subject  what  it  is).  However,  Enoch’s  critique  does  not  apply  to  Velleman’s  theory, 
because  Velleman  relies  on  a  relativist  theory  of  knowledge  about  normative  facts  that  does  not 
allow  for  normative  questions  that  are  external  from  the  nature  of  the  subject:  these  external 
questions  cannot  be  allowed,  according  to  Velleman,  because  it  is  the  subject  itself  which  must 
ask  the  questions  (including  the  shmagency  problem  question:  ‘why  be  an  agent’).  Velleman’s 
relativist  theory  of  normative  knowledge  claims  that  both  normative  facts  and  the  criterion  for 
their  correctness  are  provided  by  the  subject.  Velleman’s  theory  is  relativist  in  the  sense  that  it 
entails  that  normativity  is  relative  to  the  nature  of  the  subject  and  altering  that  nature  could 
change  the  moral  law.  Between  Velleman’s  relativism  and  Enoch’s  realism  there  is  the 
possibility  of  a  third  outcome  to  the  shmagency  problem,  a  Kantian  reply  which  solves  the 
problem  by  arguing  that  particular  elements  of  the  nature  of  the  subject  is  necessary  for  all 
knowledge  claims  and,  therefore,  alterations  in  that  nature  are  not  possible  (which  means  that 
altering  the  nature  of  a  subject  cannot  be  done  in  order  to  alter  the  moral  law).  The  shmagency 
problem  debate  serves  the  function  of  revealing  these  three  distinct  positions  and  their 
implications  for  constitutivism  as  the  source  of  all  normativity.  
 
In  order  to  demonstrate  the  results  of  the  shmagency  problem  debate  between  Enoch  and 
Velleman,  I  first  explain  the  shmagency  problem  itself,  then  I  explain  Velleman’s  constitutivism, 
followed  by  why  the  shmagency  problem  applies  to  Velleman’s  constitutivism,  Velleman’s  reply 
to  the  shmagency  problem,  and  then  the  cost  (implications)  of  Velleman’s  reply.  The  result  of 
the  debate  is  that  Velleman’s  position  entails  normative  relativism.  With  the  results  of  the  debate 
between  Velleman  and  Enoch  established  I  then  present  the  alternative  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem,  the  Kantian  reply,  and  explain  the  costs  of  that  reply.  The  costs  of  that  reply  is  that  it 
requires  a  subject-dependent  theory  of  knowledge,  which  can  be  provided  by  the  Kantian 
tradition.  Finally,  I  present  the  results  by  summarising  why  the  three  potential  results  of  the 
shmagency  problem  debate,  success  of  the  critique,  failure  of  the  critique  because  of  relativism, 
and  failure  of  the  critique  because  of  subject-dependance,  each  require  making  distinct 
epistemic  commitments.  The  shmagency  problem  demonstrates  that  the  constitutivist  approach 
cannot  succeed  unless  the  constitutivist  adopts  a  relativist  or  subject-dependent  theory  of 
knowledge  and  each  of  these  has  its  own  costs  associated  with  it.  The  relativist  theory  entails 
that  objective  normative  facts  can  vary  between  subjects  if  those  subjects  are  sufficiently 
different  in  their  constitution,  and  the  subject-dependent  theory  requires  a  Kantian  theory  of 




1.1  The  shmagency  problem  question  and  the  debate  between  David  Velleman  and  David 
Enoch 
 
In  §0.5  I  provide  an  explanation  of  the  shmagency  problem  that  informs  §  1.  Here  I  provide  a 
reminder  of  key  elements  I  covered  in  §0.5,  explained  with  reference  to  the  exchanges  between 
David  Velleman  and  David  Enoch  in  their  respective  publications  discussing  the  shmagency 
problem.  Velleman  and  Enoch  disagree  over  whether  asking  the  question  ‘why  be  an  agent?’ 
demonstrates  that  the  constitutivist  position  is  flawed  or  that  this  question  does  not  make  sense. 
Enoch  argues  that  asking  this  question  demonstrates  that  constitutivists  cannot  motivate  the 
endorsement  of  agency  while  Velleman  argues  that  the  question  itself  is  flawed. 
 
As  I  explain  in  §0.5  Enoch  argues  that  before  we  can  endorse  whatever  follows  from  agency  we 
must  first  be  provided  with  a  reason  to  endorse  agency.  Constitutivists  argue  that  normativity  is 
derived  from  an  examination  of  how  we  are  constituted  while  Enoch  argues  that  any  normativity 
derived  in  this  manner  is  contingent  upon  whatever  reason  we  have  to  endorse  our  own 
constitutions.  Enoch’s  point  is  that  if  constitutivism  explains  what  we  ought  to  do  if  we  are 
agents,  then  something  else  must  determine  whether  we  ought  to  do  what  agency  prescribes. 
This  is  how  the  shmagency  problem  question,  ‘why  be  an  agent?’,  becomes  the  focus  of  the 
disagreement  between  Enoch  and  Velleman.  Velleman  argues  that  how  we  are  constituted 
determines  what  we  ought  to  do  (see  §1.2),  Enoch  points  out  that  Velleman’s  theory  relies  on 
our  having  a  reason  to  endorse  how  we  are  constituted  (see  §0.5  for  further  detail  than  I  have 
provided  here),  and  Velleman  replies  by  arguing  that  asking  why  we  should  endorse  our 
constitutions  does  not  make  sense  (see  §1.4). 
 
The  purpose  of  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  to  demonstrate  that  constitutivism,  on  its 
own,  does  not  provide  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  source  of  normativity.  It  attempts  to 
accomplish  this  by  showing  that  constitutivism  must  refer  to  a  source  of  normativity  beyond  what 
our  constitution  as  agents  can  provide  to  answer  at  least  some  questions.  The  extent  of  this 
problem  is  summarised  by  Bertea  (2013)  in  “Constitutivism  and  Normativity:  a  Qualified 
Defence”  where  he  explains  that: 
“There  is  nothing  about  constitutivism  that  can  demonstrate  why  we  ought  to  be  agents. 
But,  insofar  as  we  have  no  special  normative  reason  to  be  agents,  the  standards 
constitutive  of  agency  ultimately  fail  to  provide  us  with  a  normative  standpoint. 
Constitutive  standards,  thus,  prove  to  be  by  themselves  unable  to  issue  normative 
requirements,  namely,  requirements  we  ought  to  follow  on  the  basis  of  their  being 
justified  by  virtue  of  agency  itself.”  (p.  84) 
The  nature  of  the  problem  is  such  that  the  supposed  inability  to  answer  the  shmagency  problem 
question  undermines  the  ability  of  a  constitutivist  approach  to  answer  any  normative  question. 
This  is  because  the  reasons  we  have  to  be  an  agent  underwrite  whatever  normativity  agency 
itself  provides.  
 
Velleman’s  reply,  explained  in  §1.4,  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  question  is  to  argue  that  the 
question  is  flawed.  Velleman  (2009)  argues  that  normative  questions  (questions  that  ask  what 
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we  should  do)  are  types  of  questions  that  are  asked  by  agents  and  that  asking  such  questions 
assumes  agency  (pp.  142-144).  This  reply  attempts  to  establish  that  normative  questions 
require  a  particular  type  of  context  which  establishes  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer  to  the 
question  being  asked.  This  context  is,  according  to  Velleman,  packaged  with  the  question  and 
required  for  the  question  to  make  sense.  If  Velleman  is  correct  about  this  then  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  question  requires  that  the  appropriate  context  is  provided  before  the 
question  can  be  asked.  Velleman  argues  that  our  agency  is  the  appropriate  context  that 
provides  the  criterion  for  correct  answers  to  normative  questions  (pp.  127-128).  
 
Velleman’s  reply  to  Enoch’s  question  is  an  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  Enoch’s  question  does 
not  make  sense  beyond  the  context  of  agency.  The  idea  is  that  normative  questions  must  be 
asked  within  the  context  of  one’s  agency  and,  therefore,  all  normative  questions  can  be 
answered  by  appealing  to  constitutive  elements  of  agency.  Velleman  (2009)  argues  that  the 
shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  can  either  be  answered  on  constitutivist 
grounds  or  does  not  make  sense  (pp.  142-144).  This  claim  is  central  to  the  exchanges  between 
Velleman  and  Enoch  regarding  the  shmagency  problem  and  constitutivism.  Velleman’s  point  is 
that  if  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  asked  in  the  context  of  being  an  agent  then  what  is 
being  asked  is  whether  an  agent  should  be  an  agent.  Remember  that,  according  to 
constitutivists,  normativity  is  derived  from  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  so  asking  whether  an 
agent  should  be  an  agent  means  asking  whether  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  prescribes  the 
endorsement  of  agency.  The  argument,  that  normative  questions  require  contexts  that  provide 
the  criteria  of  correctness  for  the  answer  to  the  question  being  asked,  becomes  an  argument 
that  normative  questions  must  assume  agency  in  order  for  the  question  to  have  a  context  that  is 
capable  of  providing  the  criteria  of  correctness.  So,  Velleman’s  response  to  the  shmagency 
problem  question  is  to  argue  that,  if  the  question  makes  sense,  then  it  is  asking  ‘does  what  is 
constitutive  of  our  agency  entail  that  we  should  endorse  what  is  constitutive  of  our  agency?’ 
rather  than  simply  ‘why  be  an  agent?’. 
 
Another  way  of  explaining  Velleman’s  reply  (explored  in  further  detail  in  §1.4)  is  in  terms  of  the 
inescapability  of  agency.  Velleman’s  argument  that  agency  provides  the  context  that  normative 
questions  require  and,  therefore,  agency  is  inescapable  for  anyone  wanting  to  ask  normative 
questions.  Agency  is  inescapable  in  this  sense  because  normative  questions  do  not  make 
sense  without  what  agency  provides  (that  is,  without  a  context  that  can  provide  the  criteria  for 
correct  answers  to  normative  questions).  If  Velleman  is  correct  about  the  inescapability  of 
agency,  then  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  either  can  be 
answered  by  referring  to  agency  (and,  therefore,  does  not  demonstrate  that  constitutivism 
cannot  justify  the  normativity  derived  from  agency)  or  the  question  is  defective. 
 
Enoch  does  not  accept  Velleman’s  argument  that  the  shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an 
agent?’)  is  defective.  Enoch  (2011a)  argues  in  “Shmagency  revisited”  that  appealing  to  the 
inescapability  of  does  not  demonstrate  that  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  defective  (pp. 
223-224).  Enoch  insists  that  Velleman’s  explanation  that  normative  questions  require  contexts, 
such  as  agency,  in  order  to  make  sense  is  not  a  satisfactory  reply.  This  disagreement  is 
40 
discussed  in  terms  of  the  externality  or  interniality  of  questions:  whether  these  questions  are 
being  asked  internally  in  the  context  of  being  an  agent  or  externally  of  the  context  of  being  an 
agent.  Velleman  argues  that  asking  any  normative  question  beyond  the  context  of  agency 
(externally)  does  not  make  sense  while  asking  the  shmagency  problem  question  within  the 
context  of  agency  (internally)  allows  the  constitutivist  to  appeal  to  what  is  constitutive  of  our 
nature  in  order  to  answer  the  question.  Velleman’s  point  is  that  if  the  shmagency  problem 
question  is  asked  internally,  in  the  context  of  being  an  agent,  then  the  answer  is  trivial  because 
it  is  determined  by  appealing  to  what  is  constitutive  of  agency.  
 
Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  is  not  intended  to  be  asked 
internally.  At  least,  not  insofar  as  asking  a  question  internally  means  that  the  answer  is 
determined  according  to  the  criteria  prescribed  by  how  we  are  constituted.  If  Enoch’s  question 
did  have  to  be  answered  with  reference  to  what  is  constitutive  of  agency,  then  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  would  be  trivial.  It  would  be  trivial  because  it  would  have  failed  to 
demonstrate  that  the  constitutivist  position  cannot  demonstrate  why  we  should  endorse  what 
follows  from  how  we  are  constituted:  if  the  shmagency  problem  question  was  merely  asking 
about  what  our  constitution  has  to  say  about  whether  we  should  endorse  what  follows  from  our 
constitution,  then  the  question  would  not  be  fit  for  the  purpose  Enoch  intends.  Velleman  hopes 
that  this  demonstrates  that  the  question  is  either  trivial  or  defective. 
 
There  is  an  exchange  between  Velleman  and  Enoch  which  is  at  the  heart  of  their  shmagency 
problem  debate,  demonstrates  the  importance  of  the  shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an 
agent?’),  and  outlines  the  disagreement  that  I  have  just  explained.  Enoch  (2011a)  makes  the 
point  that  inescapability  does  not  avoid  the  shmagency  problem  question  when  he  argues  that 
attacking  the  shmagency  problem  question  has  yielded  a  satisfactory  defence: 
“When  the  why-care-about-self-understanding  question  is  understood  externally, 
Velleman  -  rather  than  answering  it  -  suggests  that  there’s  something  wrong  with  the 
question.  The  suggestion  is  that  such  practical  why-questions  -  requests  for  practical 
reasons  -  only  make  sense  within  some  constitutive  framework  or  another.  Asking  with 
the  ambition  of  being  understood  outside  any  framework  (agency,  or  even  shmagency, 
or  some  other  one),  the  question  is  supposed  to  be  semantically  defective.”  (pp. 
223-224)  
Enoch  is  replying   to  a  particular  point  in  Velleman’s  (2009)  response  to  the  shmagency 10
problem  where  he  writes: 
“What  the  Kantian  argues  is  that  the  criterion  in  relation  to  which  guidance  is  possible 
must  lie  in  the  very  nature  of  that  which  is  to  be  guided.  A  question  must  establish 
criteria  for  what  can  count  as  a  correct  answer;  if  it  fails  to  establish  criteria  for  an 
answer,  then  it  is  not  a  fully  constituted  question.  If  “Why  be  an  agent”  isn’t  about  a 
choice  …  then  you  aren’t  owed  an  answer,  because  you  haven’t  yet  asked  a  question. 
…  Asking  whether  agency  rather  than  shmagency  is  objectively  correct  would  be  like 
10  Enoch  cites  this  passage  too,  in  the  context  of  his  excerpt  above,  but  I  have  cited  them  separately  to 
facilitate  a  more  concise  explanation  to  fit  my  purposes  here. 
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asking  whether  a  telephone  is  correct  rather  than  a  tree.  Agency  or  Shmagency  can  be 
objectively  correct  as  the  solution  to  a  determinate  problem,  or  as  the  answer  to  a 
determinate  question;  but  then  the  problem  or  question  will  invoke  the  criterion  implicit  in 
agency  or  the  criterion  implicit  in  shmagency  (or  some  third  criterion),  by  which  one  or 
the  other  can  qualify  as  a  correct  solution  or  answer.”   (pp.  144-145) 
Enoch  (2011a)  does  not  agree  that  specific  contexts,  like  agency,  are  inescapable  for  normative 
questions: 
“Furthermore,  it  is  very  hard  to  see  how  the  natural  inescapability  of  agency  can  be  seen 
as  anything  but  normatively  arbitrary,  and  so  it  is  equally  hard  to  see  how  it  could  help 
here.  The  discussion  of  dialectical  inescapability  misunderstands  the  nature  of  skeptical 
challenges  (by  committing  the  mistake  of  the  adversarial  stance  [and  assuming  that 
showing  a  problem  with  the  challenge  results  in  defeating  it]).  And  that  we  already  do 
care  about  whatever  it  is  that  is  constitutive  of  action  -  if  indeed  we  do  -  is  just  neither 
here  nor  there.”  (p.  228) 
 
It  is  not  clear  whether  this  exchange  establishes  a  resolution  to  the  debate  either  way.  In 
“Constitutivism  and  Inescapability:  a  diagnosis”  Hanish  (2016)  references  parts  of  this  exchange 
when  explaining  that  the  shmagency  problem  debate  has  become  fruitless,  having  been 
reduced  to  an  exchange  where  “Velleman  and  Enoch  charge  each  other  with  begging  the 
question  against  the  other  regarding  the  possibility  of  a  criterion  of  correctness”  (p.  1158).  While 
Velleman  and  Enoch  do  not  reach  a  clear  conclusion  themselves,  the  exploration  I  provide 
reveals  that  their  disagreement  is  a  reflection  of  underlying  epistemic  disagreements  that  reach 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  shmagency  problem  and  prevent  them  from  satisfactorily  concluding 





1.2  Velleman’s  constitutivism 
Velleman  (2009)  argues  in  How  we  get  Along  that  normativity  is  grounded  in  the  intelligibility  of 
action  (p.  132-133).   When  an  autonomous  agent  undertakes  deliberate  action,  they  are  doing 11
so  in  order  to  become  intelligible  to  themselves;  they  are  attempting  to  make  sense  of 
themselves  to  themselves  (Velleman,  2009,  p.  32).  So,  when  I  am  deciding  what  I  should  do, 
the  correct  method  is  for  me  to  identify  the  reasons  I  have  for  action  and  then  act  in  ways  that 
are  intelligible  given  those  reasons.  The  source  of  normativity  is  grounded  in  the  conception  of 
‘action’  as  the  deliberate  attempt  to  make  oneself  intelligible  with  the  reasons  for  action  that  one 
has.  
 
The  agent  discovers  this  in  what  makes  his  actions  intelligible  to  himself.  Practical  reason,  the 
activity  of  making  decisions  and  taking  action,  dictates  intelligibility  to  oneself  as  the  criterion  for 
successful  actions  (Velleman,  2009,  p.  136).  For  Velleman,  ‘success  in  action’  means  the 
successful  constitution  of  the  self:  the  use  of  one's  autonomy  to  make  oneself  intelligible  to 
oneself.  In  The  Possibility  of  Practical  Reason ,  Velleman  (2000)  argues  that  the  constitutive  aim 
of  action  is  exercising  your  controlling  consciousness  to  manifest  an  intelligible  inclination 
towards  your  own  autonomy  (pp.  188-199).  This  is  explained  as  a  comparison  to  beliefs,  where 
beliefs  reflect  your  inclination  towards  the  truth,  actions  reflect  your  inclination  towards  yourself: 
A  full-blooded  action  is  therefore  behaviour  that  manifests  your  inclination  toward 
autonomy,  just  as  a  belief  is  a  cognitive  attitude  that  manifests  your  inclination  toward 
the  truth.  ...  My  view  is  that  your  inclination  toward  the  constitutive  goal  of  action  also 
mediates  the  influence  of  your  reasons  for  acting,  just  as  your  inclination  toward  the  truth 
mediates  the  influence  of  your  reasons  for  belief.  (Velleman,  2000,  pp.196-197) 
The  purpose  of  action  is  to  manifest  your  inclination  towards  your  own  autonomy.  This  means 
that,  when  undertaking  action  of  the  appropriate  type,  your  goal  is  to  enact  your  attempts  to  be 
the  type  of  thing  you  think  you  should  be.  ‘Action  of  the  appropriate  type’  means  action  you 
have  the  appropriate  opportunity  to  reflect  upon  because,  as  Velleman  (2000)  argues,  intention 
is  required  for  an  action  to  be  an  action  in  the  full  sense:  in  the  sense  that  it  has  the  constitutive 
aim  of  action  (p.  189).  Attempting  to  be  the  type  of  thing  you  think  you  should  be,  the  type  of 
thing  you  intend  to  be,  entails  intelligibility  because  intelligibility  is  what  follows  from  the  attempt 
to  be  anything  at  all.  Intending  to  be  something  at  all  is  what  makes  you  autonomous,  and  what 
you  intend  to  be  necessarily  includes  being  intelligible.  
 
The  argument  is  that  autonomy  is  constitutive  of  action,  and  intelligibility  is  constitutive  of 
autonomy,  therefore  intelligibility  is  constitutive  of  action  (Velleman,  2000,  pp.  30-31  and  189). 
Having  intentioned  actions,  at  all,  is  to  be  seeking  self  understanding,  in  the  sense  that 
understanding  your  reasons  for  action  and  applying  them  to  your  actions  is  the  attempt  to 
understand  yourself.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  your  agency  is  inescapable  and  an  inherent, 
11  Velleman  (2000)  explains  in  “The  Possibility  of  Practical  Reason”  that  while  his  earlier  works  identify 
autonomy  itself  as  the  constitutive  aim  of  action  he  now  considers  self-intelligibility  the  more  plausible 
candidate  (p.  30).  As  Velleman  goes  on  to  explain  these  ideas  are  linked,  self-intelligibility  is  a  particular 
requirement  placed  on  autonomy  because  of  the  demand,  for  coherence,  placed  on  ourselves  by  the 
nature  of  autonomy.  
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constitutive,  feature  of  all  of  your  full-blooded  (that  is,  intentioned)  actions.  As  Velleman  (2009) 
explains:  
[T]he  aim  of  self-understanding  is  inescapable  for  you,  and  in  two  senses.  First,  it  is 
naturally  inescapable  for  you  as  a  human  being.  As  a  human  being  you  are  naturally 
endowed  with  a  theoretical  intelligence,  which  is  not  a  passive  receiver  of  information  but 
an  active  synthesizer,  striving  to  make  incoming  information  hang  together  so  as  to 
represent  an  intelligible  world.  You  are  also  endowed  with  an  objective  self-awareness,  a 
concept  of  yourself  as  a  part  of  the  world  to  be  understood.  These  two  endowments 
inevitably  combine  to  yield  the  aim  of  understanding  yourself,  which  inevitably  motivates 
you  to  do  what  you  can  understand,  whereupon  you  become  a  writer  rather  than  a 
reader  of  your  own  behaviour.  …  This  brings  me  to  the  second  sense  in  which  the  aim  of 
self-understanding  is  inescapable:  it  is  constitutively  inescapable  for  you  as  an  agent 
and  hence  as  the  kind  of  creature  who  can  ask  practical  questions  like  ‘Why  should  I 
have  this  aim?’  If  this  is  indeed  a  practical  question,  posed  in  the  spirit  of  deliberation 
between  options,  such  as  those  of  adopting  or  rejecting  an  aim,  then  it  must  be  resolved 
via  the  sort  of  reasoning  that  is  practical,  in  the  sense  that  its  resolution  is  authored 
rather  than  discovered,  written  rather  than  read.  The  question  must  therefore  be 
resolved,  I  have  argued,  via  reasoning  that  aims  at  self-understanding.  (p.  136-137)  
This  is  the  sense  in  which  intelligibility  is  constitutive  of  autonomy  and  so  constitutive  of 
full-blooded  action:  deliberating  between  reasons  is  making  oneself  intelligible  to  oneself. 
Velleman’s  point  is  that  attempts  to  analyze  the  process  of  action  suppose,  by  the  nature  of  the 
attempt,  the  aim  of  self-understanding  and  the  task  of  self-understanding  is  the  task  of  making 
oneself  intelligible.  So,  when  undertaking  this  analysis  of  action,  one  discovers  that  action  itself 
is  an  attempt  to  manifest  the  reasons  one  has  for  action  in  an  intelligible  manner.  What  this 
means  is  that  when  you  undertake  full-blooded  (intentioned)  action  you  are  trying  to  make  the 
reasons  you  have  for  action  coherent  with  the  type  of  person  you  want  to  be  (Velleman,  2009, 
pp.  31-33).  
 
The  perspective  of  an  agent  requires  decision  making  and  attempting  to  solve  the  problem  of 
how  to  act.  Agents  must  decide  what  to  do,  and  when  doing  so,  they  are  deciding  what  they  are 
as  much  as  what  they  are  trying  to  do.  They  are  deciding  what  they  are  because  the  perspective 
of  an  agent  is  a  perspective  of  self  understanding.  Within  that  perspective,  which  is  accessible 
to  the  agent  who  is  trying  to  solve  the  problem  of  how  to  act,  one  discovers  reasons  for  action 
and  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer  to  the  questions  which  stem  from  the  problem  of  how  to 
act.  Velleman’s  (2009)  argument  is  that  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer  to  a  normative 
question  is  determined  by  the  question  itself,  because  the  question  itself  entails  the  perspective 
of  an  agent;  to  ask  a  normative  question  one  must  be  an  agent,  taking  the  perspective  of  an 
agent,  and  for  this  reason,  your  constitution  is  provided  at  the  same  time  the  question  is  asked 
(pp.  133-138).  It  is  because  the  aim  of  self  understanding  is  constitutive  of  full-blooded 
(intentioned)  action  that  normative  questions  and  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer  to  normative 
questions  are  both  provided  by  our  own  agency.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  practical  reason  entails 
agency  and  agency  entails  normativity.  Agency  entails  both  normative  questions,  required  to 
decide  how  to  act,  and  the  criterion  for  correct  answers  to  those  questions.  
44 
 
So,  when  an  agent  is  trying  to  decide  how  to  act  they  have,  by  taking  the  perspective  of 
practical  reason,  both  put  forward  a  question,  “how  should  I  act?”,  and  the  criterion  for  a  correct 
answer:  they  should  act  in  a  manner  coherent  with  the  reasons  they  have  for  action.  For 
example,  if  I  am  deciding  what  I  want  to  do  for  the  evening  and  I  determine  that,  for  the  sake  of 
my  mental  health  and  well  being,  I  require  comradery,  I  have  a  reason  to  spend  time  with 
friends,  and  to  make  my  actions  intelligible  with  this  reason,  I  ought  to  contact  friends  in  the 
pursuit  of  an  evening  socialising  with  them.  I  act  on  my  reason  (desire  for  comradeship)  in  this 
manner,  because  I  have  further  reasons  to  believe  I  should  meet  my  mental  health  needs. 
Together,  the  two  reasons  (understanding  myself  as  someone  who  meets  my  mental  health 
needs  and  requiring  comradery  to  preserve  my  mental  health)  determine  what  I  ought  to  do  in 
order  to  be  intelligible  to  myself.  In  this  example,  I  identified  the  reasons  I  have  for  action  and 
attempted  to  make  myself  intelligible,  from  my  own  perspective  (to  myself),  with  those  reasons. 
This  is  why  the  source  of  normativity  is  found  in  what  is  constitutive  of  action,  taking  the 
perspective  of  an  actor  (a  rational  agent)  entails  providing  the  reasons  for  action,  and  what  the 
actor  ought  to  do  is  act  in  a  manner  intelligible  with  those  reasons.  We  need  the  reasons  for 
action  in  order  to  have  something  to  make  intelligible  and  those  reasons  for  action  are  found  in 
the  perspective  of  the  subject. 
 
Velleman’s  theory  does  not  entail  variation  between  agents  who  are  in  the  same  frame  of 
reference.  If  two  agents  are  in  the  same  position,  in  the  sense  that  they  have  the  same  reasons 
for  action,  the  answers  to  the  normative  questions  they  ask  will  be  the  same.   As  Velleman 12
(2013)  explains  in  Foundations  for  Moral  Relativism ,  frames  of  reference  are  the  contexts  in 
which  reasons  “exert  their  weight”  (p.  52).  These  contexts  are  parts  of  the  statements  and 
questions  they  relate  to  in  the  sense  that  they  are  constitutive  of  those  statements.  For  example, 
as  Velleman  (2013)  explains  the  point,  in  the  same  way  that  claiming  ‘rocks  tend  to  fall’  implies 
the  context  of  gravity,  normative  statements  imply  the  context  of  an  agent’s  constitution  (pp. 
51-52).  So,  the  statement  ‘you  ought  to  be  nice  to  your  neighbour’  requires  agency  in  the  sense 
that  one  must  be  an  agent  to  make  this  claim  and  particular  reasons  for  action  in  the  same  way 
that  the  statement  ‘a  thrown  rock  will  fall’  requires  gravity  in  the  sense  that  the  context  is 
required  for  the  statement  to  be  accurate  and  a  body  of  mass  to  exert  gravity's  force.  Neither 
statement  even  makes  sense  without  those  frames  of  reference;  the  frame  of  reference  is  the 
context  of  the  statement  and  that  context  is  required  for  the  statement  to  have  a  truth  value  (be 
right  or  wrong,  or  truth  apt).  This  is  how  Velleman  justifies  the  objectivity  of  normativity  while 
grounding  normativity  in  the  nature  of  our  agency,  the  answers  to  normative  questions  are 
objective  in  the  context  in  which  they  are  asked.  Because  the  subject  provides  that  context,  their 
12  Assuming,  of  course,  they  are  genuinely  in  the  same  position  and  asking  the  same  question.  We  might 
imagine  a  scenario  where  two  agents  who  are  identical  except  for  a  three  feet  difference  in  height  have 
different  answers  to  the  same  normative  questions.  In  such  a  case  the  question  “ought  I  help  my  friend 
change  the  light  bulb”  would  be  different  for  each  because  the  task  in  question  is  more  difficult  for  one  of 
the  agents  in  question.  The  answer  may  still  be  the  same,  but  this  difference  is  relevant  so  the  answer 
may  be  different.  Assuming  no  such  differences  then  a  shared  frame  of  reference  (shared  reasons  for 
action)  entail  shared  answers  to  normative  questions. 
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agency  is  the  context;  the  answers  to  normative  questions  only  need  to  be  true  in  that  same 
context.  Normative  questions  have  objective  answers,  answers  which  are  truth  apt,  in  the  sense 
that  they  have  answers  which  follow  from  the  agent’s  aim  of  action  (self  understanding),  that  is, 
answers  which  are  intelligible  with  the  agent’s  reasons  for  action.  
 
Velleman  (2013)  argues  that  agents  share  underlying  traits,  human  nature ,  which  generate 13
reasons  (pp.  49-69).  While  frames  of  reference  vary,  for  example  between  different  societies, 
the  intelligibility  of  actions  once  reasons  are  in  place  does  not.  So,  an  agent  will  generate 
reasons  from  its  nature  based  on  its  frame  of  reference  and  in  doing  so  provide  normativity  in 
the  form  of  the  criteria  for  correct  answers  about  questions  that  relate  to  how  they  should  act. 
This  does  not  entail  that  an  actor  will  always  succeed  or  that  actors  have  always  identified  the 
correct  reasons  for  their  frame  of  reference.  Rather,  failures  to  act  intelligibly  and  to  identify  the 
correct  reasons  for  acting  help  to  demonstrate  the  source  of  normativity  and  how  it  functions  by 
showing  what  it  is  to  act  or  generate  reasons  incorrectly  (irrationally).  Velleman  (2004)  explains 
in  “Willing  the  Law”  that  an  agent  is  irrational  when  they  do  not  possess  the  capacities  and 
dispositions  that  are  “essential  to  the  activity  of  practical  reasoning”  (p.  24).  If  you  identify  the 
correct  reasons  and  fail  to  act  intelligibly,  to  yourself  and  in  accordance  with  those  reasons,  you 
have  acted  irrationally,  that  is,  you  have  failed  to  be  coherent.  If  you  fail  to  have  the  correct 
reasons  for  action,  you  have  failed  to  be  rational,  your  capacities  and  dispositions  are  irrational. 
This  distinction  is  important  for  Velleman,  because  it  allows  him  to  explain  the  distinction 
between  deficient  agents  and  agents  who  are  failing  to  constitute  themselves  intelligibly.  If, 
through  some  deficiency  of  the  brain  perhaps,  one  simply  does  not  have  the  reasons  otherwise 
provided  by  human  nature,  this  is  not  a  case  of  acting  irrationally,  it  is  a  case  in  which  one  is 
missing  one  of  the  requirements  for  practical  reasoning.  So,  instances  which  appear  to  be 
examples  of  agents  having  a  fundamentally  different  nature  can  be  explained  as  merely 
examples  of  deficient  agents  rather  than  examples  of  some  other  legitimate  alternative 
normativity  that  we  ourselves  might  engage  in.  
 
The  distinction  between  failing  to  act  intelligibly  with  your  reasons  and  not  even  having  those 
reasons  supports  Velleman’s  theory,  because  failing  to  have  the  reasons  that  are  a  part  of 
human  nature  is  a  defect.  Velleman  (2013)  argues  that  the  same  reasons  lead  to  different 
answers  in  distinct  frames  of  reference,  such  as  different  cultures,  because  those  frames  of 
reference  are  different,  not  because  the  agents’  natures  are  different  (pp.  49-50).  The  natures  of 
the  agents  are  not  different  in  the  sense  that  practical  reason  is  not  different;  agents  deal  with 
different  problems  and  different  contexts,  but  they  all  engage  in  practical  reason  and  the  task  of 
self  understanding.  Velleman’s  point  is  that  any  deficiency  in  the  nature  of  practical  reason  is  not 
13  This  should  not  be  confused  with  the  claim  that  moral  reasons  exist  in  a  manner  which  implies  they  are 
separate  from  an  agent,  each  agent  provides  reasons  according  to  their  nature  and  while  those  reasons 
are  provided  within  a  particular  perspective,  and  only  exist  in  that  perspective,  separate  perspectives  will 
have  commonalities  underlying  their  reasons  because  of  the  commonalities  that  exist  in  their  natures 
(Velleman,  2013,  p.  62).  
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a  failure  of  an  agent  but  a  sense  in  which  one  is  failing  to  be  an  agent .  An  inability  to  reason 14
and  the  failure  to  do  so  correctly  are  distinct,  argues  Velleman,  and  the  manner  in  which  they 
are  different  is  the  type  of  evidence  that  is  used  to  support  his  theory.  As  Velleman  (2013) 
explains,  the  support  for  the  foundations  of  his  theory  are  observations  as  much  as  arguments 
(p.  45).  The  distinction  between  failing  to  understand  yourself  and  being  unable  to  understand 
yourself   is  an  example  of  one  of  these  types  of  observations:  we  observe  that  agents  have  to 
have  particular  capacities  in  order  to  actually  be  agents.  So,  according  to  Velleman, 
observations  about  our  own  nature  and  the  nature  of  our  reason  (including  what  counts  as  an 
agent)  provide  supporting  evidence  for  his  theory . 15
 
In  summary,  Velleman  argues  that  the  nature  of  an  agent  provides  reasons  for  action  and,  in  the 
process  of  doing  so,  dictates  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer  to  questions  about  how  the  agent 
should  act;  therefore,  the  source  of  normativity  is  the  nature  of  action  itself,  because  action  is 
the  activity  of  making  oneself  intelligible  with  the  reasons  for  action  that  one  finds  in  one's  own 
perspective  as  a  subject.  This  is  a  constitutivist  theory  because  the  grounding  of  normativity,  the 
source  of  answers  to  normative  questions,  is  what  is  constitutive  of  action.  The  agent 
understands  where  normativity  comes  from  and  how  to  answer  normative  questions  by 
understanding  that  the  nature  of  action  is  the  pursuit  of  coherently  acting  for  the  reasons  for 
action  that  the  agent  provides.  
 
  
14  Which  is  not  to  say  that  deficiencies  entail  that  one  is  not  an  agent  in  an  absolute  sense.  This  can  be  a 
scalar  matter  rather  than  ‘all  or  nothing’.  If  one’s  capacity  for  practical  reason  has  been  damaged  then 
ones  agency  has  taken  damage,  but  that  does  not  entail  that  one  is  not  an  agent  (although,  presumably, 
extensive  damage  that  does  reach  this  point  is  a  possibility).  
15  I  suspect  that  this  point  reflects  the  Kantian  inspiration  from  Velleman’s  earlier  work.  Similar  to  the 
process  of  transcendental  apperception  which  grounds  the  Kantian  approach  Velleman  is  asking  the 
reader  to  examine  their  own  nature  and  the  nature  of  their  reason  to  provide  grounding  for  his  theory  of 
normativity.  
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1.3  Why  the  shmagency  problem  applies  to  Velleman’s  constitutivism 
Enoch  argues  that  his  shmagency  problem  demonstrates  that  a  subject,  such  as  a  shmagent, 
could  be  so  different  from  an  agent  that  its  constitution  entailed  a  different  normativity  than  the 
normativity  which  follows  from  agency.  The  significance  of  this  is  that  even  if  constitutivism  can 
justify  normativity  for  agents  that  does  not  entail  that  this  normativity  is  justified  for  shmagents.  A 
constitutivist  might  explain,  to  an  agent,  why  the  answers  to  normative  questions  are  found  in 
the  constitution  of  agency,  and  so  justify  those  answers,  but  this  approach  cannot  extend  the 
justification  to  non-agents.  For  this  reason  the  answers  provided  by  the  constitutivist  approach, 
answers  provided  by  appealing  to  one's  constitution,  are  not  suitably  justified  and,  hence,  not 
objective  (truth  apt).  They  are  not  suitably  justified  because  the  agent  can  question  its  own 
agency,  by  asking  whether  it  ought  to  be  an  agent,  and  in  that  manner  question  the  grounding  of 
normativity  provided  by  Velleman’s  constitutivist  theory.  The  shmagency  problem  question,  why 
be  an  agent,  may  still  be  asked  by  an  agent  even  if  they  already  have  reasons  for  action  and 
regardless  of  the  manner  in  which  those  reasons  for  action  were  acquired.  An  agent  may  in  this 
manner  ask  about  those  reasons  which,  according  to  Velleman’s  theory,  are  the  source  of 
normativity  and  constitutive  of  action.  The  answers  to  these  questions,  which  are  about  those 
elements  of  an  agent’s  nature  that  is  constitutive  of  normativity,  must  appeal  beyond  what  can 
be  provided  by  Velleman’s  theory  to  provide  an  answer.  The  result  is  that  Velleman  has 
provided  a  story  about  how  we  derive  normativity  from  the  reasons  which  are  constitutive  of 
action,  but  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  question  asks  why  we  should  endorse  those  reasons, 
even  if  we  accept  that  we  have  them.  So,  the  agent  may  acknowledge  reasons  as  Velleman 
describes  them  but  still  ask  about  hypothetical  alternatives,  shmagents  who  shmact  instead  of 
agents  who  act,  and  ask  the  normative  question:  ‘ought  I  be  one  of  those,  a  shmagent,  instead 
of  what  I  am?’. 
 
Enoch’s  argument  is  that  this  hypothetical  subject,  the  shmagent,  could  provide  these 
alternative  answers  even  if  Velleman’s  argument,  and  his  constitutive  approach,  is  otherwise 
successful  (Enoch,  2006,  p.  178).  The  shmagency  problem  depends  on  a  normative  question 
which  may  be  asked  by  the  agent  even  if  you  assume  the  supporting  claims  underlying 
Velleman’s  theory.  Even  if  you  grant  that  an  actor  is  attempting  to  act  intelligibly  to  themselves 
according  to  criteria  dictated  by  the  reasons  their  nature  has  provided,  that  same  agent  may 
enquire  as  to  whether  this  is  how  they  should  be;  any  type  of  subject  with  any  type  of 
motivations  could  still  ask  ‘should  I  be  what  I  am’  (or,  ‘why  be  an  agent?’).  By  any  subject  I 
mean  any  subject  assuming  they  possess  the  required  rational  faculties  to  undertake  rational 
inquiry.  Given  the  deliberative  nature  of  action  in  Velleman’s  theory  it  is  fair  to  assume  a  robust 
faculty  of  reason.  However,  a  reply  related  to  this  point  will  be  put  forward  later  in  this  paper  in 
which  I  will  argue  that  a  deficiency  of  the  shmagency  problem  question  itself  may  entail  that  no 
creature  with  a  rational  faculty  could  intelligibly  ask  such  a  question,  because  it  does  not  make 
sense. 
 
The  assertion  underlying  Enoch’s  argument  is  that,  even  if  Velleman  is  right  that  we  are  agents, 
there  is,  also,  a  sense  in  which  we  are  subjects  who  can  suppose  being  something  else.  The 
distinction  between  the  term  subject  and  agent  that  I  have  just  used  demonstrates  the  key  point 
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made  by  the  shmagency  problem  and  why  it  applies  to  Velleman’s  constitutivism.  Whatever  it  is, 
exactly,  that  makes  us  agents,  in  the  sense  Velleman  describes,  it  does  not  appear  to  preclude 
us  from  asking  whether  we  ought  to  be  agents.  In  this  sense  we  are  subjects  first  and  agents 
second;  we  are  thinking  creatures  with  a  perspective,  and  for  that  reason  can  ask  normative 
questions  about  the  type  of  subjects  we  are .  We  can  ask  those  questions  even  if  we  do  not 
know  what  it  would  be  like  to  be  another  type  of  subject,  even  if  we  do  not  have  a  specific  notion 
about  what  we  would  change  or  what  it  would  be  like  to  have  changed  elements  of  our  nature. 
In  this  sense  the,  notional,  shmagent  can  perform  its  function  as  the  demonstration  of  Enoch’s 
critique,  even  if  it  is  a  purely  negative  conception:  the  shmagent  does  not  need  to  be  a  particular 
or  concrete  suggestion,  it  can  merely  mean  not  being  constituted  as  an  agent  is  constituted. 
Velleman  provides  a  theory  which  argues  that  normativity  comes  from  our  agency,  and  Enoch 
criticizes  this  theory  because  there  must  be  a  reason  to  think  that  our  agency  matters  in  the  first 
place.  In  this  manner  the  shmagency  problem  question,  ‘why  be  an  agent?’,  can  be  rephrased, 
for  the  purpose  of  explanation,  to:  ‘if  agency  entails  particular  normative  prescriptions,  what 
entails  that  the  normative  prescriptions  of  agency  are  significant?’  
 
When  explaining  the  normativity  of  reasons,  Velleman  (2013)  argues  that  providing  the 
foundations  for  his  normative  theory  requires  explaining  where  the  normativity  of  reasons  comes 
from  in  a  non-reductionist  manner  (pp.  49-50).  Velleman’s  point  is  that  there  must  be  a  story  to 
tell  about  why  any  given  reason  prescribes  in  the  manner  that  it  does.  It  cannot  simply  be  brute 
fact;  it  cannot  simply  be  the  case  that  reasons  are  normative.  This  anti-reductionist  requirement 
is  the  reason  the  shmagency  problem  question,  ‘why  be  an  agent?’,  is  a  problem  for  Velleman’s 
theory.  In  this  manner  the  shmagency  problem,  as  it  applies  to  Velleman’s  theory  in  particular, 
can  be  restated  as:  there  must  be  a  non-reductionist  reason  for  us  to  endorse  agency  if  we  have 
reasons  to  endorse  the  prescriptions  that  follow  from  agency.  This  is  a  problem  because  the 
reason  to  endorse  agency  cannot  appeal  to  agency  and,  hence,  the  normativity  which  follows 
from  agency  is  contingent  on  something  that  is  not  grounded  in  agency.  Furthermore,  because 
the  reasons  to  endorse  what  does  follow  from  agency  are  found  in  whatever  reason  we  have  to 
endorse  agency,  the  grounding  of  normativity  is,  in  fact,  whatever  provides  us  with  a  reason  to 
endorse  agency  rather  than  in  agency  itself. 
  
In  summary,  even  if  the  hypothetical  alternative  subject  is  completely  impossible,  the  schmagent 
still  illustrates  that  Velleman,  by  deploying  the  constitutivist  maneuver,  has  derived  a  normative 
necessity  from  a  non-normative  necessity.  The  shmagency  problem  question  demonstrates  that 
the  agent,  the  one  asking  the  question,  is  capable  of  asking  normative  questions  about  what 
they  are,  even  if  they  possess  no  ability  to  change  what  they  are,  and  in  demonstrating  this 
capacity  the  shmagency  problem  critique  reveals  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  what  is 
necessarily  the  case  and  what  ought  to  be  the  case  (Enoch,  2011a,  pp.  220-223).  Velleman’s 
assertion  that  we  provide  reasons  based  on  our  frame  of  reference  fails  to  establish  that  these 
are  the  reasons  we  ought  to  provide  and  this  failure  stands  even  if  we  grant  that  those  reasons 
are  ones  we  must  provide.  This  distinction  between  what  we  do  in  fact ,  or  even  must ,  provide  to 
our  own  perspective  and  what  we  ought  to  provide  illustrates  that  there  are  some  questions 
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whose  answers  are  beyond  the  scope  of  what  is  constitutive  of  action  or  agency.  There  must  be 




1.4  Velleman’s  reply 
Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  that  the  variation  between  subjects,  hypothetical 
or  otherwise,  is  irrelevant  when  the  term  ‘subjects’  refers  to  non  agents  (such  as  shmagents). 
Velleman  (2009)  argues  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  critique  misunderstands  the  scope  of 
normativity  and  the  importance  of  supplying  the  criterion  of  correctness  when  asking  a 
normative  question  (pp.  142-144).  Normative  questions  are  types  of  questions  that  are  asked 
about  what  an  agent  should  do  and,  for  that  reason,  they  are  limited  to  the  actions  and 
perspective  of  agents.  According  to  Velleman’s  reply,  the  shmagency  problem  question,  ‘why  be 
an  agent?’,  is  an  impossible  question  if  it  supposes  you  can  somehow  ask  it  without  first  being 
an  agent  and  it  is  a  trivial  question  if  you  ask  it  as  an  agent  (p.  143).   Because  the  criterion  for 16
a  correct  answer  to  a  normative  question  is  provided  by  the  agent  there  simply  is  no  correct 
answer  to  normative  questions  without  being  an  agent ;  hence,  any  attempt  to  answer  a 
normative  question  without  invoking  agency  is  simply  a  defective  use  of  practical  reason  and 
any  attempt  to  answer  a  normative  question  which  does  invoke  agency  can  only  provide 
normativity  which  is  grounded  in  what  is  constitutive  of  the  actions  of  agents .  
 
The  objectivity  of  normativity  is  not  grounded  in  the  same  manner  as  objectivity  for 
non-normative  facts.  Assuming,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  a  shmagent  could  not  have 
different  and  simultaneously  correct  answers  about  non-normative  facts,  such  as  scientific  facts, 
does  not  entail  that  the  shmagent  and  agent  cannot  have  different  answers  about  normative 
facts .  Velleman’s  argument,  in  reply  to  Enoch,  is  that  objective  normative  facts  can  vary  from 
subject  to  subject  if  they  are  fundamentally  different  types  of  subjects,  such  as  shmagents  and 
agents.  Notice  that  Velleman’s  reply  acknowledges  the  possibility  of  shmagents,  this  is  where 
he  deviates  from  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  that  I  develop  in  §1.6.  Velleman 
(2009)  explains  that  the  objectivity  of  normativity  is  grounded  in  the  inescapability  of  providing 
the  criterion  for  the  correct  answers  to  normative  questions  when  engaging  in  the  perspective  of 
practical  reason  (pp.  138-140).  Practical  reason  entails  the  aim  of  self  understanding,  which  in 
turn  entails  asking  normative  questions  and  providing  the  criteria  for  correct  answers  to  those 
questions.  The  type  of  objectivity  normative  facts  have,  according  to  Velleman’s  theory,  is 
relative  to  the  subject  and,  hence,  it  follows  that  altering  the  subject  does  (or,  at  least,  can)  alter 
the  normative  facts.  Furthermore,  the  variance  of  normative  facts,  depending  on  the  nature  of 
the  subject,  does  not  challenge  the  objectivity  of  those  normative  facts  because  they  are  only 
objective,  only  truth  apt,  in  the  context  of  the  subject’s  perspective  and  that  perspective  is 
determined  by  the  subjects  nature  (by  how  it  is  constituted)  Notice  that,  according  to  Velleman, 
this  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  necessary  similarities  between  subjects.  For  example, 
the  relationship  between  action  and  normativity  might  be  the  same  for  all  subjects  in  the  sense 
that  it  always  entails  self-understanding  even  though  the  particulars  of  what  follows  from  the 
goal  of  self-understanding  may  vary.  
 
16  Velleman’s  point  that  Enoch  asks  an  impossible  question  lays  the  groundwork  for  the  Kantian  reply  to 
the  shmagency  problem  I  develop  on  Velleman’s  behalf  in  §1.6.  Rather  than  develop  this  line  of  argument 
Velleman  puts  forward  a  relativist  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  which  Iexplain  in  §1.4. 
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So,  even  if  the  shmagency  problem  shows  that  normative  facts,  as  they  are  described  in 
Velleman’s  theory,  cannot  be  objective  in  the  same  sense  as  non-normative  facts,  this  is  not  a 
problem  for  Velleman.  It  might  be  the  case  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  identifies  that 
non-normative  facts  cannot  be  both  objective  and  grounded  in  what  is  constitutive  of  action; 
because,  for  example,  a  relationship  between  the  facts  and  the  external  world  entails  some 
external  elements  in  the  grounding  of  the  facts.  Enoch  might  have  established  that 
non-normative  facts,  in  some  sense,  come  from  the  external  world.  Which  is  to  say,  because  of 
the  way  the  world  is  the  correct  answers  to  at  least  some  types  of  questions  must  be  grounded 
to  at  least  some  extent  in  what  that  external  world  is  like.  The  accuracy  of  this  depiction  of 
non-normative  facts  is  not  important  to  Velleman’s  reply  and  is  not  intended  to  represent 
Velleman’s  position  on  that  issue,  it  is  presented  to  explain  the  distinction  between 
non-normative  and  normative  facts.  The  point  is  that  Velleman’s  theory  establishes  objectivity 
only  for  normative  facts  and  this  does  not  require  taking  a  position  beyond  that  scope.  So, 
claiming  that  normative  facts  can  differ  from  subject  to  subject  entails,  strictly,  that  this  is  true  for 
normative  facts  and  it  is  not  intended  to  extend  to  any  similar  claims  about  non-normative  facts 
such  as  ‘scientific  facts’.  Normative  facts  have  their  own  nature  and  their  own  type  of  objectivity; 
the  shmagency  problem,  according  to  Velleman’s  position,  falsely  assumes  that  objectivity  for 
normative  facts  is  similar  to  objectivity  for  non-normative  facts. 
 
If  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  demonstrates  that  non-normative  facts  cannot  be  both  objective 
and  grounded  in  what  is  constitutive  of  action,  it  does  not  follow  that  normative  facts  cannot  be 
objective  and  grounded  in  what  is  constitutive  of  action,  because  objectivity  can  mean  different 
things  for  normative  facts  than  it  does  for  non-normative  facts.  In  the  case  of  normative  facts, 
objectivity  means  that  normativity  is  established  by  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  and  so  is  only 
true  for  agents ;  grounding  normativity  in  agency  entails  that  the  objectivity  of  normativity 
extends  to  subjects  that  are  agents,  not  shmagents,  and  justifying  the  correctness  of  answers  to 
normative  questions  to  those  who  are  not  agents,  such  as  shmagents,  is  not  required  because 
“once  we  have  established  that  an  aim  is  constitutive  of  agency,  we  must  expect  it  to  be  solely 
self-justifying”  (Velleman,  2009,  p.  142).  The  expectation,  crucial  to  the  shmagency  problem 
critique,  that  the  shmagent  having  different  answers  to  normative  questions  than  the  agent  is  a 
problem  merely  demonstrates  that  Enoch  and  Velleman  are  referring  to  different  things  when 
using  the  term  ‘objective’.  
 
An  independently  stable  shmagent  is  simply  irrelevant  to  normativity  for  agents.  If  an  agent  were 
to  consider  whether  they  should  be  an  agent  or  a  shmagent,  they  could  only  do  so  according  to 
the  criteria  for  correct  answers  provided  by  their  agency.  So,  we  are  not  subjects  first  and 
agents  second  when  it  comes  to  normativity.  Normative  questions  are  limited  to  those  questions 
for  which  the  subject  can  provide  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer.  However,  even  if  the 
shmagent  were  an  alternative  type  of  subject  capable  of  providing  criteria  for  correct  answers  to 
normative  questions,  this  alternative  would  be  irrelevant  to  the  agent.  As  Velleman  (2009) 
explains  this  hypothetical  possibility,  the  shmagent,  would  provide  shmmorals  in  a  somewhat 
similar  manner  to  how  the  agent  provides  morals:  so  the  agent  makes  choices  while  the 
shmagent  makes  shmchoices,  they  are  different  but  not  in  some  untenable  epistemic  conflict  (p. 
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143).   In  such  a  hypothetical  example  the  shmagent  would  represent  a  stable  alternative  to 
agency  which  would  result  in  “two  independently  stable  conditions”  but  this  is  simply  not  a 
concern  to  the  agent   (pp.  142-144).   There  is  a  sense  in  which  only  the  agents  “independently 17
stable  condition”  relates  to  normativity.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  the  force  of  normativity  is  for 
agents .  The  shmmorals  that  relate  to  the  shmagent  would  be  shmnorms  rather  than  norms 
because  they  come  from  shmagency.  In  this  sense  the  shmagent  does  not  deal  in  normativity  at 
all,  it  deals  in  shmnormativity .  However,  this  categorisation  of  shmnormativity  as  distinct, 
because  of  its  foundations,  from  normativity  does  not  alter  Enoch’s  claims  that  the  shmagent 
has  a  competing  set  of  prescriptions  for  action  that  are  derived  from  its  constitution. 
Shmnormativity  is  equivalent  to  normativity  in  the  sense  that  Enoch  requires  it  to  be:  both 
prescribe  reasons  for  action  that  one  might  endorse  given  the  appropriate  constitution.  The 
agent,  because  it  is  an  agent,  must  deal  in  reasons,  while  the  shmagent  deals  in  shmreasons 
and  the  existence  of  one  does  not  entail  a  problem  for  the  objectivity  of  the  normative  facts  of 
the  other  because  the  objectivity  of  each  is  isolated  to  the  type  of  subject  they  are:  shmagent 
objectivity  is  for  shmagents  and  agent  objectivity  is  for  agents,  neither  entails  a  claim  to 
normative  knowledge  that  extends  to  the  other. 
 
  
17  I  would  like  to  thank  Velleman  for  access  to  an  unpublished  manuscript  where  he  explains  this  point 
further  ( The  two  normativities ,  forthcoming,  p.  15). 
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1.5  The  cost  of  Velleman’s  reply 
Enoch  (2011a)  describes  the  results  of  the  shmagency  problem  in  terms  of  “score  keeping”  (p. 
227)  and  argues  that  the  shmagency  problem  debate  has  failed  to  demonstrate  that  how  we  are 
constituted  is  “anything  but  normatively  arbitrary”  (p.  228).  Enoch’s  argument  is  that  the 
constitutivists,  and  Velleman  in  particular,  have  to  either  explain  why  the  shmagency  problem 
question  cannot  be  asked,  in  the  external  sense,  or  why  we  have  an  external  reason  to  endorse 
agency.  Enoch  has  identified  the  problem  that  constitutivism  entails  that  a  justification  which  is 
not  grounded  in  agency  cannot  be  demanded  without  first  assuming  either  agency  or  the 
framework  of  some  constitution.  Enoch’s  score  keeping  approach  tis  an  appropriate  method  for 
representing  the  results  of  the  debate  because  Velleman  and  Enoch  have  different  ideas  about 
what  counts  as  a  problem  for  their  respective  positions.  In  this  sense,  the  implications  of 
Velleman’s  reply  are  a  cost  that  Velleman  is  willing  to  pay,  or  are  not  even  viewed  by  Velleman 
as  a  cost,  while  Enoch  considers  those  same  costs  unacceptable.  Furthermore,  implications  of 
Velleman’s  theory  which  Enoch  considers  costs  are,  from  Velleman’s  position,  the  same  points 
that  make  his  theory  plausible  For  this  reason,  it  is  helpful  to  present  these  implications  as 
‘costs’  to  identify  that  Enoch  considers  establishing  that  these  are  implications  of  Velleman’s 
theory  a  success  of  the  shmagency  problem  debate. 
 
I  disagree  with  Enoch’s  (2011a)  point  that  “no  convincing  reasons  have  been  given  for  why  we 
should  reject”  normative  questions  external  from  the  framework  of  agency  (p.  228).  I  disagree 
because  Velleman  (2009)  directly  addresses  this  point  and  explains  why,  and  in  what  sense, 
normative  questions  cannot  be  asked  externally  from  some  framework  of  constitution:  his 
argument  is  that  ‘normative  questions’  means  questions  asked  relative  to  some  framework, 
because  the  criteria  for  correct  answers  about  normative  questions  are  the  frameworks  within 
which  they  are  asked  (p.  143).  Velleman’s  point,  as  explained  earlier,  is  that  normative 
questions  cannot  be  asked  externally  from  the  framework  of  agency:  to  do  so  would  be  to  ask  a 
defective  question.  I  agree  with  the  sentiment  underlying  Enoch’s  point,  which  is  that  having  to 
take  the  stance  that   the  shmagency  problem  question  does  not  make  sense  is  a  cost  of 
Velleman’s  theory.  It  is  a  cost  because  the  reason  Velleman  gives  to  convince  us  that  the 
shmagency  problem  question  cannot  be  asked  without  assuming  the  agents  framework  of 
constitution  is  essentially  a  restatement  of  his  theory. 
 
The  reason  Velleman  gives  to  convince  us  that  the  shmagency  problem  cannot  be  asked 
externally  from  the  framework  of  agency  had  to  be  a  restatement  of  his  theory,  because  the 
purpose  of  his  theory  is  to  explain  the  grounding  of  normativity.  The  shmagency  problem  asks  a 
normative  question,  ‘why  be  an  agent?,  and  the  constitutivist  must  refer  to  our  constitution  to 
provide  an  answer  to  that  question.  The  constitutivist  must  refer  to  our  constitution,  or  at  least 
some  constitution,  when  responding  to  the  shmagency  problem  question  because  the  point  of 
the  constitutivist  approach  is  to  explain  normativity  by  reference  to  our  constitution.  For  this 
reason,  the  shmagency  problem  does  demonstrate  that  constitutivism  is,  in  this  sense,  circular.  
 
However,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  circularity  is  a  problem.  If  our  constitution,  and  the  task  of 
self-understanding,  is  a  compelling  grounding  for  normativity,  then  circular  answers  to  normative 
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questions  may  be  an  acceptable  price  to  pay.  Velleman’s  reasons  for  thinking  that  this  is  an 
acceptable  price  relate  to  the  nature  of  the  objectivity  he  intends  to  establish  for  normative  facts. 
Velleman’s  reply  requires  that  objectivity  about  normative  and  non-normative  facts  is,  in  some 
meaningful  sense,  distinct.  Objectivity  about  normative  facts  can ,  at  least  hypothetically,  lead  to 
different  truths  between  subjects.  Although  normative  facts  for  agents  cannot  differ  in  this 
manner,  normative  facts  for  other  types  of  subjects,  non  agents,  may  provide  completely 
different  answers  to  moral  questions  even  in  identical  circumstances   without  this  variance 18
threatening  the  objectivity  of  the  moral  claims  made  by  either  type  of  subject.  Enoch’s  point  is 
that  Velleman’s  (2011)  claim  that  one  cannot  ask  normative  questions  without  prescribing  to  a 
frame  of  reference,  “within  the  framework  of  some  constitution”  (p.  143),  appears  to  be  an 
implausible  claim  which  Velleman  is  required  to  make  in  order  to  defend  his  theory  from  the 
shmagency  problem.:  Hence,  this  claim  is  a  cost  of  Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem. 
Velleman  makes  this  claim  in  order  to  establish  that  asking  the  shmagency  problem  question 
without  assuming  either  agency,  shmagency,  or  some  type  of  subjecthood  is  nonsensical. 
Velleman  needs  to  deny  that  a  subject  can  ask  normative  questions  without  appealing  to  what  is 
constitutive  of  their  nature,  because  the  notion  of  a  subject  asking  a  normative  question 
externally  from  their  own  nature  is  incompatible  with  his  theory.  Enoch  (2009)  argues  that 
Velleman  has  failed  to  establish  that  this  type  of  question  can  be  asked: 
If,  as  I  suggested,  apparently  making  sense  is  strong  pro  tanto  evidence  of  making 
sense,  the  dialectical  situation  is  not  symmetrical.  The  burden  is  on  Velleman  to  show 
some  countervailing  reason,  some  reason  to  believe  that  appearances  here  are 
misleading,  and  that  the  external  question  that  appears  to  make  sense  in  fact  does  not. 
(p.  226) 
While  Velleman  provides  supporting  reasons  to  justify  his  claim  that  normative  questions  do  not 
make  sense  without  referring  to  agency  (or  some  framework  which  is  constitutive  of  the  nature 
of  a  subject),  the  supporting  reasons  he  gives  are  his  constitutivist  theory.  Because  Velleman’s 
constitutivism  entails  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  does  not  make  sense,  insofar  as  it 
entails  asking  a  question  outside  of  your  own  constitution,  it  has  conceded  the  point  to  Enoch  as 
much  as  it  has  provided  a  defence.  Velleman’s  reply  deploys  the  same  theory  he  is  defending  to 
explain  why  the  problem  he  is  replying  to  is  either  not  a  problem  or  does  not  make  sense,  which 
puts  his  defence  in  the  position  of  relying  on  the  plausibility  of  the  same  points  which  required 
the  defence.  Therefore,  the  point  of  contention  is  whether  the  question,  ‘why  be  an  agent?’ 
asked  without  assuming  agency  or  an  analogous  framework  of  reference,  makes  sense  and 
because  of  that  the  plausibility  of  this  question  making  sense  becomes  the  plausibility  of 
Velleman’s  theory. 
 
Another  way  of  saying  this  is  that  the  shmagency  problem  question,  ‘why  be  an  agent?’,  is  only 
as  much  of  a  problem  as  the  notion  of  asking  a  question  which  is  external  from  agency.  If  asking 
18An  alternative  way  of  stating  this  claim  would  be  that  agents  and  shmagents  simply  cannot  be  in 
identical  circumstances  because  being  an  agent  is  a  relevant  element  of  the  circumstances  which  pertain 
to  any  moral  claims.  However,  I  do  not  think  Velleman  is  committed  to  this  stronger  version  of  the  claim:  it 
may  be  desirable  to  make  the  claim  in  this  manner  but  it  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  put  forward 
Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem. 
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a  normative  question  without  the  framework  of  some  constitution  is  a  plausible  notion  then  the 
shmagency  problem  question  is  a  demonstration  of  why  Velleman’s  theory  is  not  plausible 
(strictly  to  the  extent  that  the  notion  of  such  a  question  is  plausible).  However,  if  asking  a 
normative  question  without  the  framework  of  some  constitution  is  not  a  plausible  notion  the 
shmagency  problem  question  is  an  example  of  a  question  which  does  not  make  sense. 
Crucially,  Velleman  provides  an  answer  which  is  consistent  with  his  theory  when  faced  with  the 
shmagency  problem  question:  Velleman  replies  that  the  question  itself  does  not  make  sense 
because  of  the  implications  of  his  theory .  This  is  a  cost  only  insofar  as  the  plausibility  of  the 
question  making  sense  is  more  potent  than  the  plausibility  of  Velleman’s  theory.  If  one  finds 
Velleman’s  theory  convincing,  the  fact  that  it  explains  why  the  shmagency  problem  question 
does  not  make  sense  is  an  advantage  of  the  theory:  it  is  an  example  of  the  theory  explaining 
what  requires  explaining .  If  one  finds  Velleman’s  theory  unconvincing,  the  fact  that  it  does  not 19
provide  any  new  information  when  replying  to  the  shmagency  problem  question  may  appear, 
like  it  does  to  Enoch,  to  be  the  theory  failing  to  provide  a  reason  to  change  your  mind.  In  either 
case,  the  shmagency  problem  debate  has  clarified  the  points  of  disagreement  and  in  that  sense 
aided  the  reader  in  deciding  which  position  is  more  compelling;  although  it  does  not  appear  to 
have  provided  a  conclusive  argument  one  way  or  the  other. 
 
Enoch  can  now  reframe  his  critique  in  the  style  of  his  “argument  from  objectivity's  implications” 
(2011b,  p.  16-49).  Velleman’s  reply  entails  both  that  asking  a  normative  question  requires 
agency,  or  an  analogous  framework  of  reference  which  supplies  a  constitution  from  which 
normativity  can  be  derived,  and  that  the  objectivity  of  normative  facts  is  compatible  with  varying 
constitutions,  even  if  such  variances  are  merely  hypothetical,  providing  varying  normative  facts. 
Enoch  argues  that  taking  this  position  is  cost  enough,  but  I  contend  that  a  different  argument, 
the  argument  from  objectivity's  implications  that  Enoch  provides  in  “Taking  Morality  Seriously  A 
Defense  of  Robust  Realism”  is  capable  of  being  deployed  against  Velleman’s  position  in 
response  to  Velleman’s  reply.  Enoch  (2011b)  argues  that  subject-dependent  theories  are  not 
plausible  because  they  require  depending  on  the  responses  of  subjects  to  provide  answers  to 
moral  questions  which  results  in  a  problematic  variety  of  answers  to  questions  which  can  only 
plausibly  have  one  correct  answer  (pp.  15-49).  Given  that  Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  entails  that  subjects  with  differing  constitutions  (such  as  shmagents)  can  generate 
different  normative  truths,  Enoch’s  argument  from  objectivity's  implications  is  almost  a  suitable 
reply  to  Velleman’s  constitutivism.  
 
Enoch’s  argument  from  objectivity's  implications  is  an  argument  directed  at  moral  relativism  in 
general,  which  is  why  it  applies  to  Velleman’s  constitutivism.  Because  normativity,  as 
established  by  Velleman’s  theory,  is  relative  to  the  constitution  of  the  subject  (its  frame  of 
reference)  it  is  an  appropriate  target  for  the  argument  Enoch  uses  against  relativist  theories. 
Velleman  will,  of  course,  not  view  being  the  target  of  Enoch’s  argument  against  moral  relativism 
as  a  cost:  it  will  not  bother  Velleman  that  his  theory  is  an  appropriate  target  for  an  argument 
19  Rosati  (2016)  puts  forward  a  similar  reply  in  “Agents  and  “Shmagents”:  An  Essay  on  Agency  and 
Normativity”  where  she  argues  that  Enoch’s  critique  fails  to  explain  why  the  constitutivist  cannot  merely 
appeal  to  the  constitutivist  theory  to  justify  agency  (pp.  203-204). 
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against  moral  relativism  because  his  theory  is  a  relativist  theory.  As  a  relativist  theory  Velleman 
is  not  trying  to  establish  the  same  type  of  foundations  or  grounding  for  morality  that  Enoch  is 
dealing  in  (see  §0.3  for  further  explanation),  so  Enoch’s  argument  from  objectivity's  implications 
is  not  going  to  concern  Velleman.  Enoch’s  argument  from  objectivity's  implications  establishes 
that  it  follows  from  relativism  that  answers  to  moral  questions  can  vary  between  subjects: 
furthermore,  establishing  this  is  key  to  the  arguments  critique  of  relativism.  As  I  discussed,  in 
Velleman’s  reply,  Velleman  actually  agrees  with  this  point:  it  does  follow  from  Velleman’s  theory 
that  the  answers  to  moral  questions  can  vary  between  subjects,  but  only  if  they  are  different 
kinds  of  subjects  in  a  sense  that  entails  they  have  a  different  frame  of  reference  (such  as 
shmagents  and  agents).  
 
Caroline  Arruda  (2016)  argues  in  “Constitutivism  and  the  Self-Reflection  Requirement”  that 
Velleman’s  constitutivism  entails  only  weak  normativity  in  the  sense  that  his  theory  only  entails  a 
type  of  “non-moral  pressure  to  consider  the  kinds  of  motives  and  reasons  that  inform  one’s 
actions  in  light  of  one’s  non-moral  aim  to  be  an  autonomous  agent”  (p.  1176).  Arruda’s  point  is 
that  Velleman’s  theory  “has  no  obvious  stake  in  the  debate  about  metaethical  constructivism” 
(p.1176).  This  is  true  for  the  same  reason  that  his  theory  is  subject  to  Enoch’s  argument  from 
objectivity's  implications,  and  for  the  same  reason  being  subject  to  this  argument  is  not  a 
problem  (a  cost)  as  far  as  he  is,  or  needs  to  be,  concerned:  Velleman  has  no  stake  in  the 
shmagency  problem  in  the  sense  that  his  theory  is  not  trying  to  construct  objectivity  in  the  sense 
that  Enoch  is  critiquing.  Even  if  Enoch  succeeds  in  establishing  that  constitutivism  fails  to 
ground  objectivity,  in  the  sense  that  Enoch  understands  objectivity,  this  is  not  a  concern  for 
Velleman  because  the  type  of  objectivity  he  is  attempting  to  ground  is  different  than  the  type  of 
objectivity  Enoch  is  dealing  in.  Velleman  is  claiming  constitutivism  grounds  normative  facts  that 
are  truth  apt  for  agents  while  Enoch  is  critiquing  constitutivism  for  failing  to  establish  normative 
facts  that  are  truth  apt  full  stop  (or,  truth  apt  for  all  subjects). 
 
Velleman’s  theory  is  response-dependant  in  a  manner  incompatible  with  Enoch’s  objectivism 
because  the  two  philosophers  mean  different  things  by  the  notion  of  objective  normativity. 
Because  the  debate  between  Velleman  and  Enoch  results  in  competing  assertions  about  the 
plausibility  of  being  able  to  ask  a  normative  question  without  relying  on  what  is  constitutive  of 
agency  (or  shmagency),  advancing  the  debate  further  requires  moving  beyond  the  shmagency 
problem,  as  such,  and  discussing  the  nature  of  objectivity  directly.  The  closest  Enoch  comes  to 
providing  an  argument  that  directly  threatens  Velleman’s  understanding  of  objectivity  is  his 
argument  from  objectivity’s  implications,  which  is  why  I  contend  that  it  is  close  to  a  suitable 
response  to  Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.  I  do  not  think  Enoch  would  endorse 
applying  this  argument  as  it  stands,  because  the  argument  from  objectivity’s  implications  utilises 
the  variation  of  answers  to  normative  questions  between  actual  agents  and  the  shmagency 
problem  requires  only  variation  between  hypothetical  agents.  However,  insofar  as  Enoch  is 
required  to  provide  further  supporting  argument  against  the  plausibility  of  Velleman’s  claims,  he 
can  do  so  by  arguing,  as  he  does  in  the  argument  from  objectivity’s  implications,  that  a  definition 
of  objectivity  which  facilitates  different  responses  from  different  subjects  merely  because  of 
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those  subjects’  differences  fails  to  meet  the  expectations  we  have  for  what  constitutes  objective 
fact.  
 
In  summary,  Velleman  is  unlikely  to  view  the  commitment  to  his  relativist  foundation  for 
normativity  as  a  cost;  it  is  a  feature  of  his  theory.  The  cost  of  Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  is  that  it  entails  that  the  shmagency  problem  question  does  not  make  sense  and  that 
objective  normative  facts  may  differ  between  sufficiently  different  subjects.  The  plausibility  of 
these  claims  undermines  the  plausibility  of  Velleman’s  position  only  insofar  as  the  claims 
themselves  are  not  plausible  (Enoch,  2011a,  pp.  227-228).  Essentially,  the  cost  of  Velleman’s 
reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  that  his  theory  is  a  relativist  theory,.  so,  it  is  no  surprise  that 
Enoch  terms  this  a  cost  while  Velleman  does  not.  Velleman  (2013)  argues  in  that  there  are 
reasons  to  wonder  whether  he  is  a  relativist  or  something  else  (p.  63).  This  allows  Velleman  to 
attempt  to  assert  objectivity  and  relativism  simultaneously:  the  variance  of  normative  truth 
between  subjects  with  different  constitutions  allows  Velleman  to  deal  in  objectivity  on  the  one 
hand,  with  correct  answers  which  are  ‘objective’  within  the  scope  of  particular  reasons  found  in 
the  constitution  of  agency,  while  appealing  to  relativism  on  the  other.  Velleman  argues  that 
relativism  is  supported  as  much  by  observations  as  by  argument  (2013,  p.  45).  What  Velleman 
means  is  that  his  constitutivist  theory  is  an  observation  of  how  normativity  works  that 
demonstrates  norms  are  relative  to  constitutive  elements  of  our  nature.  Velleman’s  claims  about 
the  nature  of  the  objectivity  of  normative  facts  and  the  types  of  normative  questions  which  make 
sense  are  plausible  in  the  sense  that  they  explain  the  way  normativity  functions.  It  is  because 
normativity  only  makes  sense  in  the  context  of  our  nature  and  because  drastically  altering  that 
nature  would  alter  the  moral  facts  along  with  it  that  Velleman’s  theory  is  plausible.  At  least,  that 
is  the  claim  and,  hence,  the  costs  of  Velleman’s  reply  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  serve  as 
much  to  undermine  its  plausibility  by  forcing  it  to  make  such  claims  as  it  does  to  support 
Velleman’s  theory  by  demonstrating  that  such  claims  follow  from  it.  These  are  two  different 
methods  of  making  the  same  point,  from  both  Enoch  and  Velleman,  which  is  that  the  plausibility 





1.6  An  alternative,  Kantian,  reply 
The  result  of  Enoch  and  Velleman’s  shmagency  problem  debate  is  a  disagreement  about  the 
plausibility  of  particular  notions  of  objectivity  and  the  objectivity  of  normative  facts.  Kantian 
constitutivists  offer  an  alternative  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.  A  Kantian  constitutivist  is  not 
required  to  adopt  a  relativist  conception  of  the  objectivity  of  normative  facts  in  order  to  solve  the 
shmagency  problem.  By  taking  a  Kantian  approach,  a  constitutivist  can  provide  a  foundation  for 
objective  normativity  that  is  truth  apt  in  all  cases,  that  is,  in  the  same  sense  that  non-normative 
claims  are  objective.  The  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  that  the  shmagent  is 
impossible  because  the  shmagen  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  concepts  of  the  understanding, 
which  is  to  say,  the  ‘position’,  or  constitution,  of  the  shmagent  is  strictly  inconceivable.  While 
Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  to  appeal  to  a  notion  of  normative  objectivity  that 
is  limited  to  a  particular  type  of  subject,  one  constituted  such  that  it  an  agent,  the  Kantian  does  t 
not  concede  that  another  type  of  subject  is  possible.  By  appealing  to  a  Kantian  theory  of 
knowledge  and  facts  in  general,  rather  than  appealing  to  a  notion  of  objectivity  which  applies 
only  to  normativity,  the  shmagency  problem  can  be  solved  without  claiming  that  altering  the 
nature  of  the  subject  can  alter  moral  facts.  A  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  justifies  the  claim  that 
there  are  at  least  some  elements  of  our  nature  which  cannot  be  altered  and  even  the  prospect 
of  doing  so  is  a  nonsensical  notion.  Because  it  is  the  same  unalterable  elements  which  are 
constitutive  of  agency,  and  therefore  ground  normativity  as  per  the  constitutivist  approach,  the 
shmagent  is  impossible  and  the  shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  is 
nonsensical.  This  alternative  approach  is  not  what  follows  from  Velleman’s  theory,  his  own  reply 
explains  what  follows  from  that,  but  it  is  what  could  follow  if  he  was  not  willing  to  concede  that 
moral  truths  are  contingent  on  a  nature  that  could,  at  least  hypothetically,  be  otherwise .  If,  as 
Enoch  suggests,  Velleman’s  position  that  normative  objectivity  can  allow  for  differing  normative 
truth  between  subjects  is  a  cost  of  his  position  (and  renders  it  implausible)  then  the  constitutivist 
is  still  left  this  Kantian  reply  which  does  not  incur  this  cost.  
 
(However,  there  are  at  least  some  broad  costs  to  Velleman’s  position  were  he  to  alter  it  so  that 
he  could  deploy  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.  The  Kantian  reply  is  consistent 
with  Velleman’s  (2013)  claim  in  “Foundations  for  Moral  Relativism”  that  human  nature  is  the 
source  of  convergent  moral  attitudes  (p.  56)  and  his  (2009)  claim  in  that  how  we  are  constituted 
is  the  source  of  normative  truths  which  are  objective  (p.  139).  This  reply  is  not  consistent  with 
his  denial  that  there  are  “necessary  moral  norms  of  any  kind”  (Velleman,  2013,  p.  64);  but,  it  is 
consistent  with  the  supporting  claims  which  lead  to  Velleman’s  foundations  for  that  claim,  such 
as  his  assertion  that  there  are  aspects  of  interactions  between  agents  which  require  that  their 
moralities  facilitate  shared  moral  truths  and  that  their  nature  entails  only  limited  types  of 
divergence  from  one  another  across  societies  (2013,  pp.  45-69).  This  alternative  reply  is  a 
fundamental  deviation  from  Velleman’s  position  because  it  posits  a  different  definition  of 
objectivity  for  normative  truths.  However,  despite  this  deviation  it  is  worth  considering  in  the 
context  of  his  position  because  the  results  remain  consistent  with  the  bulk  of  his  claims  and 
arguments;  or,  anyway,  they  preserve  what  could  be  preserved  while  avoiding  the  costs  of  his 
reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.) 
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The  Kantian  reply  that  I  put  forward  is  distinct  from  Velleman’s,  however  he  does  put  forward  a 
related  line  of  argument  in  “The  Two  Normativities”  (forthcoming)  where  he  argues  that  because 
the  shmagent  is  a  differently  constituted  kind  of  subject,  than  the  agent,  it  deals  in  a  different 
type  of  normativity  (if  it  deals  in  any  normativity  at  all).  So,  while  the  agent  deals  in  morals 
because  those  are  the  normative  claims  which  are  objective  in  the  agent’s  frame  of  reference, 
the  shmagent  deals  in  shmorals,  because  if  any  normative  claims  are  objectively  true  in  the 
shmagent’s  frame  of  reference,  they  would  not  be  morals.  Velleman  concedes  that  a  shmagent 
is,  at  least  hypothetically,  possible  but  argues  that  shmagents  cannot  have  reasons  from  which 
they  can  derive  morals  but  must  instead  have  shmreasons  (forthcoming,  p.  15).  Velleman’s 
point  is  that  these  shmreasons  may  lead  to  a  coherent  state  of  affairs,  a  coherent  ‘normativity’ 
(or,  something  like  normativity:  the  shmagent  equivalent)  may  be  derived  from  them,  but  this 
independently  stable  condition  (this  coherent  normativity)  is  irrelevant  to  the  morals  of  the  agent 
because  agents  only  deal  in  reasons  and  the  shmagent’s  state  of  affairs  is  supported  by 
shmreasons .  
 
The  alternative  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  to  extend  Velleman’s  point  about 
shmagents  and  shmreasons  to  objective  claims  in  general.  Rather  than  acknowledging  that  a 
subject,  such  as  a  shmagent,  could  hypothetically  be  in  a  coherent,  independently  stable, 
condition  which  generates  normativity  from  shmreasons,  the  Kantian  argues  that  because 
elements  of  agency  provide  the  grounding  for  all  claims  and  this  includes  normative  claims,  the 
shmagent  cannot  have  any  normativity  at  all.  The  point  is  that  normativity  is  grounded  in  what  is 
constitutive  of  agency  because  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  grounds  all  claims .  So,  it  makes 
no  sense  to  talk  of  a  shmagent  who  has  an  alternative  normativity  because  if  a  subject  stopped 
being  an  agent  it  would  have  no  grounding  for  any  claims  at  all  (normative  or  non-normative). 
Furthermore,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  shmagent’s  position  could  be  coherent  or  independently 
stable,  because  making  any  claims  including  those  regarding  coherence  requires  agency.  So, 
the  shmagent  cannot  be  anything  by  the  measures  of  an  agent  and,  hence,  any  statement 
about  the  sensibility  of  a  shmagent’s  position  must  carry  the  ‘shm’  prefix  to  communicate  this: 
the  shmagent  cannot  generate  normativity  from  shmreasons  in  an  independently  stable 
condition,  it  can  only  generate  shmnormativity  in  an  shmindependently  shmstable  shmcondition. 
 
The  key  claim  underlying  the  Kantian  reply  is  that  all  knowledge  requires  grounding  in  elements 
of  the  agent,  so  the  agent  is  a  prerequisite  for  knowledge.  Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  is  a  result  of  grounding  the  objectivity  of  normativity  in  particular  in  the  constitution  of 
agency  without  extending  that  grounding  to  all  knowledge.  However,  in  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
Kant  (1781/1787/1996)  grounds  all  knowledge  and  the  objectivity  of  all  claims  in  what  is 
constitutive  of  agency:  or,  phrased  more  closely  to  his  own  terms,  in  some  of  the  elements  of 
what  our  mental  faculties  provide  ( Bxvii-xix ).  Carl  Posy  (2010)  explains  the  necessity  of  agency 
for  all  claims  in  “Man  is  the  Measure”: 
[F]or  Kant,  there  is  no  standing  outside,  and  there  is  no  distance  between  a  self  and  its 
experience.  The  only  notion  of  self  this  allows  is  the  network  of  expectations  involved  in 
each  frame  and  the  fulfillments  of  those  expectations.  A  conscious  state  can  be  ascribed 
to  a  subject  only  insofar  as  it  is  the  fulfillment  of  prior  imagined  projections.  So:  No 
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coherence,  no  network,  then  no  subject,  and  no  subjectivity.  The  coherence  of  the  self’s 
states  -  a  regulative,  progressing  coherence,  to  be  sure,  like  that  of  the  world  -  is 
tantamount  to  there  being  a  self  at  all.  (pp.  121-122) 
Understanding  is  strictly  tied  to  the  subject,  there  is  no  “standing  outside”  all  elements  of  the  self 
because  some  of  those  elements  are  what  provide  knowledge.  The  Kantian  theory  of 
knowledge  entails  that  knowledge  means  something  that  is  constructed  by  agents  and,  hence, 
the  role  of  the  subject  is  tied  to  the  objectivity  of  claims  without  exception.  For  this  reason, 
agency  is  the  underlying  assumption  inherent  in  all  claims;  to  claim  any  knowledge  at  all  is  to 
acknowledge  and  depend  upon  your  agency .  20
 
For  Kantians  understanding  is  grounded  in  our  constitution  in  the  sense  that  our  faculty  of 
understanding  provides  the  categories  that  we  need  to  have  knowledge  at  all.  The  necessity  of 
our  faculty  of  understanding  to  this  process  is  Kant’s  (1787/1996)  Copernican  revolution,  with 
which  he  begins  his  theory  of  knowledge  on  the  assumption  that  knowledge,  as  such,  must  be 
provided  by  faculties  of  our  mind  (B  xvii).  Kant  argues  that  he  completes  the  project  of 
metaphysics  by  committing  to  the  assumption  that  the  world  must  conform  to  our  cognition  and 
that  elements  of  our  cognition  must  be  necessary  and,  because  of  that  necessity,  they  are 
objective.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  concepts  and  knowledge  are  real  in  the  Kantian  tradition. 
Concepts,  and  all  objects,  are  real  in  the  perspective  of  the  subject,  and  because  of  the  nature 
of  our  access  to  the  world,  could  only  be  real  in  this  sense,  and  any  notion  that  things  could  be 
otherwise  is  an  attempt  to  reach  beyond  the  scope  of  knowledge  (conjecture  about  what  cannot 
be  known  or  understood).  As  Kant  (1781/1787/1996)  argues  in  the  transcendental  aesthetic, 
experience  exists  as  the  construction  of  subjects  and  even  the  most  necessary  of  concepts 
“cannot  exist  in  themselves,  but  can  exist  only  in  us”  (A  42,  B  60).  Posy  (2010)  explains  that  the 
role  of  the  subject  grounds  both  the  nature  and  limits  of  knowledge:  “[m]an  -  the  fabric  of  human 
knowledge,  its  extent,  and  its  limits  as  receptive  -  forms  the  measure  not  only  of  ourselves  and 
of  the  very  notion  of  subjectivity,  but  of  our  world  and  of  the  objects  in  it”  (p.  122).  This  is  how 
Kant  understood  the  relationship  between  knowledge,  objectivity,  and  agency.  Now,  notice  how 
this  relationship  between  knowledge,  objectivity,  and  the  subject  can  be  imported  into  the 
shmagency  debate  by  pointing  out  that  subjects  with  fundamentally  different  constitutions  than 
agents  are  impossible.  Our  constitution  provides  the  grounding  for  knowledge  and  it  is  objective 
because  we  must  necessarily  provide  the  grounding  that  we  do;  hence,  because  our  faculty  of 
understanding  is  the  grounding  for  knowledge  it  is  inconceivable  that  it  could  be  otherwise.  
 
According  to  this  Kantian  reply,  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  results  in  broad  skepticism 
because  it  requires  notions  beyond  the  scope  of  the  categories:  in  Kantian  terms  the  shmagent 
is  essentially  a  hypothetical  entity  from  the  noumenal  realm.  Because  the  question  ‘why  be  an 
agent?’  is  external  to  agency,  it  cannot  be  within  the  scope  of  knowledge,  it  must  be  beyond  that 
scope  and  instead  in  the  ream  of  things  which  exist  independently  of  us:  this  is  the  noumenal 
realm  and  we  cannot  have  any  knowledge  about  it.  It  is  the  categories,  concepts,  which  are 
20  Kant  (1787)  makes  this  point  where  he  argues  that  the  original  synthetic  unity  of  apperception  entails 
that  the  ‘I  think’  is  attached  to  both  all  artifacts  of  sensibility  and  to  pure  apperception  (B132). 
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required  for  knowledge  and  limit  the  scope  of  knowledge.  The  categories  also  ground  objectivity 
because  they  are  what  make  claims  objectively  true.  However,  while  it  is  the  categories  that 
provide  this  function  it  is  the  subject  which  provides  the  categories.  At  the  epistemic  and 
metaphysical  level,  regarding  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  our  access  to  the  world,  the  subject 
is  those  elements  of  ourselves  which  provide  the  categories  (concepts). 
 
Considering  an  alternative  to  your  own  agency  (shmagency)  is  not  just,  as  Velleman  argues,  a 
consideration  beyond  the  scope  of  normativity;  it  is  also  a  consideration  beyond  the  scope  of 
knowledge.  Because  the  subject  is  a  prerequisite  for  knowledge,  asking  ‘why  be  an  agent?’  is 
analogous  to  asking  “why  know  things?”.  Abandoning  agency  entails  abandoning  knowledge 
claims  and,  hence,  the  hypothetical  shmagent  has  no  knowledge  whatsoever .  So,  the 
constitutivist  is  no  more  threatened  by  the  shmagency  problem  than  any  position  is  threatened 
by  skepticism  regarding  the  possibility  of  knowledge  itself.  Even  if  one  concedes  that  the 
skepticism  may  be  warranted,  that  is,  that  there  may  be  good  reason  to  critique  a  Kantian  theory 
of  knowledge  in  particular,  it  is  a  problem  of  epistemology  and,  as  such,  must  be  resolved  in  that 
context.  The  problem  is  not  with  the  constitutivist  approach,  as  the  shmagency  problem  argues, 
but  (if  it  is  anywhere)  the  problem  is  with  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  because  Enoch’s 
problem  is  with  knowledge,  as  such,  grounded  in  how  we  are  constituted  -  not  with  normativity 
in  particular.  21
 
  
21  Karl  Schafer  (2019)  makes  a  similar  point  in  “Kant:  constitutivism  as  capacities-first  philosophy”  where 
he  explains  that  Kantian  constitutivism  is,  at  its  foundations,  not  trying  to  answer  the  question  “why  be 
moral?”  but  instead  is  trying  to  demonstrate  what  follows  from  the  capacity  of  reason  (pp.  2,  13).  My  point 
is  that  because  the  shmagency  problem  question  does  not  successfully  target  the  constitutivist  approach, 
as  such,  and  instead  targets  the  epistemic  foundations  of  that  approach  it  is  not  clear  that  the  shmagency 
problem  is  fit  for  its  intended  purpose.  In  his  article  Schafer  puts  forward  a  similar  line  of  argument  to  the 
Kantian  reply  I  present  here  (the  same  idea,  differently  presented);  I  am  attaching  this  footnote  to 
acknowledge  the  similarities  and  to  point  out  that  I  developed  my  article  prior  to  my  reading  of  his  article 
(and  prior  to  the  publication  of  his  article):  we  developed  the  same  line  of  argument  independently.  
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1.7  The  cost  of  the  Kantian  reply 
Constitutivism  inherits  its  plausibility,  or  implausibility,  from  the  Kantian  tradition  if  it  replies  to  the 
shmagency  problem  in  the  manner  I  have  just  outlined.  If  the  reason  the  shmagency  problem 
fails  to  undermine  the  constitutivist  claim  is  because  the  question  is  nonsensical,  and  the  reason 
that  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  nonsensical  is  because  it  is  incompatible  with  the 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  then  the  shmagency  problem  has  only  been  solved  in  the  context 
of  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge.  If  Kantian  epistemology  has  unacceptable  problems,  then 
the  solution  it  provides  to  the  shmagency  problem  will  also  be  unacceptable.  The  Kantian 
solution  I  have  provided  refers  to  knowledge  as  something  which  requires  a  subject  to  provide 
the  faculty  of  reason,  hence  this  reply  is  inseparable  from  the  Kantian  tradition.  This  means  that 
the  cost  of  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  whatever  problems  come  with  the 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge .  22
 
Velleman’s  (2013)  denial  “that  there  are  universal  norms  of  any  kind,  and  that  there  are 
necessarily  ubiquitous  norms  of  morality”  (p.  64)  is  incompatible  with  the  Kantian  response.   The 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  grounds  objectivity  in  universal  and  necessary  unities  constructed 
by  the  self  (Kant,  1787/1996,  B  141-143).  These  necessary  unities  are,  in  the  case  of  normative 
facts,  moral  law,  and  they  are  necessary  in  the  sense  that  they  are  the  universalizable 
explanation  of  the  reasons  we  have  for  action.  In  the  empirical  world  the  agent  constructs 
necessary  unities  in  the  form  of  laws,  which  explain  the  actions  of  objects  in  the  physical  world, 
and  moral  laws  are  the  same,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  necessary  unities  which  explain  what 
we  ought  to  do.  Objectivity  means  the  same  thing  for  normative  and  empirical  facts:  in  both 
cases  it  refers  to  necessary  explanations  which  are  universalizable  because  they  can  explain  all 
relevantly  similar  cases.  Posy  (2010)  explains  this  type  of  Kantian  relationship  between 
normative  and  non-normative  facts: 
[T]he  formal  unity  of  that  world  (what  Kant  calls  the  “moral  law)”  -  like  the  unity  of  the 
empirical  world  -  is  tied  to  objectivity.  In  this  case  it  is  the  collection  of  objective  maxims 
that  do  or  would  pass  the  universalization  test.  (p.  124) 
The  necessity  and  universalizability  of  objective  unities,  laws,  created  by  the  subject  is  the 
source  objective  facts  (normative  and  non-normative),  which  is  inconsistent  with  Velleman’s 
relativist  foundations  but  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  his  subject-dependent  claims .  
 
The  inconsistency  between  these  Kantian  foundations  and  Velleman’s  relativist  foundations 
does  not  entail  an  inconsistency  between  the  Kantian  foundations  and  Velleman’s 
subject-dependent  claims,  because  the  subject  is  the  source  of  normativity  in  both  cases.  For 
the  Kantian,  the  subject  is  the  source  of  normativity  because  what  the  subject  provides  to  the 
process  of  experience  creation,  the  categories  (concepts),  is  the  source  of  all  objective  facts.  As 
Posy  (2010)  explains,  for  Kant  the  subject  is  the  source  of  objective  normative  facts: 
My  moral  self  is  given  by  the  nexus  of  near  and  further  goals  that  place  me  in  the  moral 
world.  Indeed,  objective  justification  of  an  act  places  me  as  part  of  the  unity  of  the  moral 
22  The  costs  I  explore  are  related  to  this  point,  difficulties  which  result  from  adopting  the  Kantian  theory  of 
knowledge,  but  the  broader  problems  associated  with  the  Kantian  tradition  will  not  be  developed  further. 
The  point  I  intend  to  make  is  strictly  that  those  costs  are  incurred  by  this  reply. 
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world  just  as  judging  objectively  about  an  event  puts  me  in  tune  with  the  causal  unity  of 
nature.  So,  if  one  thinks  in  this  way  we  have  again  a  reciprocity  of  self  and  world.  Those 
things  in  the  world  which  are  parts  of  my  projects  are  in  fact  parts  of  my  self.  (p.124) 
The  objectivity  of  normativity  is  grounded  in  the  nature  of  the  subject  for  both  Kant  and 
Velleman,  this  does  not  change  when  Velleman’s  relativist  foundations  are  replaced  with  the 
objectivity  of  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge.  Where  Velleman  (2010)  explains  that  subjects 
provide  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer  when  they  ask  normative  questions,  Kant’s  position 
entails  that  “action  is  tied  up  with  attaining  an  imagined  goal,  and  the  moral  law  simply  codifies 
those  goals  for  which  we  may  objectively  aim”  (pp.  135-138;  Posy,  2010,  p.  124).  In  both  cases 
it  is  what  is  constitutive  of  the  subject  and  its  relationship  with  action  which  provides  the  source 
of  normativity  and  its  grounding.  So,  while  adopting  the  Kantian  reply  would  cost  Velleman’s 
theory  its  relativist  foundations,  this  cost  does  not  extend  to  the  role  of  human  nature  and  the 
subject;  despite  this  foundational  divergence  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  is  compatible  with 
the  majority  of  Velleman’s  claims  about  the  source  and  foundations  of  objectivity. 
 
(Velleman’s  (2013)  claim  that  observations  about  the  relativist  nature  of  normativity  provide 
support  for  his  theory  are  inconsistent  with  the  Kantian  reply  because  he  argues  that  these 
observations  entail  incompatible  moral  norms  and  the  lack  of  universal  moral  facts  (p.  45). 
However,  while  relativist  claims  are  not  compatible  with  the  Kantian  reply,  the  role  of  the  subject 
in  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  supports  many  of  the  claims  that  follow  from  Velleman’s 
relativism,  such  as  ubiquitous  morals  shared  across  cultures  arising  from  human  nature, 
variations  in  social  and  cultural  norms  counting  as  relevant  differences  for  moral  considerations, 
and  the  conceptually  central  role  of  reasons  for  action  which  are  derived  from  the  nature  of  the 
subject  itself  (pp.  45-69).  The  point  is  not  that  Velleman’s  theory  survives  unaltered  by  deploying 
the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.  Rather,  the  point  is  that  subject  dependance 
survives  despite  the  relativist  foundations  being  incompatible,  furthermore  many  of  the  claims 
are  similar  whether  founded  on  outright  relativism  or  on  subject  dependance.  Subject 
dependance,  objectivism,  and  realism  are  all  compatible,  especially  in  the  context  of  the  Kantian 
theory  of  knowledge:  the  subject  provides  the  categories  (concepts)  which  are  objective,  and 
their  role  in  experience  creation  makes  them  real.  The  shmagency  problem  marks  a  point  of 
epistemic  contention  (a  contention  about  what  normative  facts  are)  where  a  constitutivist  such 
as  Velleman  may  adopt  either  a  relativist  or  objectivist  position.) 
 
The  Kantian  reply  requires  deriving  normative  necessities  from  non-normative  necessities. 
Because  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  entails  that  conceptual  necessity  (necessary 
application  of  the  categories)  is  the  source  of  objectivity,  the  objectivity  of  normative  facts  is 
grounded  in  conceptual  necessity .  As  I  explain  in  §  0.5  the  shmagency  problem  demonstrates 
that  normative  necessity  cannot  be  derived  from  non-normative  necessity  because  the  fact  that 
something  is  the  case,  even  necessarily,  does  not  entail  that  it  ought  to  be  the  case.  So,  the 
Kantian  reply  appears  to  incur  the  cost  of  claiming  that  normativity  is  grounded  in  the  necessary 
nature  of  the  agent  regardless  of  whether  that  nature  ought  to  be  as  it  is  or  not .  My  Kantian 
reply  has  derived  an  endorsement  of  normativity  from  how  we  are  constituted:  this  is  a  problem 
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because  I  appear  to  have  derived  a  normative  prescription  from  a  factual  statement  (an  ought 
from  an  is). 
 
This  particular  derivation  of  an  ought  from  a  factual  statement  is  not  problematic  because  there 
is  no  sense  in  which  an  alternative  (hypothetical  or  otherwise)  to  agency  is  possible.   The 23
shmagency  problem  cannot  demonstrate  that  deriving  normative  necessity  from  non-normative 
necessity  is  unjustified  when  the  necessity  in  question  is  absolute  necessity ,  because  absolute 
necessity  entails  that  there  are  no  other  possibilities  that  we  ought  to,  or  even  could,  endorse. 
This  notion,  that  merely  because  something  is  the  case  does  not  mean  that  it  should  be  the 
case,  is  irrelevant  when  there  are  no  alternatives:  ought  implies  can  and  therefore  ought  must 
imply  what  is  necessary . 24
 
One  might  think  that  the  problem,  or  at  least  some  element  of  it,  persists  despite  this  result 
because  of  the  possibility  that  we  might  reject  or  condemn  our  nature  even  if  that  nature,  or 
relevant  elements  of  it,  are  necessary:  in  a  sense,  we  can  bemoan  the  plight  of  our  existence 
independently  from  any  possibility  of  changing  it;  so,  forget  the  hypothetical  ‘shmagent’  but  keep 
the  problem.  Assume,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  Kantian  reply  is  correct  and  the 
shmagent  is  absolutely  impossible,  even  as  a  hypothetical  notion.  Notice  that  even  if  I  accept 
that  the  Kantian  reply  is  correct,  the  problem  does  not  appear  to  vanish,  I  can  still  ask  if  I  ought 
to  be  the  way  I  am  even  if  I  accept  that  there  is  no  feasible  alternative .  Furthermore,  I  can  still 
regret  or  condemn  how  I  am  constituted  independently  from  any  notion  of  what  else  I  could  be 
(or,  the  impossibility  of  being  anything  else).  The  problem  is  that,  in  a  sense,  the  shmagency 
problem  never  required  the  shmagent  at  all,  the  notion  of  a  shmagent  was  a  tool  of  rhetoric 
rather  than  a  crucial  element  of  the  problem.  The  implication  of  this  problem  is  that  the  Kantian 
reply  can  solve  the  shmagency  problem  but  at  the  cost  of  it  resurfacing  without  the  notion  of  the 
shmagent  and,  hence,  the  Kantian  reply  has  failed  to  solve  the  problem  after  all.  This  might  be 
considered  analogous  to  the  problem  posed  by  George  Moore  (1903)  in  Principia  Ethica ,  where 
he  argues  that  utilitarian  attempts  to  define  good  as  pleasure  result  in  an  open  question  (what 
23  At  least  no  sense  within  the  scope  of  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge.  The  point  here  is  that  the 
hypothetical  alternative  to  agency  simply  does  not  exist  even  as  a  hypothetical  unless  you  abandon  the 
theory  of  knowledge  underlying  the  Kantian  reply.  The  aim,  remember,  is  to  demonstrate  that  the 
shmagency  problem  is  not  targeted  at  the  constitutivist  approach  to  establishing  normativity  but,  instead, 
at  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  as  such. 
24  This  might  raise  the  concern  that  utilising  necessity  in  this  manner  will  result  in  problematic  normative 
concerns  beyond  morality.  For  example,  that  logic  or  mathematics  are  normative  because  of  the 
mathematical  and  logical  problems  which  have  necessary  answers.  I  do  not  think  this  is  a  problem  for  the 
Kantian  reply  I  have  put  forward  in  this  paper.  Because,  even  if  it  is  a  problem  at  all,  it  would  be  a  problem 
for  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  as  such,  rather  than  the  constitutivist  approach.  While  these  two  are 
fundamentally  related,  one  is  founded  upon  the  other,  the  two  remain  distinct  in  terms  of  which  is  the 
appropriate  to  critique  with  which  problems  in  particular:  the  theory  of  knowledge  must  solve  the  problems 
related  to  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  the  theory  of  normativity  must  solve  the  problems  related  to 
metaethics.  I  suspect  that  any  intrinsic  incompatibility  between  normativity  and  mathematics  or  logic  are 
epistemic  rather  than  metaethical.  That  said,  to  see  how  such  a  problem  might  be  solved  in  defence  of 
the  Kantian  tradition  see  Tyke  Nunez’s  (2018)  “ Logical  Mistakes,  Logical  Aliens,  and  the  Laws  of  Kant’s 
Pure  General  Logic”. 
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then,  is  good?)  or  a  tautology,  when  the  assertion  that  good  is  pleasure  is  meant  to  be  a 
substantive  statement  not  just  an  assertion  that  the  words  are  equivalent  (p.  67  and  72).  This 
type  of  problem  can  be  ported  into  the  implications  of  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  by  asking  why  the  absolute  impossibility  of  the  shmagent  entails  that  we  should 
endorse  our  constitution.  The  Kantian  argument  that  the  shmagent  is  a  nonsensical  notion  still 
leaves  the  open  question  of  whether  we  should  endorse  our  constitution  (and,  therefore,  the 
prescriptions  which  follow  from  that  constitution).  The  idea  is  that  the  Kantian  reply  fails  to  solve 
the  shmagency  problem  because  it  can  still  be  posed,  just  without  the  notion  of  a  shmagent.  In 
this  sense,  a  cost  of  the  Kantian  reply  is  that  the  shmagency  problem  question,  ‘why  be  an 
agent?’,  can  be  asked  again  just  without  providing  an  alternative  to  agency. 
 
Enoch  (2011a)  discusses  his  disagreement  with  Velleman  in  similar  terms  when  he  argues  that: 
“Given  Velleman’s  concession  that  the  justificatory  question  remains  open  even  given 
the  but-you-do-care  reply,  even  when  this  reply  is  strengthened  by  some  inescapability 
point,  his  major  line  of  response  to  the  shmagency  challenge  consists  simply  of  denying 
that  the  challenge  -  understood  externally,  as  I  meant  to  present  it  -  even  makes  sense.” 
(p.  227) 
As  I  explain  in  §1.1  the  debate  between  Enoch  and  Velleman  focuses  on  whether  the 
shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  makes  sense  if  asked  externally  from 
agency.  Like  Moore  with  the  open  question  argument,  Enoch  is  asserting  that  deriving 
normativity  from  something  that  is  non-moral  leaves  an  open  question  that  demonstrates  the 
problem  with  such  an  attempt  to  explain  morality.  Moore  (1903)  argues  that  the  utilitarian 
attempt  to  define  ‘good’  as  ‘pleasure’  does  not  explain  what  the  good  is  because  it  fails  to  justify 
why  pleasure  is  good  and,  in  failing  to  provide  such  a  justification,  has  left  the  question  of 
whether  pleasure  is  good  open  (pp.  62-67).  In  Enochs  case,  he  argues  that  Velleman’s  attempt 
to  define  ‘what  we  ought  to  do’  as  ‘what  we  are  constituted  to  do’  does  not  explain  what  we 
ought  to  do  because  it  fails  to  justify  why  our  constitution  determines  what  we  ought  to  do  and, 
therefore,  leaves  the  question  of  whether  our  constitution  determines  what  we  ought  to  do  open. 
 
My  comparison  with  Moore’s  open  question  argument  identifies  that  the  Kantian  reply  to  the 
shmagency  problem  requires  asserting  that  the  question  Enoch  argues  remains  open  does  not 
make  sense.  By  arguing  in  §  1.6  that  Kantian  constitutivism  can  solve  the  shmagency  problem 
by  pointing  out  that  elements  of  agency  are  necessary  in  an  epistemic  sense  (required  for  any 
objective  claims  whatever)  I  am  providing  a  type  of  inescapability  response  to  the  shmagency 
problem.  Enoch  (2011a)  explains  that:  
“The  shmagency  challenge  is  closely  related  to  more  common 
open-question-argument-like  challenges,  challenges  that  demand  some  explanation  for 
the  normative  status  of  the  relevant  target  -  here,  agency,  or  the  aim  constitutie  of  it,  or 
some  such.  And  I  have  hinted  above  -  as  well  as  in  ‘Agency  Shmagency’  -  that  the  most 
natural  way  of  defending  the  normative  non-arbitrariness  of  such  things  is  by  invoking  a 
general,  constitutivism-independant  reason  to  be  an  agent,”  (p.  228-229) 
Enoch’s  point  is  that  to  solve  the  shmagency  problem  question  there  must  be  an  explanation  of 
how  constitutivism  does  not  leave  the  shmagency  problem  question  open:  constitutivism  needs 
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to  explain  why  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  defective.  Enoch  goes  on  to  speculate  that 
constitutivism  might  be  able  to  solve  this  problem  if  it  could  justify  why  the  having  “a  reason  to 
pursue  self  understanding  [or,  self  constitution]  because  that’s  just  what  it  is  to  have  a  reason; 
it’s  to  be  related  in  the  relevant  way  to  the  pursuit  of  self-understanding”  (p.  229).  One  might 
understand  my  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  as  developing  on  Enoch’s  speculation. 
The  reason  the  process  of  self  constitution  is  “just  what  it  is  to  have  a  reason”  is  that  the 
elements  of  the  self  that  entail  this  claim  are  necessary  to  be  understanding  the  world  at  all  (see 
§  1.6).  The  point  is  that  asking  questions  externally  to  these  necessary  elements  of  our 
constitution  requires  asking  questions  externally  to  what  is  necessary  to  understand  anything  at 
all  and,  therefore,  the  question  is  defective  (because  asking  it  precludes  what  is  necessary  to 
understanding  the  answer).  
 
This  concern  that  the  question  may  still  be  raised  despite  the  necessity  of  agency  is  not 
problematic  for  the  Kantian  reply  because  it  is  only  true  in  a  phenomenological  sense  which 
prevents  it  from  threatening  the  grounding  of  knowledge,  and  normativity,  in  how  we  are 
constituted.  What  I  mean  by  ‘phenomenological’  is  that  it  is  merely  the  case  that  one  can  feel 
like ,  experience  the  sentiment  that,  we  ought  to  be  constituted  in  a  different  manner.  While  we 
might  feel  like  it  would  be  better  if  we  were  not  rational  that  cannot,  for  the  Kantian,  entail  any 
obligation  that  we  should  not  be  rational.  As  I  explained  earlier,  the  Kantian  reply  entails  that  we 
ought  to  be  constituted  as  we  are  because  it  is  necessary:  so  the  concern  that  we  can  still  raise 
the  shmagency  problem  without  shmagents,  ask  ‘why  be  an  agent?’  even  if  there  is  no 
alternative,  is  not  a  problem  for  the  Kantian  because  when  it  comes  to  how  we  are  constituted 
there  is  only  one  thing  we  can  do .   25
 
Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  we  cannot  condemn  the  plight  of  our  existence  and  bemon  the 
task  of  reason;  at  least,  it  does  not  mean  we  cannot  feel  like  it  is  hard,  difficult,  or  unfair  to  be 
constituted  as  rational  beings.  But  such  feelings  are  not  evidence  of  a  conceptual  problem,  a 
shortcoming  in  the  grounding  of  knowledge  and  normativity,  they  are  simply  feelings  that  do  not 
match  our  obligations.  Notice  that  the  reply  to  this  new  concern  is  the  same  as  the  reply  to  the 
shmagency  problem.  The  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  to  point  out  that  we 
absolutely  must  be  agents  and,  therefore,  must  endorse  our  constitution  because  it  is  necessary 
25  Notice  that  if  Kantian  constitutivists  are  correct  that  endorsing  our  agency  (and  the  moral  law  that 
follows  from  agency)  is  required  in  order  to  be  coherent,  then  they  have  successfully  derived  normativity 
from  a  formal  evaluation  of  our  own  faculties:  they  have  solved  the  empty  formalism  problem.  Georg 
Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  critiques  Kant  in  Philosophy  of  Right  where  he  argues  that  self  direction  of  the 
will  alone  is  insufficient  to  establish  morality  (§  135  or  p.  114).  Hegal’s  point  is  that  deriving  morality  from 
the  will  alone  cannot  provide  the  content  of  morality  because  obligations  cannot  arise  without  contribution 
from  other  elements  of  our  nature:  hence,  according  to  Hegel,  Kant’s  moral  theory  is  an  empty  formalism 
because  it  fails  to  appreciate  the  contributions  of  crucial  elements  of  our  nature.  Ping-cheung  Lo  (1981) 
argues,  in  “A  Critical  Reevaluation  of  the  alleged  ‘Empty  Formalism’  of  Kantian  Ethics”,  that  developments 
of  Kant’s  categorical  imperative  can  offer  a  solution  to  this  problem  of  empty  formalism  by  formulating  the 
categorical  imperative  such  that  it  explains  why  content  follows  from  it  (pp.  186-187,  197-199).  Lo  argues 
that  some  of  Kant’s  formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative  already  provide  this  type  of  solution.  Given 
that  both  Velleman  and  Korsgaard  utilise  these  formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative  in  the 
development  of  their  theories  they  could  be  considered  to  have  proven  Lo’s  claim. 
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to  be  constituted  as  we  are  in  order  to  know  things  at  all.  The  Kantian  reply  to  this  concern 
remains  the  same,  even  when  the  notion  of  the  shmagent  is  removed:  it  is  still  the  case  that  we 
must  endorse  what  is  absolutely  necessary,  because  there  is  no  other  option.  How  we  are 
constituted  is  a  necessary  component  of  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  and,  therefore,  we 
must  endorse  our  constitution  in  order  to  endorse  any  knowledge  at  all  (because  it  provides  the 
grounding  for  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge).  So,  we  must  endorse  our  constitution.  
 
If  this  reply  to  the  new  concern,  the  shmagency  problem  without  the  notion  of  the  shmagent,  is 
unsatisfactory,  the  reason  will  be  because  of  some  problem  with  the  Kantian  theory  of 
knowledge.  One  might  continue  to  object  by  insisting  that  even  if  our  constitution  is  necessary 
for  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  that  does  not  mean  we  cannot  object  to  it.  This  does  not 
need  to  entail  an  alternative  theory  of  knowledge,  one  could  merely  insist  that  one  does  not 
want  to  undertake  knowing  things  at  all.  So,  even  if  one  must  endorse  one’s  constitution  in  order 
to  endorse  any  knowledge  at  all,  one  could  still  refuse  to  endorse  one’s  constitution!  Once 
again,  this  is  not  a  problem  for  the  Kantian.  It  is  not  a  problem  for  the  Kantian  reply  to  the 
shmagency  problem  because  this  rendition  of  the  shmagency  problem  has  become  a  problem 
with  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  in  general .  In  moving  the  problem  to  the  Kantian  theory  of 
knowledge  I  have  accomplished  my  primary  goal,  the  constitutivist  approach  is  no  longer 
subject  to  the  shmagency  problem,  although  at  the  cost  of  moving  the  problem  elsewhere. 
Furthermore,  because  the  shmagency  problem  has  now  been  moved  to  a  problem  with  the 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  the  shmagency  problem  has  become  a  skeptical  argument  in  the 
broadest  sense  (an  argument  against  knowledge).  As  for  what  constitutivists  might  say  to  such 
a  broad  skepticism:  they  will  point  out  that  undertaking  any  activity  of  reason  is  an  endorsement 
of  the  faculty  of  reason,  and  so  even  raising  this  problem  entails  endorsing  how  one  is 
constituted;  which  is  to  say,  they  will  point  out  that  broad  and  all-encompassing  skepticism  is 
self  defeating. 
 
One  might  put  forward  alternative  theories  of  knowledge,  and  in  that  manner  utilise  what  has 
become  of  the  shmagency  problem,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Kantian  reply,  to  argue  for  one 
theory  of  knowledge  over  another.  In  this  manner,  one  might  avoid  applying  the  shmagency 
problem  as  a  skeptical  argument  in  the  broad  sense  (an  argument  against  the  possibility  of 
knowledge)  and  instead  as  a  reason  to  favour  one  epistemological  theory  over  another.  This 
application  of  the  shmagency  problem  question,  despite  making  no  use  of  the  notion  of  a 
shmagent,  might  turn  out  to  be  a  problem  for  the  Kantian  tradition  (or,  it  might  not)  but  note  that 
it  is  no  longer  a  problem  for  the  constitutivist  approach.  except  in  the  most  indirect  sense.  
 
In  summary,  the  costs  of  the  Kantian  reply  are  that:  it  relies  on  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge, 
it  is  incompatible  with  the  relativist  foundations  for  Velleman’s  theory,  and  it  derives  normative 
necessities  from  non-normative  necessities.  While  I  do  not  think  that  Velleman  would  be 
compelled  to  elect  for  these  costs  in  place  of  the  costs  of  his  own  reply,  those  readers  who  find 
the  relativist  foundations  Velleman  appeals  to  implausible  are  likely  to  find  the  Kantian  solution 
more  plausible.  The  costs  of  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  are  those  same  costs 
incurred  by  adopting  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  in  its  own  right.  While  these  costs  may,  or 
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may  not,  be  significant  or  acceptable,  the  point  I  have  established  is  that  by  using  this  theory  of 
knowledge,  a  subject-dependent  constitutivist  position,  much  like  Velleman’s,  can  provide  an 




1.8  The  conclusion  of  the  shmagency  problem  debate:  the  plausibility  of  underlying 
epistemic  claims 
The  nature  of  objectivity  is  at  stake  in  both  Velleman’s  and  the  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem.  In  both  cases,,  solving  the  shmagency  problem  requires  appealing  to  a  notion  of 
objectivity,  and  it  is  that  appeal  which  results  in  the  costs  of  the  reply.  The  effect  of  the 
shmagency  problem  critique  is  that  it  reveals  these  metaphysical  and  epistemic  commitments  of 
the  constitutivist  position:  in  order  to  solve  the  shmagency  problem,  a  constitutivist  must  justify 
why  their  grounding  of  normativity  in  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  is  either  compatible  with 
alternative  normative  truths  for  sufficiently  different  subjects  or  why  sufficiently  different  subjects 
are  not  possible.  
  
Enoch  (2011a)  explains  that  the  result,  “Score-keeping”,  of  the  debate  between  Velleman  and 
himself  hinges  on  their  disagreement  over  whether  the  shmagency  problem  question  is 
defective  if  asked  externally  from  any  framework  provided  by  what  is  constitutive  of  a  subject 
(pp.  227-228).  Enoch  is  correct  that  the  result  of  the  debate  between  him  and  Velleman  is  a 
divergence  on  this  point,  because  the  competing  commitments  about  what  the  nature  of 
normative  objectivity  is  are  exposed  by  the  disagreement  over  the  possibility  of  such  a  question. 
The  disagreement  reveals  three  alternative  explanations  of  what  the  shmagency  problem 
question  shows: 
1. If  the  shmagency  problem  question  demonstrates  that  one  could  hypothetically  alter  the 
constitution  of  a  subject  to  alter  ‘objective’  normative  facts,  then  those  normative  facts 
must  have  relativist  foundations.  (Velleman’s  reply) 
2. If  the  shmagency  problem  question  demonstrates  that  one  cannot,  even  hypothetically, 
alter  the  constitution  of  an  agent  then  those  elements  of  our  constitution  which  make  us 
agents  must  be  necessary  in  a  foundational  sense.  (Kantian  reply) 
3. If  the  shmagency  problem  question  demonstrates  that  there  is  at  least  one  normative 
question  which  cannot  be  answered  by  referring  to  what  is  constitutive  of  agency,  then 
that  constitution  cannot  be  the  source  of  normativity.  (Enoch’s  position) 
Enoch  begins  the  debate  by  putting  forward  explanation  three  and  Velleman  in  reply  puts 
forward  elements  of  both  explanation  1  and  2.  Velleman  (2009)  argues  that  the  shmagency 
problem  question  does  not  make  sense  because  the  agent’s  constitution  is  necessary  for 
normative  objectivity  (pp.  125-133).  At  this  point  Velleman  was  in  a  position  to  expand  his  reply 
into  either  reply  1  or  2.  In  response  to  Velleman,  Enoch  (2011a)  argues  that  the  necessity  of 
agency  does  not  entail  that  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  defective  because  the 
shmagents  position  can  still  make  sense  hypothetically, that  is,  even  if  we  must  be  agents,  we 
can  imagine  shmagents  (pp.  223-227).  Velleman  (2013)  then  clarifies  that  his  foundations  are 
relativist  (pp.  68-69).  This  clarification  solves  the  shmagency  problem  for  Velleman  because  it 
allows  him  to  establish  response  1  by  arguing  that  alternative  moral  facts  are  not  relevant  to  his 
theory  if  they  require  altering  the  constitution  of  the  subject  (Velleman,  forthcoming,  p.  15-16). 
Response  2  is  an  alternative  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem  which  a  subject-dependant 
constitutivist  may  adopt  to  preserve  realist  objectivism  and  avoid  relativism  while  still  solving  the 
shmagency  problem.  
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The  shmagency  problem  reveals  that  constitutivism  cannot  provide  objectivity  as  Enoch  defines 
it.  Enoch  (2011a)  argues  that  external  questions  which  do  not  assume  that  a  response  is 
dependant  on  the  constitution  of  the  subject  can,  at  least  hypothetically,  make  sense  (pp. 
227-228).  In  the  case  of  either  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem,  a  normative  question,  asked 
externally  from  the  nature  of  a  subject,  is  nonsensical,  and  therefore,  if  the  question  does  make 
sense  3  must  be  the  correct  position.  Velleman  argues  that  you  could  hypothetically  adopt  a 
different  constitution,  but  normative  questions  still  require  some  form  of  a  subject’s  perspective: 
hypothetically  you  could  be  an  agent  or  a  shmagent  and  ask  a  normative  question,  but  you 
cannot  be  neither.  The  Kantian  argues  that  only  questions  which  provide  the  necessary 
elements  of  agency  are  possible  within  the  realms  of  knowledge. 
 
 
The  expectation  that  such  a  question,  external  from  the  nature  of  a  subject,  makes  sense, 
reveals  that  Enoch’s  understanding  of  objectivity  is  incompatible  with  constitutivism. 
Incompatibility  with  an  understanding  of  knowledge  that  allows  for  such  an  external  question  is 
an  implication  (and,  perhaps,  cost)  of  the  constitutivist  position:  the  shmagency  problem 
successfully  demonstrates  that  a  constitutivist  cannot  make  sense  of  a  normative  question 
which  does  not  appeal  to  the  constitution  of  a  subject  for  its  answer.  In  this  sense,  Enoch’s 
critique  is  successful.  However,  it  does  not  leave  the  constitutivist  without  reply,  and  in  the  case 
of  the  Kantian  reply  the  constitutivist  can  preserve  realist  objectivity  by  taking  the  position  that 
no  questions  of  any  type  make  sense  without  appealing  to  the  nature  of  the  subject .  The 26
conclusion  of  the  shmagency  problem  debate  is  that  constitutivism  requires  the  role  of  the 
subject  and,  hence,  is  either  relativist  or  entails  a  theory  of  knowledge  in  which  the  subject  is 
necessary. 
 
Velleman  argues  that  you  could  hypothetically  adopt  a  different  constitution,  but  normative 
questions  still  require  some  form  of  a  subject’s  perspective:  hypothetically  you  could  be  an 
agent  or  a  shmagent  and  ask  a  normative  question,  but  you  cannot  be  neither.  The  Kantian 
argues  that  only  questions  which  provide  the  necessary  elements  of  agency  are  possible  within 
the  realms  of  knowledge.The  issue  is  decided  on  the  costs  each  of  these  entail,  their  underlying 
epistemic  commitments.  Enoch’s  critique  requires  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  can  make  sense 
of  external  questions  and  so  entails  some  sort  of  external  realism.  Velleman’s  solution  requires 
a  theory  of  knowledge  which  can  support  a  relativist  normativity.  The  Kantian  reply  requires  that 
the  subject  is  absolutely  necessary  for,  the  source  of,  objectivity  and  so  entails  the  Kantian 
theory  of  knowledge. 
 
For  Enoch  this  is  the  success  of  the  shmagency  problem  because  it  demonstrates  that 
constitutivism  cannot  establish  normativity  without  committing  to  the  claim  that  the  normativity  it 
establishes  is  dependant  on  the  nature  of  the  subject.  For  Velleman  the  inapplicability  of  the 
shmagency  problem  question  to  his  theory  entails  the  failure  of  the  shmagency  problem,  rather 
26In  Taking  Morality  Seriously  A  Defence  of  Robust  Realism  Enoch  (2011b)  makes  the  point  that  a  theory 
of  knowledge  which  requires  the  subject  but  does  not  allow  for  a  variation  of  responses  is,  in  terms  of  the 
results  of  the  theory,  no  different  than  a  theory  which  is  “response- in depend[ent],  objectivist,  Platonist”.  
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than  the  failure  of  his  theory.  The  shmagency  problem  does  not  apply  to  relativism  and  so 
Velleman  would  not  consider  it  a  successful  critique.  The  shmagency  problem  demonstrates 
that  the  constitutivist  must  become  a  relativist  or  subject-dependent,  so  Enoch  would  be  in  a 
good  position  to  consider  it  successful.  Both  parties  to  the  debate  are  successful  in  the  sense 
that  they  demonstrate  in  the  context  of  their  epistemic  commitments  that  they  are  correct. 
Therefore,  the  results  of  the  shmagency  problem  are  a  clarification  of  the  epistemic  and 
metaphysical  assumptions  underlying  the  metanormative  claims  of  constitutivism.  The 






Section  2:  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  and  developing 




2.0  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism:  developing  a  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem 
Christine  Korsgaard’s  Kantian  constitutivist  theory  can  be  defended  from  David  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  critique  by  deriving  a  justification  for  the  objectivity  of  the  normativity  her 
theory  purports  to  establish  from  her  reply  to  Gerald  Cohen’s  bad  action  problem.  In  “Agency, 
Shmagency:  why  Normativity  Won’t  Come  From  What  is  Constitutive  of  Action”  Enoch  (2006) 
critiques  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theory.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  in  The  Sources  of 
Normativity  that  objective  normativity  can  be  derived  from  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  by 
undertaking  an  examination  of  our  use  of  rational  reflection  to  make  decisions  and  take  action, 
which  she  describes  as  the  process  of  reflective  endorsement  (pp.  49-51,  89,  92-93,  and 
128-130).  Enoch  argues  that  Korsgaard’s  approach  cannot  succeed  because  it  fails  to  provide  a 
reason  for  us  to  endorse  how  we  are  constituted:  if  the  contents  of  normativity  is  determined  by 
how  we  are  constituted  and  we  have  no  reason  to  endorse  our  own  constitution  then  we  have 
no  reason  to  endorse  the  contents  of  normativity.  Korsgaard  does  not  provide  a  reply  to  Enoch’s 
critique  but  she  does  provide  a  reply  to  a  similar  problem  posed  by  Geral  Cohen  (1996)  in 
“Reason,  Humanity,  and  the  Moral  law”.  Cohen  argues  that  Korsgaard  has  failed  to  provide  a 
sufficient  reason  for  a  subject  to  endorse  one  element  of  their  constitution  over  another  and, 
hence,  has  failed  to  justify  why  a  subject  should  endorse  her  theory  of  normativity  rather  than  an 
alternative  which  derives  the  moral  law  from  a  different  element  of  our  constitution  than 
Korsgaard  utilises.  Korsgaard  replies  to  Cohen  by  explaining  that  she  derives  normativity  from  a 
necessary  element  of  our  constitution  which,  because  of  its  necessity,  all  of  us  must  endorse 
over  and  above  any  alternative  elements.  While  Cohen  and  Enoch  appear  to  be  targeting 
different  elements  of  Korsgaard’s  theory,  in  the  particulars  of  their  critiques,  an  examination  of 
Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen  demonstrates  that  her  solution  to  his  critique  also  provides  a 
solution  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem. 
 
I  demonstrate  how  a  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  can  be  derived  from  Korsgaard’s  reply  to 
Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  by  explaining  why  the  shmagency  problem  applies  to  Korsgaard’s 
theory  and  examining  the  similarities  with  why  the  bad  action  problem  applies  to  her  theory, 
followed  by  an  explanation  of  why  her  solution  to  Cohen’s  problem  is  addressing  the  same 
perceived  error  with  her  theory  that  Enoch  targets.  In  §  2.1  I  explain  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist 
theory  which  allows  me  to  demonstrate  why  the  shmagency  problem  applies  to  it  in  §  2.2. 
Following  this  in  §  2.3  I  explain  a  related  problem  that  fails  to  solve  the  shmagency  problem  on 
behalf  of  Korsgaard’s  theory.  In  §  2.4  I  examine  the  bad  action  problem  in  preparation  for  §2.5 
which  explains  the  crucial  similarity  between  the  shmagency  problem  and  the  bad  action 
problem.  This  allows  me  to  undertake  an  analysis  in  §  2.6  of  how  Korsgaard  solves  the  bad 





2.1  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  is  supported  by  a  transcendental  argument  founded  in  necessary 
elements  of  our  experience  of  the  world  derived  from  observations  of  the  structure  of  the  self. 
When  described  in  this  way  it  is  not  immediately  obvious  how,  or  why,  her  position  is  subject  to 
the  shmagency  problem.  Given  that  the  shmagency  problem  deals  in  the  contingent  details  of 
the  self  while  her  theory  does  not,  there  is  an  initial  difficulty  in  seeing  how  the  two  relate  at  all. 
The  shmagency  problem  is  predicated  on  the  assertion  that  the  particulars  of  the  self  are  not 
necessary,  that  they  might  be  otherwise,  while  Korsgaard’s  argument  is  predicated  on  an 
element  of  the  self  that  is,  at  least  supposedly,  necessary.  However  the  shmagency  problem 
applies  to  Korsgaard’s  method;   the  necessary  elements  of  the  self  she  utilises  are  included  in 
the  elements  of  the  self  deemed  contingent  in  the  shmagency  problem.  That  disagreement  is 
developed  in  the  following  section,  prior  to  that  development,  Korsgaard’s  argument,  and  its  use 
of  the  necessary  element  of  the  self,  needs  to  be  explained. 
 
According  to  Kantian  constitutivism  the  source  of  normativity  is  self  constitution.  Korsgaard 
(1996b)  argues  that  normativity  is  the  product  of  reflective  endorsement,  the  result  of  the  activity 
of  rational  reflection  (pp.  49-  50).  By  reflective  endorsement  Korsgaard  means  the  process  of 
making  a  decision  (deciding  what  to  endorse)  by  utilising  your  faculty  of  reason.   This  activity, 27
reflective  endorsement,  is  a  commitment  to  your  own  identity  and  is  authoritative  because  it  is 
fundamental  to  the  nature  of  the  self  (pp.  100-104).  Being  an  agent  means  solving  problems, 
such  as  what  aims  we  should  have  and  how  to  achieve  them,  with  reflective  endorsement; 
Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  that  we  have  privileged  access  to  this  fact  in  the  sense  that  we  need 
only  experience  our  own  faculty  of  reflective  endorsement  in  action  to  understand  that  it  is 
fundamental  to  what  we  are: 
The  reflective  structure  of  the  mind  is  a  source  of  ‘self-consciousness’  because  it  forces 
us  to  have  a  conception  of  ourselves  .  .  .   When  you  deliberate,  it  is  as  if  there  were 
something  over  and  above  all  of  your  desires,  something  which  is  you ,  and  which 
chooses  which  desire  to  act  on.  This  means  that  the  principle  or  law  by  which  you 
determine  your  actions  is  one  that  you  regard  as  being  expressive  of  yourself .  To  identify 
with  such  a  principle  or  way  of  choosing  is  to  be,  in  St  Paul’s  famous  phrase,  a  law  to 
yourself.  (p.  100) 
Reflective  endorsement  is  simultaneously  the  deployment  of  reason  to  dictate  laws  to  oneself 
and  the  activity  of  being  yourself .  28
 
27  §  3.7  develops  this  further  by  explaining  the  relationship  between  our  control  over  our  own  decisions, 
our  faculty  of  reason,  and  the  nature  of  autonomy  and  freedom. 
28  Sorin  Baiasu  argues  in  “Constitutivism  and  Transcendental  Practical  Philosophy:  how  to  pull  the  Rabbit 
out  of  the  hat”  that  Korsgaard’s  account  of  agency  and  the  role  that  agency  plays  in  her  theory  commits 
her  to  transcendental  idealism  (p.  1206).  Baiasu  argues  this  because  Korsgaard’s  account  of  agency  is 
something  that  we  must  establish  by  synthesising  multiple  claims  and  something  that  we  can  establish 
prior  to  learning  of  the  particulars  of  any  specific  phenomena:  Baiasu’s  argument  is  that  Korsgaard’s 
account  of  agency  is  simultaneously  a  synthetic  and  an  a  priori  claim.  Whether  or  not  Baiasu’  is  correct 
Korsgaard  is  providing  a  transcendental  argument  in  order  to  establish  her  Kantian  constitutivist  theory. 
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Self  constitution  is  the  activity  of  reflective  reason.  Acting  for  reasons,  doing  what  you  ought  to 
do,  is  the  activity  of  constituting  yourself.  Korsgaard  (2009a)  explains  in  “The  Activity  of  Reason” 
that  reasons  are  “a  ground  of  belief  or  action  that  has  been  endorsed  by  the  person  who 
believes  or  acts”  (p.  26).  The  activity  of  reflective  endorsement  is  what  develops  a  belief  or 
states  of  affairs  into  a  reason ,  the  activity  of  reflection  is  what  provides  the  normative  force. 
Korsgaard  explains  that  this  is  a  grounding  for  normativity  in  the  Kantian  sense,  in  the  sense 
that  it  explains  both  what  normativity  is  and  where  it  comes  from:  it  provides  the  story  of 
normativity,  the  story  you  provide  when  someone  asks  what  it  is,  why  it  exists,  and  why  they 
should  believe  the  story  you  are  telling  them.  The  evidence  provided  in  support  of  this  grounding 
is  found  within  the  nature  of  yourself,  your  own  experience  of  the  manner  in  which  you  yourself 
function.  It  is  not  any  particular  experience  of  reflection  which  provides  this  support,  but  the 
structure  of  reflection.  Utilising  such  an  analysis  of  the  structure  of  your  own  mind  to  support  the 
grounding  of  normativity  is,  to  relate  it  to  the  Kantian  tradition  upon  which  Korsgaard  builds, 
apperception.  This  apperception,  as  I  shall  now  explain,  is  transcendental  because  of  the 
necessity  of  the  subject  matter. 
 
This  grounding  that  Korsgaard  provides,  found  in  the  structure  of  self  reflection,  is  foundational. 
It  explains  why  the  normativity  derived  from  the  activity  of  self  constitution  is  true:  it  is 
foundational  because  it  is  where  the  explanation  of  the  nature  of  normativity  ends  in  the  sense 
that  there  is  no  further  explanation  that  can  be  offered  (beyond  clarifying  the  theory  already 
offered).  Aristotle  (1994/n.d)  argues  in  Posterior  Analytics  that  there  must  be  some  principle  of 
understanding  which  allows  us  to  to  get  to  know  the  definitions  of  primitive  assertions, 
assertions  which  are  the  beginning  of  the  explanations  of  the  things  that  follow  from  them  (72b 
1-25).  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theory  uses  how  we  are  constituted  as  a  foundation  in  the 
sense  that  it  solves  this  problem:  it  explains  the  assertions  which  begin  the  explanation  of  the 
source  of  normativity  and  what  follows  from  it.  Korsgaard’s  theory  is  grounded  in  the  structure  of 
our  own  reason,  the  nature  of  practical  reason  as  evidenced  by  your  own  engagement  in 
practical  reasoning,  because  it  is  the  nature  of  our  understanding  of  normativity.  The  point  is 
that  the  nature  of  our  faculty  of  understanding,  the  structure  of  our  own  mind  engaged  in  the 
activity  of  practical  reason,  is  where  we  must  find  the  explanation  for  the  source  of  normativity, 
because  it  is  our  own  understanding  that  provides  the  definitions  of  the  most  primitive  assertions 
about  normativity.  The  foundation  of  an  explanation  about  normativity  is  the  structure  of  the 
reasoning  involved  in  normative  decisions,  practical  reason,  because  the  definitions  of  whatever 
it  is  that  underlies  (explains,  makes  up,  constitutes)  normativity,  as  such,  must  be  found  there.  
 
Putting  forward  a  theory  based  on  evidence  provided  by  the  nature  of  our  own  mind  and  the 
ability  of  our  reason  to  ascertain  that  evidence  about  the  nature  of  our  own  mind  is  a  Kantian 
approach  to  explaining  the  source  of  normativity.  It  follows  the  model  put  forward  by  Immanuel 
Kant  (1781/1787/1996)  in  Critique  of  Pure  Reason ,  where  he  proposes  a  system  of 
transcendental  philosophy  which  explains  the  nature  of  cognition  by  examining  what  is 
necessary  for  the  cognition  of  objects  to  be  possible  at  all   (A11-16,  B24-30).  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism  is  a  transcendental  argument  which  derives  its  conclusions  from  the  nature  of  our 
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cognition.  Our  cognition  must  function  in  particular  ways  and  that  necessary  structure,  our 
constitution,  is  the  grounding  for  normativity.  Korsgaard  puts  forward  this  relationship  as  follows: 
The  reflective  structure  of  human  consciousness  requires  that  you  identify  yourself  with 
some  law  or  principle  which  will  govern  your  choices.  It  requires  you  to  be  a  law  to 
yourself.  And  that  is  the  source  of  normativity.  So  the  argument  shows  just  what  Kant 
said  that  it  did:  that  our  autonomy  is  the  source  of  obligation.  (1996b,  pp.  103-104) 
So,  the  reflective  nature  of  practical  reason  entails  the  constitutivist  theory  Korsgaard  puts 
forward.  While  this  line  of  reasoning  puts  forward  a  transcendental  argument,  this  does  not 
entail  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  is  transcendental  philosophy.  Kant  (1781/1787/1996)  argues  that 
while  the  grounding  for  morality,  the  “supreme  principles  and  basic  concepts  of  morality”,  are 
found  prior  to  experience  ( a  priori ),  do  not  fulfil  the  requirements  of  transcendental  philosophy 
because  they  involve  the  practical  perspective  of  action  rather  than  the  perspective  of  pure 
reason  (A15,  B29).  This  is  because  transcendental  philosophy,  as  Kant  puts  it,  deals  in  only 
what  is  conceptually  necessary.  So,  they  are  not  necessary  insofar  as  they  can  be  removed 
from  the  perspective  of  practical  reason,  but  they  are  necessary  given  the  nature  of  practical 
reason.  The  necessity  of  the  self  and   the  fact  that  its  existence  is  implied  in  every  thought 
provides  the  transcendental  grounding  for  Korsgaard’s  position.  29
 
Korsgaard’s  theory  utilises  a  Kantian  approach  by  deriving  its  conclusions  from  the  necessary 
nature  of  thought  and  therefore  her  theory  ultimately  depends  upon  the  viability  of 
transcendental  philosophy.  One  might  think  of  Korsgaard  as  putting  forward  a  transcendental 
aesthetic  similar  to  Kant’s  (1781/1787/1996)  derivation  of  space  and  time  (A23-49,  B37-73). 
Where  Kant  argues  that  the  nature  of  experience,  how  our  understanding  constructs 
experience,  demonstrates  that  space  and  time  are  true  prior  to  experience  and  without  relying 
on  any  particular  sensory  data,  Korsgaard  argues  that  the  nature  of  how  we  reflect  on  our 
actions  demonstrates  that  normativity  is  true  prior  to  experience  and  without  relying  on  any 
particular  sense  data.  30
 
Similarly,  transcendental  philosophy  can  be  used  to  show  that  reasons  are  objective,  despite 
being  provided  by  the  agent.   This  method  of  establishing  objectivity  is  a  transcendental 31
29  This  applies  to  all  Kantian  constitutivist  positions  that  utilise  the  Kantian  approach  to  establish  the 
grounding  of  normativity  in  what  constitutes  the  self.  Even  if  what  constitutes  the  self  is  practical  reason, 
the  existence  of  the  self  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  must  exist  if  thought  exists  (while  thinking,  the 
self  is  a  necessity).  It  is  this  necessity,  the  necessity  of  the  self  during  the  activity  of  thinking,  that  allows 
for  transcendental  arguments  (arguments  about  what  must  be  true  given  what  we  have  access  to)  based 
on  the  activity  of  reason. 
30  Which  is  to  say,  in  both  cases  it  is  the  nature  of  our  faculty  of  understanding  which  demonstrates  that 
space  (for  Kant)  and  normativity  (for  Korsgaard)  must  necessarily  ‘exist’.  By  exist  I  mean  they  must  be 
found  in  the  experiences  we  create.  This  method  of  demonstrating  why  normativity  must  exist  entails  that 
normativity  must  exist  because  of  the  relationship  it  has  with  other  concepts  which  means  that,  like  Kant’s 
argument  for  the  relationship  between  geometric  facts  and  space  and  time,  the  theory  establishes  that 
normative  truths  are  synthetic  a  priori  facts  because  of  their  relationship  with  the  necessity  of  normativity 
as  it  is  found  in  the  structure  of  our  own  reflection. 
31  Remember  that  ‘objective’  refers  to  the  necessity  of  the  reason  rather  than  a  requirement  that  the 
reason  is  founded  on  something  external  to  the  agent,  see  §§  0.3  and  0.4  for  further  details.   
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argument:  it  identifies  something  that  exists  and  determines  what  must  be  the  case  given  its 
existence.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  utilises  a  transcendental  argument  to  establish  that  we  are 
valuable,  which  is  a  crucial  element  of  grounding  normativity ,  in  the  following  manner: 32
[R]ational  action  exists,  so  we  know  it  is  possible.  [Then,  of  course,  the  question  which 
follows  is:]  How  is  it  possible?  And  then  by  the  course  of  reflections  in  which  we  have 
just  engaged,  I  show  you  that  rational  action  is  possible  only  if  human  beings  find  their 
own  humanity  to  be  valuable.  But  rational  action  is  possible,  and  we  are  the  human 
beings  in  question.  Therefore  we  find  ourselves  to  be  valuable.  Therefore,  of  course  we 
are  valuable.  (p.  123-124) 
The  structure  of  reflective  endorsement  grounds  normativity,  as  such,  in  the  same  manner: 
rational  action  exists  and  entails  the  endorsement  of  some  reasons  over  others,  this  activity  of 
endorsement  is  normativity.  Observing  the  structure  of  our  own  minds  is  the  transcendental 
apperception  which  Korsgaard  utilises  to  establish  normativity.  This  apperception,  the  analysis 
of  the  structure  of  your  own  mind,  is  transcendental  because  the  structure  of  your  mind  is 
necessary .  It  must  be  the  case  that  the  reasons  you  provide  are  capable,  when  the  reflection 33
process  is  undertaken  correctly,  of  being  developed  into  universal  laws,  because  the  structure 
which  develops  the  moral  law  is  a  necessary  requirement  for  the  activity  of  reflective 
endorsement.  This  universalizability  of  moral  law,  based  on  the  necessity  of  the  structure  which 
produces  the  law,  provides  the  objectivity  of  the  moral  law  and  in  that  sense,  this  argument  is  a 
transcendental  argument.  For  this  reason,  because  it  is  utilised  to  access  objective  facts,  the 
apperception  (introspection  or  self  examination)  which  provides  access  to  the  structure  of 
reflective  endorsement  is  transcendental  apperception .  
 
This  is  a  constitutivist  theory  because  universalizable  normativity  is  grounded  in  what  is 
constitutive  of  the  subject.  As  Korsgaard  (2009b)  argues  in  Self-Constitution:  Agency,  Identity, 
and  Integrity :  
“[R]espect  for  humanity  is  a  necessary  condition  of  effective  action.  It  enables  you  to 
legislate  a  law  under  which  you  can  be  genuinely  unified,  and  it  is  only  to  the  extent  that 
you  are  genuinely  unified  that  your  movements  can  be  attributable  to  you,  rather  than  to 
forces  working  in  you  or  on  you,  and  so  can  be  actions.  So  the  moral  law  is  the  law  of 
the  unified  constitution,  the  law  of  the  person  who  really  can  be  said  to  legislate  for 
himself  because  he  is  the  person  who  really  has  a  self.  It  is  the  law  of  successful 
self-constitution.  So  the  basic  insight  behind  Plato  and  Kant’s  confidence  here  is  not 
32  Establishing  that  we  ourselves  are  valuable  is  useful  in  grounding  normativity  in  how  we  are  constituted 
because  explaining  how  our  own  value  is  established  allows  Korsgaard  to  demonstrate  why  grounding 
your  own  value  also  grounds  the  value  of  others.  Demonstrating  that  value  that  is  grounded  in  what  is 
constitutive  of  agency  is  universalizable,  applicable  to  others  even  though  applied  by,  and  to,  the  self, 
which  allows  Korsgaard  to  then  demonstrate  why  moral  obligations  with  the  same  grounding  can  also  be 
universalizable;  which  is  the  project  she  undertakes  in  lecture  4  (Korsgaard,  1996b,  p131-166).  
33  The  nature  of  your  experience  of  the  world  is  the  experience  of  being  a  rational  agent  and  for  the  self  to 
have  that  experience  the  self  must  be  rational .  Once  this  is  established,  by  a  self  examination  of  the 
structure  of  your  experiences,  the  necessity  of  what  rational  thought  entails  is  just  as  necessary  as  the 
existence  of  rational  thought  itself.  
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really  anything  surprising  or  paradoxical.  It  is  simply  that  every  person  interacts  with 
others  as  he  interacts  with  himself,  and  in  this  the  good  person  is  no  different.”  (p.  206)  
The  moral  law  is  the  result  of  the  constitution  of  the  agent  -  it  is  a  requirement  of  that 
constitution.  The  story  of  why  normativity,  and  hence  the  moral  law,  exists  is  the  story  of  how  we 
are  constituted,  how  we  identify  that  constitution,  and  what  that  constitution  dictates  we  ought  to 
do.  
 
Gerald  Cohen  (1996),  whose  critical  analysis  of  Korsgaard  is  considered  later,  provides  a 
summary  of  Korsgaard’s  argument  for  the  foundation  of  morality  in  the  nature  of  agency: 
1  Since  we  are  reflective  beings,  we  must  act  for  reasons. 
But 2  If  we  did  not  have  a  normative  conception  of  our  identities,  we  could  have  no 
    reasons  for  actions. 
So 3  We  must  have  a  normative  conception  of  our  identities  (and  our  factual  need 
    for  a  normative  identity  is  part  of  our  normative  identity). 
So 4  We  must  endorse  ourselves  as  valuable. 
So 5  We  must  treat  (all)  human  beings  as  valuable. 
So 6  We  find  human  beings  to  be  valuable. 
So 7  Human  beings  are  valuable. 
So 8  Moral  obligation  is  established:  it  is  founded  in  the  nature  of  human  agency.  
(p.  185) 
Notice  that  steps  one  to  three  begin  the  process  of  establishing  morality  by  appealing  to 
necessary  elements  of  our  own  constitution.  While  Cohen  provides  this  summary  to 
demonstrate  that  Korsgaard  cannot  derive  her  conclusions  from  these  foundations,  the 
summary  shows  that  her  theory  is  an  attempt  to  do  so.  That  is  to  say,  Korsgaard’s  theory  is  a 
transcendental  argument  which  founds  morality  in  the  necessary  structure  of  our  own  mind.  My 
present  purpose  is  to  establish  the  nature  of  Korsgaard’s  argument  to  support  the  section  that 
follows:  it  explains  why  her  argument  is  subject  to  the  shmagency  problem.  
 
So,  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  grounds  normativity  in  the  nature  of  practical  reason  (deciding 
what  to  do).  For  Korsgaard,  the  process  of  deciding  what  to  do  is  the  process  of 
self-constitution,  and  that  process  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  agent.  The  process  of  self- 
constitution,  deciding  what  to  do,  is  determined  by  the  agent  in  the  sense  that  the  agent 
provides  the  rational  faculties  that  undertake  this  process  and  determine  its  success  or  failure. 
Normativity  is  grounded  in  the  constitution  of  the  agent  because  it  is  the  agent  that  determines 
what  one  ought  to  do;   it  is  this  perspective  of  practical  reason,  this  process  of  self-reflection, 
that  is  one’s  agency.  Hence,  because  one  is  an  agent,  one  is  faced  with  both  the  problem  of 
what  to  do  and  the  faculty  of  reason  which  provides  the  solution.  
 
This  brings  up  an  objection  which  may  be  confused  with  the  shmagency  problem.  One  might 
object  that  the  problem  of  what  to  do  cannot  be  solved  by  the  faculty  of  reason  because 
deciding  what  to  do  requires  a  motivational  component  that  cannot  be  provided  by  reason.  I 
have  in  mind  David  Hume’s  (1739/2007)  objection  against  ethics  founded  in  practical  reason  in 
A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature ,  where  Hume  argues  that  reason  cannot  provide  motivation, 
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because  in  the  absence  of  a  particular  desire  reason  cannot  determine  whether  one  ought  to  do 
one  thing  or  another  (2.3.3.4-6).  This  concern  is  only  weakly  related  to  the  shmagency  problem, 
but   my  presentation  of  Korsgaard’s  argument  may  raise  this  concern,  so  it  is  worth  addressing 
briefly.  Korsgaard  (1986)  argues  in  “Skepticism  About  Practical  Reason”  that  Hume’s  criticism  of 
practical  reason  is  based  on  a  skepticism  about  the  content  of  reason  rather  than  a  skepticism 
about  motivation  as  such  (pp.  5-6  and  25).  Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  if  a  suitable  theory  can 
show  that  the  results  of  reason  can  provide  a  reason  for  action,  the  nature  of  motivation  will  not 
provide  a  suitable  justification  for  being  skeptical  of  that  theory.  So,  a  normative  theory  which 
explains  how  reasons  for  action  are  derived  from  practical  reason  would  provide  a 
counterexample  to  Hume’s  critique  because  such  a  normative  theory  would  demonstrate  that 
the  content  of  practical  reason  includes  reasons  for  action.  So,  she  solves  this  problem  by 
explaining  that  the  concern  is  not  motivated  by  concerns  about  motivation  but  instead  by 
concerns  about  the  content  of  practical  reason.  In  this  manner,  Korsgaard  demonstrates  that  her 
theory  is  the  type  of  counterexample  to  Hume’s  critique  that  is  required  to  solve  the  problem  he 
poses,  because  her  theory  grounds  reasons  for  action  in  practical  reason.  So,  reasons  for 
action  exist  in  the  nature  of  the  moral  law  because  the  nature  of  the  agent  demands  that  the 
agent  is  rational.  In  that  sense,  the  reason  for  action  is  found  in  the  moral  law  itself  and  this  is 
relevant  to  the  agent  because  the  process  of  self  reflection  is  a  demand  on  the  agent,  and  a 
demand  by  the  agent ,  to  be  rational.  
 
In  summary,  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  is  an  examination  of  the  self,  of  one's  own  nature  as  an 
agent  that  engages  in  practical  reason,  and  grounds  normativity  in  the  result  of  that  self 
examination.  This  self  examination  targets  the  structure  of  self  reflection  itself:  it  is  apperception . 
Because  this  process  of  apperception  is  targeted  at  the  necessary  structure  of  the  process  of 
deciding  what  to  do,  practical  reason,  the  theory  that  follows  is  transcendental.  The  structure  of 
self-constitution,  deciding  what  to  do,  is  not  contingent,  it  must  be  as  it  is,  the  normativity 
grounded  in  this  element  of  the  agent’s  constitution  is  objective.  Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  explains 
that  her  argument  is  transcendental  because  it  first  identifies  that  “rational  action  exists,  so  we 
know  it  is  possible”  and  then  explains  “that  rational  action  is  only  possible  if  human  beings  find 
their  own  humanity  is  valuable”  (pp.124-125).  Her  point  is  that  because  we  know  rational  action 
exists  we  also  know  that  everything  which  is  required  for  rational  action  is  also  the  case  -  this  is 
how  she  develops  a  transcendental  argument  that  derives  our  value  (and,  ultimately,  her  theory 
of  normativity)  from  an  observation  of  the  structure  of  our  experience  of  the  world.  So,  we  find 
the  source  of  value  in  our  own  faculty  of  practical  reason:  the  grounding  of  normativity  is  found 




2.2  Why  the  shmagency  problem  applies  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism 
The  shmagency  problem  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  self  constitution  could  mean  different 
things  for  different  types  of  subjects.  If  the  shmagency  problem  is  correct,  what  self  constitution 
entails  would  vary  if  the  constitution  of  the  subject  varied .  The  argument  goes  as  follows:  if 
constituting  myself  coherently  is  the  aim  of  action,  then  my  aims  will  depend  on  how  I  am 
constituted,  because  my  constitution  determines  what  must  be  made  coherent,  and  how  I  am 
constituted  could  have  been  otherwise.  So,  if  coherent  self  constitution  means  a  particular  set  of 
moral  laws  for  an  agent,  because  of  the  agent's  own  constitution,  then  it  might  mean  another 
thing  for  a  different  type  of  subject,  a  shmagent,  because  of  how  they  are  constituted.  Once  the 
possibility  of  alternatively  constituted  subjects  is  established,  the  shmagency  problem  question 
(‘why  be  an  agent?’)  can  be  asked,  even  by  those  subjects  which  are  already  agents.  This  is  a 
problem  for  Korsgaard’s  theory  because  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  a  normative 
question  which  cannot  be  answered  by  referring  to  constitutivism.  Your  constitution  as  an  agent 
can  tell  you  what  agents  should  do,  but  it  cannot  tell  you  whether  you  ought  to  be  an  agent; 
hence,  the  shmagency  problem  demonstrates  that  Korsgaard’s  moral  law  is  not  a  categorical 
imperative,  it  is  merely  a  hypothetical  imperative  because  it  depends  on  a  contingent  claim  (that 
you  are  an  agent).   So,  the  argument  is  that  the  grounding  of  Korsgaard’s  theory,  agency,  is 34
contingent  because  Enoch  has  demonstrated  the  existence  of  an  alternative:  the  shmagent. 
This  contingency  demonstrates  that  the  grounding  Korsgaard’s  theory  relies  on  cannot  provide 
objectivity. 
 
Korsgaard  has  not  provided  a  reply  to  this  problem,  however  I  have  derived  one  from  her 
solution  to  another  critique  of  her  theory.  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  this  problem  would  be  that  the 
necessity  of  the  source  of  normativity  is  incompatible  with  the  contingency  of  the  source  of 
normativity:  normativity  cannot  be,  and  is  not  (in  her  theory),  derived  from  contingent  elements 
of  the  self   Korsgaard.  (1996b)  explains  the  problem  of  the  existence  of  normativity  as  an 
impossible  choice  between  grounding  normative  facts  in  externally  real  normative  entities 
(entities  which  are  moral  facts)  or  in  some  normative  consideration  (such  as  compassion  or  a 
form  of  contract)  (pp.  30-32).  Korsgaard  uses  the  term  “natural  source  of  power”  or  platonic 
realism  and  relates  it  to  the  realists  position  contextually  (p.30).  Her  discussion  of  Kant’s  reply  to 
the  difficulties  of  grounding  normativity  faced  by  metaphysical  realists  is  the  closest  that 
Korsgaard  comes  to  critiquing  the  underlying  assumptions  of  the  shmagency  problem.  The 
shmagency  problem  itself  purports  to  utilise  only  what  constitutivism  itself  provides, 
demonstrating  that  the  problem  persists  even  if  you  assume  (for  the  sake  of  argument)  much  of 
34  I  am  ignoring  the  distinction  that  Korsgaard  draws  between  the  categorical  imperative  and  the  moral 
law.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  that  the  categorical  imperative  and  the  moral  law  are  distinct  because  the 
categorical  imperative  does  not,  in  and  of  itself,  entail  morality  unless  one  also  thinks  of  oneself  as  a 
member  of  the  kingdom  of  ends  (p.  98-100).  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theory  explains  why  an  agent  must 
make  this  additional  step  and  consider  oneself  a  member  of  the  kingdom  of  ends:  one  must  do  so 
because  one  is  inescapably  engaged  in  the  activity  of  self  constitution.  So,  with  that  distinction 
acknowledged,  I  will  continue  to  use  the  term  “categorical  imperative”  to  include  the  moral  law  as 
Korsgaard  defines  it.  This  simplification  serves  to  clearly  identify  the  connection  between  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  approach  while  allowing  me  to  easily  describe  the  similarities  between  the 
shmagency  problem  and  a  different  critique  later  in  this  paper. 
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the  assertions  made  by  constitutivism  (Enoch,  2006,  p.  180).  However,  as  Velleman  points  out 
in  How  we  get  along  the  shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’)  assumes  that  one 
can  ask  a  normative  question  without  referring  to  agency  itself  (pp.  142-144).  Velleman’s  point  is 
that  a  question  which  seeks  a  normative  answer  which  cannot  be  provided  by  the  agent  or  what 
the  agent  constructs  entails  an  assumption  of  robustly  real  (externally  real)  metaphysical 
normative  entities;  at  least,  assuming  it  is  not  attempting  to  posit  a  skeptical  conclusion  (which 
Enoch  is  not).  For  this  reason  a  critique  of  the  type  of  realism  required  to  posit  such  a  question 
could  itself  be  considered  a  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.  In  that  context  one  might  look  to 
Kosgaard’s  (1996b)  support  for  Kant’s  critique  of  such  projects  to  find  a  reply  to  Enoch  (pp. 
33-40). 
 
This  is  a  problem  because,  she  argues,  positing  externally  real  normative  entities  has  been 
unsuccessful  and  other  normative  considerations,  such  as  contracts,  provide  an  unsatisfactory 
grounding  because  we  cannot  explain  why  those  considerations  have  normative  weight.   As 35
Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues:  
If  we  try  to  derive  .  .  .  [normativity]  from  some  supposedly  normative  consideration,  such 
as  gratitude  or  contract,  we  must  in  turn  explain  why  that  consideration  is  normative,  or 
where  its  authority  comes  from.  Either  its  authority  comes  from  morality,  in  which  case 
we  have  argued  in  a  circle,  or  it  comes  from  something  else,  in  which  case  the  question 
arises  again,  and  we  are  faced  with  an  infinite  regress.  (p.  30) 
  Korsgaard’s  theory  is  a  solution  to  these  problems  because  it  provides  an  explanation  of  the 
source  of  normativity:  it  explains  why  morality  exists  and  why  it  is  objective.  The  moral  law,  as 
Korsgaard  (1996b)  describes  it,  is  objective  in  the  sense  that  it  is  necessary  (pp.  102-105  and 
125).  The  moral  law  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  comes  with  the  problem  of  deciding  what  to 
do  (p.  89).  
 
Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  extends  the  problem  Korsgaard  poses  for  supposedly  normative 
considerations,  like  gratitude  and  contracts,  to  apply  to  Korsgaard’s  own  theory.  Where  she 
dismisses  these  considerations  as  insufficient  because  explaining  their  authority  results  in  an 
infinite  regress,  due  to  the  need  to  appeal  beyond  the  particular  consideration  put  forward, 
Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  asserts  that  constitutivism  suffers  the  same  fate.  Korsgaard’s  point 
is  that  if  one  puts  forward  a  supposedly  normative  consideration  as  the  source  of  normativity, 
the  result  will  be  the  problem  of  regress;  the  problem  of  regress  is  the  problem  that  there  is  still 
a  question  to  be  asked  and  it  is  the  answer  to  that  question  which  will  be  the  source  of 
normativity.  Once  the  explanation  has  regressed  in  this  manner  the  source  of  normativity  is  no 
longer  the  initial  supposedly  normative  consideration,  because  explaining  where  the  authority  of 
35  See  Korsgaard  (1996b)  p.  37-42.  Korsgaard  argues  that  approaches  to  the  problem  of  normativity  (to 
explaining  why  normativity  exist)  which  posit  external  normative  entities  fail  because  they  are  essentially 
refusing  to  answer  the  question  (p.  39).  The  appeal  to  the  external  entity,  whatever  it  might  be,  is  intended 
to  be  the  end  of  the  discussion,  an  appeal  to  a  foundational  claim,  and  in  that  sense  proof  in  its  own  right. 
This,  argues  Korsgaard,  is  a  failure  to  provide  a  satisfactory  explanation  and  cannot  deliver  a  satisfactory 
explanation  about  why  we  should  obey  the  normative  force  of  these  entities  even  if  we  are  willing  to 
concede  their  existence.  
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that  supposedly  normative  consideration  comes  from  will  entail  providing  the  source  of  the 
normativity  of  that  supposedly  normative  consideration:  hence,  the  source  of  normativity  must 
be  what  provides  the  normativity  to  that  supposedly  normative  consideration  rather  than  that 
normative  consideration  itself.  The  question  that  was  supposed  to  have  been  answered  is  still, 
so  to  speak,  an  open  question.  This  means  that  if  any  regression  is  possible  in  an  explanation  of 
the  source  of  normativity,  then  the  given  explanation  is  insufficient;  to  be  specific,  there  cannot 
be  any  regression  past  the  ending  point  of  the  provided  foundation.  Even  if  the  claim  the 
explanation  regresses  to  is  sufficient  (or,  at  least,  does  not  suffer  result  in  further  regression)  the 
regression  still  means  that  it  is  the  claim  the  explanation  has  regressed  to  that  is  the  source  of 
normativity  rather  than  the  initial  claim.  
 
Notice  that  this  is  the  same  line  of  argument  utilised  by  Enoch  (2006)  when  he  argues  that: 
If  a  constitutive-aim  or  constitutive-motives  theory  is  going  to  work  for  agency,  then,  it  is 
not  sufficient  to  show  that  some  aims  or  motives  or  capacities  are  constitutive  of  agency. 
Rather,  it  is  also  necessary  to  show  that  the  “game”  of  agency  is  one  we  have  reason  to 
play,  that  we  have  reasons  to  be  agents  rather  than  shmagents.  .  .  .   And  this,  of  course, 
is  a  paradigmatically  normative  judgement.  .  .  .   [I]f  we  need  a  normative  judgment—that 
we  have  a  reason  to  be  agents  rather  than  shmagents—in  order  for  the 
constitutive-of-agency  strategy  to  kick  in,  then  the  constitutivist  strategy  cannot  give  us 
the  whole  story  of  normativity.  (p.  186).  
So,  my  point  is  that  Enoch  is  using  Korsgaard’s  own  critique  against  her  by  arguing  that  the 
constitutivist  approach  regresses  and  for  that  reason  fails  to  ground  normativity:  the  normativity 
must  be  grounded  in  whatever  gives  our  constitution  its  authority  rather  than  in  our  constitution 
itself.  This  critique  aims  to  show  that  Korsgaard  fails  at  the  task  she  has  set  for  her  moral  theory 
on  her  own  grounds;  Korsgaard  claims  normative  considerations  cannot  be  the  source  of 
normativity  because  asking  where  their  authority  comes  from  results  in  a  regression  to  either 
something  else  or  to  further  regressions.  Enoch  points  out  that  asking  the  shmagency  problem 
question,  ‘why  be  an  agent’,  demonstrates  that  one  can  ask  where  the  authority  from 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  comes  from  too. 
 
One  might  think  at  this  point  that  the  other  option  Korsgaard  (1996b)  presents,  “[e]ither  its 
authority  comes  from  morality,  in  which  case  we  have  argued  in  a  circle,  or  it  comes  from 
something  else”  (p.  30),  might  offer  some  alternative  to  the  shmagency  problem.  If  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  demonstrates  that  Korsgaard’s  appeal  to  our  constitution  to  derive 
normativity   is  undermined  by  a  regression,  then  perhaps  she  could  appeal  to  morality  as  such, 
in  conjunction  with  our  constitution,  to  avoid  this  regression.  However,  if  one  took  this  route,  it 
would  either  result  in  the  type  of  circular  explanation  Korsgaard  was  concerned  about  or  the 
shmagency  problem  would  still  apply.  So,  if  one  argues  that  our  constitution  as  agents  is  the 
source  of  normativity  because  of  the  way  morality  is,  this  raises  the  problem  of  why  morality  is 
such  that  it  is  derived  from  our  constitution.  The  answer  to  this  is,  according  to  Korsgaard’s 
theory,  that  this  is  because  of  our  constitution,  which  then  leads  one  to  ask  why  our  constitution 
has  this  relationship  to  morality.  Hence,  if  we  refer  to  the  nature  of  morality  to  explain  why  our 
constitution  is  the  source  of  normativity,  we  will  have  provided  a  circular  answer  because  we 
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must  use  our  constitution  to  explain  why  morality  is  the  way  that  it  is.  Furthermore,  even  if  we 
suppose  that  this  particular  circular  logic  is  not  vicious,  that  it  is  not  a  problem  for  our  answer  to 
rely  on  circular  reasoning  in  this  case,  then  we  have  still  yet  to  answer  the  shmagency  problem 
question  (‘why  be  an  agent’)  because  one  could  ask  ‘why  bother  beginning  this  circle  at  all’. 
Escaping  the  regression  of  explanation  by  deploying  circular  reasoning  cannot  succeed 
because  an  alternative  to  an  agent  whose  constitution  leads  to  this  circular  answer  will  be 
compared  to  a  hypothetical  alternative,  a  shmagent,  whose  constitution  does  not  involve  in  this 
type  of  circular  answer  and  then  one  can  ask  ‘why  be  an  agent  and  engage  in  that  circle  instead 
of  a  shmagent?’. 
 
This  relates  to  the  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  that  I  provide  in  defence  of  Korsgaard’s 
theory  in  §2.7  which  can  also  be  used  to  demonstrate  why  her  reply  to  Cohen’s  problem  that  I 
discuss  in  §2.6  does  not  lead  to  the  circularity  discussed  here.  This  might  be  done  by  deriving 
morality  from  non-moral  foundations  which  in  turn  rest  on  epistemic  foundations  which 
themselves  are  not  viciously  circular.  I  will  develop  this  line  of  thought  later.  My  purpose  in 
mentioning  it  here  is  merely  to  identify  that  infinite  regression,  vicious  circularity,  and  the 
shmagency  problem  are  not  the  only  choices  available.  The  point  is  that  the  shmagency 
problem  applies  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theory  in  the  sense  that  it  indicates  that  these  are 
available  choices:  if  Korsgaard  has  a  reply  to  the  problem  which  explains  why  these  are  not  the 
only  choices  available,  the  problem  applies  in  the  sense  that  it  demands  she  provide  that  reply. 
Korsgaard  has  provided  no  such  reply.   36
 
If  something  about  the  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  contingent,  then  the  moral  law 
itself  is  contingent  because,  as  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues,  reflective  endorsement  (solving  this 
problem)  “ is  morality  itself ”  (p.  89).  So,  the  shmagency  problem  is  a  problem  for  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism  because  the  shmagency  problem  illustrates  that  our  constitution  could  be 
otherwise  and  because  our  constitution  dictates  how  we  solve  the  problem  of  deciding  what  to 
do,  our  constitution  dictates  how  we  create  the  moral  law,  the  shmagency  problem  entails  that 
the  moral  law  itself  could  be  otherwise  and,  hence,  is  contingent.  Once  it  is  established  that  the 
moral  law  is  contingent,  the  agent  can  ask  if  they  ought  to  obey  it  at  all  (they  can  ask  ‘why  be  an 
agent’  with  moral  law,  when  I  could  be  a  shmagent  with  shmoral  law?’).  
 
The  hypothetical  possibility  of  the  shmagent  demonstrates,  if  the  shmagency  problem  is 
accurate,  that  any  number  of  coherent  prescriptions  follow  from  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism.  This 
is  a  problem  for  her  theory  because  the  imperative  of  self  constitution,  the  aim  which  follows 
from  how  we  are  constituted,  cannot  be  a  categorical  imperative  if  it  is  contingent,  and  if  it  is  not 
36  I  think  the  reason  she  provided  no  such  reply  is  because  she  does  not  think  the  problem  is  worth 
replying  to.  She  might  think  that  it  is  not  worth  replying  to  because  her  theory  is  already  presented  with  all 
of  the  tools  required  to  diffuse  the  problem.  The  Kantian  approach  derives  normativity  from  non-normative 
and  necessary  attributes  of  our  own  cognition  and  therefore  does  not  require  a  further  development  or 
explanation  of  why  it  is  not  regressive,  viciously  circular,  or  subject  to  normative  questions  beyond  its 
scope.  However,  even  though  I  think  that  this  is  Korsgaard’s  position,  I  think  Enoch’s  problem  still  justifies 
a  reply:  even  if  the  tools  to  give  such  a  reply  are  already  present  in  Korsgaard’s  theory,  the  problem  is 
problematic  enough,  on  the  face  of  the  matter,  to  justify  a  demonstration  of  how  those  tools  diffuse  it.  
84 
a  categorical  imperative,  then  the  normativity  Korsgaard  has  derived  from  our  constitution  as 
agents  is  not  objective.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  provides  developments  of  Kant’s  humanity  and 
kingdom  of  ends  formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative  (p.122  and  127  respectively) .  The 37
argument  is  that  a  specific  moral  law  follows  from  the  process  of  self  constitution  and  that  those 
moral  laws  are  universal  and  apply  to  all  rational  agents,  they  are  categorical  and  prescriptive: 
the  categorical  imperative.  This  relationship  between  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  and  the 
categorical  imperative  runs  parallel  to  the  objectivity  of  the  normativity  of  her  theory.  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism  derives  objective  normativity  from  the  constitution  of  our  agency  because  of  the 
necessity  of  that  constitution  and  that  necessity  is  also  what  makes  the  imperative  of  self 
constitution  categorical.  This  can  be  seen  where  she  summarises  the  relationship  between 
action,  causality,  the  categorical  imperative,  and  the  self: 
.  .  .   the  hypothetical  and  categorical  imperatives  are  constitutive  principles  of  volition 
and  action.  Unless  we  are  guided  by  these  principles —unless  we  are  at  least  trying  to 
conform  to  them—we  are  not  willing  or  acting  at  all.  The  conception  of  action  that  yields 
this  conclusion  is  Kant’s  conception:  that  action  is  determining  yourself  to  be  the  cause 
of  some  end.  The  hypothetical  imperative  binds  you  because  what  you  are  determining 
yourself  to  be  when  you  act  is  the  cause  of  some  end.  The  categorical  imperative  binds 
you  because  what  you  are  determining  to  be  the  cause  of  some  end  is  yourself .  In  fact, 
the  two  things  are  so  closely  bound  together  that  they  seem  to  be  inseparable,  for 
nothing  counts  as  trying  to  realize  some  end  that  is  not  also  trying  to  determine  yourself 
to  realize  that  end,  and  nothing  counts  as  determining  yourself  to  realize  the  end  that  is 
not  also  trying  to  determine  your  own  causality .  In  fact  .  .  .   the  two  ideas  are  so  closely 
linked  that  there  is  something  artificial  in  the  idea  that  there  are  two  imperatives.  There  is 
really  just  one  imperative  here:  act  in  accordance  with  a  maxim  you  can  will  as  a 
universal  law.  The  hypothetical  imperative  merely  specifies  the  kind  of  law  we  are 
looking  for—a  causal  law,  a  practical  law.  And  that  thought  is  already  contained  in  the 
idea  that  what  we  are  looking  for  is  a  law  that  governs  action .  It  appears  that  there  is 
only  one  law  of  practical  reason,  and  it  is  the  categorical  imperative.  (Korsgaard,  2009, 
p.  81) 
So,  because  Korsgaard  argues  that  our  agency  demands  by  its  very  nature  and  because  of 
what  it  is  that  we  constitute  ourselves  coherently,  she  is  deriving  the  categorical  imperative  to 
the  same  extent,  and  in  the  same  manner,  that  she  is  deriving  normativity.  Which  is  to  say, 
grounding  normativity  in  our  constitution  as  agents  and  deriving  the  categorical  imperative  from 
our  constitution  as  agents  is  the  same  thing.  It  is  the  same  thing  because  determining  what  it  is 
necessarily  the  case  that  we  should  do  by  referring  to  what  is  constitutive  of  our  agency  is  both 
explaining  where  normativity  comes  from  and  why  it  exists  (grounding  normativity)  and 
demonstrating  why  that  normativity  is  necessary  (why  the  imperative  is  categorical).  So,  the 
activity  of  self  constitution,  which  is  the  overarching  imperative  that  Korsgaard  derives  from  our 
constitution  as  agents,  is  both  an  explanation  of  the  source  of  normativity  and  of  the  categorical 
imperative.  This  is  also  the  point  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  is  in  direct  conflict  with.  
37  Or,  p.  120-130  for  the  expanded  reconstructions  and  the  entire  chapter  for  supporting  developments. 
Korsgaard  also  provides  an  adaption  of  the  Kingdom  of  Ends  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  in 
Self  Constitution:  Agency,  Identity,  and  Integrity  p.  188-206.  
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This  relationship  between  the  categorical  imperative  and  the  activity  of  self  constitution 
demonstrates  why  the  shmagency  problem  question  applies  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism. 
The  normativity  derived  from  our  constitution,  by  Korsgaard’s  theory,  is  supposed  to  provide  the 
answer  to  all  normative  questions  -  just  like  the  categorical  imperative.  This  is  because 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theory  is  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative.  Her  argument 
that  what  we  ought  to  do  is  constitute  ourselves  coherently  is  both  categorical  and  an 
imperative;  it  is  also  intended  to  be  the  source  of  the  solution  to  moral  problems  and,  hence,  a 
formulation  of  our  obligation,  to  ourselves,  to  be  coherent:  the  categorical  imperative.  Enoch’s 
shamgency  problem  appears  to  demonstrate  a  normative  question  that  either  Korsgaard’s 
theory  cannot  answer  or  that  might  be  answered  in  multiple,  incompatible,  ways.  We  might, 
according  to  Enoch,  have  a  reason  to  endorse  agency  that  is  not  derived  from  our  constitution, 
or  there  might  be  a  competing  reason  to  endorse  shmagency  that  is  derived  from  a  rival 
constitution.  38
 
While  it  might  be  an  awkward  problem  if  we  found  that  there  were  normative  questions  which 
we  cannot  answer,  the  prospect  of  alternative  answers  to  normative  questions  is  a  more 
significant  problem  and  it  is  the  problem  posed  by  the  shmagency  problem:  if  one  asks  why  one 
should  endorse  one’s  own  agency,  the  problem  is  not  merely  that  this  is  a  question  the 
constitutivist  cannot  answer,  but  that  it  implies  that  the  answers  derived  from  our  own 
constitution  are  no  more  worth  endorsing  than  the  answers  derived  from  alternative 
constitutions.  Hence,  our  own  constitution  cannot  establish  that  the  normativity  it  provides  is 
necessary  because  it  cannot  establish  that  this  normativity  is  worthy  of  endorsement  over  any 
alternative  (hypothetical  or  otherwise).  So,  the  problem  would  be  that  there  cannot  be  a 
categorical  imperative  to  obey  the  normativity  derived  from  my  own  constitution  (because  there 
is  no  reason  to  endorse  my  constitution)  and,  therefore,  my  constitution  cannot  be  necessary. 
 
At  this  point  it  appears  that  something  has  been  misunderstood  about  Korsgaard’s  theory  in 
order  for  the  shmagency  problem  to  be  applied  to  it.  On  the  one  hand  it  appears  that  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  question  demonstrates  that  the  categorical  imperative  and  the  task  of  self 
constitution  have  been  put  at  odds  (there  is  no  categorical  imperative  to  endorse  the  task  of  self 
constitution).  This  means  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  has  been  undone  because  it  cannot  provide 
objective  normativity;  because  it  can  only  provide  normativity  based  on  something  contingent: 
our  own  constitution.  On  the  other  hand  the  point  that  how  we  are  constituted  is  necessary  is 
central,  and  crucial,  to  Korsgaard’s  theory,  so  one  might  wonder  if  Enoch  has  misunderstood 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  by  supposing  that  our  constitution  might  be  otherwise.  The  distinction 
38  Peter  Railton  (1997)  raises  a  related  concern  in  “On  the  Hypothetical  and  Non-Hypothetical”  where  he 
argues  that  constitutivism  is  incompatible  with  asking  some  questions  about  normativity:  Railton  argues 
that  a  constitutivist  would  be  unable  to  criticize  an  agent  who  refused  to  give  deliberative  weight  to  an  end 
that  it  acknowledged  as  following  from  its  own  constitution  (p.  70).  Railton’s  point  is  that  constitutivism  can 
only  attempt  to  compel  agents  by  appealing  to  their  constitution,  which  leaves  them  with  no  recourse  if 
confronted  with  an  agent  whom  is  admently  uncompelled  by  their  own  constitution  despite  acknowledging 
what  it  entails. 
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that  leads  to  this  contention  is  the  use  of  normative  and  non-normative  necessity.  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  does  not  depend  on  us  actually  being  able  to  provide  a  particular 
alternative  to  agency:  the  shmagent  does  not  actually  have  to  be  something  that  exists.  Rather, 
the  point  is  that  we  can  question  whether  we  ought  to  be  constituted  as  we  are.  So,  while 
Korsgaard  develops  her  theory  from  the  point  that  we  must  be  agents  Enoch  is  pointing  out  that 
there  is  a  distinction  between  what  we  have  to  do  and  what  we  ought  to  do .  The  shmagency 
problem  applies  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theory  as  a  critique  of  her  use  of  non-normative 
necessity  to  derive  a  normative  necessity:  essentially,  Enoch  is  arguing  that  Korsgaard  has 
failed  to  establish  that  it  is  normatively  necessary  to  be  an  agent  and  instead  has  derived  her 
conclusions  from  the  non-normative  necessity  of  agency .  39
 
  
39  Which  is  in  fact  a  misunderstanding  of  Korsgaard’s  theory  because  the  necessity  she  is  utilising  is  not 
normative  but  it  is  special  in  other  regards.  This  is  a  point  I  will  develop  soon  and  then  pick  up  again  later. 
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2.3  A  similar  problem,  which  fails  to  show  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  is  not  subject  to  the 
shmagency  problem 
Before  I  continue  to  discuss  the  bad  action  problem,  and  develop  a  solution  to  the  shmagency 
problem  based  on  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  the  bad  action  problem,  I  need  to  discuss  a  problem 
which  is  very  similar  to  the  shmagency  problem  that  Korsgaard  does  provide  a  clear  solution  to. 
The  solution  to  this  problem  does  not  solve  the  shmagency  problem,  but  the  reasons  why  it  fails 
to  do  so  are  important  in  their  own  right:  they  provide  further  demonstration  that  the  shmagency 
problem  applies  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism.  The  shmagency  problem  claims  that  while  a 
specific  moral  law  follows  from  the  process  of  self  constitution,  our  particular  constitution  plays  a 
role  in  that  process  and  changing  our  constitution  would  change  the  results  of  the  process; 
hence,  the  moral  law  is  not  universal  because  it  would  be  different  if  we  were  differently 
constituted.  Michael  Smith  puts  forward  a  similar  critique  in  “The  Magic  of  Constitutivism”,  where 
he  argues  that  there  are  multiple  functions  constitutive  of  our  nature  and  that  the  laws  coherent 
with  some  of  those  functions  will  compete  with  laws  that  are  coherent  with  others  (pp.  193-194). 
As  Smith’s  argument  exposes  there  appear  to  be  different  types  of  necessity  that  relate  to  our 
constitution.  Agency  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  I  could  not  be  a  thinking  and  acting  agent 
that  understands  the  world  without  it  and  this  makes  it  necessary.  However,  there  are  myriad 
other  elements  of  my  constitution  that  I  would  not  be  myself  without  too  such  as  my  gender, 
parts  of  my  genetic  makeup,  my  particular  upbringing,  and  so  on.  Smith’s  point  is  that  the 
inescapability  of  our  agency  does  not  entail  that  we  ought  to  follow  the  prescriptions  of  agency, 
because  if  that  was  the  case,  then  the  obligation  that  arises  from  inescapability  would  also  apply 
to  other  inescapable  elements  of  our  nature:  so,  the  inescapability  of  agency  cannot  be  what 
entails  that  we  ought  to  endorse  agency’s  prescriptions.  Smith  puts  forward  the  function  we 
have  as  vehicles  for  our  genes  and  explains  that  we  have  this  function  because  we  are  human 
beings  which  is  an  inescapable  state  of  affairs  (p.  194).   This  inescapable  state  of  affairs,  being 40
a  human  animal,  also  appears  necessary  for  the  same  reasons  that  it  is  inescapable:  there  does 
not  appear  to  be  any  sense  in  which  we  can  completely  escape  or  cease  engaging  in  the 
activity  of  being  human  and  this  activity  of  being  human  entails  this  function.  Notice  that  the 
crucial  point  is  that  there  appear  to  be  many  elements  of  our  constitution  other  than  agency 
which  appear  to  have  similar  qualities  to  agency  (although  it  is  not  clear  that  they  are  necessary 
in  the  same  sense  as  agency  -  but  this  is  a  point  I  am  about  to  develop  and  then  expand  on  in 
§§  2.6  and  2.7).  So,  if  the  necessity  of  our  agency  entails  that  the  normativity  derived  from  our 
constitution  as  agents  is  objective  then,  it  appears,  so  would  the  normative  prescriptions  we  can 
derive  from  other  necessary  elements  of  our  constitution.  
 
One  might  contest  that  this  analogy  appears  unfair  because  of  the  distinction  between  the  types 
of  necessity  relevant  to  these  different  types  of  inescapable  elements  of  our  constitution. 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  could  be  defended  in  this  manner  by  describing  one  as  an 
inescapable  hypothetical  imperative  and  the  other  as  the  categorical  imperative.  The  defence 
40  Smith  gets  this  example  from  Richard  Dawkins  (1976)  The  selfish  gene .  The  particulars,  and  appeal,  of 
Dawkins  position  is  beside  the  point  so  I  will  not  develop  it  here.  Smith  uses  this  example  as  a  convenient 
method  of  providing  an  alternative  function  which  we  inescapably  have  and  seems  to  prescribe  particular 
courses  of  action.  
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would  be  that  prescriptions  which  follow  from  our  nature  as  vehicles  for  our  genes  are  not 
objective  because  they  are  a  hypothetical  imperative:  if  one  wants  to  obey  the  demands  of  our 
genes  (food,  breathing,  finding  shelter,  and  so  on).  In  contrast,  the  prescriptions  which  follow 
from  our  nature  as  agents  are  objective  because  they  are  categorical:  one  ought  to  obey  the 
prescriptions  which  agency  entails  in  all  cases.  However,  this  distinction  will  not  protect 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  from  Smith’s  critique  for  the  same  reason  that  the  shmagency 
problem  applies  to  her  theory:  the  relationship  between  the  necessity  of  the  imperative  and 
whether  the  imperative  is  categorical  is  what  is  in  question.  
 
Korsgaard  argues  that  the  necessity  of  our  agency  is  what  makes  the  normativity  derived  from 
our  agency  objective  but  that  approach  appears  to  be  able  to  render  other  necessary  elements 
of  how  we  are  constituted,  that  also  have  functions  from  which  we  can  derive  prescriptions, 
objective  too.  So,  the  normativity  derived  from  agency  must  be,  in  some  way,  special  such  that 
its  necessity  can  entail  objectivity.  Notice  how  this  has  developed  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
shmagency  problem:  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  demands  that  the  constitutivist  explain  why 
we  should  endorse  agency ,  and  Smith’s  presentation  of  non-agential  elements  of  our 
constitution  from  which  we  can  derive  prescriptions  demands  that  the  constitutivist  explain  why 
the  necessity  of  agency  is  special .  In  both  cases  the  problem  is  an  apparent  disjunction 
between  the  hypothetical  and  categorical  imperative,  because  in  both  cases  Korsgaard’s  theory 
is  being  critiqued  for  putting  forward  what  appears  to  be  a  hypothetical  imperative  as  a 
categorical  imperative.  
However,  Korsgaard  (1996b)  provides  a  solution  to  Smith’s  (2015)  problem  when  she  argues 
that: 
The  test  of  reflective  endorsement  is  the  test  used  by  actual  moral  agents  to  establish 
the  normativity  of  all  their  particular  motives  and  inclinations.  So  the  reflective 
endorsement  test  is  not  merely  a  way  of  justifying  morality.  It  is  morality  itself .  (p.  89)  
Normativity  is  uniquely  related  to  agency  because  it  is  our  agency  which  provides  prescriptions 
as  such .  The  point  is  that  there  is  a  fundamental  distinction  between  what  agency  entails  and 
what  other  elements  of  how  we  are  constituted  entail  because  the  kinds  of  things  they  entail  are 
different.  They  are  different  because,  according  to  Korsgaard  our  agency  is  our  practical  reason.  
 
As  Korsgaard  (1996b)  explains,  our  agency  is  our  practical  reason  in  the  sense  that  “[y]our 
humanity  requires  you  to  conform  to  some  of  your  practical  identities”  (p.  123)  and  “moral 
identity  exerts  a  kind  of  governing  role  over  the  other  kinds”  (p.  130).  It  is  your  humanity  which 
entails  practical  identities  and  because  morality  governs  practical  identities  that  means  your 
humanity  entails  morality.  In  this  manner  Korsgaard  justifies  our  agency  as  the  source  of 
normativity  in  a  manner  that  does  not  allow  for  any  other  constitution  to  provide  a  rival 
normativity.  Note  that  this  does  not  mean  that  other  elements  of  our  constitution  cannot  be  in 
contention  with  the  moral  law.  The  point  is  not  that  only  agency  prescribes,  the  point  is  that 
agency  governs  law  principled  behaviour  and  so  is  the  arbitrator  of  any  such  conflicts.  So, 
agency  might  conflict  with  other  elements  of  your  nature  but  agency  is  also  the  decider  of  those 
conflicts  and  so  the  resolution  will  be  agency’s  resolution.  However,  Korsgaard  is  also  not  (of 
course)  saying  that  agency  always  in  fact  wins.  So,  if  the  resolution  is  an  autonomous  action 
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agency  decides  the  conflict.  Which  is  to  say,  agency  decides  the  conflict  because  autonomous 
actions  are  actions  which  are  decided  in  a  principled  manner  and  deciding  things  in  a  principled 
manner  is  the  activity  of  your  agency. 
 
So,  our  agency  perscribes  principles  and  laws,  while  other  elements  of  our  constitution 
prescribe  in  some  different  sense:  the  relationship  between  agency  and  the  process  of  self 
reflection  (deciding  what  to  do)  is  what  makes  the  prescriptions  of  agency  special.  Smith 
provides  a  similar  solution  to  this  problem  which  helps  explain  Korsgaard’s  position.  Smith 
(2015)  solves  the  problem  he  presents  with  a  reconstruction  of  Korsgaard’s  point: 
[D]oes  the  fact  that  we  are  essentially  both  agents  and  human  beings  entail  that  we  face 
a  deliberative  dilemma  when  it  comes  to  [conflicts  between  the  prescriptions  of  agency 
and  the  prescriptions  which  follow  from  being  a  human  being]? 
The  answer  is  no  to  both  questions.  We  do  not  have  incommensurable  reasons  because 
only  the  demand  relative  to  our  function  as  agents  is  analytically  tied  to  the  concept  of  a 
reason  for  action.  (p.  194) 
The  solution  to  the  problem  that  is  that  constitutivism  does  provide  a  special  reason  to  think  that 
the  necessity  of  agency  is  uniquely  positioned  to  provide  the  categorical  imperative  .  Korsgaard 
finds  this  reason,  the  analytic  relationship  between  normativity  and  our  constitution  as  agents,  in 
the  Kantian  approach.  The  idea  is  that  normativity  can  be  derived  from  the  necessity  of  agency 
because  exercising  our  autonomy  entails  the  task  of  self  constitution  and  our  autonomy  is  the 
activity  of  making  principles   for  ourselves.  Hence,  the  principles  of  normativity  can  only  come 
from  our  autonomy,  and  therefore  the  activity  of  self  constitution,  because  no  alternative 
element  of  our  constitution  provides  laws. 
 
In  Groundwork  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals  Kant  (1785/2011)  argues   this  point  by  explaining 
that  exercising  our  autonomy  and  the  categorical  imperative  are  one  and  the  same  thing:  
Autonomy  of  the  will  is  the  property  of  the  will  by  which  it  is  a  law  to  itself  (independently 
of  any  property  of  the  objects  of  volition).  The  principle  of  autonomy  is,  therefore:  to 
choose  only  in  such  a  way  that  the  maxims  of  your  choice  are  also  included  as  universal 
law  in  the  same  volition.  (4:441).  
Lawgiving  and  the  will  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  according  to  Kant,  in  the  sense  that  the  will 
is  free,  autonomous,  when  and  because  it  is  the  author  of  its  own  laws.  Kant  (1797/1999) 
argues  in  The  metaphysics  of  morals ,  like  Korsgaard  after  him,  that  for  this  reason  agency  and 
practical  reason  are  the  same: 
The  faculty  of  desire  whose  internal  ground  of  determination  and,  consequently,  even 
whose  likings  are  found  in  the  reason  of  the  subject  is  called  the  Will .  Accordingly,  the 
Will  is  the  faculty  of  desire  regarded  not,  as  is  the  will,  in  relation  to  action,  but  rather  in 
relation  to  the  ground  determining  will  to  action.  The  Will  itself  has  no  determining 
ground;  but,  insofar  as  it  can  determine  will,  it  is  practical  reason  itself.  (214) 
So,  for  Kant  (like  Korsgaard)  the  relationship  between  normativity,  agency,  and  practical  reason 
entail  that  agency  is  not  something  that  can  be  in  competition  with  other  elements  of  our 
constitution  for  the  grounding  of  normativity.  Normativity  cannot  be  grounded  in  anything  other 
than  the  autonomy  of  the  will  because  it  is  practical  reason .  Notice  that  Kant  is  making  the  same 
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point  that  Korsgaard  and  Smith  provide  in  order  to  solve  the  problem  of  alternative  sources  of 
normativity.  As  Smith  summarises,  and  Kant  and  Korsgaard  argue,  agency  is  special  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  the  only  element  of  our  constitution  which  can  ground  normativity  because  the 
principles  of  normativity  and  autonomy  are  one  and  the  same. 
 
These  problems  are  similar  because  they  explore  problems  that  result  from  the  relationship 
between  necessity  and  the  objectivity  of  the  normativity  derived  from  agency.  Smith’s  problem 
that  we  have  multiple  inescapable  elements  of  our  constitution  and  the  shmagency  problem  are 
both  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  objective  normativity  cannot  be  derived  from  agency.  As 
explained,  the  problem  Smith  summarises  is  easily  solved  by  points  already  provided  by 
Korsgaard,  however,  this  solution  will  not  solve  the  shmagency  problem  because,  as  I  alluded  to 
earlier,  the  shmagency  problem  critiques  the  derivation  of  normative  necessity  from 
non-normative  necessity,  and  this  solution  does  not  solve  that  problem.  So,  even  though 
Korsgaard  can  explain  why  agency’s  privileged  role  in  the  process  of  self  reflection  is  special, 
this  does  not,  in  and  of  itself,  entail  that  we  ought  to  endorse  that  privileged  role.   While 
Korsgaard,  Smith,  and  Kant  have  explained  why  agency  must  be  endorsed  over  and  above  any 
other  element  of  our  constitution,  this  does  not  preclude  us  refusing  to  endorse  any  element  of 
our  constitution.  Which  is  to  say,  the  shmagency  problem  has  still  not  been  answered  even 
though  some  potential  candidates  have  been  precluded:  it  could  be  helpful  to  think  of  the 
shmagency  problem  rephrased  as  follows,  ‘Ok,  so  we  cannot  endorse  our  animal  nature  in 
place  of  our  agency  but  that  does  not  require  me  to  endorse  agency  itself:  so,  I  ask  again,  why 
be  an  agent?’;  the  open  question,  so  to  speak,  remains  open  regardless  of  how  difficult  it  is  to 
actually  specify  what  the  alternative  source  of  normativity  is,  or  even  could  be. 
 
In  summary,  the  shmagency  problem  applies  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  because  it  is  a 
critique  of  her  derivation  of  normative  necessity  from  non-normative  necessity.  Korsgaard 
argues  that  we  cannot  escape  the  activity  of  practical  reason  and  undertaking  this  activity 
entails  endorsing  agency.  Enoch  replies  that  the  inescapability  of  agency  cannot  entail  that  we 
ought  to  endorse  agency  because  the  inescapability  of  agency  is  a  non-normative  necessity: 
agency  might  be  our  plight,  but  that  does  not  entail  that  we  should  endorse  our  plight.  If  we  do 
not  have  a  reason  to  endorse  agency,  then  we  do  not  have  a  reason  to  endorse  the  normativity 
derived  from  it.  So,  Korsgaard  is  required  to  provide  a  reply  to  Enoch  which  explains  why  the 
inescapability  of  agency  provides  a  normative  necessity.  The  nature  of  practical  reason  will  not 
help,  because  it  is  merely  an  element  of  the  non-normative  necessity  which  is  agency. 
Korsgaard  has  not  given  a  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem,  but  she  has  given  a  reply  to  a 




2.4  The  bad  action  problem 
Before  explaining  the  similarities  between  the  bad  action  problem  and  the  shmagency  problem, 
I  will  analyse  the  bad  action  problem  to  explain  the  problem  it  poses  for  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism.  The  underlying  similarity  between  the  two  problems  will  become  increasingly 
apparent  as  this  analysis  develops,  but  this  similarity  will  be  explored  in  the  next  section.  The 
bad  action  problem  demonstrates  that  a  subject  can  coherently  provide  different  answers  to.  .  .  . 
than  Korsgaard’s  theory  predicts.  Cohen  (1996)  puts  forward  the  bad  action  problem  in 
“Reason,  humanity,  and  the  moral  law”  (which  is  a  chapter  in  Korsgaard’s  book  The  Source  of 
Normativity ),  where  he  argues  that  “I  can  show  that  morality  is  a  rational  way,  without  being  able 
to  show  that  it  is  the  (only)  rational  way)”  (p.  181).  This  is  a  problem  for  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism  because  it  entails  that  the  moral  law  cannot  be  necessary  in  the  manner  her 
theory  requires  in  order  to  ground  the  objectivity  of  normativity  in  agency.  Cohen  is  attempting  to 
demonstrate  that  morality  is  not  defended  as  a  matter  of  rational  requirement.  Rather,  he 
argues,  it  is  something  defended  by  the  moral  agent  that  endorses  it.  So,  according  to  Cohen, 
he  can  demonstrate  that  multiple  answers  follow  from  Korsgaard’s  approach  to  grounding 
normativity.  He  demonstrates  why  this  distinction  becomes  a  problem,  why  it  is  incompatible 
with  the  necessity  of  the  moral  law,  by  providing  an  example  of  a  mafioso  who  believes  he 
should  live  by  his  mafia  code  of  honour  rather  than  the  moral  law.  It  appears,  according  to 
Cohen’s  presentation  of  the  situation,  that  the  mafioso  cannot  be  convinced  that  they  ought  to 
endorse  the  moral  law  instead  of  the  mafia  code;  at  least,  that  they  cannot  be  convinced  to  do 
so  by  reference  to  any  element  of  their  own  constitution.  So,  bad  action  is  a  problem  for 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  because  she  cannot  appeal  beyond  reason  to  explain  why  we  ought 
to  endorse  the  moral  law.  Reason  cannot  make  that  endorsement  because  multiple 
normativities  appear  to  be  coherent  with  reason  and,  furthermore,  there  does  not  appear  to  be 
any  way  to  compel  an  individual  who  is  already  endorsing  a  different  normativity  to  endorse 
Korsgaard’s  instead.  
 
Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  creates  this  problem  for  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  by  attempting  to 
demonstrate  that  because  the  agent  is  the  creator  of  the  moral  law  the  agent  cannot  also  be 
bound  by  the  moral  law.  Cohen  (1996)  explains  this  in  the  beginning  of  his  critique: 
You  might  think  that,  if  you  make  the  law,  then  that  law  binds  you,  because  you  made  it. 
For,  if  you  will  the  law,  then  how  can  you  deny  that  it  binds  you,  without  contradicting 
your  own  will?  But  you  might  also  think  the  opposite.  You  might  think  that,  if  you  are  the 
author  of  the  law,  then  it  cannot  bind  you.  For,  how  can  it  have  authority  over  you  when 
you  have  authority  over  it?  How  can  it  bind  you  when  you,  the  law maker ,  can  change  it, 
at  will,  whenever  you  like?  (p.  167)  
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  appears  to  forgo  the  authority  of  the  moral  law  when  it  grounds  it  in 
the  constitution  of  the  agent.  This  authority  is  missing  because  the  grounding  for  the  moral  law, 
the  constitution  of  the  agent,  is  capable  of  making  alternatives  to  the  moral  law  and  those 
appear  to  be  just  as  well  grounded  as  the  moral  law  itself  because  it  is  the  constitution  of  the 
agent  which  leads  to  both.  So,  as  Cohen  argues  the  point,  if  the  agent’s  own  constitution  leads 
to  multiple  different  normativities,  by  which  I  mean  multiple  solutions  to  normative  problems,  for 
example  Korsgaard’s  moral  law  or  the  mafioso’s  code  of  honour,  then  those  different 
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normativities  appear  to  be  grounded  in  the  manner  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  describes. 
Furthermore,  Korsgaard  cannot  appeal  to  something  beyond  the  agent  to  resolve  this  dispute, 
because  the  agent  is  the  lawmaker  so  the  resolution  must,  if  Korsgaard  is  correct,  come  from 
the  agent.  
 
This  inability  to  appeal  beyond  the  agent  is  problematic  because,  as  Cohen  argues,  if  the  agent 
solves  this  problem  by  endorsing  a  normativity  other  than  Korsgaard’s  moral  law,  there  does  not 
appear  to  be  anything  left  for  Korsgaard  to  say  to  compel  them  otherwise.  Korsgaard  has  a 
reply  to  this  point:  she  argues  that  practical  reason,  utilised  appropriately,  entails  the  moral  law, 
and  so  anyone  who  has  used  their  practical  reason  inappropriately  is  simply  in  error  and  so, 
presumably,  the  answer  is  to  demonstrate  or  explain  this  to  them,  and  if  they  are  rational,  they 
will  realise  their  error  and  the  problem  is  solved.  However,  Cohen’s  point  is  that  there  does  not 
appear  to  be  a  method  of  demonstrating  to  such  an  individual  that  they  have  made  an  error  of 
this  kind.  If  one  disagrees  about  what  follows  from  practical  reason  and  one  is  being  coherent, 
then  there  are  no  grounds  within  one's  own  constitution  which  can  prove  to  you  that  you  have 
made  an  error. 
 
Notice  the  similarities  this  has  with  Velleman  and  Enoch’s  disagreement  about  internal  and 
external  questions.  In  How  we  get  along  Velleman  (2009)  replies  to  Enoch’s  shmagency 
problem  by  arguing  that  normative  questions  that  are  external  from  agency  cannot  be  asked,  or, 
at  least,  cannot  be  answered,  because  they  are  defective  in  a  particular  sense  (see  §§  1.4  and 
1.5)  (pp.142-144).   Enoch  (2011a)  replies  to  Velleman  in  “Shmagency  Revisited”  where  he 41
argues  that  questions  external  from  agency  demonstrate  why  the  shmagency  problem 
undermines  the  constitutivist  maneuver  (pp.  220-229).  The  distinction  between  internal  and 
external  questions  is  a  disagreement  about  whether  or  not  normative  questions  that  do  not 
assume  agency  make  sense.  This  debate,  in  its  most  direct  form,  takes  place  between  Enoch 
and  Velleman,  but  is  crucial  to  the  prospects  of  Kantian  constitutivism  in  general  because  it  is  an 
argument  over  the  nature  of  normative  questions.  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  relies  on  the 
agent  asking  if  they  ought  to  be  an  agent  which  is,  in  a  particular  sense,  a  question  external  to 
agency .  It  is  an  external  question  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not  assume  agency  in  either  the 
asking  of  the  question  or  where  it  looks  to  for  the  answer.  Enoch’s  point  is  that  asking  a 
normative  question  which  does  not  utilise  agency  in  either  the  asking  or  answering  of  the 
question  demonstrates  that  (all)  normativity  cannot  be  grounded  in  agency.  Cohen’s  bad  action 
problem  makes  the  same  underlying  contention:  in  both  cases  the  problem  is  that  an  appeal 
beyond  one's  own  constitution  is  required  to  demonstrate  that  one  should  endorse  agency.  In 
order  to  demonstrate  that  one  should  not  be  a  mafioso,  for  Cohen,  or  a  shmagent,  for  Enoch, 
the  constitutivist  is  asked  to  explain  the  endorsement  of  agency  without  reference  to  the 
41  This  terminology,  external  and  internal  questions,  is  used  by  Luca  Ferrero  in  “Constitutivism  and 
Inescapable  Agency”  (2009)  in  relation  to  questions  internal  or  external  to  agency  (p.  306)  and  Enoch 
(2009)  in  relation  to  Velleman’s  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.  Ferrero  uses  this  terminology  in  his 
explanation  of  the  shmagency  problem  and  I  have  extended  this  terminology  to  Velleman  because  it 
provides  an  accurate  shorthand  for  explaining  the  difficulty  of  normative  questions  that  do  not  invoke 
agency  in  the  context  of  constitutivism.  
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authority  of  agency  as  such .  This  is  a  point  I  will  return  to  later,  but  it  benefits  the  reader  to 
identify  that  this  is  the  point  that  both  the  bad  action  problem  and  the  shmagency  problem  utilise 
to  attack  the  constitutivist  maneuver.  
 
Cohen’s  (1996)  point,  the  inability  to  appeal  beyond  the  agent’s  own  practical  reason  costs 
Korsgaard  the  ability  to  demonstrate  that  an  agent  is  in  error,  unless  the  agent  is  being  outright 
incoherent;  as  he  explains  the  point: 
Kant  thought  that  if  the  moral  law  came  just  from  my  own  will,  then  it  would  have  no 
claim  on  me,  rather  as  the  law  of  the  sovereign  has  none  over  the  sovereign  in  Hobbes. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  law  was  just  externally  imposed,  and  did  not  come  from  my 
own  will,  then  it  would  be  heteronomous  slavery  for  me  to  obey  it,  and  the  challenging 
argument  that  Hobbes  uses  about  the  citizen,  that  he  must  obey  the  law  because  it  is  his 
own  law ,  he  must  obey  it  on  pain  of  inconsistency,  would  not  be  available.  (pp.  171) 
Cohen’s  point  is  that  grounding  normativity  has  both  external  and  internal  requirements.  If  one 
imposes  the  moral  law  oneself,  entirely  on  one's  own,  then  there  is  no  particular  reason  to 
endorse  one  rendition  of  the  moral  law  over  another  and  if  someone  else  imposes  the  moral 
law,  on  the  individual,  then  there  is  no  good  reason  for  me  to  willingly  endorse  this  other 
person’s  rendition  of  the  moral  law.  
 
There  are  two  key  points  at  work  in  Cohen’s  critique:  the  first  is  the  notion  of  different  possible 
normativities,  different  renditions  of  the  moral  law  or  different  ‘moralities’,  and  the  second  is  the 
notion  that  the  grounding  of  normativity  must  be  legitimate  in  a  sense  that  does  not  entail 
‘slavery’  to  reasons  you  yourself  do  not  endorse.  The  first  notion  argues  that  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism  cannot  derive  one  particular  moral  law  from  the  nature  of  practical  reason, 
because  there  are  multiple  potential  normativities  (multiple  potential  variations  of  a  ‘moral  law’) 
which  are  consistent  with  practical  reason.  The  second  notion  argues  that  because  the  agent 
must  play  a  crucial  role  in  their  endorsement  of  the  moral  law,  constitutivism  cannot  force  or 
compel  one  to  endorse  the  moral  law  without  some  element  of  consent  or  cooperation;  by 
consent  or  cooperation  I  mean  that  one  cannot  simply  be  instructed  to  concede  to  the  authority 
of  the  moral  law,  one  must  be  compelled  by  one's  own  reason  to  endorse  the  moral  law.  
 
Cohen’s  hypothetical  skeptic  has  a  moral  code,  it  is  just  not  Korsgaard’s.  This  moral  code  is  not 
internally  inconsistent,  so  from  the  skeptic’s  standpoint  it  appears  a  legitimate  normativity.  At 
least,  according  to  Cohen  and  in  line  with  what  his  critique  requires,  it  is  legitimate  when 
measured   by  what  follows  from  the  nature  of  practical  reason.  This  is  the  first  notion,  the  point 
being  that  if  the  only  measure  of  a  potential  moral  law  is  the  constitution  of  practical  reason, 
then  the  ‘candidate  moral  law’  needs  only  to  be  coherent  in  its  role  as  a  law  of  action. 
Furthermore,  the  hypothetical  skeptic  endorses  this  moral  code  and  will  not  yield  that 
endorsement  to  outside  influence  unless  that  influence  can  convince  them  that  they  are  wrong 
(simply  insisting  he  is  incorrect  will  not  change  the  skeptics  mind).  This  is  the  second  notion,  the 
point  being  that  the  skeptic  will  not  yield  his  point  unless  you  can  explain  why  he  is  wrong. 
Between  both  of  these  notions,  Korsgaard  appears  to  have  no  ability  to  convince  the  skeptic  of 
her  constitutivist  theory,  despite  her  approach  entailing  that  (assuming  the  skeptic  is  rational) 
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she  must  have  the  tools  to  do  so:  she  cannot  simply  ignore  the  skeptic,  because  the  possibility 
of  the  skeptic’s  existence  demonstrates  that  her  constitutivist  theory  does  not  necessarily  follow 
from  how  we  are  constituted,  and  she  cannot  dismiss  the  skeptic’s   position  due  to  a  lack  of 
merit  because  the  skeptic  has  reached  their  position  (the  flawed  moral  law,  the  mafioso  code)  in 
the  appropriate  manner  -  in  accordance  with  their  constitution.  If  Cohen  is  correct,  then  this 
skeptic  is  not  inconsistent,  so  there  must  be  some  reason  the  skeptic  is  wrong  that  is  not  due  to 
the  relationship  between  the  skeptic’s  moral  code  and  their  constitution,  and  Korsgaard  cannot 
explain  to  them  what  that  problem  is. 
 
Regarding  the  first  notion,  it  is  important  for  Cohen’s  critique  that  there  are  different  possible 
renditions  of  morality  (the  moral  law  or  other  normativities),  which  are  coherent  with  practical 
reason,  because  if  there  were  only  one  rendition  of  the  moral  law  that  followed  from  the  nature 
of  practical  reason,  then  Korsgaard  could  simply  reply  to  any  skeptic  that  they  are  being 
incoherent   by  even  purporting  to  disagree  with  the  moral  law.  Cohen  expects  that  Korsgaard 
might  argue  that  any  skeptic  would  be  incoherent  to  even  suppose  an  alternative.  Or,  rather,  as 
Cohen  (1996)  explains,  he  expects  that  Korsgaard  needs  to  be  able  to  put  forward  this  line  of 
argument: 
If  morality  is  to  do  with  law,  then  the  liaison  between  morality  and  practical  identity  is 
questionable,  since  the  commitments  that  form  my  practical  identity  need  not  be  to 
things  that  have  the  universality  characteristic  of  law.  Practical  identity  is  a  matter  of 
loyalty  and  identification,  and  whereas  there  is  indeed  such  a  thing  as  loyalty  to  general 
principles,  there  also  exists  loyalty  to  family,  to  group,  to  another  individual,  and  no 
credible  characterization  of  what  practical  identity  is,  in  general  terms,  would  yield  a 
general  priority  for  principled  over  particularistic  identifications.  (pp.  174-175).  
Cohen  is  arguing  that  Kant  argues  we  must  be  moral  or  be  irrational,  but  Kant  can  only  argue 
that  because  he  appeals  beyond  human  reason  which  is  something  Korsgaard  cannot  do  (p. 
174).  The  idea  of  a  difference  between  ‘human  reason’  and  ‘reason  as  such’  is  that  there  is 
something  external  from  the  constitution  of  humans  in  particular  that  grants  reason  unequivocal 
authority.  Cohen  is  arguing  that  the  authority  of  Kant’s  moral  law  comes  from  this  source  while 
Korsgaard  has  surrendered  her  ability  to  appeal  to  this  same  source  of  authority  for  the  moral 
law  because  she  is  founding  it  in  our  constitution.   Instead,  Korsgaard’s  argument  is  that  we 42
must  be  moral  or  sacrifice  our  practical  identity.  
 
42  I  think  a  disagreement  between  Cohen  and  Korsgaard  on  how  to  interpret  Kant  on  this  point  may  be 
underlying  the  disjunction  between  their  positions.  Or,  if  not  interpretations  of  Kant  as  such,  then  a 
disagreement  about  what  a  reasonable  Kantian  position  might  be.  One  might  think,  in  support  of  Cohen’s 
interpretation,  that  because  Kant  puts  forward  transcendental  arguments  he  is  appealing  to  something 
inherently  beyond  the  self:  one  might  think  this  on  the  grounds  that  when  Kant’s  arguments  transcend 
something  to  attain  the  truth,  it  is  the  self,  in  some  sense,  that  the  arguments  are  transcending. 
Alternatively,  one  might  argue  that  it  is  not  the  self  that  one  is  transcending,  but  elements  of  the  self:  one 
might  think  this  on  the  grounds  that  there  is  no  sense  in  which  we  can  truly  transcend  the  self,  because  to 
do  so  would  preclude  attaching  the  ‘I  think’  to  the  resulting  propositions,  so  what  is  transcended  are 
limiting  elements  of  experience  and  the  self  but  not  the  self  in  its  entirety.  
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So,  the  first  notion  at  work  in  Cohen’s  critique  of  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  points  out  that  there 
is  a  disjunction  between  the  notion  of  moral  law  and  the  requirements  of  practical  reason. 
Remember  that  according  to  Korsgaard’s  theory  the  relationship  between  practical  reason  and 
autonomy  entails  the  nature  of  our  practical  identity,  which  in  turn  entails  the  moral  law.  The 
disjunction  Cohen  asserts  is  that  it  is  not  clear  human  reason  in  its  own  right  entails  the  moral 
law  to  any  greater  extent  than  it  entails  other  candidate  moralities.  Cohen’s  summarises  his 
criticism  of  Korsgaard’s  theory  of  practical  reason:  
If,  as  Korsgaard  says,  ‘the  necessity  of  acting  in  the  light  of  reflection  makes  us 
authorities  over  ourselves’,  then  we  exercise  that  authority  not  only  in  making  laws  but 
also  in  issuing  singular  edicts  that  mean  as  much  to  us  as  general  principles  do.  .  .  . 
And  whether  or  not  the  moral  must  be  law-like  if  it  is  prescriptive,  Korsgaard  says  that  it 
is  law-like,  yet  it  is  just  not  true  that  every  claim  on  me  that  survives  reflection  is,  or, 
presupposes,  a  law.  (p.  176).  
The  problem,  for  Korsgaard,  is  that  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any  reason  to  endorse  the  laws 
that  follow  from  our  practical  identities  instead  of  the  singular  edicts,  particular  prescriptions,  or 
one-off  endorsements  that  also  follow  from  practical  identity.  Hence,  Korsgaard’s  solution  is  not 
necessarily  universally  prescriptive.  
 
Cohen  argues  that  practical  identity  is  composed  of  myriad  components  that  appear  to  have 
normative  force,  or  at  least  some  relationship  to  normativity,  irrespective  of  their  relationship  to 
universal  law.  Practical  identity  is  composed  of  myriad  components  in  the  sense  that  any  given 
subject  possesses  various  commitments,  relationships  and  so  on,  that  compose  their  identity 
and  that  have  weight  in  the  exercising  of  the  subjects’  practical  reason.  Cohen  supports  this 
argument  by  pointing  out  that  a  parent  who  saves  their  child,  or  a  husband  who  saves  their  wife, 
does  not  do  so  because  of  an  appeal  to  a  law  but  because  of  some  other  aspect  of  their  identity 
(pp.  175-176).  So,  “[w]hat  the  reflective  structure  [of  my  mind]  requires,  if  anything,  is  not  that  I 
be  a  law  to  myself,  but  that  I  be  in  command  of  myself”  (Cohen,  1996,  p.  176).  This  point 
conflicts  with  two  of  Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  key  claims:  firstly,  her  claim  that  obligations  are 
reactions  to  threats  on  our  own  identity  and  that  our  relationship  with  practical  reason  is  our 
deepest  (most  important)  identity  (pp.  102-103),  and,  second,  her  claim  that  our  experience  of 
our  own  minds  and  the  nature  of  reflection  demonstrate  that  practical  reason,  in  its  lawgiving 
capacity,  is  the  origin  of  normativity  (pp.  92,  100). 
 
Korsgaard  makes  these  claims  to  establish  that  the  moral  law  follows  from  our  own  constitution 
and  that  they  are  both  crucial  to  her  theory.  Regarding  the  first,  she  argues  that  normativity 
entails  obligations  as  reaction  to  threats  to  our  identity: 
An  obligation  always  takes  the  form  of  a  reaction  against  a  threat  of  a  loss  of  identity.  But 
there  are  two  important  complications,  and  both  spring  from  the  complexity  of  human 
identity.  One  is  that  some  parts  of  our  identity  are  easily  shed,  and  where  they  come  into 
conflict  with  more  fundamental  parts  of  our  identity,  they  should  be  shed.  (Korsgaard, 
1996b,  pp.  102-103) 
The  point  is,  according  to  Korsgaard,  that  our  identity  and  the  moral  law  are  fundamentally 
intertwined.  For  this  reason,  moral  obligations  function  as  a  reaction  to  a  threat  to  our  own 
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identities:  obeying  our  moral  obligations  is  demanded  by  what  we  are.  This  claim  is  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism:  the  constitution  of  our  practical  identity  entails  normativity.  The  universalizability 
of  the  obligations  that  follow  from  the  constitution  of  our  identity  is,  as  Korsgaard  (1996b)  goes 
on  to  explain,  a  fundamental  demand  we  place  on  ourselves: 
Kant  points  out  that  when  we  violate  the  laws  of  the  Kingdom  of  Ends  we  must  be 
making  exceptions  of  ourselves,  because  we  cannot  coherently  will  their  universal 
violation.  In  one  sense,  a  commitment  to  your  own  identity  —  that  is,  to  your  integrity  — 
is  supposed  to  solve  that  problem.  But  .  .  .   [because  an  individual  can  occasionally 
violate  the  universal  law  without  permanently  damaging  their  own  identity],  the  problem 
reiterates  within  the  commitment  to  your  own  integrity.  The  problem  here  does  not  come 
from  the  fragility  of  identity,  but  rather  from  its  stability.  (p.  103)  
This  stable  identity  is  our  autonomy,  our  faculty  of  reason  where  the  self  and  practical  reason 
meet,  and  it  is  this  identity  which  is  the  same  identity  that  is  threatened  by  a  denial  of  moral  law. 
The  point  is  that  our  practical  identity,  the  nature  of  autonomy  and  practical  reason  expressed 
as  the  self,  is  both  the  stable  foundation  of  how  we  are  constituted  and  incompatible  with  the 
violation  of  the  moral  law;  as  Korsgaard  completes  the  point  by  explaining: 
Obligation  is  always  unconditional,  but  it  is  only  when  it  concerns  really  important 
matters  that  it  is  deep .  Of  course,  since  we  can  see  that  the  shallowness  of  obligation 
could  give  rise  to  problems,  we  must  commit  ourselves  to  a  kind  of  second-order 
integrity,  a  commitment  to  not  letting  these  problems  get  out  of  hand.  We  cannot  make 
an  exception  ‘just  this  once’  every  time,  or  we  will  lose  our  identities  after  all.  .  .  .   What 
we  have  established  is  this.  The  reflective  structure  of  human  consciousness  requires 
that  you  identify  yourself  with  some  law  or  principle  which  will  govern  your  choices.  It 
requires  you  to  be  a  law  to  yourself.  And  that  is  the  source  of  normativity.  So  the 
argument  shows  just  what  Kant  said  that  it  did:  that  our  autonomy  is  the  source  of 
obligation.  (p.  103-104) 
Our  practical  identity  is  the  identity  which  connects  practical  reason  to  our  autonomy. 
Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  we  are  constituted,  fundamentally  and  at  the  deepest  level  of  what  we 
ourselves  are,  as  lawmakers  and  that  deep  constitution  is  the  grounding  for  normativity. 
 
So,  to  identify  the  significance  of  her  line  of  argument,  Korsgaard’s  claim  that  obligations  are 
reactions  to  threats  to  our  deepest  identity  is  in  contention  with  Cohen’s  point  that  the  reflective 
structure  of  our  mind  merely  requires  that  we  are  in  command  of  ourselves  but  not  that  we  are 
laws  to  ourselves.  If  Cohen  is  correct,  Korsgaard  has  overstated  her  claim  about  what  follows 
from  autonomy:  if  the  reflective  structure  of  our  mind  does  not  entail  that  we  must  be  laws  to 
ourselves  then  the  moral  obligations  which  follow  from  those  laws  are  not  reactions  to  threats  to 
own  our  own  identity.  Or,  at  least,  they  are  not  necessarily  threats  to  our  own  identity,  because 
our  identity  would  not  necessarily  entail  that  we  follow  laws.  This  is  the  first  key  claim  that 
Korsgaard’s  theory  requires  that  is  threatened  by  Cohen’s  rejection  of  the  law  giving 
requirement  of  our  identity.  
 
The  second  key  claim  of  Korsgaard’s  that  Cohen’s  claim  threatens  is  her  argument  that  the  law 
giving  nature  of  self  reflection  is  provided  by  the  nature  of  our  experience  of  our  own  mind. 
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Korsgaard’s  claims  are  not  as  peculiar  as  they  might  first  appear,  she  is  not  arguing  that  we 
have  accurate  knowledge  about  our  own  mental  states  as  such: 
The  human  mind  is  self-conscious.  Some  philosophers  have  supposed  that  this  means 
that  our  minds  are  somehow  internally  luminous,  that  their  contents  are  completely 
accessible  to  us  —  that  we  can  always  be  certain  what  we  are  thinking  and  feeling  and 
wanting  —  and  so  that  introspection  yields  certain  knowledge  of  the  self.  Like  Kant,  and 
many  philosophers  nowadays,  I  do  not  think  that  this  is  true.  Our  knowledge  of  our  own 
mental  states  and  activities  is  no  more  certain  than  anything  else.  (p.  92) 
This  point  is  important  because  it  might  appear,  on  the  face  of  the  matter,  that  Cohen  is  merely 
contesting  some  poorly  founded  empirical  claims  Korsgaard  has  made  about  our  knowledge  of 
our  own  mind.  However,  this  is  not  the  type  of  claim  Korsgaard  is  making  and  Cohen’s  critique 
is  not  that  she  has  done  so.  Rather,  as  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues,  immediately  after  the  above 
excerpt,  that  we  see  the  relationship  between  the  moral  law,  self  reflection,  and  autonomy  when 
we  examine  our  own  minds  and  discover  a  law  making  structure : 
But  the  human  mind  is  self-conscious  in  the  sense  that  it  is  essentially  reflective.  I’m  not 
talking  about  being  thoughtful ,  which  of  course  is  an  individual  property,  but  about  the 
structure  of  our  minds  that  makes  thoughtfulness  possible.  A  lower  animal’s  attention  is 
fixed  on  the  world.  Its  perceptions  are  its  beliefs  and  its  desires  are  its  will.  It  is  engaged 
in  conscious  activities,  but  it  is  not  conscious  of  them.  That  is,  they  are  not  the  objects  of 
its  attention.  But  we  human  animals  turn  our  attention  on  to  our  perceptions  and  desires 
themselves,  on  to  our  own  mental  activities,  and  we  are  conscious  of  them.  That  is  why 
we  can  think  about  them.  (p.  93) 
Korsgaard  is  grounding  her  theory  in  this  observation  of  the  structure  of  our  own  mind. 
Normativity,  she  argues,  is  the  problem  that  arises  from  this  structure  of  self  reflection  and 
where  we  find  the  solution  (1996b,  p.  93).  Reasons  for  action,  in  this  arena  of  self  reflection  that 
Korsgaard  describes,  are  the  result  of  this  process:  “The  normative  word  ‘reason’  refers  to  a 
kind  of  reflective  success”  (1996b,  p.  93).   She  goes  on  to  argue  that  this  reflective  success,  the 
notion  of  reasons  for  action  and  the  problem  of  normativity  (deciding  what  to  do),  is  also  the 
notion  of  the  mind  acting  under  the  idea  of  freedom  (1996b,  p.  94)  and  then  that  the  exercising 
of  this  freedom  is  the  activity  of  making  laws  (1996b,  pp.  97-8,  100).  
 
I  have  provided  Korsgaard’s  presentation  of  the  key  element  of  our  constitution  that  she  uses  to 
ground  normativity:  the  self  reflective  structure  of  our  conscious  experience.  This  is  the 
presentation  that  Cohen’s  critique  focuses  on.  Cohen’s  point  is  that  not  only  law  making 
behaviour  follows  from  this  self  reflective  structure;  there  are  other  coherent  stories,  so  to 
speak,  that  can  be  told  about  what  is  constitutive  of  ourselves  given  the  self-reflective  structure 
of  our  conscious  experience.  This  critique  is  an  assertion  that  Korsgaard  has  misunderstood 
what  she  is  experiencing  when  she  examines  the  structure  of  her  own  mind:  Cohen  is  arguing 
that  she  has  provided  an  investigation  of  a  particular  experience  (a  phenomena)  rather  than  an 
explanation  of  the  necessary  nature  of  how  our  mind  constructs  experiences  (1996,  p.  183).  To 
explain  this  in  Kantian  terms:  Korsgaard  claims  to  be  grounding  her  normativity  in  a 
transcendental  apperception  by  providing  a  transcendental  argument  which  explains  that  the 
moral  law  is  what  follows  from  the  necessary  structure  of  our  own  conscious  experience,  and 
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Cohen  replies  that  her  apperception  is  not  transcendental  because  it  is  not  the  necessary 
explanation  of  the  structure  she  identifies.  If  Korsgaard’s  examination  of  the  structure  of  our 
conscious  experience  (apperception)  is  not  transcendental,  if  it  is  not  what  must  follow  from  the 
examination,  then  her  attempt  at  grounding  normativity  fails  to  provide  a  reason  to  endorse  the 
moral  law  she  proposes  instead  of  whatever  else  follows  from  the  same  process  she 
undertakes:  Korsgaard’s  theory  must  be  the  only  position  that  follows  from  her  examination  of 
the  nature  of  our  minds  for  it  to  be  necessary,  and  it  must  be  necessary  because  that  is  what 
grounds  its  objectivity. 
 
Cohen  provides  thought  experiments  to  demonstrate  counter  examples  to  Korsgaard’s  theory  in 
order  to  demonstrate  that  she  has  failed  to  derive  objective  normativity  from  agency.  Consider, 
once  again,  the  case  of  the  subject  that  saves  their  drowning  child  because  of  their  relationship 
with  that  child  rather  than  because  of  an  obligation  to  a  law  they  themselves  constructed.  Cohen 
(1996,  p.  175)  refers  to  a  point  made  by  Bernard  Williams  (1981)  in  “Persons,  character  and 
morality”.  Williams  argues  that  acting  to  save  someone  based  on  your  relationship  with  them,  is 
a  sufficient  explanation  of  why  one  does  and  ought  to  save  one’s  wife  (1981,  p.  18).  There  is  no 
need  to  appeal  to  some  other  justification,  such  as  a  rule  dictating  that  one  ought  to  save  one’s 
wife.Cohen  argues  that  this  is  a  counterexample   to  Korsgaard,  because  acting  for  the  sake  of 
one’s  relationship  without  any  further  underlying  appeal  appears  to  be  a  case  of  an  agent  acting 
from  something  other  than  a  law.  
 
Cohen’s  point  is  that  we  do  act  without  reference  to  laws  and,  furthermore,  that  in  some 
instances  we  appear  to  act  without  reference  to  laws  and  be  coherent  with  our  own  constitution 
and  identity  while  doing  so.  To  demonstrate  why  this  is  a  problem,  consider  Korsgaard’s  (1996b) 
summary  of  her  derivation  of  our  law  making  constitution  from  the  structure  of  our  minds: 
The  reflective  structure  of  the  mind  is  a  source  of  ‘self-consciousness’  because  it  forces 
us  to  have  a  conception  of  ourselves.  As  Kant  argued,  this  is  a  fact  about  what  it  is  like 
to  be  reflectively  conscious  and  it  does  not  prove  the  existence  of  a  metaphysical  self. 
From  a  third-person  point  of  view,  outside  of  the  deliberative  standpoint,  it  may  look  as  if 
what  happens  when  someone  makes  a  choice  is  that  the  strongest  of  his  conflicting 
desires  wins.  But  that  isn’t  the  way  it  is  for  you  when  you  deliberate.  When  you 
deliberate,  it  is  as  if  there  were  something  over  and  above  all  of  your  desires,  something 
which  is  you ,  and  which  chooses  which  desire  to  act  on.  This  means  that  the  principle  or 
law  by  which  you  determine  your  actions  is  one  that  you  regard  as  being  expressive  of 
yourself .  To  identify  with  such  a  principle  or  way  of  choosing  is  to  be,  in  St  Paul’s  famous 
phrase,  a  law  to  yourself.  (p.  100) 
Korsgaard’s  argument  is  that  when  you  consider  the  reflective  structure  of  your  own  mind  you 
find  that  your  deliberation  is  an  act  of  law  making  and  this  structure,  practical  reason,  is  a  deep 
element  of  your  identity  that  entails  obligations.  These  obligations  arise  because  failure  to  fulfil 
them  would  threaten  your  identity  as  a  lawmaker  who  is  in  control  of  your  own  actions.  Your 
autonomy  is  the  law-making  structure  of  your  mind  and  that  entails  your  practical  identity. 
Cohen’s  reply  is  that  we  can  and  do  (in  at  least  some  instances)  act  autonomously  with  no 
reference  to  law  making  yet  without  threatening  our  identity,  such  as  when  saving  one’s  wife  just 
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because  she  is  one’s  wife ,  which  entails  that  there  is  more  than  just  law  making  that  follows 
from  the  reflective  structure  of  our  conscious  experience.  This  is  the  second  key  claim  of 
Korsgaard’s  that  Cohen’s  claim  threatens.  If  Cohen  is  correct  that  coherent  self  constitution 
does  not  necessarily  entail  law  making  then  Korsgaard’s  moral  law  does  not  entail  the  moral 
law. 
 
However,  Cohen’s  point  and  the  critique  underlying  it  is  not  limited  to  this  scope.  The  underlying 
problem  remains  even  if  Korsgaard  can  establish  that  obligations  arise  as  a  result  of  threats 
against  our  identity  as  lawmakers.  That  is,  even  if  we  do  have  a   law  making  nature,  this  in  and 
of  itself  does  not  entail  that  one  law  in  particular  follows  from  our  constitution.  Even  lawmakers 
cannot,  simply  because  they  are  lawmakers,  determine  that  one  potential  morality  should  be 
endorsed  over  another.  It  is  in  this  context  that  Cohen  (1996)  presents  the  thought  experiment 
of  a  Mafioso  who: 
does  not  believe  in  doing  unto  others  as  you  would  have  them  do  unto  you:  in  relieving 
suffering  just  because  it  is  suffering,  in  keeping  promises  because  they  are  promises,  in 
telling  the  truth  because  it  is  the  truth,  and  so  on.  Instead,  he  lives  by  a  code  of  strength 
and  honour  that  matters  as  much  to  him  as  some  principles  I  said  he  disbelieves  in 
matter  to  most  of  us.  .  .  .   What  the  mafioso  takes  to  be  his  obligations  can  be  made  to  fit 
Korsgaardian  formulae  about  loss  of  identity  as  much  as  what  most  of  us  would  regard 
as  genuine  obligations  can  be  made  to  fit  those  formulae.  So  it  looks  as  though  what  she 
has  investigated  is  the  experience  of  phenomenology  of  obligation,  not  its  ground  or 
authenticating  source.  (p.  183) 
Cohen’s  point  is  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  does  not  provide  sufficient  grounding  to  derive  the 
moral  law  instead  of  some  other  morality  or  alternative  moral  code.  Notably,  this  criticism  does 
not  entail  that  the  moral  law  as  Korsgaard  proposes  it  is  implausible  as  such,  or  even  that 
another  moral  code  is  plausible.  Rather,  the  problem  is  that  the  moral  law  proposed  by 
Korsgaard  does  not  follow  simply  from  the  constitution  of  our  agency.  So,  if  Cohen’s  mafioso 
represents  another  moral  code  which  is  coherent  with  our  constitution,  then  Korsgaard’s 
grounding  is  insufficient  because  it  does  not  entail  the  moral  law  exclusively:  our  constitution 
entails  whatever  moral  laws,  codes,  and  so  on  that  follow  from  it.  Given  that,  if  Cohen  is  correct, 
multiple  moralities  follow  from  our  constitution,  there  would  need  to  be  some  further  reason  to 
endorse  Korsgaard’s  morality,  which  would  entail  that  her  grounding  is  insufficient  because  it 
would  also  rely  on  this  further  reason.  This  is  essentially  the  point  of  the  shmagency  problem 
critique  raised  by  Enoch  that  I  discuss  later:  arguing  that  the  reason  to  endorse  one  moral  law 
rather  than  another  must  be  external  to  one's  constitution  is  the  same  type  of  critique  as  arguing 
that  the  reason  to  endorse  agency  must  be  external  to  one’s  constitution. 
 
Remember  that  Korsgaard  (1996b)  does  argue  that  we  can  sometimes  knowingly  disobey  the 
moral  law  without  seriously  threatening  our  identity,  that  is,  without  threatening  the  coherence  of 
our  constitution: 
The  problem  here  [of  an  agent  who  makes  an  exception  of  herself  by  choosing  to 
disobey  the  moral  law]  does  not  come  from  the  fragility  of  identity,  but  rather  from  its 
stability.  It  can  take  a  few  knocks,  and  we  know  it.  The  agent  I  am  talking  about  now 
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violates  the  law  that  she  is  to  herself,  making  an  exception  of  the  moment  or  the  case, 
which  she  knows  she  can  get  away  with.  .  .  .    We  cannot  make  an  exception  ‘just  this 
once’  every  time,  or  we  will  lose  our  identities  after  all.  .  .  .   That,  by  the  way,  is  why  even 
people  with  the  most  excellent  characters  can  occasionally  knowingly  do  wrong  (pp. 
102-103).  
However,  her  argument  here  still  relies  on  the  point  that  there  is  disharmony,  incoherence, 
between  disobeying  the  moral  law  and  our  constitution  (our  identity).  Cohen’s  point  is  that 
sometimes  we  are  not  lawmakers  at  all .  Either  Cohen’s  examples  of  agents  who  are  coherently 
self  constituted  but  are  not  dealing  in  Korgaard’s  moral  laws  are  impossible,  or  Korsgaard’s 
theory  fails  to  ground  normativity  in  the  necessary  nature  of  our  own  constitution. 
  
The  particular  example  (Cohen  uses  a  mafioso)  is  not  important:  the  problem  Cohen  poses  for 
Korsgaard  is  that  any  example  of  someone  performing  an  act  of  significant  moral  weight  without 
either  being  a  lawmaker  in  the  manner  Korsgaard  conceives  or  threatening  their  own  identity  by 
failing  to  be  such  a  lawmaker  is  a  counterexample  to  Korsgaard’s  theory.  By  an  act  of  significant 
moral  weight,  I  mean  an  act  of  self  constitution,  an  act  that  according  to  Korsgaard,  but  not 
according  to  Cohen,  is  (and  must  be )  inherently  an  act  of  lawmaking.  So,  if  we  can  find  or 
conceive  of  an  agent  who  acts  because  of  particular  reasons,  such  as  relationships  with  other 
agents,  that  they  do  not  intend  to  propose  as  universal  law  or  an  agent  who  puts  forward  a 
moral  code  distinct  from  Korsgaard's  and  that  agent  is  coherently  constituted  with  their  own 
identities,  then  Korsgaard’s  theory  has  failed  to  ground  normativity  in  how  we  are  constituted. 
Which  is  to  say,  it  cannot  be  the  case  that  the  moral  law  necessarily  follows  from  how  we  are 
constituted  unless  the  types  of  counter  examples  posed  by  Cohen  are  not  examples  of 
coherently  constituted  agents.  Hence,  Korsgaard  must  explain  why  the  agent  acting  based  on 
reasons  they  do  not  will  as  laws  and  agents  acting  based  on  a  moral  code  or  law  distinct  from 
Korsgaard’s  are  not  coherent  agents. 
 
Cohen’s  second  key  point  is  more  easily  examined  after  explaining  its  role  in  his  overall 
argument.  Cohen’s  second  point,  the  notion  that  the  grounding  of  normativity  must  be  legitimate 
in  a  sense  that  does  not  entail  heteronomous  slavery  (1996,  p.  171),  supports  the  first  point  by 
demonstrating  why  that  first  point   is  deeply  problematic  for  Korsgaard’s  theory.  Heteronomous 
slavery,  in  this  context,  means  that  the  legitimacy  of  Korsgaard’s  grounding  for  normativity  must 
be  endorsement  by  the  agent  and  not  from  some  external  source  (such  as  another  agent).  This 
supports  Cohen’s  first  point,  that  there  are  multiple  moralities  which  are  coherent  with  how  we 
are  constituted,  because  together  they  reveal  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  does  not  have  the  tools 
required  to  demonstrate  why  one  ought  to  endorse  her  moral  law.  The  critique  can  be 
reconstructed  as  follows: 
Premise  1:  Multiple  moralities  are  coherent  with  how  we  are  constituted. 
  
Premise  2:  Korsgaard’s  theory  entails  that  normativity  must  be  endorsed  by  the  agent 
themselves,  based  on  their  own  constitution,  for  it  to  be  legitimate. 
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Conclusion:  Korsgaard’s  theory  cannot  demonstrate  why  one  ought  to  endorse  ‘the’ 
moral  law 
Given  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  can  only  appeal  to  one's  constitution  to  demonstrate  why  one 
ought  to  endorse  the  moral  law  and  that  our  constitution  is  coherent  with  multiple  competing 
claims  about  the  nature  of  morality,  then  Korsgaard  cannot  demonstrate  why  one  ought  to 
endorse  the  moral  law.  
 
So,  according  to  Cohen,  Korsgaard  cannot  demonstrate  based  only  what  follows  from  our 
constitution  that  one  should  endorse  the  moral  law,  as  she  conceives  it,  instead  of  endorsing 
something  else  that  follows  from  our  constitution .  The  point  of  adding  this  qualifier  to  the 
conclusion  is  to  acknowledge  that  one  who  already  found  Korsgaard’s  moral  law  (instead  of, 
say,  a  mafioso  honour  code)  appealing  might  also  find  her  theory  compelling  without  that 
threatening  the  validity  and  applicability  of  Cohen’s  critique.  The  point  of  his  critique  is  to 
demonstrate  that  her  theory  cannot  demonstrate  that  one  ought  to  endorse  her  moral  law  simply 
because  it  follows  from  how  we  are  constituted  and  this  does  not  mean  that  someone  who 
already  finds  it  compelling  will  not  continue  to  do  so.  Rather,  the  point  of  the  critique  is 
demonstrated  by  the  notion  that  a  subject  who  found  some  other  morality  (such  as  the  mafioso’s 
honour  code)  compelling  could  not  be  convinced  to  instead  endorse  Korsgaard’s  moral  law 
without  something  more  than,  merely,  showing  them  the  moral  law  is  also  a  coherent  candidate . 
This  is  why  Cohen  (1996)  accuses  Korsgaard  of  having  merely  discovered  “the  experience  of 
phenomenology  of  obligation,  not  its  ground  or  authenticating  source”  (p.  183).  The  point  of  this 
accusation  being  that  if  Korsgaard’s  moral  law  does  not  necessarily  follow  from  how  we  are 
constituted  (because  other,  conflicting,  moralities  also  follow)  there  might  be  some  other 
explanation  for  the  apparent  appeal  of  Korsgaard’s  theory,  such  as  that  the  examination  of  our 
own  mind  she  utilises  to  establish  that  normativity  is  grounded  in  the  structure  of  self-reflection 
provides  phenomenological  support  for  the  moral  law.  
 
Cohen’s  second  point,  premise  2,  demonstrates  the  severity  of  the  problem  posed  by  his  first 
point  Cohen  directs  this  second  point  at  the  part  of  Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  work  where  she 
explains:  
Kantians  believe  that  the  source  of  the  normativity  of  moral  claims  must  be  found  in  the 
agent’s  own  will,  in  particular  in  the  fact  that  the  laws  of  morality  are  the  laws  of  the 
agent’s  own  will  and  that  its  claims  are  ones  she  is  prepared  to  make  on  herself.  The 
capacity  for  self-conscious  reflection  about  our  actions  confers  on  us  a  kind  of  authority 
over  ourselves,  and  it  is  this  authority  which  gives  normativity  to  moral  claims.  (pp. 
19-20) 
Cohen  quotes  this  same  excerpt  (1996,  p.  182)  while  explaining  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  entails 
that  one’s  own  constitution  must  be  the  source  of  legitimate  normativity.  While  Cohen  presents 
this  excerpt  as  representing  Korsgaard’s  own  position,  it  is  worth  noting  that  she  presents  this 
as  the  Kantian  precursor  to  her  theory  (1996b,  p.  20).  However,  I  agree  with  Cohen’s  implied 
assertion  that  this  Kantian  precursor  remains  representative  of  the  position  she  ultimately  puts 
forward  (at  least,  insofar  as  it  is  relevant  to  his  critique).  Cohen  picks  out  another  point  of 
Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  work,  which  is  explicitly  crucial  to  her  constitutivist  theory,  where  she 
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argues  that  “your  reasons  express  your  identity,  your  nature;  your  obligations  spring  from  what 
identity  forbits”  (p.  101);  this  point  supports  Cohen’s  assertion  that  Korsgaard  relies  on  the 
“Kantian  belief  that  the  source  of  the  normativity  of  moral  claims  must  be  found  in  the  agent's 
own  will”  (p.  19).  Although  Korsgaard’s  claim  is,  specifically,  that  the  authority  must  come  from 
our  identity ,  the  relationship  between  the  agents  will  and  the  agents  identity  is,  for  Korsgaard, 
fundamental  in  a  manner  that  allows  Cohen’s  point  to  stand.  Remember,  that  our  practical 
identity,  the  deep  identity  that  makes  us  who  and  what  we  are,  is  our  autonomy  and  our 
practical  reason  (our  nature  as  a  lawmaker)  and  so  is  essentially  our  will.  
 
The  key  point  of  disagreement  between  Cohen  and  Korsgaard  is  about  the  nature  of  the  self. 
So,  on  the  face  of  it,  Cohen’s  point  that  Korsgaard’s  theory  entails  the  legitimacy  of  normativity’s 
grounding  must  come  from  oneself  is  merely  Korsgaard’s  own  point  that  the  authority  of 
normativity  must  come  from  our  own  identity  as  lawmakers.  However,  this  is  not  quite  true 
because  Cohen  means  something  subtly  different,  than  Korsgaard,  by   what  it  is  for  something 
to  be  legitimized  by  oneself.  Cohen  disagrees  with  Korsgaard  about  what  the  self  fundamentally 
is  and  therefore  does  not  agree  with  her  about  what  it  entails  for  normativity  to  be  grounded  in 
the  self.  This  disagreement,  about  the  nature  of  the  self  that  grounds  normativity,  is  what  allows 
Cohen  to  use  Korsgaard’s  point,  that  the  authority  of  normativity  must  come  from  our  own 
identity,  as  part  of  his  critique  of  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism.  Examining  the  point  Cohen  (1996) 
makes  helps  explain  on  how  this  different  understanding  of  legitimizing  oneself  matters:  
I  think  that  [Korsgaard’s  theory]  is  powerful  stuff  for  me,  the  moral  agent,  to  say  to  my 
interrogator  [someone  who  is  asking  why  I  endorse  the  moral  law],  but  it  is  entirely 
impotent  when  addressed  to  someone  who,  being  disaffected,  ex  hypothesi  finds  no 
actions  to  be  worth  undertaking,  or,  more  pertinently  and  more  plausibly,  no  moral  ones. 
It  is  powerful  to  say  ‘I  couldn’t  live  with  myself  if  you  did  that’,  but  off  the  mark  to  say  ‘you 
couldn’t  live  with  yourself  if  you  did  that  to  someone  who  is  evidently  managing  to  do  so. 
(p.  182) 
Cohen’s  point  is  that  if  we  ourselves  must  legitimize  normativity,  then  the  force  of  the  reasons  to 
endorse  that  normativity,  the  ability  to  compel  others,  is  incapable  of  performing  its  function  in  at 
least  some  cases.  
 
Korsgaard  sets  her  own  theory  the  goal  of  being  able  to  compel  others  in  this  manner,  so  Cohen 
takes  such  a  failure  to  entail  the  failure  of  Korsgaard’s  theory.  As  Cohen  (1996)  explains  it, 
Korsgaard  cannot  answer  the  same  question  her  theory  puts  forward  as  the  question  of 
normativity:  
The  intransigent  person  who  insists  on  a  justification  for  being  moral  is  close  to  saying: 
‘As  far  as  my  deep  identity  goes,  I  feel  no  force  in  morality’s  claims’.  To  that  little  can  be 
said,  so  that,  if  we  set  Korsgaard’s  answer  to  the  normative  question  against  her  own  too 
demanding  description  of  that  question,  then  her  answer  to  it  does  not  work.  (p.  183) 
The  problem  is  that  her  theory  cannot  answer  the  normative  question  as  Korsgaard  herself 
presents  it.  So,  with  Cohen’s  conclusion,  and  its  relationship  to  his  first  point  (premise  1  as 
presented  earlier),  established  we  need  to  examine  what  the  normative  question  is  in  order  to 
explain  why  the  disagreement  between  Korsgaard  and  Cohen,  regarding  what  it  means  for  the 
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self  to  legitimize  normativity,  is  crucial  to  Cohen’s  critique.  Ultimately  this  will  demonstrate  that, 
in  conjunction  with  the  other,  related,  lines  of  reasoning,  some  of  which  have  already  been 
presented,  the  same  disagreement  about  the  role  of  the  self,  and  the  nature  of  the  self,  is 
underlying  both  the  bad  action  problem  and  the  shmagency  problem.  Because  Korsgaard 
grounds  normativity  in  practical  identity,  in  what  the  self  necessarily  constructs,  her  theory 
cannot  be  separated  from  the  conception  of  the  self  which  facilitates  this  grounding  and  both  the 
bad  action  and  shmagency  problem  function  by  disagreeing  with  that  conception  of  the  self 
(specifically,  with  the  epistemic  role  played  by  the  construction  of  practical  identity).  While  the 
substantiation  of  this  claim  that  a  disagreement  about  the  nature  of  the  self  underlies  both 
problems  is  the  ultimate  result,  the  immediate  task  is  explaining  the  relationship  between 
Cohen’s  use  of  his  second  point  (premise  2)  and  Korsgaard’s  presentation  of  the  normative 
question. 
 
Korsgaard  frames  her  discussion  of  the  normative  question  as  an  explanation  of  the  foundations 
of  morality,  because  understanding  the  nature  of  the  question  is  a  method  of  understanding  how 
to  explain  why  answers  to  moral  questions  are  real  or  objective  (1996b,  pp.  7-8,  see  also  pp. 
8-48).  In  part  this  takes  the  form  of  a  critique  of  alternative  attempts,  especially  moral  realism,  to 
explain  the  foundations  of  normativity  (pp.  18-47).  What  is  relevant  here  is  Korsgaard’s  (1996b) 
explanation  of   the  problem  of  providing  foundations  for  normativity: 
To  be  successful,  there  are  three  conditions  which  the  answer  [to  the  normative 
question,  how  to  provide  foundations  for  morality]  must  meet.  All  of  these  conditions 
spring  from  the  position  from  which  the  normative  question  arises,  the  first  person 
position  of  the  agent  who  demands  a  justification  of  the  claims  which  morality  makes 
upon  him.  (p.  16) 
From  the  outset  of  her  project,  Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  agents  ask  the  moral  question  of 
themselves.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  all  questions  are  asked  to,  or  at  least  of,  ourselves:  for 
example,  we  might  consider  questions  we  ask  about  the  world,  such  as  scientific  questions,  as 
being  asked  as  ‘why  should  I  believe  this?’  or  ‘how  do  I  explain  that?’;  however,  Korsgaard 
means  more  than  just  this  sense  when  she  claims  that  the  normative  question  is  something  the 
agent  asks  in  a  fundamentally  first  person  position.  What  Korsgaard  means  is  that  the  agent  is 
asking  what  about  themselves  justifies  the  claims  morality  makes  on  them. 
 
Korsgaard’s  point,  that  the  agent  is  asking  the  normative  question  to  and  about  themselves,  is 
demonstrated  by  her  explanation  of  the  three  conditions  which  are  required  for  a  successful 
answer  to  the  normative  question  (how  to  provide  foundations  for  morality).  The  first  of  these 
conditions,  as  Korsgaard  (1996b)  explains,  is: 
[T]he  answer  must  actually  succeed  in  addressing  someone  in  that  position  [someone  in 
the  first-person  position  of  agency].  It  must  not  merely  specify  what  we  might  say,  in  the 
third  person,  about  an  agent  who  challenges  or  ignores  the  existence  of  moral  claims. 
Every  moral  theory  defines  its  concepts  in  a  way  that  allows  us  to  say  something 
negative  about  people  who  do  that  -  say,  that  they  are  amoral  or  bad.  But  an  agent  who 
doubts  whether  he  must  really  do  what  morality  says  also  doubts  whether  it’s  so  bad  to 
be  morally  bad,  so  the  bare  possibility  of  this  sort  of  criticism  settles  nothing.  (p.  16) 
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The  answer  to  the  normative  question,  the  explanation  of  the  foundation  for  morality,  must, 
according  to  Korsgaard,  succeed  in  providing  an  explanation  for  an  agent.  This  is  the  assertion 
which  informs  Korsgaard’s  presentation  of  her  theory  as  a  reply  to  the  skeptic  and,  in  turn, 
Cohen’s  criticism  that  her  theory  fails  to  provide  a  suitable  explanation  to  an  agent  with  these 
types  of  doubts.  The  crucial  point  is  that  the  answer  to  the  normative  question  must  be  relevant 
to  agents  from  their  own  perspective  and  even  when  they  doubt  the  normative  theory  in 
question .  The  reason  why  this  condition  is  plausible  is  revealed  in  the  next  two  conditions. 
 
The  second  condition  required  for  a  successful  foundation  for  morality  is,  explains  Korsgaard 
(1996b),  the  relationship  between  reasons  to  endorse  the  foundation  and  our  access  to  those 
reasons: 
The  second  condition  follows  from  the  first.  Because  we  ourselves  are  both  to  ask  and  to 
answer  the  normative  question,  a  successful  normative  theory  must  meet  a  condition 
which  is  sometimes  called  ‘transparency’.  Usually  this  is  thought  of  as  a  property  of 
explanations.  If  a  theory’s  explanation  of  how  morality  motivates  us  essentially  depends 
on  the  fact  that  the  source  or  nature  of  our  motives  is  concealed  from  us,  or  that  we 
often  act  blindly  or  from  habit,  then  it  lacks  transparency.  .  .  .   A  normative  moral  theory 
must  be  one  that  allows  us  to  act  in  the  full  light  of  knowledge  of  what  morality  is  and 
why  we  are  susceptible  to  its  influences,  and  at  the  same  time  to  believe  that  our  actions 
are  justified  and  make  sense.  (p.  17) 
Because  the  answer  to  the  normative  question  must  be  relevant  to  someone  in  the  first  person 
position  of  an  agent,  which  is  Korsgaard’s  first  condition,  the  moral  theory  that  follows  from  the 
foundations  laid  out  in  the  answer  to  the  normative  question  must  provide  reasons  for  the  agent 
in  that  same  position .  Together,  these  first  two  conditions  establish,  for  Korsgaard,  that  the 
foundation  of  morality  must  be  provided  by  an  agent,  for  that  agent,  and  usable  by  that  agent.  
 
Korgaard’s  third  condition  provides  the  relationship  between  the  first  two  conditions  and  the 
nature  of  the  self.  While  the  first  two  conditions  explain  the  role  of  the  self,  why  it  is  central  to  the 
normative  question  and  dictate  the  requirements  of  a  suitable  foundation  for  morality,  Korsgaard 
(1996b)  explains  that  the  third  condition  is  what  aspect  of  the  self  fulfils  this  role:  
[The  third  condition  is  that]  the  answer  must  appeal,  in  a  deep  way,  to  our  sense  of  who 
we  are,  to  our  sense  of  identity.  As  I  have  been  emphasizing,  morality  can  ask  hard 
things  of  us,  sometimes  even  that  we  should  be  prepared  to  sacrifice  our  lives  in  its 
name.  This  places  a  demanding  condition  on  a  successful  answer  to  the  normative 
question:  it  must  show  that  sometimes  doing  the  wrong  thing  is  as  bad  or  worse  than 
death.  (p.  17) 
Korsgaard's  argument,  in  this  excerpt,  is  that  the  grounding  of  morality  must  appeal  to  our 
identities  in  a  manner  that  reflects  its  ability  to  demand  significant  self  sacrifice  and  there  are 
two  things  meant  by  this:  one  is  that  a  successful  normative  theory  must  explain  why  our  lives 
are  less  important  than  our  morals  in  at  least  some  cases  and,  two,  that  the  reason  for  this  is 
because  of  the  relationship  between  morality  and  our  sense  of  identity.  The  second  of  these  two 
aspects  of  Korsgaard’s  claim  is  more  important  in  regards  to  Cohen’s  second  key  point  for  his 
105 
criticism  of  Korsgaard  (that  the  agent  must  endorse  the  normative  theory),  however  before 
exploring  this  further  I  address  the  first  aspect  of  Korsgaard’s  claim  in  this  excerpt.  
 
Korsgaard’s  claim  that  morality  must  be  able  to  justify  self  sacrifice  needs  addressing  because  it 
may  seem  peculiar.  The  reason  it  might  seem  peculiar  unimportant  to  the  analysis  I  am 
undertaking,  however,  why  it  is  unimportant  is  itself  important.  It  seems  obvious  that  there  are  at 
least  some  cases  where  moral  obligations  are  more  important  than  your  own  life.  While  this  may 
appear  an  odd  claim  to  an  egoist,  it  is  actually  a  weak  claim;  it  merely  requires  that  there  is  a 
case  in  which  one  might  favour  one’s  moral  obligations  over  one's  life.  For  example,   imagine  a 
contrived  scenario  in  which  you  have  a  choice  between  instantly  killing  yourself  or  everyone 
including  yourself  dying  one  second  later.  Surely  in  such  a  case  you  would  choose  to  endorse 
your  moral  obligation  to  save  everyone  over  the  one  additional  second  of  existence.  
 
Notice  that  it  does  not  matter  for  at  Korsgaard’s  third  condition  why  you  think  morality  can 
entails  self  sacrifice.  You  might  think  that  Korsgaard’s  claim  is  unfounded  if  she  is  claiming  that 
one  might  endorse  one’s  rational  obligations  over  one’s  own  life  while  endorsing  the  claim  that 
in  such  extreme  cases  as  I  just  outlined  one  might  endorse  one’s  obligation  to  one’s  own 
desires  over  one’s  own  life.  Here,  I  have  in  mind  Hume’s  (1738/2007)  claim  that  reason  in  its 
own  right  cannot  motivate  us  to  undertake  an  action,  even  preferring  our  slightest  discomfort 
over  the  fate  of  the  world  (2.3.3.4-6).  While  Korsgaard,  broadly  speaking,  is  claiming  that  reason 
can  demand  we  sacrifice  ourselves,  her  third  condition,  in  particular,  for  the  successful 
foundation  of  a  normative  theory  is  not  bound  to  making  that  claim.  Her  point,  in  this  condition, 
is  merely  that  moral  theories  must  explain  this  type  of  prioritisation,  regardless  of  how  exactly 
the  particular  theory  accomplishes  this;  the  accuracy  of  this  particular  condition  does  not 
depend  on  whether  passion  or  reason  does  the  work. 
 
The  second  aspect  of  Korsgaard’s  third  condition  for  the  successful  foundation  of  a  normative 
theory  is  that  the  moral  theory’s  ability  to  demand  significant  sacrifice  must  be  explained  with 
reference  to  the  relationship  between  some  deep  element  of  our  identity  and  the  nature  of 
morality.  It  is  this  aspect  of  this  condition  which,  on  the  face  of  it,  supports  Cohen’s  criticism  that 
Korsgaard  has  discovered  an  aspect  of  the  phenomena  of  morality  rather  than  a  necessary 
grounding  of  morality  (1996,  p.  189).  This  element  of  Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  argument  appears  to 
support  Cohen’s  criticism  because  she  presents  this  relationship  between  our  deep  identity  and 
morality  as  something  we  experience: 
[F]or  most  human  beings  on  most  occasions,  the  only  thing  that  could  be  as  bad  or 
worse  than  death  is  something  that  for  us  amounts  to  death  —  not  being  ourselves  any 
more.  This  is  not  an  unfamiliar  thought.  Most  people  contemplating  extreme  old  age, 
hope  that  they  will  die  rather  than  exist  for  years  in  a  condition  of  severely  diminished 
intelligence,  altered  character,  or  with  an  inability  to  recognize  and  interact  with  those 
whom  they  have  loved  for  years.  (p.  18) 
We  might  consider  this  point  as  Korsgaard  arguing  that  moral  theories  must  explain  their 
authority  by  deriving  it  from  the  relationship  we  have  with  our  identity.  This  is  why,  according  to 
Korsgaard,  we  are  better  off  dead  than  old  and  feeble  minded.  This  is  an  unfair  restatement  of 
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Korsgaard’s  argument,  but  pointedly  so:  if  we  interpret  her  argument  as  relying  on  contingent 
matters  of  preference,  such  as  what  we  would  be  willing  to  endure,  then  Cohen’s  critique  does 
indeed  follow  from  Korsgaard’s  explanation  of  the  necessary  relationship  between  the  self  and 
the  foundations  for  morality.  Before  I  explain  why  this  restatement  is  unfair,  notice  what  follows 
from  it:  if  our  deep  relationship  with  morality  depends  on  what  we  are  willing  to  become,  then 
the  foundations  of  morality  are  indeed  intertwined  with  the  contingent  phenomena  of  identity,  as 
Cohen  argues.  
 
So,  as  previously  explained,  if  our  relationship  with  ourselves  entails  that  the  foundations  of 
morality  depend  on  what  we  are  willing  to  become,  then  it  appears  Cohen’s  (1996)  critique 
establishes  that  Korsgaard’s  moral  foundations  lose  the  element  of  necessity  present  in  Kant’s 
moral  philosophy,  because  Korsgaard  derives  her  constitutivism  from  “human  reason”  rather 
than  “reason  as  such”  (p.  174).  When  Korsgaard  asks  us  to  examine  the  structure  of  our  own 
minds  and  consider  the  nature  of  self  reflection,  she  draws  a  connection  between  our  identity 
and  that  reflective  structure,  the  convergence  of  which  she  develops  into  practical  identity  which 
is  crucial  to  her  theory.  If  the  convergence  between  self  reflection  and  our  identity  is  the  bringing 
together  of  self  reflection  and  however  we  happen  to  conceive  our  own  identity  then  the 
contingency  of  that  experience  of  ourselves  entails  Cohen’s  criticism  that  Korsgaard  has  merely 
discovered  a  phenomena  related  to  her  morality,  rather  than  a  necessary  foundation. 
 
This  is  the  primary  disagreement  between  Cohen  and  Korsgaard:  whether  the  nature  of  our 
identity  can  be  developed  as  a  necessary  foundation  for  morality  in  conjunction  with  the 
reflective  structure  of  our  mind  or  whether  doing  so  will  merely  introduce  contingent  phenomena 
into  the  theories  foundations.  The  precursor  to  Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  reply  to  Cohen  can  be 
found  where  she  continues  from  the  previous  excerpt  while  explaining  the  relationship  between 
morality  and  our  deep  identity: 
The  thought  [behind  preferring  death  to  extreme  old  age]  is  ‘that  would  not  be  me  any 
more’  and  one  would  rather  be  dead.  If  moral  claims  are  ever  worth  dying  for,  then 
violating  them  must  be,  in  a  similar  way,  worse  than  death.  And  this  means  that  they 
must  issue  in  a  deep  way  from  our  sense  of  who  we  are.  (p.  18) 
Korsgaard’s  point   is  that  our  identity  provides  reasons  to  prefer  death  over  some  extreme 
violations  of  the  moral  law  because  those  violations  can  amount  to  losing  what  makes  us 
ourselves.  The  crucial  difference  between  Korsgaard’s  point  and  the  position  Cohen  describes 
when  he  critiques  her  theory  is  that  she  is  arguing  that  our  nature  provides  a  reason  to  prefer 
death  over  such  a  loss  of  identity  rather  than  claiming  that  we  actually  do  hold  such 
preferences.  The  distinction  between  these  two  assertions  is  crucial  to  the  argument  between 
Cohen  and  Korsgaard  because  one  is  a  claim  about  rational  necessity  and  the  other  is  a  claim 
about  contingent  details  of  our  nature.  
 
In  both  cases,  making  a  claim  about  contingent  details  of  our  nature  or  making  a  claim  about 
rational  necessity,  the  specific  details  and  broad  explanation  of  the  can  look  similar,  but  the 
underlying  argument  is  distinct.  One  might  think,  as  follows  from  Cohen’s  critique  (and  the 
shmagency  problem),  that  Korsgaard’s  claims  about  the  nature  of  our  identity  and  the  role  of 
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self  reflection  are  claims  about  our  contingent  nature  in  a  sense  that  entails  her  entire  theory  is 
founded  in  such  contingent  claims.  If  this  is  true,  then  it  follows  that  Korsgaard’s  normative 
theory  is  grounded  in  contingent  claims,  assertions  about  elements  of  our  nature  that  might 
have  been  otherwise,  and  so  her  moral  law  is  not  necessary  after  all.  This  line  of  argument  will 
be  developed  in  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen  and  further  when  I  explain  why  that  reply  also 
functions  as  a  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem. 
 
It  is  true  that  all  elements  of  our  nature  are,  in  a  sense,  contingent.  But  this  is  the  same  sense  in 
which  we  ourselves  are  contingent:  our  very  existence  is  contingent  in  the  sense  that  we  might 
not  have  existed.  This  type  of  contingency  is  what  causes  the  disjunction  between  Korsgaard 
and  Cohen  because  it  mirrors  the  disjunction  between,  as  Cohen  describes  it,  human  reason 
and  reason  as  such.  There  is  a  difference  between  saying  the  existence  of  human  beings  is 
contingent  compared  to  saying  that  the  existence  of  elements  of  reason  as  such  are,  or  even 
could  conceivably  be,  contingent.  This  difference  is  the  same  distinction  used  by  Cohen  in  his 
critique:  this  distinction  underlies  his  argument  that  Kant  can  appeal  to  reason  as  such  while 
Korsgaard  can  only  appeal  to  human  reason.  Cohen’s  point  is  that  the  particulars  of  human 
reason  are  contingent  (in  the  same  manner  as  our  existence  and  the  specifics  of  our  nature) 
while  reason  as  such  is  not  contingent.  
 
With  these  differing  conceptions  of  the  contingency  of  reason  identified,  the  relationship 
between  Korsgaard’s  conditions  for  the  foundation  of  a  normative  theory  and  Cohen’s  critique  of 
her  theory  can  be  summarised.  Cohen’s  two  points  are,  first,  that  different  possible  normativities 
(different  renditions  of  the  moral  law  such  as  a  mafioso  moral  code)  follow  from  how  we  are 
constituted  and,  second,  that  if  Korsgaard  is  correct,  the  agent  must  provide  legitimacy  to  the 
moral  law.  Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  argues  that  these  two  points  are  incompatible.  They  are 
incompatible  because  Korsgaard  cannot  establish  objective  normativity  if  the  agent  is  the 
grounding  for  that  normativity,  this  cannot  be  done  because  relevant  elements  of  the  agent  are 
contingent,  so  the  normativity  founded  in  those  elements  will  also  be  contingent.  This  argument 
utilises  Korsgaard’s  own  conditions  for  the  foundation  of  a  normative  theory  to  demonstrate  that 
her  project  is,  if  Cohen  is  correct,  fundamentally  flawed.  Korsgaard’s  three  conditions  for  the 
foundation  of  a  normative  theory  are  (1)  that  it  must  address  the  perspective  of  an  agent,  (2) 
that  it  must  provide  transparent  reasons  for  action  (reasons  we  can  simultaneously  know  and 
use  to  decide  what  to  do),  and  (3)  that  it  must  appeal  to  a  sense  of  our  identity.  The  tension,  if 
Cohen’s  criticism  is  correct,  is  that  addressing  the  perspective  of  an  agent  (1)  and  providing  us 
with  usable  reasons  for  action  (2)  cannot  be  done  while  (3)  appealing  to  a  sense  of  our  identity 
without  sacrificing  the  necessity  of  the  normativity  being  founded.  
 
So,  the  bad  action  problem  is  that  appealing  to  an  agent’s  sense  of  identity  to  provide  reasons 
for  action  that  address  the  perspective  of  an  agent  removes  the  necessity  of  morality.  Cohen 
(1996)  summarises  the  bad  action  problem  as  demonstrating  why  something  beyond  the  human 
mind  must  be  the  source  of  morality: 
So,  I  return  to  the  thought  that  something  transcending  human  will  must  figure  in  morality 
if  it  is  to  have  an  apodictic  character.  Kant  was  right  that,  if  morality  is  merely  human, 
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then  it  is  optional,  as  far  as  rationality  is  concerned.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  morality 
cannot  be  merely  human,  since  Kant  may  have  been  wrong  to  think  that  morality  could 
not  be  optional.  What  does  follow  is  that  Korsgaard’s  goal  is  unachievable,  because  she 
wants  to  keep  the  ‘must’  that  Kant  put  into  morality  while  nevertheless  humanizing 
morality’s  source.  (p.  188)  
The  point  of  Cohen’s  critique  is  that  Korsgaard’s  claim  to  have  grounded  the  necessity  of 
morality  is  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  the  foundations,  our  own  constitution,  because  that 
foundation  is  not  itself  necessary  in  the  right  sense.  So,  while  morality  may  be  based  in  the 
constitution  of  agency  (our  constitution  as  humans)  this  is  incompatible  with  morality  being 
necessary  and,  in  that  sense,  objective.  Notice  how  similar  this  is  to  Enoch’s  shmagency 
problem,  in  both  Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  and  the  shmagency  problem  the  critique  focuses 
on  a  disjunction  between  the  necessity  of  how  we  are  constituted  and  the  normative  necessity 
we  expect  from  the  grounding  of  morality.  This  is  the  problem  of  normative  and  non-normative 
necessity:  even  if  we  must  be  human  that  does  not  entail  that  we  must  endorse  what  follows 
from  our  humanity.  
  
Cohen  does  not  appear  to  appreciate  that  his  disagreement  with  Korsgaard  on  this  point  is 
problematic  for  his  use  of  Korsgaard’s  argument  about  the  authority  of  normativity.  Korsgaard 
and  Cohen  disagree  about  what  follows  from  the  necessity  of  human  reason,  which  is  crucial  to 
Korsgaard’s  theory,  and  yet  Cohen  persists  in  utilising  this  point  to  demonstrate  that  Korsgaard’s 
conclusion  does  not  follow  from  her  argument.  Cohen  explains  that  the  grounding  of  objective 
(necessary)  morality  cannot  follow  from  Korsgaard’s  argument  because  of  her  own  demanding 
description  of  the  normative  question  (1996b,  p.  183).  This  is  a  disagreement  about  the  nature 
of  practical  identity,  the  role  reason  plays  in  relation  to  what  we  are  at  the  most  fundamental 
(deepest,  to  use  Korsgaard’s  terminology)  level.  The  point  of  identifying  this  as  the  crucial  point 
of  disagreement  is  that  it  explains  why  Korsgaard  and  Cohen  disagree  about  whether  necessary 
normativity  can  follow  from  the  necessity  of  our  constitution.  The  distinction  between  reason  as 
such  and  human  reason,  as  human  reason  is  manifested  in  the  reflective  structure  of  our  minds, 
is  not  something  Korsgaard  is  going  to  agree  with  Cohen  about,  and  this  disagreement  will 
inform  her  reply  to  Cohen.  Furthermore,  Korsgaard’s  defence  of  her  theory  based  on  the 
absolute  necessity  of  the  reflective  structure  of  our  mind  also  serves  as  a  reply  to  Enoch’s 
critique  that  normative  and  non-normative  necessity  are  distinct  in  a  manner  that  undermines 
the  constitutivist  approach.  In  both  cases  the  problems,  bad  action  and  shmagency,  are 
misunderstandings  of  Korsgaard’s  theory;  or,  more  charitably,  need  to  be  rephrased  for  the 
actual  point  of  disagreement  to  be  identified. 
 
The  disagreement  between  Cohen  and  Korsgaard  lies  in  the  relationship  between  Cohen’s 
critique  that  the  necessity  of  morality  is  incompatible  with  Korsgaard’s  attempt  to  ground 
morality  in  human  reason  and  his  disagreement  with  Korsgaard  about  the  role  of  reason  in  our 
identity.  Cohen  (1996)  comes  close  to   putting  forward  this  point  himself  when  he  argues  that 
one  can  set  aside  one's  practical  identity  even  while  undertaking  the  activity  of  self  reflection: 
Korsgaard  says  that  ‘the  normative  question  arises  when  our  confidence  [‘that  we  really 
do  have  obligations’]  [brackets  in  the  original]  has  been  shaken  whether  by  philosophy  or 
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by  the  exigencies  of  life’,  and  that  someone’s  confident  affirmation  of  the  reality  of 
obligation  will  then  do  nothing  for  us.  But  one  thing  which  life’s  exigencies  can  shake  is  a 
person’s  practical  identity,  and,  when  that  happens,  then  Korsgaard’s  answer  will  not 
help.  Something  shatters  my  sense  of  being  and  obligation  in  the  world,  consequently 
my  confidence  that  obligation  is  real.  It  is  then  useless  to  tell  me  that  it  lies  in  my 
practical  identity  to  be  thus  obliged.  When  I  doubt  that  my  ‘obligations  really  exist’,  or  do 
not  recognize  that  moral  ‘actions’  are  ‘worth  undertaking’,  I  am  setting  aside  any  relevant 
practical  identity  that  the  philosopher  might  have  invoked.  (p.  180).  
This  claim  that  the  moral  skeptic,  or  anyone,  has  set  aside  their  practical  identity  is  where  we 
find  the  crux  of  Korsgaard  and  Cohen’s  disagreement.  So,  Cohen’s  argument  is  that  using  our 
identity  as  the  foundations  for  morality  is  incompatible  with  necessary  morality  and  the  method 
he  uses  to  establish  this  argument  is  to  point  out  that  the  particular  element  of  our  identity 
Korsgaard  to  which  appeals  to  establish  her  theory  is  optional.  Practical  identity  is  optional  in 
the  sense  that  we  can  undertake  at  least  some  relevant  reflection  (some  practical  reason) 
without  it  (while  “setting  it  aside”).  
 
Ostensibly,  the  relationship  between  setting  aside  any  relevant  practical  identity  and  the 
disjunction  between  the  necessity  of  morality  and  grounding  morality  in  the  constitution  of 
agency  appears  to  be  a  misunderstanding  of  Korsgaard’s  theory.  That  is  to  say,  Cohen’s 
assertion  that  someone  can  be  simultaneously  reflecting  upon  their  moral  commitments  yet 
setting  aside  the  practical  identity  that  Korsgaard  intends  to  invoke  is  a  direct  disagreement  with 
how  Korsgaard  explains  the  normative  question.  Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  point  is  that  the  normative 
question  is  an  activity  of  reflection:  “To  raise  the  normative  question  is  to  ask  whether  our  more 
unreflective  moral  beliefs  and  motives  can  withstand  the  test  of  reflection”  (p.  47).  So,  when 
Cohen  argues  that  her  theory  fails  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  same  normative  question  she 
puts  forward,  he  makes  this  claim  in  the  context  of  a  different  understanding  of  what  practical 
identity  is  than  the  one  Korsgaard  puts  forward  (1996,  p.  183).  This  disagreement,  in  particular, 
is  crucial,  because  the  nature  of  the  normative  question  as  Korsgaard  explains  it  is  dependant 
on  that  same  understanding  of  practical  reason  and  practical  identity  that  these  two 
philosophers  disagree  on.  
 
Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  to  be  undertaking  self  reflection  about  one’s  moral  obligations  is  to  be 
utilising  your  practical  identity.  So,  when  Cohen  argues  that  an  agent,  such  as  his  mafioso, 
might  put  aside  their  practical  identity,  and  leave  Korsgaard  with  nothing  to  say  that  is  capable 
of  compelling  this  agent  to  endorse  the  moral  law,  Cohen  is  denying  her  explanation  of  what  the 
normative  question  is.  Korsgaard’s  reply  will  be  merely  to  point  this  misunderstanding  out:  she 
can  inform  Cohen  that  an  agent  cannot  simultaneously  set  aside  their  practical  identity  and 
undertake  this  type  of  reflection;  remember,  Korsgaard  argues  that  the  structure  of  our  own 
mind  is  fundamentally  reflective  and  that  means  fundamentally  utilises  our  practical  identity.  43
43  One  might  argue  that  there  are  incidents  where  our  minds  do  not  utilise  our  practical  identity  in  any 
sense.  This  would  undoubtedly  be  correct  in  cases  where  we  are  not  reasoning  at  all .  In  such  cases 
Korsgaard  would  be  bound  to  claiming  that  those  cases  do  not  represent  our  minds  -  they  are  simply  not 
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The  point  of  such  a  reply  is  that  any  agent  who  set  aside  their  practical  identity  would  not  be  an 
example  of  someone  who  Korsgaard  has  failed  to  convince,  they  would  be  an  example  of 
someone  who  has  simply  refused  to  enter  into  the  discussion  at  all .  The  accurate  description  of 
someone  who  sets  aside  their  practical  reason  is  not  a  mafioso  who  listens  to  Korsgaard’s 
theory  and  simply  cannot  see  why  her  position  is  compelling:  rather,  someone  who  sets  aside 
their  practical  reason  is  best  described  as  someone  with  their  fingers  in  their  ears  and  who 
refuses  to  reflect  on  the  issue  at  all.  Failing  to  convince  such  a  person  is  not  a  problem  for 
Korsgaard’s  theory,  they  are  simply  refusing  to  reason.  Whether  this  reply  is  successful,  and 
how  it  relates  to  the  shmagency  problem,  will  be  developed  further  -  but  in  relation  to  Cohen’s 
bad  action  problem,  the  crucial  point  is  that  Korsgaard  will  not  accept  Cohen’s  explanation  of 
the  mafioso  as  someone  who  is  rational  but  not  convinced. 
 
In  summary,  Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  is  a  disagreement  with  Korsgaard’s  conception  of 
practical  identity  and  the  role  of  reflection.  Korsgaard  argues  that  our  deepest  identity  is 
fundamentally  intertwined  with  our  capacity  for  reflection  and  that  from  this  relationship, 
between  reflection  and  our  deepest  identity,  we  can  discern  that  morality  itself  is  a  result  of  the 
relationship  between  our  deepest  identity  and  the  role  of  practical  reason.  Cohen  critiques 
Korsgaard’s  argument  by  arguing  that  we  can  utilise  reason  without  endorsing  the  particular 
type  of  identity  she  envisions,  for  example  by  endorsing  an  honour  code  or  prioritising  particular 
relationships  above  whatever  practical  identity  entails.  This  is  a  problem  for  her  argument, 
because  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  requires  that  agents  are  using,  and  endorsing,  their 
practical  identity  whenever  they  attempt  to  test  whether  their  moral  beliefs  can  withstand  the 
scrutiny  of  reflection.  So,  Cohen’s  critique  is  best  understood  as  a  disagreement  about  what  is 
necessary  for  the  process  of  reflection  on  morality.  Korsgaard  argues  reflecting  on  morality 
entails  the  use  (and  therefore  endorsement)  of  our  practical  identity  while  Cohen  argues  that  we 
can  undertake  reflection  on  morality  without  endorsing  practical  identity  as  Korsgaard  conceives 
it.  Practical  identity  is  the  endorsement  of  practical  reason,  the  reflective  structure  of  my  mind, 
as  the  most  fundamental  element  of  my  identity.  Cohen’s  disagreement  is  that  we  can  endorse 
other  elements  of  our  identity,  such  as  particular  relationships  or  concepts  such  as  honour,  just 




cases  where  we  ourselves  are  making  decisions.  Our  bodies  and  parts  of  our  brains  might  be  at  work,  but 
the  decisions  are  not  ours .  
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2.5  The  similarity  between  the  shmagency  problem  and  the  bad  action  problem 
Both  the  bad  action  problem  and  the  shmagency  problem  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  the 
constitutivist  approach  cannot  ground  objective  normativity  by  arguing  that  the  objectivity  of 
normativity  must  be  grounded  in  something  external  to  the  constitution  of  the  agent.  There  are 
underlying  assumptions  that  differ  between  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  and  Cohen’s 
presentation  of  the  bad  action  problem,  but  they  share  the  key  mechanism  that  accomplishes 
the  task  of  undermining  the  constitutivist  approach:  in  both  cases  the  argument  is  that  the 
constitution  of  the  agent  is  not  necessary  in  the  manner  required  for  the  grounding  of  objective 
(necessary)  normativity.  This  shared  critique  is  supported  in  different  ways,  with  different 
examples  and  varying  supporting  explanations,  but  can  be  solved  with  the  same  solution 
because  they  share  this  key  mechanism.  
 
Enoch  presents  shmagents  as  alternatives  to  agents  while  Cohen  presents  his  mafioso  as  an 
agent  with  a  differently  prioritised  identity  than  Korsgaard’s  theory  entails.  Because  of  the  role 
identity  plays  in  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  these  are,  broadly  speaking  and  in  the  relevant 
sense,  the  same  thing:  the  point,  underlying  both  the  bad  action  and  shmagency  problems, 
requires  that  there  is  an  alternative  to  the  identity  of  the  agent  as  Korsgaard  explains  it.  Cohen 
presents  this  point  as  an  agent  who  identifies  something  other  than  their  practical  identity  as  the 
source  of  normativity.  Enoch  presents  this  same  point  as  an  agent  questioning  their  constitution, 
as  such,  by  providing  the  hypothetical  alternative  constitution  of  a  shmagent.   A  ‘bad  actor’, 
such  as  Cohen’s  mafioso,  is  a  coherently  self  constituted  subject,  but  it  is  not  a  subject  that 
endorses  its  own  constitution  in  the  manner  described  by  Korsgaard.  In  this  sense  it  is  a 
shmagent .  My  point  is  that  endorsing  something  other  than  the  constitution  as  Korsgaard 
understands  it  is  the  functional  definition  of  shmagency.  By  functional  definition  I  mean  that  the 
bad  actor  is  doing  the  same  thing  as  the  shmagent,  performing  the  same  function  in  the  same 
manner:  it  is  an  example  of  a  subject  who  is  coherently  constituting  themselves  but  not  as 
Korsgaard  envisions  and  the  problem  this  causes  is  that  this  alternative  coherent  self 
constitution  entails  a  different  morality  (a  different  moral  law,  a  different  moral  code).  For  this 
reason  one  might  consider  the  mafioso  an  example  of  a  shmagent.  I  do  not  mean  this  in  the 
sense  that  Cohen  himself,  or  Enoch,  would  regard  the  mafioso  and  the  shmagent  as  the  same 
thing.  If  Enoch  thought  this  I  assume  he  would  have  made  it  explicit  in  his  first  paper  on  the 
shmagency  problem.  What  I  mean  is  that  they  are  the  same  problem  but  differently  represented.  
 
The  shmagent  and  the  mafioso  are  the  same  thing,  differently  represented,  because  they  both 
serve  to  expose  the  same  (supposed)  problem  with  constitutivism:  the  necessity  of  the  source  of 
normativity  is  incompatible  with  the  contingency  of  the  source  of  normativity.   Cohen’s  bad 44
action  problem  demonstrates  that  Korsgaard’s  source  of  normativity  is  contingent  because  an 
agent  might  elect  to  endorse  a  different  element  of  their  identity  as  the  foundations  for 
normativity  while  the  shmagent,  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem,  demonstrates  that  her  source  of 
44  At  least,  they  are  exposing  the  same  problem.  I  have  described  it  as  the  key  problem  because,  as  I  will 
explain  later  in  this  thesis,  it  relates  to  existing  and  long  standing  problems  with  the  Kantian  approach: 
Kant’s  epistemology  is  critiqued  for  making  too  much  of  (attempting  to  derive  too  much  from)  our  access 
to  the  nature  of  reason.  
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normativity  is  contingent  by  explaining  that  an  agent  may  not  endorse  their  own  constitution  at 
all.  In  both  cases  the  problem  is  that  the  constitutive  element  of  agency  itself  is  not  necessary 
and  the  difference  is  how  this  is  demonstrated. 
 
Cohen’s  mafioso  is  a  specific  example  while  Enoch’s  shmagent  is  a  discussion  of  a  hypothetical 
possibility,  but  both  are  making  the  point  that  multiple  imperatives  follow  from  the  constitution  of 
a  subject.  At  the  end  of  §  2.4  I  explained  that  Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  is  actually  a 
disagreement  with  Korsgaard  about  the  particulars  of  how  normativity  can  be  derived  from  our 
deepest  identity.  Cohen’s  problem  is  only  possible  if  Korsgaard  is  wrong  that  we  ultimately 
derive  all  normative  judgements  (principled  acts  of  law  making)  from  practical  identity  as  such. 
Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  relies  upon  the  same  disagreement:  the  shmagency  problem  only 
works  because  it  conflicts  with  Korsgaard’s  point  that  the  dictates  of  practical  identity  are 
self-authenticating.  By  ‘self-authenticating’  I  refer  to  Korsgaard’s  argument  that  the  normativity 
grounded  in  practical  identity  is  justified  because  of  the  necessity  of  that  foundation,  and  that 
this  grounding  does  not  entail  a  reference  to  any  external  entity  or  justification.  The  point  of 
contention  is  that  Korsgaard  derives  normativity  from  our  constitution  while  putting  forward  a 
particular  conception  of  what   that  constitution  is;  in  particular,  Korsgaard  posits  that  our  faculty 
of  reason,  in  its  role  as  the  arbitrator  between  differing  reasons  for  action,  is  our  deepest  identity 
and  that  the  necessity  of  this  identity  entails  both  the  moral  law  and  the  objectivity   of  the  moral 45
law.  The  disagreement,  from  both  Enoch  and  Cohen,  is  with  the  necessity  of  this  role  for  our 
practical  identity.  They  pose  their  respective  problems,  with  the  mafioso  example  and  the 
shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an  agent?’),  by  demonstrating  that  the  moral  law  as  it 
follows  from  our  constitution  cannot  be  necessary  (or,  at  least,  if  it  is  necessary  it  must  be 
because  of  some  consideration  independent  from  our  constitutions).  
 
This  common  point  at  work  in  both  critiques  can  be  made  more  explicit  with  an  examination  and 
comparison  of  the  key  points  of  Enoch  and  Cohen’s  criticisms.  Enoch  (2006)  argues  that  even  if 
our  constitution  entails  a  particular  moral  law  and  we  are  able  to  discern  what  that  particular 
moral  law  is,  it  does  not  follow  from  these  two  points  that  we  should  endorse  this  moral  law  (pp. 
185-186).  The  distinction,  which  is  the  heart  of  the  shmagency  problem,  is  that  something 
following  from  our  constitution  does  not  entail  that  we  should  endorse  it.  With  this  distinction 
Enoch,  if  he  is  correct,  establishes  that  Korsgaard  has  failed  to  ground  normativity  in  how  we 
are  constituted,  even  if  she  is  correct  in  her  claim  about  the  moral  law  following  from  our  own 
constitution.  This  can  be  summarized  as  follows: 
Enoch:  the  Moral  Law  follows  from  Practical  Identity,  but  this  does  not  establish  that  we 
ought  to  endorse  Moral  Law 
45  ‘Absolute  necessity’  and  ‘objectivity’  are  in  this  context  the  same  thing.  However,  pointing  out  that  it  is 
the  nature  of  our  constitution  that  entails  this  objectivity  is  a  substantial  claim:  it  is  not  clear  that  absolute 
necessity,  objectivity,  and  the  nature  of  our  faculty  of  reason  are  related  in  the  manner  Korsgaard  posits. 
For  an  expansion  of  what  I  mean  by  ‘absolute  necessity’  see  the  section  on  Velleman  and  Enoch  where  I 
put  forward  an  alternative,  Kantian,  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem.  The  nature  of  objectivity,  as  such, 
and  how  it  relates  to  necessity  is  discussed  directly  in  the  objectivity  and  realism  section:  at  this  point  my 
intent  is,  merely,  to  identify  the  relationship  between  the  necessity  of  practical  identity  and  the  objectivity 
of  Korsgaard’s  foundations  (rather  than  to  elaborate  on  that  relationship). 
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So,  the  point  of  the  shmagency  problem  (at  least,  as  it  applies  to  Korsgaard’s  theory)  is  that  it 
does  not  matter  what  normativity  follows  from  practical  identity  (how  we  are  constituted)  unless 
we  have  a  reason  to  endorse  what  follows  from  practical  identity.  Notice  the  parallel  to  Cohen’s 
criticism:  Cohen’s  critique  is  that  one  might  endorse  what  follows  from  some  other  element  of 
your  identity  rather  than  what  follows  from  practical  identity.  This  point  can  be  summarised  in  the 
same  way  as  Enoch’s  critique  because  in  both  cases  we  need  some  further  reason  to  endorse 
what  follows  from  practical  identity: 
Cohen:  the  Moral  Law  follows  from  Practical  Identity,  but  this  does  not  establish  that  we 
ought  to  endorse  Moral  Law 
The  summaries  of  both  positions  are  the  same  because  in  both  cases  the  point  is  that  practical 
identity  only  entails  that  we  ought  to  endorse  the  moral  law  if  it  is  the  case  that  we  ought  to 
endorse  what  follows  from  practical  identity. 
 
The  particulars  of  how  this  common  point  is  demonstrated  differs  between  Enoch  and  Cohen, 
but  the  differences  do  not  cause  the  two  to  become  different  problems.  Cohen  demonstrates 
this  point  by  explaining  that  one  might  endorse  another  element  of  our  identity  while  Enoch 
demonstrates  the  point  by  explaining  that  one  might  endorse  shmagency  instead  of  agency.  In 
either  case  what  is  being  demonstrated  is  that: 
PI  entailing  ML  only  means  we  ought  to  endorse  ML  if  it  is  the  case  that  we  ought  to 
endorse  PI. 
This  difference  in  presentation,  of  the  same  underlying  problem,  makes  the  connection  to 
Korsgaard’s  solution  to  the  problem  clearer  for  Cohen’s  presentation  than  it  is  for  Enoch’s. 
Because  Cohen  demonstrates  the  problem  by  referring  to  an  agents  self  constitution  (an  agent 
interacting  with  their  own  identities)  it  is,  comparably,  straightforward  for  Korsgaard  to  reply  to 
the  problem  by  explaining  that  the  agent  (the  mafioso,  in  this  case)  is  merely  performing  the 
activity  of  self  constitution  poorly.  This  is  the  same  solution  I  will  present,  on  Korsgaard’s  behalf, 
to  the  shmagency  problem;  but  it  is  not  as  straightforward  to  apply  this  solution  to  the 
shmagency  problem  because  it  is  not  clear  how,  in  Enoch’s  demonstrating  of  the  problem,  the 
agent  in  question  is  undertaking  the  activity  of  self  constitution  at  all.  The  point  is  that  the 
difference  of  these  two  presentations  of  the  problem,  Enoch  and  Cohen’s,  makes  providing  a 
reply  to  the  problem  more  difficult  in  Enoch’s  case  than  Cohen’s,  but  these  differences  do  not 
alter  either  the  nature  of  the  problem  underlying  the  critique  or  what  the  solution  to  that  problem 
is. 
 
There  is  another  presentation  of  this  same  problem  that  demonstrates  the  issue.  In  §  2.4  I 
explained  a  similar  problem  put  forward  by  Smith  (2015)  who  argues  that  multiple  reasons  for 
action  follow  from  what  is  inescapable  because  we  have  multiple  inescapable  functions  (such 
as,  according  to  Smith,  vehicles  for  our  genes  and  self  constitution)  (pp.  193-194).  This  is  the 
same  critique  put  forward  by  Cohen:  the  problem  is  that  we  might  endorse  one  of  the  other 
things,  not  the  moral  law,  that  follows  from  elements  of  our  constitution.  The  distinction  between 
Smith’s  and  Cohen’s  problems  is  that  Smith  (2015)  also  provides  the  solution  when  he  explains 
that  the  necessary  relationship  between  reasons  for  action  and  our  identity  as  agents  precludes 
the  comparison  that  causes  the  problem  (p.  193).  His  solution  is  that  there  is  a  necessary 
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connection  between  being  an  agent  and  the  reasons  for  action  that  one  ought  to  endorse.  This 
is  similar  to  Korsgaard’s  solution  to  the  bad  action  problem:  Korsgaard’s  solution,  covered  in  the 
next  subsection,  is  that  our  deepest  identity  is  necessary  and  it  entails  the  moral  law. 
 
In  summary,  the  common  point  underlying  both  Cohen  and  Enoch’s  critiques  is  a  disagreement 
with  Korsgaard  over  the  nature  of  our  constitution  and  its  ability  to  function  as  a  self 
authenticating  foundation  for  normativity.  They  argue  that  our  constitution  cannot  be  self 
authenticating  because  we  require  some  reason  to  endorse  practical  identity:  even  if  the  moral 
law  follows  from  how  we  are  constituted,  we  still  require  a  reason  to  endorse  our  constitution. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  this  is  a  broad  disagreement,  in  Enoch’s  case  the  disagreement 
between  robust  realism  and  constructivist  realism  underlies  his  critique.  However,  the  particular 
point  of  disagreement  is  more  focused  than  this  suggests  -  Korsgaard’s  claims  about  our 
deepest  identity  is  both  the  point  of  contention  and  the  defence  she  puts  forward.  In  Cohen’s 
case  the  point  is  that  we  might  endorse  some  competing  element  of  our  identity  as  the  ‘deepest’ 
and  in  doing  so  endorse  a  normativity  other  than  the  moral  law  as  envisioned  by  Korsgaard. 
Because,  in  both  cases,  the  problem  is  that  we  require  a  reason  beyond  what  our  practical 
identity  itself  provides  to  endorse  what  practical  identity  entails  the  solution  to  the  underlying 
problem  will  be  a  solution  to  both  of  the  problems:  if  Korsgaard’s  answer  to  Cohen  justifies  why 
practical  identity  is  self-authenticating  (why  it  does  not  require  further  grounding)  then  her 




2.6  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  the  bad  action  problem  
Korsgaard’s  reply  to  the  bad  action  problem  is  that  our  constitution  is  self-authenticating.  This 
shows  that  there  cannot  be  a  regression  that  leads  an  agent  asking  why  they  ought  to  endorse 
their  practical  identity.  Our  constitution,  according  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism,  is 
self-authenticating  in  the  sense  that  the  normativity  grounded  in  it  does  not  require  further 
justification:  our  constitution  is  the  foundation  for  her  constitutivism.  This  solves  Cohen’s 
presentation  of  the  bad  action  problem  because,  if  Korsgaard  is  right,  it  explains  that  one  ought 
to  endorse  what  follows  from  one’s  practical  identity  rather  than  some  other  element  of  their 
identity  because  practical  identity  is  the  appropriate  grounding  for  normativity  in  a  manner  that 
other  elements  of  our  identity  are  not.  In  this  subsection  I  explain  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  the  bad 
action  problem:  her  reply  is  that  the  bad  actor  presented  by  Cohen  is  wrong  about  the  ability  of 
elements  of  our  identity,  other  than  practical  identity,  to  serve  as  competing  foundations  for 
normativity.  The  purpose  of  developing  an  examination  of  this  reply  is  to  explain  the  key  point 
required  to  extend  this  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem,  which  is  the  topic  of  the  next 
subsection.  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  the  bad  action  problem  can  be  extended  to  the  shmagency 
problem  because  her  contention  that  the  agent  is  making  an  error  by  seeking  any  grounding 
beyond  practical  identity  also  explains  why  the  shmagency  problem  question  (‘why  be  an 
agent?’)  is  misguided  in  a  manner  that  solves  the  problem  posed  by  Enoch;  however,  explaining 
the  particulars  of  why  this  reply  can  serve  to  solve  the  shmagency  problem  in  this  manner 
requires  an  explanation  of  the  problem  itself. 
 
Korsgaard  begins  her  reply  to  Cohen  by  explaining  why  one  must  conceive  of  one’s  will  as 
enacting  universal  laws  rather  than  particular  edicts.   She  begins  her  reply  in  this  manner 46
because  Cohen  presents  the  possibility  of  endorsing  particular  edicts,  rather  than  laws,  as  an 
alternative  to  her  explanation  of  the  process  of  self  constitution.  This  is  an  important 
disagreement,  and  an  appropriate  place  for  Korsgaard  to  have  begun  her  reply,  because  the 
reason  that  Korsgaard  thinks  we  must  will  in  universal  laws  is  the  same  reason  that  she  thinks 
that  we  must  endorse  what  follows  from  practical  identity  rather  than  an  alternative  element  of 
our  identity.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  that  we  must  will  in  universal  laws  because: 
I  cannot  regard  myself  as  an  active  self,  as  willing  an  end,  unless  what  I  will  is  to  pursue 
my  end  in  spite  of  temptation.  In  the  same  way,  I  cannot  regard  myself  as  an  active  self, 
as  willing  a  maxim,  unless  what  I  will  is  to  follow  my  maxim  in  spite  of  temptation.  Laws 
which  cannot  be  violated  cannot  be  followed  either,  so  if  I  am  to  give  myself  a  law  it  must 
be  conceivable  that  I  should  break  it.  If  I  give  myself  a  law,  if  I  am  not  merely  the  place 
where  an  impulse  is  operating,  then  what  I  do  essentially  involves  a  reference  to  other 
occasions  when  I  might  do  otherwise  .  .  .   to  this  occasion,  regarded  as  possibly  other, 
and  so  regarded  in  general  terms.  .  .  .  Again,  the  form  of  the  act  of  the  will  is  general. 
The  claim  to  generality,  to  universality,  is  essential  to  an  act’s  being  an  act  of  the  will. 
(pp.  231-232) 
46  Korsgaard  is  in  fact  replying  to  both  Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  and  other  critiques  simultaneously. 
Focusing  on  the  elements  of  her  reply  as  they  relate  to  Cohen  facilitates  both  a  more  succinct 
examination  and  allows  the  reader  to  more  easily  appreciate  the  relationship  between  her  reply  to  Cohen 
and  the  reply  to  Enoch’s  problem  that  I  am  deriving  from  it. 
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The  nature  of  the  will  and  the  nature  of  the  self,  Korsgaard  argues,  are  one  and  the  same:  the 
self  is  the  will  in  a  particular  sense  that  entails  a  law  giving  nature.  This  position  allows 
Korsgaard  to  reply  to  Cohen’s  critique  by  arguing  that  you  cannot  endorse  some  competing 
element  of  your  own  identity,  other  than  practical  identity,  as  the  foundation  for  normativity 
because  doing  so  would  be  to  misunderstand  yourself.  How  this  answer  works  requires  further 
examination  of  Korsgaard’s  theory  on  the  nature  of  the  self,  but  before  I  undertake  a 
development  of  that  point  I  need  to  explain  how  the  misunderstanding  of  oneself  and  the 
misunderstanding  of  the  foundations  of  normativity  are  one  and  the  same  thing  (in  Korsgaard’s 
theory). 
 
The  relationship  between  misunderstanding  the  categorical  imperative  and  misunderstanding 
your  own  identity  reveals  the  crux  of  both  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen  and  her  theory.  The  point 
is  that  the  grounding  of  Korsgaard’s  Kantian  constitutivism  is  simultaneously  the  nature  of  the 
self  and  the  categorical  imperative:  to  misunderstand  the  role  one  plays  in  grounding  normativity 
is  to  misunderstand  the  other.  The  categorical  imperative  grounds  normativity  because  it 
denotes  what  laws  are  universalizable,  and  the  nature  of  the  self  i  grounds  normativity  because 
it  determines  that  issuing  and  obeying  universalizable  laws  is  the  activity  of  the  self.  So,  if 
Korsgaard’s  theory  and  her  reply  to  Cohen  are  correct,  then  misunderstanding  the  categorical 
imperative,  misunderstanding  the  foundations  of  normativity,  and  misunderstanding  the  nature 
of  the  self  are  all  one  and  the  same  thing.  To  establish  this,  and  so  to  reply  to  Cohen’s  critique, 
she  needs  to  establish  that  the  nature  of  oneself  entails  the  categorical  imperative,  which  is  why 
her  answer  to  the  bad  action  problem  begins  by  explaining  that  the  self  deals  in  universalizable 
laws. 
 
Korsgaard’s  argument,  her  answer  to  Cohen  and  a  point  crucial  to  her  metanormative  theory,  is 
that  the  claim  to  the  universalizability  of  one’s  will  is  crucial  to  the  very  existence  of  one’s  will 
and  for  that  reason  is  the  relevant  feature  of  one’s  will  when  determining  the  foundations  of 
normativity.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  attempts  to  establish  this  by  arguing  that  the  existence  of  the 
self  is  the  claim  to  universalizability:  
[I]t  is  the  claim  to  universality  that  gives  me  a  will,  that  makes  my  will  distinguishable 
from  the  operation  of  desires  and  impulses  in  me.  If  I  change  my  mind  and  my  will  every 
time  I  have  a  new  impulse,  then  I  don’t  really  have  an  active  mind  or  a  will  at  all  -  I  am 
just  a  kind  of  location  where  these  impulses  are  at  play.  And  that  means  that  to  make  up 
my  mind  even  now  -  to  give  myself  a  reason  -  I  must  conceive  my  reason  as  an  instance 
of  some  general  type.  Of  course  this  is  not  to  say  that  I  cannot  ever  change  my  mind,  but 
only  to  say  that  I  must  do  it  for  a  reason,  and  not  at  random.  (p.  232) 
Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  the  activity  of  the  will,  what  the  self  does,  is  the  activity  of  willing 
universal  laws  and  the  will  exists  because  what  it  wills  is  universal.  Her  idea  is  that  if  you  do  not 
will,  in  this  universal  fashion,  your  will  fails  to  be  a  will  or  a  self  at  all,  at  least  it  fails  to  be  such  in 
any  unified  sense.  A  subject  that  failed  to  will  universally  would  instead  be  a  hodgepodge  mix  of 
impulses  rather  than  a  self.  She  continues  to  explain  that: 
  Geuss  [another  critic  in  Korsgaard’s  book]  reports  in  his  comments  that  Hegel 
characterized  the  Schlegelian  life,  in  which  laws  are  broken  frivolously  or  for  its  own 
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sake,  as  a  ‘constant  succession  of  self-creation  and  self-destruction’  [p193].  This 
characterization  seems  to  me  to  be  perfectly  apt.  The  active  will  is  brought  into  existence 
by  every  moment  of  reflection,  but  without  the  claim  to  universality,  it  is  no  sooner  born 
than  dead.  And  that  means  that  it  does  not  really  exist  at  all.  (p.  232) 
So,  according  to  Korsgaard,  the  existence  of  the  will,  the  activity  of  being  yourself,  depends  on 
the  universalizability  of  what  is  being  willed.  
 
If  Korsgaard  is  correct,  this  entails  that  Cohen’s  mafioso  example  is  not  an  example  of  someone 
who  has  failed  to  deal  in  universalizable  laws  (because  this  is  what  we  all  must  do),  but  merely 
an  example  of  someone  who  has  failed  to  come  to  the  correct  conclusion  when  undertaking  this 
endeavour.  This  point  is  important  to  her  solution  to  Cohen’s  problem  because  if  one  accepts 
that  point,  all  Korsgaard  needs  to  do  is  establish  that  the  mafioso  is  incorrect  that  the  mafia 
code  can  be  universalizable  in  the  same  manner  as  the  categorical  imperative.  In  this  manner, 
the  problem  with  the  mafioso’s  mafia  code  becomes  simply  that  it  is  not  the  categorical 
imperative ,  because,  of  course,  if  it  could  be  universalizable  in  the  same  sense  as  the 
categorical  imperative  then  it  would  be  the  categorical  imperative.  Cohen’s  critique  is  supposed 
to  entail  that  multiple  potential  moralities  follow  from  how  we  are  constituted;  however,  if 
Korsgaard  is  right  that  the  nature  of  the  self  entails  we  deal  in  universalizable  laws,  then 
claiming  multiple  potential  moralities  follow  from  how  we  are  constituted  entails  claiming  that 
there  are  multiple  universalizable  laws.  So,  to  restate  what  I  explained  earlier,  Korsgaard’s  reply 
to  Cohen  becomes  to  argue  that  Cohen’s  mafioso  has  misunderstood  the  categorical 
imperative,  which,  remember,  is  interchangeable  with  misunderstanding  oneself.  
 
Korsgaard’s  solution  relies  upon  the  claim  that  there  are  not  multiple  competing  normativities 
one  could  endorse.  This  claim  follows  from  her  position  because  there  cannot  be  multiple 
categorical  imperatives  that  are  in  competition  with  one  another  or  else  they  would  not  be 
universalizable  (Korsgaard,  2009,  pp.175-176).  So,  because  there  is  only  one  categorical 
imperative,  the  bad  actor  has  failed  to  constitute  themselves  coherently  when  adopting  the 
mafioso  honour  code  (or  whatever  morality  that  is  in  competition  with  the  moral  law  that  follows 
from  the  categorical  imperative).  This  means  that  either  Korsgaard  is  wrong  that  the  will,  the 
self,  exists  because  it  deals  in  universal  laws  or  bad  actors,  such  as  Cohen  describes,  are 
examples  of  subjects  who  are  in  error  and  not  examples  of  subjects  who  endorse  independently 
stable  normativities  that  are  legitimate  alternatives  to  the  moral  law.  This  is  why  Korsgaard 
replies  to  the  bad  action  problem  by  attempting  to  establish  that  Cohen,  and  his  mafioso 
exemplar,  is  mistaken  about  the  nature  of  the  self. 
 
Korsgaard  (1996b)  attempts  to  establish  that  the  self,  necessarily,  requires  dealing  in  universal 
laws  because  it  is  this  that  allows  us  to  synthesise  ourselves  as  a  unified  identity: 
I  must  be  able  to  see  myself  as  something  that  is  distinct  from  any  of  my  particular, 
first-order,  impulses  and  motives,  as  the  reflective  standpoint  in  any  case  requires. 
Minimally,  then,  I  am  not  the  mere  location  of  a  causally  effective  desire  but  rather  am 
the  agent  who  acts  on  the  desire.  It  is  because  of  this  that  if  I  endorse  acting  a  certain 
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way  now,  I  must  at  the  same  time  endorse  acting  the  same  way  on  every  relevantly 
similar  occasion.  (p.  288)  47
Korsgaard’s  point,  in  this  excerpt,  is  that  in  order  to  deal  in  a  self  at  all  we  must  be  dealing  in 
something  like  a  unified  entity:  something  that  is  yourself.  The  subject,  the  unified  self,  exists, 
according  to  Korsgaard  (1996b),  because  of  the  nature  of  reflection,  because  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  ‘our  mind’  which  can  make  a  proposition  and  take  an  action: 
For  if  all  of  my  decisions  were  particular  and  anomalous,  there  would  be  no  identifiable 
difference  between  my  acting  and  an  assortment  of  first  order  impulses  being  casually 
effective  in  or  through  my  body .  And  then  there  would  be  no  self  -  no  mind  -  no  me  -  who 
is  the  one  who  does  the  act.  .  .  .   So  I  need  to  will  universally  in  order  to  see  my  action 
as  something  which  I  do .  (pp.  228-9)  
Her  argument,  as  she  explains,  is  analogous  to  cause  and  effect  because: 
  Just  as  the  special  relation  between  cause  and  effect,  the  necessitation  that  makes  their 
relation  different  from  mere  temporal  sequence,  cannot  be  established  in  the  absence  of 
law  or  regularity,  so  the  special  relation  between  agent  and  action,  the  necessitation  that 
makes  that  relation  different  from  an  event’s  merely  taking  place  in  the  agent’s  body, 
cannot  be  established  in  the  absence  of  at  least  a  claim  to  law  or  universality.  (Korsgard, 
1996b,  p.  228). 
The  self,  according  to  Korsgaard,  requires  universalizability,  regularity,  in  order  for  the  subject  to 
understand  oneself  as  a  subject  (as  a  self  at  all)  :  “so  I  need  to  will  universally  in  order  to  see  my 
action  as  something  which  I  do ”  (p.  299). 
 
Korsgaard’s  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  self,  might  appear,  on  the  face  of  it,  a  poor  reply  to 
Cohen  because  it  relies  upon  the  same  points  he  criticises.  Cohen’s  critique  is  that  we  do 
appear,  in  at  least  some  cases,  to  understand  ourselves  as  subjects  without  willing  universally  in 
the  manner  Korsgaard  describes.  The  reason  Korsgaard  views  her  reply  is  satisfactory  is  that 
the  nature  of  self  reflection  requires  viewing  oneself  from  a  reflective  distance  and  doing  this 
means  viewing  oneself  in  terms  of  what  one  would  do  in  various  situations  (1996b,  p.  229-230). 
The  generality,  universalizability,  of  what  we  will  is  found,  argues  Korsgaard,  in  the  nature  of 
how  we  will :  because  we  will  with  self  reflection  and  that  entails  determining,  at  a  reflective 
distance,  what  one  would  do,  the  nature  of  the  will  is  an  activity  of  universalizing  itself.  
 
Korsgaard  (1989)  argues  in  “Personal  Identity  and  the  Unity  of  Agency:  A  Kantian  Response  to 
Parfit”  that  the  conception  of  agency,  the  will  as  a  unified  entity,  is  required  (“fundamental”)  for 
the  activity  of  practical  reason  (pp.  9-10,  26,  29-30).  The  proof  Korsgaard  (1996b)  provides  to 
support  this  claim,  in  support  of  the  foundations  of  her  normative  theory,  is  the  structure  of  our 
own  faculty  of  reason  (pp.  92-93,  100-101).   Given  that  this  observation  of  the  structure  of  our 48
own  minds  is  the  grounding  for  her  position  the  only  reply  she  can  offer  Cohen  is  to  refer,  once 
47  Korsgaard  (2009)  also  makes  this  point  in  Defective  Action  on  p  164  and  173. 
48  Proof  is,  in  a  sense,  a  peculiar  term  to  use  here.  This  proof,  as  I  explained  earlier,  is  a  transcendental 
apperception  which  means  that  it  is  an  observation  of  the  necessary  nature  of  the  self  and  is  a  ‘proof’  in 
the  sense  that  a  subject  can,  if  Korsgaard  is  right,  undertake  the  same  examination  of  the  self  Korsgaard 
undertook. 
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again,  to  the  nature  of  our  rational  faculties,  self  reflection,  and  explain  the  implications  this  has 
for  the  nature  of  the  self.  If  Cohen  is  correct  that  we,  as  fully  fledged  subjects  in  whatever  sense 
we  are  required  to  be,  can  understand  ourselves  without  dealing  in  universalities  then 
Korsgaard’s  normativity  cannot  successfully  be  grounded  in  the  necessity  of  the  reflective 
structure  of  agency.  So,  given  the  significance  of  the  problem  posed  by  Cohen’s  assertion, 
Korsgaard’s  response  is  to  reiterate  the  basis  of  her  theory  by  explaining  the  nature  of  agency 
and  the  activity  of  reflection. 
 
This  reply  to  Cohen’s  critique  about  the  nature  of  the  self  also  covers  the  other  two  elements  of 
Cohen’s  critique:  as  well  as  arguing  that  we  can  understand  ourselves  without  dealing  in 
generalities,  Cohen  also  points  out  that  Korsgaard’s  process  of  self  constitution  can  be  followed 
but  lead  to  different  results  (the  mafioso  and  its  mafia  code  of  honour)  and  that  the  necessity  of 
Korsgaard’s  claims  needs  to  be  established  by  something  external  to  human  reason. 
Korsgaard’s  reply  to  these  two  further  points  is  that  the  process  of  self  constitution  cannot  lead 
to  other  multiple  laws  because  of  the  necessity  of  the  elements  of  the  self  that  lead  to  the  moral 
law  in  particular  and  that  this  necessity  also  demonstrates  that  human  reason  is,  after  all, 
sufficient  to  ground  normativity.  The  necessary  structure  of  reason  solves  these  problems, 
according  to  Korsgaard,  for  the  same  reason  as  it  solves  Cohen’s  criticism  that  we  can 
understand  ourselves  without  willing  generalities:  the  structure  of  self  reflection,  our  faculty  of 
reason,  is  not  compatible  with  unifying  the  subject  without  universalising  and  this  is  necessity 
enough  to  ground  normativity.  
 
As  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  the  point,  Cohen  is  correct  that  we  find  that  our  identities  can 
have  normative  force  that  is  not  necessary  from  the  practical  standpoint,  but  they  are  not  moral 
obligations  because  they  are  not  entailed  by  our  necessary  identity  (practical  identity): 
What  makes  actual  moral  obligation  different  from  other  kinds  [such  as  a  psychological 
feeling  of  obligation]  is  supposed  to  be  its  applicability  to  everyone  and  its  rational 
inescapability.  It  is  these  features  that  seem  to  give  rise  to  special  issues  about 
justification.  (p.  256) 
Korsgaard  is  arguing  that  it  is  the  universalising  nature  of  the  will  that  entails  the  reality  of 
morality:  this  is  why  the  nature  of  the  self,  the  reality  of  the  subject  as  evidenced  by  the  structure 
of  self  reflection,  solves  the  problems  posed  by  Cohen.  The  reply  to  Cohen’s  mafioso  is  that 
agents  discover  the  categorical  imperative  in  their  deepest  identity,  their  practical  identity,  as 
evidenced  by  the  necessity  of  that  identity.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  applies  this  to  Cohen’s  example, 
the  Mafioso,  as  follows: 
If  Cohen’s  Mafioso  attempted  to  answer  the  question  why  it  matters  that  he  should  be 
strong  and  in  his  sense  honour-bound  even  when  he  was  tempted  not  to,  he  would  find 
that  its  mattering  depends  on  the  value  of  his  humanity,  and  if  my  other  arguments  go 
through,  he  would  find  that  that  commits  him  to  the  value  of  humanity  in  general,  and  so 
to  giving  up  his  role  as  a  Mafioso.  (p.  256)  49
49  Korsgaard  (2009)  also  makes  this  point  in  Defective  Action  on  p.  162. 
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The  obligation  is  real  because  the  mafioso  has  prescribed  it,  but  it  is  not  moral  because  their 
constitution  requires  that  they  not  make  this  prescription.  The  difference,  the  requirement 
entailed  by  morality,  is  the  necessity  entailed  by  practical  identity.  So,  while  one  might  have  an 
element  of  one’s  identity  that  entails  an  obligation  to  follow  the  mafioso  code  the  element  of 
one’s  identity  that  grounds  this  obligation  is  not  a  necessary  element. 
 
In  summary,  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  the  bad  action  problem  is  to  flatly  disagree  with  Cohen’s 
assertion  that  a  subject  can  understand  themselves  without  dealing  in  universalizable  laws  in 
the  manner  Korsgaard  supposes.  Korsgaard  supports  this  disagreement  by  explaining  why 
transcendental  apperception,  examination  of  the  structure  of  our  faculty  of  reason,  entails  that 
one  cannot  understand  oneself  without  employing  universal  laws.  With  this  point  in  place,  she 
explains  that  if  she  is  correct,  only  one  categorical  imperative  follows  from  the  nature  of  the  self. 
This  means  that  an  agent  endorsing  an  alternative  morality  is  making  an  error:  they  have 
misunderstood  the  categorical  imperative  because  they  have  misunderstood  themselves.  This, 
as  I  show  in  the  next  section,  is  also  a  solution  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem,  because 
Korsgaard  can  also  argue  that  the  shmagent  has  misunderstood  both  themselves  and  the 




2.7  Why  the  reply  to  the  bad  action  problem  solves  the  shmagency  problem 
Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen  also  functions,  with  only  minor  alteration  and  restatement,  as  a  reply 
to  Enoch’s  bad  action  problem.  If  she  is  correct,  her  reply  solves  both  problems  because  asking 
why  we  should  endorse  what  follows  from  our  constitution  and  asking  which  part  of  our 
constitution  we  should  endorse  are  the  same  problems  in  the  sense  that  they  both  arise  from 
misunderstanding  Korsgaard’s  point  that  we  are  obligated  to  endorse  what  follows  from  our 
constitution  because  it  follows  from  our  constitution .  At  least,  if  Korsgaard  is  correct,  both 
problems  arise  from  misunderstanding  the  role  of  practical  identity  and  the  necessity  of 
endorsing  the  moral  law  that  follows  from  the  role  of  practical  identity. 
 
Korsgaard’s  reply  to  the  bad  action  problem,  which  I  have  reconstructed  from  her  reply  to 
Cohen,  is  that  agent’s  do  not  ask  why  they  should  endorse  what  follows  from  the  constitution  of 
their  agency  without  making  an  error.  I  should  stress  to  the  reader  that  this  is  not  Korsgaard’s 
actual  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  -  she  does  not  offer  such  a  reply.  The  notion  of  a  subject 
who  decides  whether  they  ought  to  endorse  their  agency  or  some  hypothetical  alternative,  such 
as  shmagency,  is  merely  the  notion  of  a  subject  who  is  confused  or  in  error.  If  Korsgaard’s  reply 
to  Cohen  is  correct,  endorsing  anything  entails  endorsing  agency  too.  So,  Enoch’s  shmagent 
has  in  fact  already  endorsed  agency  when  asking  about  what  he  should  endorse. 
 
This  reply  might  appear,  on  the  face  of  it,  to  be  the  same  reply  offered  by  Velleman,  explained  in 
§  1.4.  Velleman  (2009)  argues  that  the  shmagency  problem  question  is  defective  and  so  the 
shmagency  problem  is  not  an  issue  for  his  constitutivism  (pp.  142-144).  In  a  broad  sense  this  is 
the  same  kind  of  reply  that  I  am  constructing  for  Korsgaard:  If  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen  is 
correct,  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  fails  because  the  subject  who  asks  the  shmagency 
problem  question  has  misunderstood  both  themselves  and  the  categorical  imperative.  Velleman 
and  Korsgaard’s  reply  are  the  same  in  the  sense  that  they  both  argue  that  the  shmagency 
problem  question  is  flawed.  However,  they  reach  the  claim  that  the  question  is  flawed  in 
different  ways. 
 
While  Velleman  argues  that  the  criterion  for  a  correct  answer  is  supplied  alongside  the  question, 
Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  the  foundation  for  the  categorical  imperative  is  supplied  by  the  nature 
of  the  self.  In  both  cases,  the  problem  with  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  question  is  that  it 
assumes  the  foundations  are  flawed.  Velleman  argues  that  the  shmagency  problem  is  flawed 
because  it  asks  a  question  that  does  not  have  a  related  frame  of  reference;  he  claims  that 
answers  to  normative  questions  are  relative  to  the  constitution  of  the  subject  who  is  asking  the 
questions.  So,  if  Velleman  is  correct,  then  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  question  is  flawed 
because  it  assumes  one  can  ask  normative  questions  without  a  related  frame  of  reference. 
Korsgaard’s  argument  is  that  morality  in  particular  is  related  to  the  necessary  frame  of  reference 
(practical  identity).  While  both  replies  argue  that  there  is  a  problem  with  the  subject  even  asking 
‘why  be  an  agent?’,  the  crucial  distinction  is  that  Velleman’s  explanation  of  why  the  question  is 
flawed  entails  relativism,  while  Korsgaard’s  does  not. 
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This  distinction  is  derived  from  Korsgaard’s  argument  that  the  categorical  imperative  is 
universalizable  in  a  manner  that  other  obligations  are  not,  which  is  the  reply  she  gives  to 
Cohen’s  claim  that  the  mafioso’s  code  follows  from  the  process  of  self  constitution.  This  is  also 
the  point  that  allows  Korsgaard,  if  she  is  correct,  to  dismiss  Cohen’s  concern  that  the  objectivity 
of  normativity  must  be  derived  from  something  other  than  human  reason.  Cohen’s  criticism 
relies  upon  the  claim  that  an  agent,  the  mafioso,  might  endorse  something  other  than  the  moral 
law,  and  this  claim  is  only  possible  if  the  moral  law  is  in  some  sense  contingent.  Cohen  thinks 
that  endorsing  our  practical  identity,  and  the  moral  law  that  follows  from  it,  is  contingent  and  so 
he  proposes  the  example  of  someone  who  endorses  something  else.  He  thinks  that  endorsing 
our  practical  identity  is  contingent  because  Korsgaard  grounds  the  necessity  of  the  practical 
identity  in  human  reason  (in  something  that,  according  to  Cohen,  might  have  been  otherwise) 
rather  than  reason  as  such  (such  as  Kant’s  pure  reason).  As  I  explain  in  §§  1.1-1.5,  the 
contingency  of  agency  is  the  claim  that  allows  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  to  threaten 
constitutivism:  because  agency  is,  at  least  hypothetically,  contingent  the  subject  can  ask 
whether  they  ought  to  endorse  agency  or  endorse  some  alternative,  such  as  shmagency.  
 
In  both  the  bad  action  and  the  shmagency  problem,   if  Korsgaard  is  correct,  the  subject  (bad 
actor  or  shmagent)  cannot  have  found  an  alternative  categorical  imperative  because  the 
categorical  imperative  is  necessary .  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  that  the  psychological 
phenomenon  of  obligations  can  conflict  with  one  another  (pp.  255-256).  Her  point  is  that  simply 
experiencing  having  an  obligation  does  suffer  the  types  of  problems  outlined  by  Cohen  and 
Enoch:  one  might  simply  not  endorse  the  element  of  one’s  identity  that  generates  the  obligation. 
So,  if  morality  were  merely  founded  in  human  reason  in  some  sense  that  entailed  a  contingent 
identity,  then  both  Cohen  and  Enoch  would  be  correct:  one  might  ask  why  one  ought  to  endorse 
the  element  of  one’s  identity  that  entails  morality  and,  because  that  element  is  contingent, 
Korsgaard’s  theory  would  not  be  able  to  provide  an  answer.  But  Korsgaard  is  not  arguing  that 
morality  is  founded  in  a  contingent  identity. 
 
Korsgaard’s  argument  is  a  transcendental  argument,  and  for  that  reason  Cohen  is  wrong  to 
assert  that  Korsgaard  cannot  utilise  Kant’s  grounding  for  the  objectivity  of  reason.  Cohen  argues 
that  because  Kant  appeals  to  reason  as  such  he  utilises  a  sense  of  reason  that  is  necessary  in 
a  manner  Korsgaard’s  use  of  human  reason  is  not.  However,  Korsgaard’s  (1996b)  argument 
(and  her  reply  to  Cohen)  is  that  the  applicability  of  practical  identity  to  everyone  undertaking  self 
reflection  does  entail  sufficient  necessity  (pp.  122-123,  256).  The  point  is  that,  if  Korsgaard  is 
right,  anyone  asking  normative  questions  must  endorse  their  own  value  and  that  entails  the 
categorical  imperative.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  to  be  asking  normative  questions  is  to  be 
engaging  in  the  activity  of  agency:  you  simply  cannot  do  it  without  having  a  practical  identity 
because  the  activity  of  asking  normative  questions  is  the  activity  of  practical  reason .  Like 
Velleman’s  reply  this  entails  that  the  question  is  coupled  with  the  criterion  for  the  correct  answer 




The  objectivity  and  necessity  of  the  categorical  imperative  are  fundamentally  linked.  The 
difference  between  this  reply  I  have  constructed  from  Korsgaard’s  response  to  Cohen  and  other 
inescapability  replies  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  the  reason  that  agency  is  inescapable. 
Constitutivists  in  general  appeal  to  the  inescapability  of  agency  (or  the  inescapability  of 
whatever  it  is  that  grounds  normativity  for  the  constitutivism  in  question),  but  they  do  so  in 
varying  ways  because  they  are  trying  to  establish  different  types  of  normativity.  In  Foundations 
for  Moral  Relativism  Velleman  (2015)  argues  that  morality  is  relative  to  our  frame  of  reference 
and  that  we  share  one  particular  frame  of  reference  (human  nature)  that  is  inescapable  given 
that  we  are  humans  (p.  56).   In  making  this  claim,  Velleman  only  intends  to  establish  a  limited 50
sense  of  inescapable  shared  normativity,  not  one  that  is,  for  example,  sufficient  to  ground  a 
categorical  imperative.  The  inescapability,  the  necessity,  of  the  grounding  of  constitutivist 
theories  is  fundamentally  linked  to  the  type  of  objectivity  the  theory  is  intended  to  establish. 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  is  intended  to  establish  the  categorical  imperative,  so  it  deals  in 
necessity  that  applies  to  all  subjects  that  engage  in  practical  reason.  Velleman’s  constitutivism  is 
intended  to  establish  reasons  that  are  relative  to  the  frame  of  reference  being  deployed,  so  it 
deals  in  necessity  that  applies  to  all  subjects  within  that  frame  of  reference.  51
 
The  point  underlying  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen  that  allows  her  reply  to  extend  to  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  is  that  the  necessary  link  between  normativity  and  the  possible  nature  of 
subjects  entails  that  what  is  necessary  for  any  subject  will  be  necessary  for  any  other  subject. 
The  point  is  about  what  something  being  necessary  means  -  we  might  consider  any  number  of 
elements  of  our  own  identity  necessary  in  a  different  sense  than  the  type  of  necessity  Korsgaard 
uses  to  establish  the  categorical  imperative  and  which  allows  her  to  offer  this  reply  to  the 
shmagency  problem.  For  example,  one  might  claim  that  being  a  father,  a  wife,  a  teacher,  and  so 
on  is  a  necessary  element  of  who  they  are,  but  could  not  be  something  that  is  necessary  for  all 
agents.  This  type  of  necessity  is  closer  to  what  Velleman  has  in  mind  for  his  constitutivism,  the 
reasons  for  action  (and,  so,  the  obligations)  that  follow  from  our  frame  of  reference  may  be 
necessary  for  us ,  which  is  fine  for  Velleman  because  he  is  attempting  to  establish  norms  that 
are  relative.  The  necessity  Korsgaard  is  grounding  normativity  in  is  the  necessary  structure  of 
the  reflective  process,  and  this  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  to  be  engaging  in  self  reflection,  or 
practical  reason,  at  all ,  it  is  necessary  to  have  practical  identity.  So,  the  necessity  that 
50  I  discuss  Velleman  here  because  of  my  focus  on  Kantian  constitutivism.  However,  this  theme  of 
inescapability  extends  beyond  Kantian  constitutivists.  Paul  Katsafanas  (2013)  puts  forward  a  Nietzschean 
constitutivism  and  argues  in  Agency  and  the  foundations  of  ethics:  Nietzschean  constitutivism  that 
inescapability  is  what  gives  normativity  its  special  status  (justifies  its  obligations  on  us)  (p.  47).  David 
Borman  (2015)  puts  forward  a  discourse  ethics  constitutivism  and  argues  in  “Going  Social  with 
Constitutivism”  that  the  shmagency  problem  is  solved  by  the  inescapability  of  what  is  constitutive  of  the 
discourse  that  grounds  normativity  (p.  222).  Connie  Rosati  (2016)  replies  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem 
with  a  weakened  version  of  the  inescapability  reply  in  “Agents  and  “shmagents”  an  essay  on  agency  and 
normativity”  where  she  argues  that  agency  is  a  necessary  requirement  for  normativity  (pp.  206,  207-208, 
with  a  stronger  version  tentatively  endorsed  by  Rosati  on  pp.  208-210).  
51  Although  it  is  worth  noting  that  frames  of  reference  as  such  are,  for  Velleman,  still  inescapable  for  all 
subjects  dealing  in  normativity. 
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Korsgaard  deals  in  when  establishing  the  grounding  of  her  normative  theory  is  necessity 
common  to  all  subjects  that  engage  in  self  reflection. 
 
My  purpose  in  explaining  the  difference  between  the  type  of  necessity  and  inescapability 
deployed  by  Velleman  and  Enoch  was  to  explain  why  the  necessity  of  the  grounding  for 
normativity  fundamentally  relates  to  the  type  of  objectivity  that  is  being  established.  Referring  to 
objectivity  in  this  manner,  the  type  of  objectivity,  may  appear  peculiar,  but  it  reveals  the 
implications  of  the  position  in  question.  Velleman  (2009)  argues  that  reasons  are  objective  in  the 
sense  that  agents  in  similar  situations  would  provide  the  same  answers  to  the  same  normative 
questions  (pp.  119,  146).  Korsgaard’s  reply,  according  to  her  normative  theory  and  her  reply  to 
Cohen,  is  that  morality  is  objective  in  the  sense  that  engaging  in  practical  reason  necessarily 
entails  the  moral  law.  
 
Notice  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  Korsgaard’s  reply  fails  to  solve  the  shmagency  problem, 
because  one  might  still  ask,  as  Enoch  (2006)  does,  why  we  ought  to  endorse  what  follows  from 
what  is  required  by  our  necessary  constitution  (pp.  187-192).  However,  this  element  of  the 
shmagency  problem  question,  as  I  argue  in  the  section  covering  Enoch  and  Velleman’s  debate, 
is  an  inappropriate  extension  of  the  problem  given  the  epistemic  underpinnings  of  the 
constitutivist  theory  in  question.  By  placing  the  grounding  for  normativity  in  the  necessary 
element  of  reflection.  Korsgaard  is  not  merely  explaining  where  normativity  comes  from  but  also 
taking  a  stance  on  where  it  cannot  come  from;  Korsgaard  (1996b)  takes  this  position  where  she 
argues  that  robustly  realist  approaches  to  grounding  normativity  have  failed  (pp.  44-48).   This 52
is  why  Korsgaard’s  reply,  like  Velleman’s,  entails  that  there  is  a  problem  with  the  shmagency 
problem  question:  it  involves  asking  for  a  justification  beyond  where  one  can  be  found.  It  is  the 
asking  of  this  further  question,  why  endorse  what  follows  from  what  is  required  by  our  necessary 
constitution,  that  makes  the  shmagency  problem  question  defective  in  the  context  of 
Korsgaard’s  theory.   53
 
If  Korsgaard  is  correct,  ‘why  be  an  agent?’  asks  for  an  answer  that  cannot  be  given,  and  what 
determines  what  questions  cannot  have  answers  in  this  manner  is  the  type  of  objectivity  the 
answer  to  the  question  is  eligible  for.  Hence,  Korsgaard’s  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem 
question  is  both  that  the  objectivity  of  normativity  is  found  in  an  element  of  the  subject  and  that  it 
must  be  the  necessary  element  of  the  agent’s  constitution  as  regards  its  exercising  of  practical 
52  Korsgaard  prefers  the  term  “substantive  realist”.  I  prefer  “robust  realist”  because  it  is  the  term  used  by 
Enoch  who  supports  such  a  position  and  utilises  it  to  pose  the  shmagency  problem;  adopting  the 
terminology  used  for  the  position  by  the  supporter  of  that  position  more  clearly  identifies  the  disjunction 
between  Korsgaard  and  Enoch. 
53  This  is  the  Kantian  solution  to  an  attempt  to  continue  asking  the  shmagency  question  after  an  answer 
has  already  been  provided.  Non-Kantian  constitutivists  can  provide  a  similar  answer.  Rosati  (2003) 
argues  in  “Agency  and  the  Open  Question  Argument”  that  our  good  is  determined  relative  to  our  agency 
and  so  Enoch  may  not  ask  the  question  in  a  manner  that  implies  normativity  beyond  the  scope  of  agency 
(pp.  523-524).  Her  point  is  that  constitutivism,  as  such,  precludes  such  inquiries  because  it  explains  why 
the  scope  of  normativity  is  limited  to  the  scope  of  agency. 
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reason  (so,  its  practical  identity).  Like  with  Velleman’s  reply,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  this  is  a 
victory  for  Enoch  and  a  sense  in  which  this  is  a  victory  for  Korsgaard.  This  is  a  victory  for  Enoch 
in  the  sense  that  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  has  indeed  failed  to  justify  the  objectivity  of 
normativity,  if  by  objectivity  one  means  a  robust  (substantive)  realist  foundation .  However,  it  is  a 
victory  for  Korsgaard  in  the  sense  that  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  requires  asking  for 
something  that  cannot  be  provided  and,  by  doing  so,  fails  to  demonstrate  that  what  is  provided 
is  unsatisfactory.  Ultimately  what  is  established  is  the  same  clarifying  of  epistemic  commitments 
that  is  accomplished  in  the  debate  between  Enoch  and  Velleman:  in  this  case  that  Korsgaard’s 
normativity  is  response  dependant  (subject  dependant),  but  still  objectivist. 
 
In  summary,  Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen’s  bad  action  problem  serves  as  a  reply  to  Enoch’s 
shmagency  problem  because  her  argument  that  practical  identity,  and  therefore  the  categorical 
imperative,  is  necessary  for  all  subjects  demonstrates  why  the  shmagency  problem  question 
(‘why  be  an  agent?’)  is  defective.  The  question  is  defective,  according  to  what  is  entailed  by 
Korsgaard’s  reply  to  Cohen,  because  it  demands  a  justification  for  normativity  that  cannot  be 
attained  because  of  epistemic  limits  on  the  foundations  of  normativity.  Korsgaard  argues  that  by 
engaging  in  practical  reason,  at  all,  one  has  already  endorsed  one’s  own  practical  reason  (found 
one’s  humanity  to  be  valuable)  and  so  the  project  of  justifying  that  claim,  the  transcendental 
argument  she  puts  forward,  begins  from  this  position  of  value.  This  is  a  response  dependant 
(subject  dependant)  approach  to  grounding  the  objectivity  of  normativity  and,  as  such,  it  entails 
an  epistemic  commitment  which  is  incompatible  with  asking  for  further  justification,  some  further 









3.0  Developing  a  scalar  deontology 
Kantian  constitutivism,  the  combination  of  the  Kantian  strategy  with  the  constitutivist  approach, 
can  be  utilised  to  develop  a  scalar  deontology:  a  deontological  moral  theory  which  measures 
our  fulfilment  of  duty  according  to  the  degree  we  are  succeeding  at  the  activity  that  is 
constitutive  of  normativity  (which  is,  according  to  Kantian  constitutivism,  coherent  or  intelligible 
self  constitution).  Our  obligation  to  ourselves  (I  use  duty  and  obligation  interchangeably)  is 
scalar  from  the  position  of  a  subject  that  is  making  a  decision  and,  by  undertaking  that  process 
of  reflection,  exercising  their  freedom.  So,  scalar  deontology  is  derived  from  the  position  of  the 
subject  that  is  engaged  in  the  activity  of  self  constitution.  The  idea  is  that  our  obligation  to 
constitute  ourselves  coherently  or  intelligibly  is  our  aim  if  we  are  to  become  the  type  of  person 
we  ought  to  be.  This  aim  is  something  we  pursue  more  or  less  successfully  depending  on  the 
decisions  we  make  as  part  of  the  ongoing  process  of  self  constitution.  From  the  standpoint  of 
the  subject  that  is  constituting  themselves  one’s  obligation  to  oneself  is  not  a  matter  of  success 
or  failure,  coherent  constitution  or  not;  it  is  an  ongoing  project  that  allows  for  varying  levels  of 
success.  It  is  in  this  context  that  our  attempts  to  adhere  to  the  categorical  imperative,  to  do  the 
right  thing,  are  more  or  less  successful  rather  than  strictly  successful  or  not.  The  decisions  we 
make,  when  deciding  what  to  do  (attempting  to  adhere  to  the  categorical  imperative),  are  more 
or  less  successful  at  furthering  our  aim  of  coherent  self  constitution. 
 
Kantian  constitutivism  allows  for  the  development  of  a  scalar  deontology.  The  constitutivist 
source  of  normativity  facilitates  a  morality  founded  in  the  categorical  imperative,  but  with  the 
ability  to  use  that  imperative  to  measure  relevant  moral  considerations  as  more  or  less  good  (or 
bad)  rather  than  strictly  good  or  not.  While  any  individual  moral  problem  might  only  have  one 
correct  solution  the  problem  itself  is  a  subset  of  an  ongoing  activity.  It  is  this  ongoing  activity 
which  allows  us  to  measure  one  incorrect  solution  as  more  or  less  incorrect  than  another.  A 
scalar  constitutivism  is  a  theory  that  explains  why  our  attempts  to  solve  moral  problems  can  be 
understood  as  more  or  less  helpful  towards  our  goal  of  self  constitution  while,  at  the  same  time, 
understood  as  correct  or  false  when  considered  in  their  own  right.  This  explains  why  a  subject 
can  simultaneously  fail  to  adhere  to  their  obligation  while  being  successful  in  constituting 
themselves  more  coherently.  A  scalar  theory  of  constitutivist  normativity  is  a  theory  that  explains 
why  self  constitution  is  something  that  one  is  more  or  less  successful  at  pursuing  rather  than 
something  one  has  archived  or  failed  to  achieve  (see  §§  3.5  and  3.6). 
 
Kantian  constitutivism  entails  scalar  deontology  because  it  combines  the  Kantian  strategy  and 
the  constitutivist  approach  to  derive  normativity  from  elements  of  the  constitution  of  the  self.  The 
Kantian  strategy  is  deriving  what  must  be  the  case  given  what  we  know  about  necessary 
elements  of  our  own  faculties  and  the  constitutivist  approach  is  deriving  normativity  from 
elements  of  the  self.  I  explain  the  Kantian  strategy  further  in  §  3.1  and  the  constitutivist  strategy 
in  §  3.2.  Kantian  constitutivism  utilises  both  of  these  to  derive  normativity  from  necessary 
elements  of  ourselves.  The  necessary  element  of  the  self  that  normativity  is  derived  from  is  our 
autonomy,  by  which  I  mean  the  ability  of  a  subject  to  control  their  own  choices  when  making  a 
decision  by  utilising  rational  reflection.  This  process  of  controlling  one’s  own  actions  with  one’s 
faculty  of  reason  is  often  described  as  freedom  or  practical  reason.  I  explain  the  role  of  freedom 
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in  the  foundations  of  kantian  constitutivism  in  §§  3.7  and  3.8.  Deriving  normativity  from  our 
control  over  our  own  decisions  requires  understanding  normativity  in  the  same  context  that  this 
control  exists  and  that  context  is  the  position  of  a  subject  that  is  engaged  in  exercising  that 
control  (making  a  decision).  I  explain  the  sense  in  which  our  control,  our  freedom,  exists  only  in 
the  context  of  the  position  of  a  subject  exercising  it  in  §  3.6.  Kantians  argue  that  freedom  exists 
in  the  context  of  a  position  of  a  subject  that  is  exercising  it  because  it  describes  the  way  they 
interact  with  the  world.  Because  normativity  is  derived  from  an  element  of  our  constitution  that 
can  only  be  understood  in  a  particular  context  the  normativity  itself  needs  to  be  understood  in 
the  same  context,  or,  at  least,  it  needs  to  be  capable  of  being  understood  in  that  context:  see  § 
3.6  where  I  develop  this  point  further.  It  is  this  point  that  allows  for  the  development  of  scalar 
deontology. 
 
The  sense  in  which  our  obligation  to  ourselves  (our  duty),  to  constitute  ourselves  coherently  or 
intelligibly,  is  scalar  can  only  be  understood  in  the  context  of  a  subject  that  is  pursuing  self 
constitution.  It  can  only  be  understood  in  this  context  because  it  is  this  context  in  which  our 
obligation  to  ourselves  is  an  ongoing  pursuit  which  we  can  pursue  more  or  less  successfully. 
When  this  obligation  is  described  in  different  contexts,  such  as  Kant  describes  when  formulating 
the  categorical  imperative  as  universal  law  (see  §  3.9  for  further  development),  it  does  not 
appear  to  be  scalar  because  removing  the  context  of  the  subject,  and  their  ongoing  pursuit  of 
the  constitution  of  their  self  identity,  removes  what  makes  our  obligation  scalar.  To  support  this 
argument  I  first  need  to  explain  the  Kantian  strategy  (§  3.1)  and  the  constitutivist  approach  (§ 
3.2),  which  allows  me  to  then  explain  how  they  combine  to  become  Kantian  constitutivism  (§ 
3.3).  With  the  combination  of  the  Kantian  strategy  and  the  constitutivist  approach  explained  I  am 
then  able  to  justify  why  it  entails  scalar  deontology  through  its  derivation  of  normativity  from  the 
constitution  of  the  autonomy  of  the  subject  (§  3.4)  and  then  present  the  argument  for  scalar 
deontology  (§  3.5).  Following  this  there  are  several  points  that  must  be  addressed  to  support  my 
argument  for  scalar  deontology.  This  argument  is  grounded  in  a  particular  conception  of 
freedom  which  entails  that  our  control  over  our  own  actions,  rather  than  any  non-deterministic 
attribute  of  the  will,  is  the  source  of  normativity  (§  3.6).  Because  of  the  dependence  of  scalar 
deontology,  and  Kantian  constitutivism,  on  the  autonomy  of  agents  the  compatibility  between 
the  foundations  of  Korsgaard’s  Kantian  constitutivism  (§  3.7)  and  Velleman’s  Kinda  Kantian 
constitutivism  (§  3.8)  need  to  be  established.  Finally,  I  need  to  explain  the  relationship  between 
scalar  deontology  and  other  formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative  (§  3.9)  in  order  to  justify 
my  argument  that  this  is  a  development  of  Kantian  moral  theory  rather  than  something  with 




3.1  The  Kantian  strategy  
The  Kantian  strategy  is  the  transcendental  approach  to  philosophy  which  is  put  forward  by 
Immanuel  Kant  (1781/1787/1996)  in  the  Critique  of  pure  reason  where  he  proposes  a  system  of 
transcendental  philosophy  which  explains  the  nature  of  cognition  by  examining  what  is 
necessary  for  the  cognition  of  objects  to  be  possible  at  all   (A11-16,  B24-30).   In  “Reading 54
Kant’s  Groundwork”  David  Velleman  (2012)  explains  the  Kantian  strategy  as  follows: 
The  overall  strategy  of  Kant’s  moral  theory  is  to  derive  the  content  of  moral  obligations 
from  the  very  concept  of  an  obligation.  Kant  thinks  that  we  can  figure  out  what  morality 
requires  by  analyzing  the  very  idea  of  being  morally  required  to  do  something.  (p.  343) 
Velleman  (2009)  applies  this  strategy  to  his  constitutivism  in  How  We  Get  Along   where  he 
argues  that  “[r]easons  are  therefore  objective  and  their  status  as  reasons  can  be  established 
once  and  for  all,  by  the  philosophical  analysis  of  agency”  (pp.  146-147).  
 
Christine  Korsgaard  (1996b)  describes  the  Kantian  strategy  in  a  similar  manner,  in  The  Sources 
of  Normativity ,  where  she  describes  the  Kantian  approach  as  an  appeal  to  autonomy  and 
explains  that: 
Kantians  believe  that  the  source  of  the  normativity  of  moral  claims  must  be  found  in  the 
agent’s  own  will,  in  particular  in  the  fact  that  the  laws  of  morality  are  the  laws  of  the 
agent’s  own  will  and  that  its  claims  are  ones  she  is  prepared  to  make  on  herself.  The 
capacity  for  self-conscious  reflection  about  our  own  actions  confers  on  us  a  kind  of 
authority  over  ourselves,  and  it  is  this  authority  which  gives  normativity  to  moral  claims. 
(pp.  19-20) 
The  similarity  between  Korsgaard’s  explanation  of  the  Kantian  approach  and  Velleman’s  is  that 
both  of  them  identify  the  role  of  the  subject  as  crucial  to  the  derivation  of  morality.  Velleman 
identifies  this  as  the  concept  of  obligations  and  Korsgaard  in  the  claims  an  agent  is  willing  to 
make  on  themselves:  both  obligations  and  claims  that  we  make  on  ourselves  require  a 
relationship  with  the  subject  in  order  to  provide  the  foundations  for  morality.  Korsgaard  develops 
her  own  application  of  this  strategy  so  that  she  can  apply  it  to  the  development  of  her 
constitutivism.  Korsgaard  (1996b)  summarises  her  development  of  the  Kantian  strategy  as  the 
derivation  of  laws  from  the  nature  of  reflection: 
[T]he  reflective  structure  of  human  consciousness  gives  us  authority  over  ourselves. 
Reflection  gives  us  a  kind  of  distance  from  our  own  impulses  which  both  force  us,  and 
enables  us,  to  make  laws  for  ourselves,  and  it  makes  those  laws  normative.  (pp. 
128-129) 
This  development  of  the  Kantian  strategy  allows  Korsgaard  to  demonstrate  why  the  constitutivist 
approach  follows  from  the  Kantian  strategy.  Deriving  the  nature  of  normativity  from  the 
constitutive  activity  of  the  self  is  an  appeal  to  the  nature  of  practical  reason  (that  is,  the  nature  of 
using  one’s  faculty  of  reflection  to  make  a  decision).  Korsgaard  makes  this  appeal  because  of 
the  relationship  between  personal  identity  and  practical  reason.  This  relationship,  argues 
Korsgaard,  is  that  the  faculty  of  reflection  is  what  makes  us  the  type  of  thing  that  we  are. 
 
54  I  explain  this  further  in  the  context  of  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  in  §§2.1  and  2.7. 
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The  idea,  the  Kantian  strategy,  is  that  the  truth  of  the  claims,  regarding  morality  and  the 
existence  of  normativity,  is  derived  from  its  foundations  in  our  own  nature:  the  Kantian  strategy 
is  to  derive  morality  from  necessary  elements  of  practical  reason.  The  necessity  of  these 
elements  is  what  makes  the  answer  derived  from  this  strategy  objective  and  the  nature  of  these 
elements,  practical  reason,  is  what  enables  the  strategy  to  answer  moral  questions.  This 
Kantian  strategy  informs  the  nature  of  the  foundations  of  the  constitutivist  approach.  The  nature 
of  being  morally  obligated  to  do  something,  as  Velleman  (2012)  describes  duty,  is  found  in  the 
nature  of  practical  reason  (p.  434)  and  this  meets  the  constitutive  approach  where  the  nature  of 





3.2  The  constitutivist  approach 
The  constitutivist  approach  is  the  method  of  deriving  moral  content  from  what  is  constitutive  of 
our  nature.  Constitutivism  is  the  metaethical  project  of  justifying  moral  claims  by  referring  to  the 
constitutive  elements  of  whatever  is  in  question.  So,  according  to  the  constitutivist  approach, 
given  my  nature  as  an  agent,  what  I  ought  to  do  can  be  determined  by  examining  what 
constitutes  my  nature;  or,  to  present  the  same  idea  differently  expressed,  how  I  should  act  can 
be  determined  by  examining  the  nature  of  action.  It  follows  that  moral  assertions,  claims  about 
the  actions  of  myself  or  others,  are  justified  by  appealing  to  what  constitutes  the  relevant  nature. 
For  example,  I  justify  my  claim  that  murder  is  wrong  by  appealing  to  some  element  of  how  the 
murderer  is  constituted.  
 
David  Enoch,  in  Agency,  shmagency:  why  normativity  won’t  come  from  what  is  constitutive  of 
action  (2006),  explains  the  constitutivist  approach  as  an  appeal  to  the  constitutive  function  of 
whatever  is  in  question: 
“The  intuitive  idea  can  be  put,  I  think,  rather  simply:  In  order  to  know  what  it  takes  for  a 
car  to  be  a  good  car,  we  need  to  understand  what  cars  are,  what  their  constitutive 
functions  are,  and  so  on.  A  good  car  is  just  a  car  that  is  good  as  a  car ,  good,  that  is,  in 
measuring  up  to  the  standards  a  commitment  to  which  is  built  into  the  very  classification 
of  an  object  as  a  car.  Analogously,  then,  perhaps  in  order  to  know  which  actions  are 
good  (or  right,  or  reason  supported,  or  rational,  or  whatever),  all  we  need  is  a  better 
understanding  of  what  actions  are,  or  perhaps  of  what  it  is  to  be  an  agent,  someone  who 
performs  actions.  Perhaps  the  normative  standards  relevant  for  actions  will  fall  out  of  an 
understanding  of  what  is  constitutive  of  action  just  as  the  normative  standards  relevant 
for  cars  fall  out  of  an  understanding  of  what  is  constitutive  of  cars.”  (p.  170)  
This  method  of  justifying  normativity  is  normative  because  it  tells  us  what  to  do,  or  shows  us 
where  to  derive  the  relevant  moral  content  from.  It  is  metanormative  because  it  explains  where 
normativity  comes  from  and  the  nature  of  normative  claims.  The  constitutivist  approach  solves 
normative  and  meta  normative  problems  by  explaining  where  we  derive  normative  content  and 
why  normative  content  exists  (where  it  comes  from  and  how  to  attain  it).  
 
The  constitutivist  approach  to  normative  theories  is  a  broad  project  that  extends  beyond 
philosophers  employing  the  Kantian  strategy.  For  example,  Paul  Katsafanas  (2013)  develops  a 
constitutivist  approach  from  the  nature  of  the  will  to  power  in  Agency  and  the  Foundations  of 
Ethics:  Nietzschean  Constitutivism  where  he  argues  that  the  subjective  aim  of  the  will  (the  will  to 
power)  allows  the  constitutivist  approach  to  provide  content  based  on  the  particulars  of  the  will 
(pp.  145-6,  156-163,  168-171).  Sharon  Street  argues  in  “Constructivism  About  Reasons”  that 
the  Kantian  use  of  the  constitutivist  approach  cannot  succeed  in  deriving  moral  content  from  the 
structure  of  practical  reason,  but  that  a  Humean  approach  which  derived  contingent  norms  from 
one’s  attitudes  towards  one’s  reasons  for  action  could  succeed  (2008,  pp.  243-244).  Non 
Kantian  constitutivist  theories  differ  from  those  employing  the  Kantian  strategy  in  the  role  and 
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nature  of  the  foundations  underlying  their  constitutivism;  which  is  to  say,  they  employ  different 
notions  of  what  it  is  to  answer  the  normative  question .  55
 
Cristoph  Hanish  (2016),  in  “Constitutivism  and  Inescapability:  A  Diagnosis”,  summarises  the 
various  constitutivist  approaches  as  sharing  a  constitutivist  maneuver  in  which  an  inescapable 
element  of  what  it  is  to  be  human  is  used  to  establish  “unconditional  normative  force  and 
authority”  (p.  1147).  Hanish  argues  that  constitutivism’s  defenders  view  the  inescapability  of  the 
constitutive  element  utilised  for  the  constitutivist  approach  as  a  guarantor  of  the  authority  of  the 
normativity  established  by  constitutivism,  while  critics  of  constitutivism  argue  that  this  same 
inescapability  is  the  problem  with  constitutivism  because  normativity  requires  that  the  contents 
of  normativity  are  optional  (pp.  1148-1150).  This  is  a  misunderstanding  of  what  constitutivism  is, 
because  the  constitutivist  approach,  considered  in  isolation,  does  not  require  dealing  in 
inescapable  elements  of  one’s  constitution  or  in  objective  (unconditional  and  authoritative) 
normativity.  While  constitutivists,  in  their  pursuit  of  their  own  particular  application  of  the 
constitutivist  approach,  do  tend  to  deal  in  inescapable  elements  of  our  constitution  and  utilise 
those  to  establish  a  form  of  objectivity,  this  is  not  a  feature  of  the  constitutivist  approach  itself; 
rather,  it  is  something  that  supplements  it.  Notice  that  this  allows  room  for  a  constitutivist 
approach  that  disregards  the  inescapability  requirement  (although  this  would  be  beyond  the 
scope  of  Kantian  constitutivism).  The  sense  in  which  constitutive  elements  of  our  agency  are 
inescapable  for  Velleman’s  Kantian  relativism,  Korsgaard’s  necessary  identity,  Katsafanas’  will 
to  power,  and  Street’s  attitudes  towards  one’s  own  reasons  for  action  is  different  for  each  of 
these  constitutivists.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  clear  that  any  of  these  philosophers  are  even 
referring  to  the  same  thing  when  discussing  those  constitutive  elements  of  our  nature  that  they 
use  to  ground  normativity  and  what  it  means  for  such  an  element  to  be  inescapable  is  different 
for  each  of  these  philosophers.  The  constitutivist  approach  requires  that  the  source  of 
normativity  is  a  constitutive  element  of  whatever  is  in  question,  but  it  does  not  require  that  one 
make  particular  commitments  to  the  inescapability  of  that  element,  nor  does  it  require  that  one 
make  particular  commitments  regarding  what  such  inescapability  would  entail.  These 
commitments,  regarding  inescapability,  are  introduced  from  beyond  the  constitutivist  approach, 
as  such,  and  represent  the  underlying  positions  (Velleman’s  relativism,  Korsgaard’s  Kantian 
roots,  Katsafanas’  Nietzschean  project,  and  Street’s  Humean  approach).  
 
My  point  is  that  the  constitutivist  approach  (the  constitutivist  maneuver),  as  such,  does  not 
necessarily  require  dealing  in  the  absolute  and  necessary  value  of  moral  obligations  or  in 
inescapable  elements  of  how  we  are  constituted.  I  do  not  intend  to  imply  that  constitutivists 
should  not  seek,  when  undertaking  the  constitutive  project,  unconditional  force  and  authority  for 
normativity,  because  there  are  reasons  to  do  so:  it  may,  for  example,  simply  be  the  case  that 
problems  with  relativism  lead  one  to  only  be  satisfied  with  theories  that  seek  objective  answers 
of  some  form.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  the  case  that  a  constitutivist  must  deal  in  inescapability  or 
purport  to  justify  objective  normativity,  at  least  not  in  order  for  them  to  be  deploying  the 
55  The  normative  question,  also  discussed  in  section  2  of  this  thesis,  regards  the  nature  of  morality:  what 
is  morality  and  in  what  sense  can  moral  assertions  be  justified. 
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constitutivist  approach.  Rather,  all  a  constitutivist  must  do,  to  be  a  constitutivist,  as  such,  is 
derive  normativity  (relative,  objective,  or  otherwise)  from  some  relevant  constitutive  element. 
This,  minimal,  sense  of  the  constitutivist  approach  is  why  such  a  vast  array  of  philosophical 
endeavours  can  be  considered  employing  the  same  metanormative  approach. 
 
The  compelling  case  for  scalar  deontology  is  founded  in  the  ongoing  activity  that  is  constitutive 
of  practical  reason.  This  activity  requires  an  element  of  necessity,  objectivity  of  some  kind  or 
scope,  in  order  to  establish  that  the  activity  remains  the  same  activity  from  one  instant  to 
another;  that  is  to  say,  I  cannot  establish  merely  from  the  constitutivist  approach  alone  that  there 
is  any  element  of  an  agents  constitution  that  can  be  considered  ongoing  through  time.  This  is 
why  I  am  utilising  the  Kantian  strategy  alongside  the  constitutivist  approach  to  establish  scalar 
deontology.  However,  if  one  were  satisfied  with  a  scalar  deontology  founded  in  an  ongoing,  but 
contingent  (by  this  I  mean  not  necessary  in  the  sense  that  establishes  objectivity),  activity,  then 
an  argument  similar  to  the  one  I  put  forward  here  could   be  developed  to  establish  a  scalar 56
deontology  without  commiting  to  particular  foundations.  
 
Non  Kantian  applications  of  the  constitutivist  approach,  those  not  combined  with  the  Kantian 
strategy,  are  attempting  to  establish  different  points  than  their  Kantian  counterparts.  The  reality 
(or  lack  thereof)  and  objectivity  of  moral  ‘facts’  founded  in  the  nature  of  the  will  (to  power),  or  in 
our  attitudes  towards  reasons  for  action,  is  distinct  from  the  reality  and  objectivity  of  moral  facts 
founded  in  the  necessary  structure  of  practical  reason.   The  purpose  of  the  Kantian  strategy  is 57
to  establish  the  necessity  of  the  moral  facts  while  the  constitutivist  approach,  when  considered 
in  isolation  from  the  Kantian  strategy,  is  satisfied  establishing  that  the  moral  facts  are  grounded 
in  what  is  constitutive  of  our  nature. 
 
  
56  Given  that  I  have  not  explicitly  done  so,  ‘could’  may  be  too  strong  a  term  here.  I  am  confident  that  such 
a  scalar  approach  to  normativity  could  be  developed  in,  broadly  speaking,  the  same  manner  I  have  done 
here.  I  am  less  confident  that  it  would  satisfactorily  deliver  something  based  on  obligations  (duties)  in  the 
same  manner,  however  I  suspect  it  could  be  done.  In  any  case,  I  have  not  provided  such  a  development 
and  explain  this  to  the  reader  merely  to  identify  that  I  am  not  intending  to  argue  that  utilising  the  Kantian 
strategy  is  the  only  method  of  developing  this  theory. 
57  Reality,  necessity,  and  objectivity  are  (for  the  purposes  relevant  to  the  point  I  am  making  here) 
interchangeable:  so,  the  reality  of  normative  facts  in  the  context  of  Kantian  constitutivism  is  the  necessity 
of  those  facts  from  the  perspective  of  the  relevant  type  of  subject  (one  with  agency).  Please  see  the  §0.2 
of  this  point;  (alternatively,  see  Korsgaard  (1996b)  pp.  107-113  where  she  develops  a  similar  point  or 
Enoch  (2011b)  where  he  argues  that  response  dependant  theories  of  normativity  that  do  not  allow  for 
varying  rational  responses  from  subjects  are,  in  the  sense  that  their  contents  are  consistent,  objectivist  in 
the  same  manner  as  platonist  theories  (p.  30)). 
 
The  reality  and  objectivity  of  moral  facts  grounded  in  the  Kantian  strategy  also  differ  depending  on  the 
extent  to  which  the  Kantian  underpinnings  are  accepted,  as  evidenced  in  Velleman’s  relativism  discussed 
during  §§  1.2  and  1.4-1.5  where,  in  response  to  the  shmagency  problem,  Velleman  endorses  a  form  of 
moral  relativism. 
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3.3  The  constitutivist  approach  and  the  Kantian  strategy 
The  constitutivist  approach  is  the  attempt  to  derive  normativity  from  what  is  constitutive  of  our 
nature.  What  we  ought  to  do,  what  normativity  demands  of  us  in  the  form  of  moral  obligation,  is 
determined,  according  to  the  constitutive  approach,  by  what  we  are;  that  is  to  say,  our 
constitution  is  the  source  of  normativity.  On  the  face  of  the  claim  this  is  similar  to  the  Kantian 
strategy,  which  attempts  to  derive  normativity  from  the  nature  of  obligations  and  practical 
reason,  but  the  difference  between  the  two  is  found  in  the  role  of  the  subject.  One  might 
consider  the  constitutivist  approach  and  the  Kantian  strategy  as  interchangeable,  but  the 
distinction  between  the  two  is  that  the  Kantian  strategy  is  a  broader  philosophical  project  with 
epistemic  and  metaphysical  positions  that  inform  and  underpin  the  metanormative  claims.  
 
The  similarities  between  the  constitutivist  approach  and  the  Kantian  strategy  might  lead  one  to 
wonder  if  a  Kantian  theory  might  utilise  only  the  constitutivist  approach,  without  commiting  to  the 
broader  Kantian  project,  while  still  providing  (at  least  seemingly)  Kantian  results.  Michael  Ridge 
(2017)  explains  in  “Meeting  Constitutivists  Halfway”  that  an  attraction  of  the  constitutivist 
approach  is  that  it  can  provide  Kantian  results  (justify  a  Kantian  approach  to  morality)  without 
the  associated  metaphysical  and  epistemological  commitments  (p.  2953-4).  The  idea  is  that  an 
autonomy  focused  normativity  that  commits  agents  to  the  categorical  imperative  can  be 
established  on  the  basis  of  agency.  Kant  (1785/2011)  argues  in  Groundwork  of  the  Metaphysics 
of  Morals  that  goodness  comes  from  the  appropriate  use  of  one’s  will  (4:400),  but  without 
positing  that  any  elements  of  agency  are  in  the  noumenal  realm  (Ridge,  2017,  p.  2954).  By 
positing  elements  of  agency  in  the  noumenal  realm  I  mean  the  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  underpinnings  of  Kant’s  moral  philosophy:  the  notion  that  the  nature  of  the 
subject’s  will  can  be  transcendental,  or  exist  in  some  sense  beyond  the  existence  one  might 
otherwise  ascribe  to  particular  experiences,  as  Kant  (1787/1996)  argues  in  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  when  he  proposes  the  transcendental  unity  of  self-consciousness  (B132  and  B140).  
 
Ridge’s  point  that  the  constitutivist  approach  can  deliver  something  similar  to  Kantian  morality  is 
demonstrated  in  Velleman’s  ‘Kinda  Kantian’  constitutivism.  As  I  explained  in  §  1.5,  Velleman’s 
reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  depends  on  his  relativist  foundations  rather  than  utilising 
Kantian  foundations  (as  the  Kantian  reply  I  put  forward,  in  §  1.6,  does).  While  I  argued  in  §  1 
that  the  Kantian  underpinnings  of  Kantian  constitutivism  can  be  utilised  to  solve  the  shmagency 
problem,  it  also  informs  some  elements  of  the  normative  theory  it  underpins.  Ridge  posits  that 
Kantian  morality  can  be  developed  from  the  constitutivist  approach  without  the  fuller  extent  of 
the  Kantian  strategy  and  insofar  as  Kantian  morality  entails  grounding  morality  in  autonomy  he 
is  correct;  however,  the  nature  of  the  self  and  its  relationship  with  autonomy  is  not  something 
that  can  be  directly  established  by  constitutivism.  Evidence  of  this  can  be  seen  in  Korsgaard’s 
(1996b)  development  of  practical  identity  in  which  she  relates  the  objectivity,  and  realism,  of 
normativity  to  necessary  elements  of  one’s  own  identity  (pp.  100-102,  107-108,  118-122,  and 
150).  Because  the  nature  of  the  self  is  utilised  to  inform  the  particulars  of  autonomy,  for 
Korsgaard  (1996b)  the  nature  of  the  self,  the  structure  of  reflection  in  particular,  allows  her  to 
identify  which  element  of  our  identity  is  the  origin  of  moral  obligations  (pp.  100-101),  the  Kantian 
strategy  is  able  to  provide  something  that  the  constitutivist  approach  does  not:  an  examination, 
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a  critique,  of  the  nature  of  what  constitutes  us  and  so  what  we  utilise  when  employing  the 
constitutivist  approach.  58
 
The  constitutivist  approach  facilitates  the  derivation  of  normativity  from  autonomy  while  the 
Kantian  strategy  facilitates  the  limitation  of  what  can  be  derived  from  autonomy.  The  Kantian 
strategy  is  required  in  order  to  establish  this  limitation  because  the  limitation  requires  a  clear 
conception  of  the  nature  of  autonomy  and  that  is  both  a  metaphysical  and  epistemological 
position:  establishing  the  nature  of  autonomy  requires  justifying  the  nature  of  knowledge  about 
autonomy  and  how  we  access  (construct  or  acquire)  that  knowledge.  This  means  that 
constitutivist  approaches  to  normativity  must  be  informed  by  a  position  of  some  kind  on  these 
matters  of  epistemology  and  metaphysics  that  pertain  to  the  nature  of  autonomy  and  what 
knowledge  can  be  justifiably  derived  from  it. 
 
  
58  Rather  than  obligations  more  broadly  understood.  You  might,  for  example,  have  obligations  to  family 
members  that  are  not  objective  in  the  same  manner  as  an  obligation  that  results  from  the  categorical 
imperative.  
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3.4  Scalar  deontology:  building  on  Korsgaard  and  Velleman’s  constitutivist  positions 
With  the  relationship  between  the  constitutivist  approach  and  the  Kantian  strategy  outlined  I  can 
now  provide  the  overview  of  the  argument  for  a  scalar  deontology  and  explain  its  compatibility 
with  Korsgaard  and  Velleman’s  constitutivist  positions.  The  idea  is  that  the  activity  of  agency, 
the  ongoing  process  of  making  decisions,  entails  a  scalar  measure   of  our  obligation  to 59
ourselves  (so,  of  value)  because  it  is  an  activity  that  can  be  performed  more  or  less  well. 
Because  undertaking  the  constitutive  activity  of  agency  is  something  that  you  do  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  extent  the  normativity  that  follows  from  that  activity  entails  that  particular  components  of 
that  activity  further  its  aims  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  in  proportion  to  their  contribution  to  that 
activity.  This  approach  can  be  adopted  by  Kantian  constitutivism,  which  does  not  require 
particular  commitments  beyond  what  is  entailed  by  the  Kantian  strategy  and  constitutivist 
approach;  at  least,  it  does  not  require  particular  commitments  that  would  preclude  it  from  being 
adopted  by  someone  who  implements  these  in  a  similar  manner  to  Christine  Korsgaard  or  David 
Velleman.  At  the  heart  of  scalar  deontology  is  the  assertion  that  autonomy  has  value  to  the 
extent  that  it  contributes  to  this  activity ;  the  value  is  grounded  in  the  activity  constitutive  of 
agency  and  that  is  something  that  is  furthered  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  (scalar)  rather  than 
something  that  is  simply  furthered  or  not.  We  value  our  autonomy  by  constituting  ourselves  in 
particular  ways  (coherently  or  intelligibly)  because  constituting  ourselves  in  that  manner  is  the 
purpose  of  autonomy  and  it  is  the  fact  that  we  have  autonomy  (freedom)  that  entails  we  have 
moral  obligations  at  all.  So,  our  autonomy  fulfils  the  value  that  we  place  on  it  to  the  extent  that  it 
is  fulfilling  its  purpose. 
 
Scalar  deontology  follows  from  accepting  the  broad  approach  put  forward  by  Korsgaard  (1996b) 
who  argues  that  the  source  of  normativity,  the  origins  of  obligation,  is  what  follows  from  the 
constitution  of  autonomy  (pp.  103-105)  and  Velleman  (2009)  who  argues  that  the  criterion  for 
determining  correct  answers  to  normative  questions  is  found  in  what  is  constitutive  of  the  agents 
own  deliberate  attempts  to  render  themselves  coherent  (intelligible,  to  use  Velleman’s  own 
terminology)  to  themselves  (pp.  41-42,  56-58,  92-93,  133-135).   The  broad  idea  is  that 60
normativity  is  grounded  in  (derived  from)  the  constitution  of  agency  or  action  (this  is  the 
constitutivist  approach)  and  that  we  can  determine  elements  of  the  constitution  of  the  nature  of 
agency  and  action  by  undertaking  a  careful  examination  of  their  structure  (the  Kantian  strategy). 
Korsgaard  and  Velleman  derive  normativity  from  an  ongoing  activity  that,  by  its  nature,  can  be 
furthered  more  or  less,  in  a  scalar  manner,  by  particular  attempts  at  its  undertaking.This  entails 
that  the  normativity  derived  from  this  activity  is  also  scalar  to  reflect  this  nature. 
 
The  activity  of  agency  is  the  grounding  for  scalar  deontology  in  the  same  manner  that  it  is  the 
grounding  for  Korsgaard’s  and  Velleman’s  constitutivist  positions.  The  overview  of  the  argument 
for  scalar  deontology  is  that  it  follows  from  grounding  normativity  in  an  ongoing  activity:  because 
59  One  might  use  the  term  ‘measure  of  value’  rather  than  ‘understanding  of  value’  here,  provided  doing  so 
does  not  include  any  consequentialist  implications  for  the  foundations  of  value;  that  is  to  say,  the  value  is 
scalar  because  it  is  grounded  in  an  ongoing  process. 
60  It  might  be  more  accurate  to  explain  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  by  saying  that  autonomy  is  what  is 
constitutive  of  us . 
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the  relevant  ongoing  activity,  the  activity  of  practical  reason  -  constituting  oneself,  is  something 
that  can  be  done  more  or  less  well,  the  value  grounded  in  that  activity  is  scalar.  Before 
explaining  this  further,  and  clearly  outlining  the  steps  involved  in  the  argument  for  scalar 
deontology,  it  is  necessary  to  develop  how  the  claim  that  agency  is  an  ongoing  activity  aligns 
with  Korsgaard’s  and  Velleman’s  positions.  To  that  end  I  will  discuss  an  excerpt  from  each  that 
demonstrates  the  point  sufficiently  for  outlining  the  argument  for  scalar  deontology  and  to 
prepare  for  the  fuller  development  of  this  point.  By  pursuing  the  claim  that  agency  is  an  ongoing 
activity  in  this  manner  it  is  not  my  intention  to  claim  that  scalar  deontology  requires  Korsgaard’s 
or  Velleman’s  theories:  rather,  by  explaining  how  it  follows  from  both  of  these  applications  of  the 
constitutivist  approach  and  the  Kantian  strategy  I  intend  to  demonstrate  that  scalar  deontology 
follows  in  general  from  the  combined  application  of  the  constitutivist  approach  and  the  Kantian 
strategy. 
 
Korsgaard  (2009a)  argues  in  Self-Constitution  Agency:  Identity,  and  Integrity  that  to  be   a 
rational  agent  is  to  undertake  the  activity  of  controlling  one’s  actions: 
As  a  rational  agent,  you  are  aware  of  the  grounds  of  your  beliefs  and  actions  -  or,  I 
should  say,  the  potential  grounds.  For  being  aware  of  them  gives  you  some  distance 
from  them,  and  puts  you  in  control.  Self-consciousness  divides  you  into  two  parts,  or 
three,  or  any  number  of  parts  you  like:  the  main  thing  is  that  it  separates  your 
perceptions  from  their  automatic  normative  force.  The  object  may  still  look  threatening, 
like  a  thing  to-be-fled ,  but  you  must  make  a  choice  about  whether  you  should  run.  On 
the  one  side,  there  is  the  threateningness  of  the  object,  and  we  call  your  perception  of 
that  threateningness  a  desire  to  run.  And  on  the  other  side,  there  is  the  part  of  you  that 
will  make  the  decision  whether  to  run,  and  we  call  that  reason.  Now  you  are  divided  into 
parts,  and  must  pull  yourself  together  by  making  a  choice.  And  in  order  to  make  that 
choice,  reason  needs  a  principle  -  not  one  imposed  on  it  from  outside,  for  it  has  no 
reason  to  accept  such  a  principle,  but  one  that  is  its  own.  (pp.  212-213) 
As  Korsgaard  explains  this  process  it  seems,  on  the  face  of  the  matter,  that  one  is  either  an 
agent  or  one  is  not  and,  for  that  reason,  that  there  is  no  scope  to  derive  a  scalar  understanding 
of  value.  The  problem,  the  seeming  disjunction  between  scalar  deontology  and  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism,  is  that  either  the  agent  is  faced  with  the  choice,  the  problem  of  deploying  reason, 
described  by  Korsgaard  or  they  are  not,  but  the  argument  I  am  providing  for  scalar  deontology 
requires  that  this  choice,  the  problem  constitutive  of  the  activity  of  agency,  is  an  ongoing  activity 
that  can  be  performed  more  or  less  well. 
 
This  apparent  problem  is  exacerbated  by  Korsgaard’s  (2009a)  understanding  of  what  it  is  to 
unify  oneself  as  an  agent,  which  she  explains  as: 
An  agent  is  the  autonomous  and  efficacious  cause  of  her  own  moments.  In  order  to  be 
an  agent,  you  have  to  be  autonomous,  because  the  movements  you  make  have  to  be 
your  own,  they  have  to  be  under  your  own  control.  And  in  order  to  be  an  agent,  you  have 
to  be  efficacious,  because  your  movements  are  the  way  in  which  you  make  things 
happen  in  the  world.  So  the  constitutive  standards  of  action  are  autonomy  and  efficacy, 
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and  the  constitutive  principles  of  action  are  the  categorical  and  hypothetical  imperatives. 
(p.  213) 
Because  the  constitutive  standards  of  action  is  the  categorical  and  hypothetical  imperatives  61
there  does  not  appear  to  be  scope  for  my  assertion  that  this  constitution  entails  a  scalar 
measure  of  value:  the,  apparent,  problem  is  that,  according  to  Korsgaard,  one’s  action  is  either 
under  the  control  of  a  principled  application  of  the  categorical  imperative  or  it  is  not. 
 
The  scope  for  a  scalar  measure  of  value  is  found  in  the  nature  of  the  self,  which  is  also  why 
scalar  deontology  requires  both  the  Kantian  strategy  and  the  constitutivist  approach,  that 
Korsgaard  (2009a)  describes  as: 
[I]n  order  to  be  autonomous,  it  is  essential  that  your  movements  be  caused  by  you,  by 
you  operating  as  unit  [sic]  not  by  some  force  that  is  working  in  you  or  on  you.  So  in  order 
to  be  an  agent  you  need  to  be  unified  -  you  need  to  put  your  whole  self,  so  to  speak, 
behind  your  movements.  That’s  what  deliberation  is:  an  attempt  to  reunite  yourself 
behind  some  set  of  movements  that  will  count  as  your  own.  And  in  order  to  reunite,  you 
have  to  have  a  constitution,  and  your  movements  have  to  issue  from  your  constitutional 
rule  over  yourself  …  in  order  to  have  a  unified  will,  you  must  will  in  accordance  with  a 
universal  law.  Otherwise,   you  are  just  a  mere  heap  of  impulses,  and  not  an  agent  after 
all.  (p.  213) 
There  are  two  points  here  that  are  in  contention  or,  at  least,  that  might  be  brought  into 
contention  with  a  particular  conception  of  the  self.  The  contention  is  between  the  notion  that 
deliberation  is  an  attempt  by  the  self  to  unite  and  the  claim  that  you  cease  to  be  an  agent  if  you 
do  not  will  in  accordance  with  a  universal  law.  
 
In  the  first  of  the  three  excerpts  from  Korsgaard  she  explains  the  problem  facing  agents  (“As  a 
rational  agent,  you  are  aware  of  the  grounds  of  your  beliefs  and  actions  -  or,  I  should  say,  the 
potential  grounds.  For  being  aware  of  them  gives  you  some  distance  from  them,  and  puts  you  in 
control”  (2009a,  p.  212))  and  in  the  third  excerpt  she  argues  that  if  you  fail  to  unify  your  will,  by 
controlling  your  actions  with  an  appropriate  principle,  you  have  failed  to  be  an  agent.  Notice  that 
there  are  two  different  conditions  for  being  an  agent  being  utilised  by  Korsgaard  in  order  to 
make  both  of  these  claims:  the  first  is  that  what  makes  one  an  agent  is  being  faced  by  the 
potential  grounds  in  which  you  have  control  and  the  second  is  that  you  successfully  utilise  that 
control  to  unify  yourself  as  an  agent.  Both  of  these  conditions  are  crucial  for  Korsgaard’s 
explanation  of  the  constitutive  elements  of  agency:  one  must  both  face  the  problem  of 
deliberation  and  solve  it  in  order  to  be  an  agent.  They  are  both  necessary,  for  Korsgaard, 
because  in  order  to  become  unified  one  needs  both  to  have  faced  the  problem  that  prompts  the 
process  of  unification  and  have  then  completed  that  process. 
 
This  unification  is  crucial  because,  for  Korsgaard  and  Kant,  it  is  related  to  the  control  one  has 
over  one’s  actions.  It  is  because  we  are  unified  in  this  manner  that  we  are  free.  The  unification 
61  It  is  worth  noting  that  Korsgaard  (2009a)  argues,  earlier  in  the  same  work,  that  the  categorical  and 
hypothetical  imperatives  are,  in  a  crucial  and  relevant  sense,  the  same  thing  (p.  81). 
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of  the  will  is  the  good  will  and  the  good  will  is  the  free  will  (Korsgaard,  2009a,  p.214;  Kant,  1785, 
4:440-441  and  4:454-463).  So,  one  is  autonomous  (is  an  agent,  rather  than  a  heap  of  impulses, 
as  Korsgaard  describes  it)  when  one  has  unified  oneself  and  this  is  accomplished  by  controlling 
one’s  actions  which,  in  turn,  requires  acting  according  to  the  appropriate  principle  (the 
categorical  imperative).  This  explanation  works  in  retrospect  or  when  examining  one  particular 
action  in  isolation,  asking  a  question  like  ‘was  this  action  autonomous’  or  ‘will  this  unify  myself 
as  an  agent’,  and  in  this  sense  Korsgaard’s  explanation  of  agency  is  complete.  There  is  an 
explanation  of  the  activity  of  being  an  agent  in  the  form  of  its  defining  activity  (facing  the 
problem  of  self  unification)  and  its  defining  attribute  (having  unified  oneself).  
 
This  explanation  of  agency  is  not  yet  complete  because  these  two  constitutive  elements  cannot 
both  be  required  to  be  an  agent,  as  opposed  to  a  heap  of  impulses,  in  all  of  the  cases  in  which 
we  have  agency.  Both  Kant  and  Korsgaard  argue  that  free  will  is  something  that  exists  from  the 
perspective  of  the  subject  making  a  decision  (Kant,  1785,  4:448  and  Korsgaard,  1996b,  pp. 
94-95)  and  ascribe  the  existence  of  freedom  to  the  nature  of  reason  and  reflection.  The  same 
element  of  our  constitution  that  gives  us  freedom  is  the  element  Korsgaard  (1996b)  cites  as  our 
deepest  identity  when  explaining  why  reflective  endorsement  has  moral  authority  (pp.  100-102 
and  103-112).  This  is  where  the  contention  between  the  two  conditions  for  being  an  agent  is 
found:  it  cannot  simultaneously  be  the  case  that  one  is  an  agent  when  facing  the  problem  of 
exercising  practical  reason  to  unify  (control)  oneself  and  that  one  was  not  an  agent,  after  all, 
when  one  fails  to  do  so.  It  seems  tempting,  on  the  face  of  the  issue  posed  by  this  apparent 
contradiction,  to  explain  that  the  problem  faced  by  Korsgaard  (and  Kant)  is  that  either  one  was 
an  agent  when  making  the  attempt,  or  one  was  not.  If  this  is  an  accurate  description  of  the 
problem  it  would  be  a  significant  issue  for  Korsgaard’s  theory  because  it  would  entail  that,  in 
order  for  unity  to  be  a  necessary  requirement,  simply  having  the  faculties  required  for  self 
reflection  is  not  enough  for  agency .  Furthermore,  it  would  mean  that  in  many  cases  (perhaps 
the  vast  majority)  subjects  are  not  agents  at  all.  If  we  are  “not  an  agent  after  all”  (Korsgaard, 
2009a,  p.  213)  in  cases  where  we  attempted  to  unify  ourselves  but  failed  to  do  so,  then  it  seems 
evident  that  a  great  many  people  would  fail  to  be  agents  in  a  great  many  cases.  This  claim 
appears,  on  the  face  of  it,  as  though  I  should  be  required  to  support  it  further;  perhaps  with 
some  empirical  measure  or  another  that  demonstrates  people  frequently  fail  to  unify 
themselves.  However,  the  point  is  merely  that  even  if  they  do  fail  to  unify  themselves  they  were 
still  agents,  in  a  meaningful  sense,  when  faced  with  the  problem  of  self  unification.  In  addition,  I 
suspect  the  claim  that  many  people  do  not  act,  at  least  some  of  the  time,  in  a  principled  manner, 
with  the  categorical  imperative  informing  that  principle,  is  not  a  controversial  assertion. 
 
This  would  be  deeply  problematic  because  Korsgaard,  and  Kant,  employ  the  value  of  humanity 
in  their  moral  theories  and  argue  that  we  ought  to  value  other  people  because  we  value  our  own 
autonomy  by  the  very  act  of  exercising  that  autonomy  (Kant,  1785,  4:428-431  and  Korsgaard, 
1996b,  pp.  120-125).  Kant  (1785)  explains  that  having  the  faculty  of  reason  entails  that  one  has 
value: 
[T]he  human  being  and  in  general  every  rational  being  exists  as  an  end  in  itself,  not 
merely  as  a  means  to  be  used  by  this  or  that  will  at  its  discretion;  instead  he  must  in  all 
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his  actions,  whether  directed  to  himself  or  also  to  other  rational  beings,  always  be 
regarded  at  the  same  time  as  an  end .  …  Beings  the  existence  of  which  rests  not  on  our 
will  but  on  nature,  if  they  are  beings  without  reason,  still  only  have  relative  worth,  as 
means,  and  are  therefore  called  things ,  whereas  rational  beings  are  called  persons 
because  their  nature  already  marks  them  out  as  an  end  in  itself,  that  is,  as  something 
that  may  not  be  used  merely  as  a  means,  and  hence  so  far  limits  all  choice  (and  is  an 
object  of  respect).  These,  therefore,  are  not  merely  subjective  ends,  the  existence  of 
which  as  an  effect  of  our  action  has  a  worth  for  us ,  but  rather  objective  ends ,  that  is, 
beings  the  existence  of  which  is  in  itself  an  end,  and  indeed  one  such  that  no  other  end, 
to  which  they  would  serve  merely  as  means,  can  be  put  in  its  place  since  without  it 
nothing  of  absolute  worth  would  be  found  anywhere;  but  if  all  worth  were  conditional  and 
therefore  contingent,  then  no  supreme  practical  principle  for  reason  could  be  found 
anywhere.  (4:  428) 
Kant’s  point  is  that  the  objectivity  of  his  moral  theory  depends  on  the  necessity  of  the  value  of 
every  rational  being.  This  is  because  the  rest  of  his  moral  theory  is  derived  from  that  value  (the 
value  of  autonomy)  and  the  objectivity  of  that  moral  theory  is  grounded  in  the  necessity  of 
valuing  both  one’s  own  autonomy  and  the  autonomy  of  others.  
 
Korsgaard  (1996b)  puts  forward  a  similar  line  of  argument  when  she  explains  that  the  activity  of 
reasoning  demonstrates  why  one’s  own  value  is  necessary: 
[H]uman  consciousness  has  a  reflective  structure  that  sets  us  normative  problems.  It  is 
because  of  this  that  we  require  reasons  for  action,  a  conception  of  the  right  and  the 
good.  To  act  from  such  a  conception  is  in  turn  to  have  a  practical  conception  of  your 
identity,  conception  under  which  you  value  yourself  and  find  your  life  to  be  worth  living 
and  your  actions  to  be  worth  taking.  That  conception  is  normative  for  you  and  in  certain 
cases  it  can  obligate  you,  for  if  you  do  not  allow  yourself  to  be  governed  by  any 
conception  of  your  identity  then  you  will  have  no  reason  to  act  and  to  live.  …  You  are  an 
animal  of  the  sort  I  have  just  described.  And  that  is  not  merely  a  contingent  conception 
of  your  identity,  which  you  have  constructed  or  chosen  for  yourself,  or  could  conceivably 
reject.  It  is  simply  the  truth.  It  is  because  we  are  such  animals  that  our  practical  identities 
are  normative  for  us,  and,  once  you  see  this,  you  must  take  this  more  fundamental 
identity,  being  such  an  animal,  to  be  normative  as  well.  You  must  value  your  own 
humanity  if  you  are  to  value  anything  at  all.  Since  you  cannot  act  without  reasons  and 
your  humanity  is  the  source  of  your  reasons,  you  must  value  your  own  humanity  if  you 
are  to  act  at  all.  It  follows  from  this  argument  that  human  beings  are  valuable.  (pp. 
122-123) 
Korsgaard’s  point,  like  Kant,  is  that  we  derive  both  normativity  and  the  objectivity  of  normativity 
from  the  necessity  of  valuing  ourselves  and,  therefore,  valuing  all  rational  agents.  Notice  that,  in 
this  context,  for  both  Kant  and  Korsgaard,  the  necessity  of  valuing  agents  (persons,  in  Kant’s 
terms,  and  humans  for  Korsgaard  -  but  rational,  reflective,  beings  in  both  cases)  is  not 
dependant  on  them  having  correctly  unified  themselves;  rather,  it  is  the  process  of  attempting  to 
unify  oneself  (the  role  of  the  subject,  the  activity  of  reasoning)  that  supplies  the  value. 
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The  value  of  agency,  for  Korsgaard  and  Kant,  is  derived  from  the  activity  of  being  an  agent  and 
it  is  the  case  that  failing  to  unify  yourself  by  controlling  your  actions  according  to  the  appropriate 
principle  causes  you  to  fail  in  that  activity.  I  have  pointed  out  the  apparent  tension  between 
these  two  claims,  but  this  problem  is  overcome  by  disambiguating  them.  The  claim  that  one  is 
“not  an  agent  after  all”  if  one  fails  at  self  constitution  and  does  not  unify  oneself  is  not  the  claim 
that  one  is  not  an  agent  in  the  same  sense  that  one  is  an  agent  when  one  faces  the  problem  of 
unifying  oneself  (deciding  what  to  do).  When  one  faces  the  problem  of  unifying  oneself  one  is  an 
agent  in  the  sense  that  one  has  the  faculty  of  practical  reason,  but  one  is  not  an  agent  if  one 
fails  to  unify  oneself  in  the  sense  that  one  has  failed  to  successfully  utilise  this  faculty.  The 
crucial  point  is  that  they  still  faced  the  problem  of  unifying  themselves  and  it  is  the  facing  of  that 
problem  that  is  constitutive  of  agency. 
 
A  particular  conception  of  freedom,  the  nature  of  autonomy,  free  will,  agency,  and  the  nature  of 
the  self  emerges  from  both  Korsgaard  and  Kant’s  use  of  the  value  of  humanity.  This  conception 
of  freedom  will  be  covered  further  shortly  as  I  establish  the  compatibility  of  Korsgaard’s  theory 
with  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology.  The  point  is  that,  as  both  Korsgaard  and  Kant  argue, 
agency  (control,  freedom)  exists  from  the  position  of  the  subject  who  is  exercising  it  and  it  is  this 
sense  in  which  agency  exists  even  for  subjects  that  do  not  successfully  unify  themselves.  Such 
a  subject,  one  who  does  not  unify  themself  (one  who  makes  the  wrong  decision)  and  becomes 
the  “heap  of  impulses”,  is  also  not  an  agent  in  the  sense  that  they  failed  to  unify  themselves  as 
one.  The  term,  agent,  means  different  things  in  these  two  cases  and  scalar  deontology  only 
exists  in  the  perspective  of  the  subject  who  is  exercising  their  agency.  When  measuring  one’s 
actions  after  the  fact  they  either  unified  the  subject  in  question  or  they  did  not;  however,  when 
measuring  one’s  actions  from  the  perspective  of  an  agent  currently  making  a  decision  it  is  not 
binary  in  this  same  manner.  As  an  ongoing  activity  one  can  become  more  or  less  unified  as 
attempts  at  self  unification  are  made  because  this  attempt  for  self  unification  is  always  ongoing 
for  so  long  as  the  agent  exists .  
 
The  sense  of  agency  required  to  establish  scalar  deontology  is  the  sense  that  only  exists  in  the 
subject  as  they  undertake  the  activity  constitutive  of  agency  (making  decisions,  the  ongoing 
attempt  to  unify  themselves).  Notice  that  this  is  the  same  sense  of  agency  that  both  Kant  and 
Korsgaard  utilise  to  establish  that  people  have  value:  they  do  not  argue  that  only  people  who 
successfully  unify  themselves  have  value,  they  argue  that  all  people  have  value  because,  like 
you,  they  all  face  the  problem  of  self  unification .  You  would,  after  all,  have  value  even  if  you 
never  unified  yourself  successfully.  Scalar  deontology  is  established  on  the  notion  of  agency 
that  exists  from  the  perspective  of  a  subject  facing  the  problem  of  agency  (the  problem  of 
unifying  oneself  by  deciding  what  to  do)  but  establishing  scalar  deontology  on  these  grounds  is 
not  a  problem  because  the  value  of  humanity  requires  that  same  sense  of  agency.  So,  while 
measuring  one’s  agency  in  a  past  sense,  examining  whether  a  particular  decision  unified  you  or 
not,  does  not  allow  for  a  scalar  measure  of  value  that  is  not  problematic  for  scalar  deontology 
because  such  a  sense  of  agency  also  does  not  allow  for  the  valuing  of  subjects  that  failed  to 
unify  themselves;  that  is  to  say,  our  value  (the  value  of  persons)  comes  from  the  sense  of 
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agency  grounded  in  the  perspective  of  the  active  subject,  so  it  is  no  surprise  that  the  scalar 
nature  of  value  comes  from  this  same  sense  of  agency. 
 
Another  way  of  explaining  the  point,  the  sense  in  which  agency  as  conceived  by  Kant  and 
Korsgaard  entails  a  scalar  understanding  of  value,  is  that  the  value  of  non-unified  agents  is 
found  in  the  extent  to  which  they  are  engaged  in  the  ongoing  activity  of  becoming  unified.  It 
does  not  matter  whether  they  ultimately  succeed  at  that  goal  or  not,  they  have  value  because 
they  are  engaged  in  the  activity  of  trying  to  constitute  themselves;  furthermore,  from  the 
perspective  of  the  subject  engaged  in  this  activity  it  is  never  the  case  that  one  actually  does 
become  fully  unified,  but  this  is  not  problematic  because  their  value,  as  an  agent  (a  person),  is 
established  by  partaking  in  the  activity.  This  is  a  different  way  of  explaining  the  same  argument 
for  the  value  of  humanity  put  forward  by  Kant  and  Korsgaard  which  is  why  I  am  arguing  that 
their  positions,  broadly  understood  in  relation  to  their  grounding  in  the  nature  of  agency,  are 
compatible  with  scalar  deontology.  From  the  perspective  of  the  subject,  the  agent,  engaged  in 
self  constitution,  they  never  actually  become  unified  because  the  activity  is  never  complete: 
there  is  always  another  decision  to  make.  One  might  argue  that  their  unity  could  be  measured  in 
isolated  cases,  such  as  reflecting  on  one  particular  decision  or  when  they  have  died,  but  that 
entails  considering  agency  in  a  different  sense  than  the  sense  in  which  agency  is  the  source  of 
value;  because  agency  is  the  source  of  value  in  the  sense  that  agency  explains  the  perspective 
of  a  subject  attempting  to  unify  themselves. 
 
My  point  is  that  there  is  an  element  to  agency  that  Korsgaard  has  not  fully  appreciated:  the 
extent  to  which  one  is  coherently  self  constituted  is  not  absolute,  one  is  not  simply  coherent  or 
not .  Rather,  one  seeks  to  become  coherent  and  the  reason  for  this  is  that  autonomy  itself  has  a 
goal,  there  is  something  it  is  aiming  at,  and  that  goal  is  not  so  much  finished  as  furthered .  This 
claim,  that  the  extent  to  which  one  is  coherently  self  constituted  is  not  absolute,  is  not 
compatible  with  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism,  on  the  face  of  the  matter,  because,  as  Korsgaard 
explains,  one  has  either  acted  according  to  the  correct  principle  or  one  has  not.  This,  apparent, 
incompatibility  can  be  overcome  when  the  importance  of  the  temporal  element  of  agency  is 
considered:  the  claim,  put  more  accurately,  is  that  the  extent  to  which  one  is  coherently  self 
constituted  is  not  absolute  when  considering  the  agent  over  time  which  is,  after  all,  how  the 
agent  sees  themselves  and  the  context  in  which  the  agent  attempts  to  constitute  themselves 
(not  as  a  finished  project,  but  as  an  ongoing  one). 
 
Another  way  to  explain  this  point,  that  may  help  in  clarifying  the  issue,  is  that  value  exists  when 
considering  the  agent  that  faces  the  problem  of  self  constitution  rather  than  considering  the 
agent  that  has  already  acted.  Remember,  freedom  exists  when  making  the  choice  rather  than 
after  the  fact  and,  according  to  Kant  and  Korsgaard,  value  is  derived  from  autonomy 
accordingly.  We  must  value  our  own  autonomy,  by  exercising  it,  because  that  is  a  necessity 
from  the  perspective  of  the  subject;  one  cannot  be  in  the  position  of  making  a  decision  without 
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also  valuing  one’s  ability  to  make  a  decision .  The  subject’s  perspective  during  the  activity  of 62
reflection/deliberation  is  also  the  position  from  which  one  values  self  constitution;  or,  rather,  it  is 
because  of  this  perspective  that  one  is  faced  with  the  problem  of  unifying  oneself.  Because  it  is 
from  this  perspective  that  this  activity,  self  unification,  exists  it  is  also  from  this  perspective  that 
normativity  exists  (remember  that,  according  to  Korsgaard,  normativity  is  grounded  in  autonomy 
which  is  the  process  of  self  unification).  This  entails  a  scalar  understanding  of  value  because 
from  this  perspective  unifying  oneself  is  not  something  one  has  done  but  it  is  something  that 
one  is  doing .  Notice  that  the  crucial  element  of  this  line  of  argument  is  establishing  that  the 
constitutive  activity  of  normativity  is  an  ongoing  activity .  Once  this  is  established  a  scalar 
understanding  of  value  follows  because  it  limits  the  understanding  of  value  to  what  facilitates  the 
aims  of  the  activity  more  or  less  (because  the  activity  can  no  longer  be  considered  something 
that  is  accomplished  or  not).  
 
This  can  also  be  explained,  in  Korsgaard’s  terms,  by  referring  to  the  sense  in  which  obligations 
exist  as  reactions  to  threats  to  one’s  identity  (see  Korsgaard  (1996b  pp.  102-103).  In  order  for 
failure  to  unify  oneself  to  be  a  threat  to  my  identity  it  must  be  my  mistake.  An  ‘error’  in  self 
unification  is  possible  because  I  find  my  agency  in  the  problem  facing  me,  the  problem  of 
agency  (deciding  what  to  do  in  the  context  of  reflection),  and  that  problem  is  what  exists  over 
time.  It  exists  over  time  because  agency  exists  over  time  and  the  mistakes  made  in  attempting 
to  solve  that  problem  are  mine  because  agency  exists  over  time;  because  autonomy  and 
freedom,  and  therefore  normativity,  exists  over  time.  It  is  the  solving  of  this  problem  that  can  be 
furthered  more  or  less  because  it  is  not  an  activity  that  is  completed.  Although  particular 
problems  that  are  faced  may  be  solved  the  ongoing  problem  of  unifying  oneself  is  not  and  it  is 
this  point  that  is  the  ‘evidence’  of  my  claim.  By  evidence  I  intend  to  invoke  the  same  manner  of 
justification  employed  by  Korsgaard  (1996b)  when  she  argues  that  the  structure  of  conscious 
thought,  the  necessary  elements  of  reasoning,  that  supports  her  explanation  of  agency  and  its 
constitutive  elements  (pp.  92-93).  My  point  is  that  the  same  structural  elements  of  agency 
identified  by  Korsgaard  in  this  manner  also  demonstrates  that  agency  is  an  ongoing  activity.  We 
find,  in  the  structure  of  our  own  mind,  that  we  face  the  problem  of  reflection  (what  to  do  and  how 
to  utilise  practical  reason  in  order  to  make  that  decision),  as  Korsgaard  argues,  but  we  also  find 
that  this  is  an  ongoing  process. 
 
I  am  now  in  a  position  to  summarise  the  compatibility  between  scalar  deontology  and 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism;  although  elements  of  this  discussion  related  to  the  nature  of  the 
62  This  is  the  notion  behind  grounding  normativity  in  autonomy:  that  our  faculty  of  reason  necessarily 
values  itself  as  a  lawgiver.  Kant  (1785)  explains  that  the  grounds  of  the  categorical  imperative  must  be 
found  in  something  common  to  the  will  of  all  rational  beings  and  that  such  common  ground  is  found  in  the 
fact  that  “ rational  nature  exists  as  an  end  in  itself ”  (4:429)  because  we  necessarily  represent  our  own 
existence  to  ourselves  in  this  manner  (4:427-429).  Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  that  normativity  is  derived 
from  our  nature  as  autonomous  animals  because  the  reflective  structure  of  our  own  mind  necessarily 
entails  valuing  the  results  and  process  of  rational  reflection  (p.  124,  128-130,  165).  Korsgaard  (2009a) 
supports  this  argument  by  explaining  that  it  is  through  reflection  that  we  choose  our  own  actions  and  that 
by  undertaking  this  process  we,  necessarily,  endorse  the  value  of  of  the  deliberative  process  (and, 
therefore,  the  value  of  reason  as  such)  (pp.107-108,  126-127,  130,  175-176,  213-214). 
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ongoing  activity  of  agency  and  the  nature  of  autonomy  will  continue  in  §§  3.5-3.8.  Korsgaard’s 
claim,  that  we  must  unify  ourselves  in  order  to  be  agents,  does  appear  incompatible  with  scalar 
deontology.  It  cannot  be  the  case  that  our  attempts  at  unification  have  more  or  less  value  in 
proportion  to  how  well  they  facilitate  our  attempts  to  unify  ourselves  if  we  must  be  unified  before 
being  of  value.  My  argument  is  that  this  incompatibility  is  not  as  problematic  as  it  seems 
because,  although  value  is  derived  from  agency,  there  is  still  a  meaningful  sense,  for  Korsgaard, 
that  we  are  agents  even  when  we  are  not  yet  unified .  Because  we  derive  value  from  the 
perspective  of  the  agent  and  that  perspective  is  of  a  subject  facing  the  problem  of  unification 
(facing  the  challenge  of  unifying  oneself),  rather  than  from  the  perspective  of  already  being 
unified,  the  value  derived  from  agency  must  exist  prior  to  unification.  It  is  this  position,  the 
position  of  the  subject  seeking  unification,  that  entails  scalar  deontology.  The  point  is  not  to 
deny  that  there  is  a  tension  between  elements  of  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism,  in  particular  her 
conception  of  agency,  and  scalar  deontology.  Instead,  the  point  is  that  by  prioritising  one 
conception  of  agency  over  the  other,  the  perspective  of  the  rational  subject  facing  the  problem 
of  unification  over  the  retrospective  perspective  of  a  subject  who  has  unified  themselves,  this 
contention  tension  can  be  avoided.   Furthermore,  the  perspective  that  is  being  prioritised  is  the 
one  that  is  cited  by  Korsgaard,  and  Kant,  as  the  source  of  value. 
 
The  compatibility  of  scalar  deontology  with  Velleman’s  constitutivism  is  easier  to  establish  than 
with  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  because  it  is  not  faced  with  the  claim  that  a  subject  must  already 
have  accomplished  the  constitutive  goals  of  action  in  order  to  have  value .  Velleman  (2009) 63
argues  that  the  constitutive  aim  of  action  is  to  make  oneself  intelligible  to  oneself,  which  is  a  way 
of  saying  that  we,  by  our  very  nature,  seek  to  make  ourselves  coherent  to  our  own  conception  of 
ourselves  (pp.  18-20,  26-27,  31-33,  133-135,  145-149).  His  point  is  that  normativity  is  a  type  of 
ongoing  push  towards  rational  development  (Velleman,  2009,  pp.  148-149).  Velleman  describes 
this  as  a  “Kinda  Kantian  strategy”  (p.  149)  because  his  position  does  not  entail  that  agents  are 
necessarily  bound  to  pursuing  the  categorical  imperative  simply  by  virtue  of  being  agents.  
 
In  this  regard  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology  and  Velleman’s  constitutivism  are  in 
agreement:  normativity  is  found  in  the  ongoing  pursuit  of  self  constitution.  Self  constitution  can, 
for  the  purpose  of  outlining  the  argument  for  scalar  deontology,  be  understood  as  either  making 
oneself  intelligible  to  oneself  (as  Velleman  conceives  it)  or  unifying  oneself  (as  Korsgaard 
conceives  it).  In  the  context  of  establishing  compatibility  between  scalar  deontology  and 
Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  I  intend  to  fully  implement  the  Kantian  strategy,  rather  than 
Velleman’s  restricted  usage.  Where  Velleman  (2009)  argues  that  “practical  reasoning  has 
favored  morality  without  requiring  or  guaranteeing  it”  (p.  149)  I  seek  to  establish  the  necessary 
grounding  for  morality  in  the  ongoing  activity  of  self  constitution;  this  necessity  is  crucial 
because  it  is  the  necessity  of  normativity  that  establishes  its  objectivity,  according  to  the  Kantian 
strategy.  However,  in  the  context  of  establishing  compatibility  between  scalar  deontology  and 
63  Although,  as  I  explained,  a  closer  examination  of  Korsgaard’s  argument  finds  that  she  is  also  not 
committed  to  this  claim;  at  least,  she  is  not  committed  to  claiming  that  the  source  of  value  entails  that  only 
unified  subjects  have  value.  My  point  here  is  that  such  a  clarification  is  not  necessary  to  establish 
compatibility  with  Velleman’s  constitutivism. 
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Velleman’s  constitutivism  I  merely  seek  to  establish  that  scalar  deontology  follows  from  the 
same  element  of  our  constitution  that  Velleman  derives  normativity  from.  In  both  cases, 
Korsgaard’s  and  Velleman’s  theories,  scalar  deontology  is  compatible  with  Kantian 
constitutivism  because  it  is  derived  from  the  same  element  of  our  constitution  as  normativity  but 
in  Korsgaard’s  case  it  is  also  required  that  whatever  is  derived  from  our  constitution  is  a 
necessary  element  of  that  constitution  (otherwise  it  would  not  be  objective)  while  in  Velleman’s 
case  it  is  sufficient  for  it  merely  to  be  present,  because  his  objectivity  is  grounded  in  relativist 
foundations  (I  will  explain  this  further  in  the  relevant  subsection).  However,  this  difference 
between  Korsgaard  and  Velleman  does  mean  that  Velleman’s  theory  is  not  fully  compatible  with 
all  of  the  claims  I  make  in  support  of  scalar  deontology,  because  I  am  intending  to  establish  that 
the  obligation  one  has  to  oneself,  one’s  duty,  is  both  scalar  and  objective. 
 
Velleman’s  constitutivism  is  compatible  with  grounding  normativity  in  the  ongoing  activity  of  self 
constitution  because  he  argues  that  the  activity  of  making  oneself  intelligible  to  oneself,  the 
activity  of  self  constitution,  is  an  ongoing  activity:  we  are  already  in  agreement  on  this  point.  This 
does  not  entail  that  Velleman  is  already  in  agreement  with  all  of  the  elements  required  for  scalar 
deontology  because  there  is  another  crucial  point  required  for  my  argument  that  Velleman  does 
not  agree  with:  his  constitutivism  is  not  committed  to  the  Kantian  strategy,  at  least  not  to  the 
extent  required  to  establish  objective  morality.  In  the  §  1.5  I  explained  that,  in  response  to 
Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  critique  of  constitutivism,  Velleman  endorsed  a  relativist 
foundation  for  his  morality.   Scalar  deontology  employs  the  Kantian  strategy  to  its  fullest  extent, 64
rather  than  Velleman’s  “Kinda  Kantian”  employment  which  results  in  relativist  foundations,  and, 
in  doing  so,  establishes  objective  foundations  for  the  scalar  nature  of  our  obligation  to  ourselves 
(scalar  duty)  in  the  necessity  of  the  elements  of  our  constitution  that  ground  normativity.  The 
point  of  contention  between  scalar  deontology  and  Velleman’s  constitutivism  is  that  Velleman 
argues  that  the  elements  of  our  constitution  that  ground  normativity  are  not  necessary  for  one  to 
be  an  agent,  while  scalar  deontology  argues  that  it  is  the  necessity  of  those  elements,  necessity 
for  one  to  be  constituted  as  an  agent,  that  entail  objective  normativity. 
 
64  Remember  that  Velleman  also  talks  in  terms  of  objective  morality,  despite  these  relativist  foundations, 
because  he  is  adopting  a  definition  of  objectivity  that  employs  a  limited  scope  and,  in  doing  so,  allows 
some  measure  of  compatibility  between  relativism  and  objectivity.  To  recap  this  point,  the  idea  is  that 
morality  is  objective  from  the  particular  perspective  of  the  subject  in  question:  given  the  particular  context 
the  answer  is  objectively  true,  but  the  context  in  question  is  itself  relative.  The  resulting  normative  theory 
can  provide  objective  answers  in  particular  contexts  but  does  not  provide  objective  answers  in  any  further 
sense.  That  is  to  say,  the  answers  to  normative  questions,  according  to  Velleman,  are  objective  in  the 
context  in  which  the  questions  are  asked  but  not  in  any  further  sense:  they  are  not  necessary  or  ‘real’ ; 
except,  of  course,  in  the  sense  in  which  a  subject  in  the  right  context  might  perceive  them  as  such.  My 
point  is  that  scalar  deontology  is  not  satisfied  with  this  qualified  objectivity:  by  employing  the  Kantian 
strategy  in  a  stronger  sense  than  Velleman  (not  “Kinda  Kantian”,  but  “Kantian  Proper”)  I  intend  to  provide 
grounding  for  normativity  that  is  compatible  with  objectivity  in  the  fullest  sense.  This  is  why  it  is  necessary 
for  me  to  have  provided  the  Kantian  reply  in  the  first  section  of  my  thesis  when  discussing  Velleman  and 
Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  argument.  I  needed  to  demonstrate  that  Velleman’s  theory,  or  something 
appropriately  similar,  can  endorse  ‘fully  fledged’  objectivity  without  succumbing  to  the  shmagency 
problem  or  the  development  of  scalar  deontology  would  itself  succumb  to  Enoch’s  critique. 
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Scalar  deontology  is  compatible  with  Velleman’s  constitutivism  in  the  same  sense  that  the 
Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  that  I  put  forward  in  §  1.6  is.  Because  scalar 
deontology  utilises  the  Kantian  strategy  to  establish  the  objectivity  of  the  normativity  it  grounds  it 
is  a  fundamental  deviation  from  Velleman’s  constitutivism.  Velleman  is  attempting  to  establish 
normativity  that  is  relative  to  the  nature  of  the  subject  while  scalar  deontology  attempts  to 
establish  normativity  in  necessary  elements  of  subjects  and,  for  that  reason,  is  an  attempt  to 
establish  objective  normativity.  These  are  two  different  types  of  projects  because  they  are 
attempts  to  establish  different  types  of  knowledge,  one  relative  and  the  other  objective,  and,  for 
that  reason,  scalar  deontology  is  not  compatible  with  Velleman’s  constitutivism:  they, 
fundamentally,  cannot  be  compatible  because  scalar  deontology  is  an  attempt  to  establish 
objective  normativity  while  Velleman’s  constitutivism  is  an  attempt  to  establish  relativist 
normativity.  While  the  compatibility  between  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  and  scalar  deontology  is 
complicated,  because  it  requires  focusing  on  the  grounding  of  value  in  one  theory  of  agency 
over  another,  the  compatibility  between  Velleman’s  constitutivism  and  scalar  deontology  is 
straightforward  because  both  of  them,  Velleman’s  theory  and  scalar  deontology,  ground 
normativity  in  an  ongoing  activity.  However,  the  problem  with  the  compatibility  between 
Velleman’s  theory  and  scalar  deontology  is  also  straightforward  because  they  are  both 
attempting  to  establish  different,  and  incompatible,  things.  They  are,  fundamentally, 
incompatible. 
 
Despite  this  fundamental  incompatibility  scalar  deontology  is  compatible  with  many  of 
Velleman’s  claims,  because  scalar  deontology  grounds  normativity  in  the  constitutive  activity  of 
agency,  rational  progress,  and  this  is  also  where  Velleman’s  constitutivism  grounds  normativity. 
Further  claims  made  by  Velleman  that  are  compatible  with  scalar  deontology  include  the  claim 
that  the  subject  provides  the  criterion  for  correct  answers  to  normative  questions,  the  notion  that 
making  oneself  intelligible  to  oneself  is  the  source  of  normativity,  and  the  argument  that  we 
discover  the  constitutive  activity  of  normativity  by  examining  the  nature  of  our  own  agency. 
These  are  core  claims  to  Velleman’s  argument  (see  §§  1.2-1.4)  that  explain,  respectively,  how 
we  determine  whether  answers  to  normative  questions  are  correct,  where  normativity  comes 
from,  and  how  we  learn  these  points.  The  combination  of  these  claims  is  what  supports  the 
various  claims  made  by  Velleman’s  theory:  they  are  core  tenets  of  his  theory  that  are  compatible 
with  scalar  deontology,  despite  the  most  fundamental  claim  made  by  Velleman’s  theory  (that 
morality  is  relative)  being  incompatible  with  scalar  deontology.  For  this  reason,  in  §  3.8  where  I 
discuss  Velleman’s  theory  of  epistemic  freedom,  I  will  put  forward  an  argument  that  explains 
how  Vellmena’s  theory  as  he  presents  it  is  compatible  with  scalar  deontology.  In  doing  so  I  will 
be  assuming  that  no  significant  problems  arise  from  Velleman’s  position  on  the  nature  of 
objectivity  because,  if  they  do  arise,  those  problems  would  not  be  from  scalar  deontology  but 
from  his  theory  itself.  65
65  It  is  my  suspicion  that  Velleman’s  position  on  the  nature  of  objectivity  is  untenable  because  his 
argument  that  objectivity  is  restricted  to  particular  frames  of  reference  either  fails  to  deliver  relativism  or 
fails  to  deliver  objectivity.  However,  critiquing  Velleman’s  position  is  not  my  purpose  here  and,  for  that 
reason,  I  do  provide  an  argument,  §  3.8,  that  assumes  his  position  is  tenable  and  establishes  the 
compatibility  of  scalar  deontology  with  his  Kantian  constitutivism  in  that  context. 
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Scalar  deontology  could  be  considered  a  development  of  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  that 
demonstrates  what  follows  from  focusing  on  the  ongoing  activity  constitutive  of  agency. 
Velleman’s  constitutivism  is  not  compatible  with  scalar  deontology  in  this  manner  because  the 
two  are  making  fundamentally  different  claims:  one  is  trying  to  establish  relative  normativity  in 
contingent  elements  of  agency  while  the  other  is  attempting  to  ground  normativity  in  necessary 
elements  of  agency  and,  in  doing  so,  establish  objective  normativity.  Despite  this,  core  claims  of 
Velleman’s  argument  (the  focus  on  the  ongoing  activity  of  reason,  how  we  learn  of  normative 
facts,  and  their  relationship  to  ourselves)  are  compatible  with  scalar  deontology.  The 
compatibility  of  scalar  deontology  with  Velleman  and  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theories  is 
different  but,  nevertheless,  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  compatibility  of  the  two  to  scalar 
deontology:  scalar  deontology  might  be  considered  as  the  meeting  point  of  the  two  theories. 
Scalar  deontology  is  the  combination  of  the  Kantian  strategy,  which  establishes  objective 
normativity  based  on  necessary  elements  of  the  self,  with  the  constitutivist  approach,  which 
establishes  the  nature  of  normativity  on  the  ongoing  activity  that  is  constitutive  of  the  self.  That 
is  to  say,  if  you  take  Korsgaard’s  objectivist  grounding  and  combine  this  with  Velleman’s  focus 
on  the  ongoing  activity  of  constituting  ourselves,  you  get  something  approximately  like  the 
arguments  for  scalar  deontology  in  the  following  section  -  the  argument  that  normativity  exists  in 
the  position  of  the  subject  making  a  decision  (by  employing  practical  reason)  and  in  that  position 
the  obligation  of  the  subject  to  themselves  is  scalar  (something  they  are  fulfilling  to  a  greater  or 




3.5  The  source  of  normativity:  the  argument  for  a  scalar  deontology 
In  the  §§  3.0-3.4  I  have  put  forward  the  initial  argument  for  scalar  deontology  and  explained  its 
relationship  with  the  Kantian  strategy  and  the  constitutivist  approach.  With  these  in  place  I  can 
now  develop  the  argument  for  scalar  deontology  by  providing  a  more  detailed  explanation  of 
why  it  follows  from  Kantian  constitutivism.  The  argument  for  scalar  deontology  is  derived  from 
the  combination  of  the  constitutivist  approach  and  the  Kantian  strategy.  Because  of  this 
combination  it  finds  inspiration  in  elements  of  Korsgaard  and  Velleman’s  constitutivist  theories. 
The  crucial  development  of  scalar  deontology,  that  allows  the  scalar  measure  of  one’s  obligation 
to  oneself,  is  to  ground  normativity  in  the  ongoing  activity  of  agency.  The  ongoing  activity  of 
agency  entails  scalar  deontology  because  it  removes  the  focus  of  deliberation  from  any 
particular  decision,  which  allows  one’s  obligation  to  oneself  to  be  contextualised  within  the 
ongoing  project  of  self  constitution. 
 
Normativity,  according  to  both  constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  tradition,  is  derived  from  (grounded 
in  or  founded  upon)  constitutive  elements  of  the  subject.  The  particular  constitutive  elements 
focused  on  by  Kantian  constitutivists,  in  order  to  derive  the  source  of  normativity,  are  elements 
of  agency.  The  reason  for  this  is  that,  by  deriving  normativity  from  the  constitutive  elements  of 
agency  in  particular  (rather  than,  say,  our  identity  broadly  understood),  normativity  is  derived 
only  from  elements  of  our  identity  that  are  inescapable.  This  is  the  connection  between 
constitutivism,  as  such,  and  the  Kantian  strategy:  the  particular  element  of  what  constitutes 
oneself  that  is  under  examination  when  deriving  normativity  is  an  element  of  the  self  that  is 
necessary  -  agency.  My  contribution  to  this  line  of  reasoning  is  to  identify  that  agency  is  an 
ongoing  activity;  this  means  that  the  activity  of  agency,  self  constitution,  is  not  something  you 
have  done  or  something  you  do ,  so  much  as  it  is  an  activity  you  are  doing  and  the  obligation 
that  is  derived  from  agency  must  be  understood  in  this  context.  
 
Self  constitution  is  the  constitutive  activity  of  agency  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  activity  that  makes 
one  an  agent.  As  I  explain  §  3.4  Korsgaard  describes  this  as  constituting  oneself  coherently  and 
Velleman  describes  this  as  making  oneself  intelligible  to  oneself;  both  are  referring  to  the  activity 
of  unifying  oneself  by  striving  to  be  what  you  should  be  (an  intelligibly  or  coherently  constituted 
agent).  Scalar  deontology  arises  from  the  need  to  understand  the  categorical  imperative  within 
the  context  of  the  ongoing  activity  of  agency  (I  explain  this  further  in  §  3.9).  The  categorical 
imperative  is  derived  from  autonomy  and  autonomy  must  be  capable  of  being  understood  in  the 
same  context  within  which  it  is  exercised:  the  context  in  which  autonomy  is  exercised  is  the 
context  of  a  subject  who  is  utilising  their  rational  faculties  to  undertake  the  activity  of  making  a 
decision.  This  activity,  the  activity  of  agency,  is  an  ongoing  activity  and  is  only  properly 
understood  in  that  context  because  of  its  relationship  with  freedom  which  must  be  understood  in 
the  context  of  a  subject  that  is  exercising  their  free  will  (see  §§  3.6-3.8).  Once  the  categorical 
imperative  is  understood  in  the  context  of  the  ongoing  activity  of  agency  then  each  specific 
application  of  the  imperative  (every  particular  decision,  say)  is  part  of  this  ongoing  activity  and, 
therefore,  must  be  understood  in  this  context.  Understanding  particular  decisions,  particular 
applications  of  the  categorical  imperative,  as  part  of  the  ongoing  activity  of  the  categorical 
imperative,  constituting  oneself,  requires  appreciating  the  contribution  that  this  particular 
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application  has  to  the  ongoing  activity.  This  is  why  the  agent’s  unity  being  an  ongoing  activity 
entails  a  scalar  deontology:  every  particular  application  of  the  categorical  imperative  is  itself  a 
part  of  the  ongoing  activity  that  the  categorical  imperative  is  derived  from.  While  elements  of  this 
pursuit  of  unity  may  be  discrete  events  in  some  sense  their  relationship  to  one’s  unity  is  not:  this 
is  because  one’s  unity  is  derived  from  the  activity  of  being  the  causal  force  behind  one’s  actions 
and  decisions  (see  §§  3.6-3.8).  A  subject  is  unified  when  they  have  exercised  their  freedom  by 
utilising  their  rational  faculties  to  decide  what  to  do  through  a  process  of  reflective  deliberation 
(see  §§  3.7  and  3.8  for  Korsgaard  and  Velleman’s  explanation  of  this  process).  The  relationship 
between  whatever  constituent  elements  comprise  this  process  and  this  process  itself  is  the  role 
that  constituent  element  plays  in  the  unification  of  the  self;  hence,  the  constituent  elements  are 
involved  in  the  pursuit  of  unity  insofar  as  they  are  involved  in  this  process.  The  categorical 
imperative,  one’s  obligation  (duty)  to  oneself,  is  ongoing  and  the  particular  applications  of  it  are 
merely  parts  of  that  activity.  These  parts  have  a  scalar  contribution  to  how  well  you  are  fulfilling 
the  obligation  as  a  whole  (that  is,  how  well  you  are  constituting  yourself). 
 
My  argument  is  that  we  can  derive  a  scalar  deontology  from  the  activity  of  constituting  oneself. 
The  idea  is  that  once  the  constitutive  activity  of  agency  is  established  as  both  the  source  of 
normativity  and  the  purpose  of  our  agency  the  features  of  that  activity  can  be  examined  to 
determine  the  nature  of  morality.  This  examination  reveals  the  relationship  between  the 
particular  applications  of  the  categorical  imperative  and  the  ongoing  activity  they  comprise.  This 
relationship  is  such  that  each  particular  application  provides  a  scalar  contribution  to  that  ongoing 
activity  (the  activity  of  self  constitution).  Finally,  the  particular  applications  providing  this  scalar 
contribution  are  themselves  applications  of  the  categorical  imperative  and,  therefore,  in  showing 
that  these  particular  applications  provide  a  scalar  contribution  I  have  demonstrated  that  the 
categorical  imperative  itself  is  scalar.  At  least,  when  understood  in  the  context  of  the  constitution 
of  the  self.  So,  this  argument  points  out  that  the  extent  to  which  one  is  managing  to  constitute 
oneself  is  also  the  extent  to  which  one  has  fulfilled  one’s  obligation  to  oneself: 
Premise  1:  self  constitution  has  constituent  activities  that  comprise  part  of  the  ongoing 
activity  of  constituting  oneself 
Premise  2:  the  constituent  activities  that  make  up  the  activity  of  self  constitution  provide 
a  scalar  contribution  to  the  goal  of  self  constitution 
Conclusion  1:  self  constitution  is  scalar 
Premise  3:  self  constitution  is  the  categorical  imperative 
Conclusion  2:  the  categorical  imperative  is  scalar 
Notice  that,  in  premise  3  and  the  move  to  conclusion  2,  this  claim  requires  that  self  constitution 
is  both  established  as  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  and  that  any  traits  of  this 
formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  extend  to  the  other  formulations. 
 
The  hope  is  that  demonstrating  that  one  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  is  an 
obligation  that  is  fulfilled  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  will  demonstrate  that  this  is  true  for  all 
formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative.  If  this  can  be  established,  or,  rather,  to  the  extent  that 
this  can  be  established,  then  scalar  deontology  follows;  if  self  constitution  is  a  formulation  of  the 
categorical  imperative  and  if  self  constitution  itself  is  scalar.  So,  there  are  three  points  that  need 
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to  be  established  in  order  to  derive  a  scalar  deontology  from  Kantian  constitutivism:  firstly,  I 
need  to  establish  that  the  activity  of  self  constitution  is  scalar,  then,  secondly,  I  need  to 
demonstrate  that  the  activity  of  self  constitution  is  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative, 
and,  third,  I  need  to  explain  why  demonstrating  that  one  formulation  of  the  categorical 




3.6  Scalar  self  constitution:  the  ongoing  activity  of  making  ourselves  into  what  we  are 
Self  constitution  is  scalar  because  it  is  not  something  you  have  done  or  something  you  are 
going  to  do,  it  is  something  you  are  doing .  It  is,  in  that  sense,  an  ongoing  activity.  Self 
constitution  is  undertaken  from  the  perspective  of  an  agent  who  is  undertaking  constituting 
themselves  and  it  needs  to  be  understood  in  this  context.  It  is  from  this  position,  the  position  of 
the  agent  constituting  themselves,  that  it  makes  sense  to  claim  that  it  is  something  the  agent 
can  develop  towards  (something  they  can  get  better  or  worse  at).  This  is  the  same  position  from 
which  the  agent  is  free,  the  position  within  which  they  have  autonomy,  and  this  is  no 
coincidence:  one’s  freedom  is  one’s  ability  to  pursue  the  ongoing  activity  of  self  constitution. 
 
The  notion  that  freedom  needs  to  be  understood  as  something  that  exists  from  the  position  of 
an  agent  exercising  their  rational  faculties  is  utilised  by  both  Kantian  moral  theory  and  Kantian 
constitutivists.  Kant  (1785)  explains  that  we  need  to  understand  ourselves  as  both  a  part  of  the 
world  and  as  seperate  to  it: 
[A]  rational  being  must  regard  himself  as  intelligence  (hence  not  from  the  side  of  his 
lower  powers)  as  belonging  not  to  the  world  of  sense  but  to  the  world  of  understanding; 
hence  he  has  two  standpoints  from  which  he  can  regard  himself  and  cognize  laws  for 
the  use  of  his  powers  and  consequently  for  all  his  actions;  first ,  insofar  as  he  belongs  to 
the  world  of  sense,  under  laws  of  nature  (heteronomy);  second ,  as  belonging  to  the 
intelligible  world,  under  laws  which,  being  independent  of  nature,  are  not  empirical  but 
grounded  merely  in  reason.  (4:452) 
Kant’s  point  is  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  we  can  understand  ourselves  as  governed  by  the 
laws  of  nature  and  a  sense  in  which  we  can  understand  ourselves  as  free  to  make  our  own 
choices.  My  point  is  that  the  sense  in  which  we  can  understand  ourselves  as  free  reveals  that 
self  constitution  is  something  we  pursue  to  greater  or  lesser  degrees  of  efficacy:  that  is,  that  self 
constitution  is  scalar. 
 
The  notion  that  freedom  needs  to  be  understood  from  the  position  of  the  subject  is  utilised  by 
both  Korsgaard  and  Velleman  to  develop  their  Kantian  constitutivist  positions.  They  utilise  this 
notion  to  establish  that  freedom  is  how  we  interact  with  ourselves  and  this  is  the  same  manner 
in  which  I  am  utilising  the  point  to  establish  that  self  constitution  is  scalar.  The  point  I  am 
attempting  to  establish  is  that  we  treat  ourselves  as  scalar  in  the  same  sense  that  we  treat 
ourselves  as  free.  The  hope  is  that  I  can  establish  that  we  must  treat  the  task  of  self  constitution 
as  scalar  because,  in  order  to  understand  the  position  from  which  we  are  free,  understanding 
our  role  in  this  task  requires  regarding  it  as  something  we  are  always  pursuing  rather  than 
something  we  can  accomplish.  If  self  constitution  is  something  we  are  in  constant  pursuit  of, 
rather  than  something  we  succeed  or  fail  at  in  an  absolute  sense,  it  becomes  the  type  of  thing 
we  are  pursuing  to  varying  degrees  of  success  rather  than  something  we  have  entirely 
succeeded  or  failed  at. 
 
Understanding  one’s  pursuit  of  self  constitution  as  a  matter  of  succeeding  or  failing  in  the 
activity  you  are  currently  undertaking  allows  one  to  make  sense  of  scalar  claims  about  that 
activity.  By  this  I  mean  claims  that  you  are  doing  a  better  or  worse  job  at  adhering  to  your 
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obligation  to  yourself:  claims  of  the  form  “it  was  not  the  worst  thing  I  could  have  done”  or  “I  am 
getting  better  at  doing  the  right  thing”.  Such  claims  amount  to  the  claim  that  one  is  getting  better 
or  worse  at  constituting  oneself  and  can  be  restated  in  the  following  forms  to  reflect  this:  “I  could 
have  constituted  myself  worse  than  I  did”  or  “I  am  getting  better  at  constituting  myself”.  To 
clarify,  my  claim  is  not  that  people  are  actually  making  claims  about  their  own  project  of  self 
constitution  when  evaluating  their  own  moral  progress  and  performance  (by  performance  I 
mean  the  degree  of  their  success  at  solving  moral  problems  -  doing  the  right  thing).  Rather,  my 
claim  is  that  it  follows  from  Kantian  constitutivism  that  correctly  formulated  evaluations  of  one’s 
normative  performance  will  be  about  one’s  self  constitution.  This  is  the  correct  formulation  of  an 
evaluation  of  a  subject’s  normative  performance  because  normativity  is,  at  least  according  to 
Kantian  constitutivism,  about  one’s  self  constitution. 
 
Evaluations  of  one’s  self  constitution  are  scalar  because  you  are  not  evaluating  whether  you  are 
correctly  self  constituted  or  not,  at  least  not  in  the  sense  that  you  are  evaluating  whether  you 
have  achieved  it  or  not.  Rather,  you  are  evaluating  how  you  are  doing  at  the  task  of  pursuing  the 
aim  of  self  constituting.  To  clarify,  my  point  is  not  that  this  is  how  individuals  actually  engage  in 
self  evaluation  (this  would  be  an  empirical  question);  my  point  is  that  this  is  how  to  correctly 
formulate  a  statement  about  your  performance  at  self  constitution  (the  task  of  normativity).  This 
is  the  correct  formulation  of  a  subject's  normative  performance  because  normativity  is 
something  that  a  subject  is  doing  as  an  ongoing  project  and  needs  to  be  understood  in  that 
context.  The  nature  of  the  activity  of  self  constitution  requires  that  it  be  understood  as  something 
that  is  ongoing,  rather  than  something  that  is  finished .  Self  constitution  is  not  something  you 66
are  ever  finished  undertaking  and  to  evaluate  it  as  something  that  has,  or  has  not,  been 
accomplished  is  to  misunderstand  its  nature.  The  nature  of  self  constitution  is  that  it  must  be 
understood  in  the  context  of  your  freedom  and  that  means  it  must  be  understood  in  the  context 
that  freedom  can  be  understood,  which  means  the  position  of  a  subject  making  a  decision.  One 
might  suppose  that  the  task  of  self  constitution  can  be  completed  in  cases  where  the  agent  has 
died,  because  they  will  no  longer  be  constituting  themselves.  However,  the  necessity  of 
understanding  freedom  from  the  perspective  of  the  subject  that  is  exercising  it  (which  I  discuss 
further  in  §§3.6  and  3.9)  means  that  the  activity  of  self  constitution  can  only  be  understood  in 
cases  where  the  subject  is  still  alive  and  capable  of  exercising  their  freedom.  Normativity,  and 
so  scalar  normativity,  is  derived  from  autonomy  and  autonomy  can  only  be  understood  in  a 
particular  context  and  that  context  requires  that  the  subject  be  alive  and  able  to  exercise  their 
freedom.  The  point  is  that  a  deceased  subject  is  finished  constituting  themselves,  but  they  are 
also  no  longer  autonomous  and  it  is  only  within  the  scope  of  autonomy  that  your  obligation  to 
yourself  is  scalar. 
 
66  Remember,  as  explained  in  §§  3.3  and  3.4,  the  activity  of  self  constitution  needs  to  be  intelligible  from 
the  perspective  of  the  subject  that  is  undertaking  the  activity.  It  is  in  this  context  that  self  constitution  is 
scalar.  Providing  a  scalar  theory  of  constitutivist  normativity  allows  the  subject  to  explain  the  activity  of 
self  constitution  in  the  same  context  with  which  they  understand  the  development  of  their  project  of  self 
constitution  (see  §  3.9  for  the  related  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative).  
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Self  constitution  must  be  understood  from  the  position  of  a  subject  making  a  decision  because 
that  is  how  freedom  must  be  understood.  Self  constitution  is  the  activity  of  exercising  one’s 
agency,  of  making  decisions,  and  for  that  reason  it  is  the  activity  of  freedom  -  it  is  the 
constitutive  activity  of  freedom.  This  is  the  argument  I  have  adopted  from  Kantian  constitutivism: 
the  freedom  of  a  subject,  your  freedom  and  every  other  persons,  must  be  understood  from  the 
position  of  a  subject  that  is  making  a  decision.  That  is  to  say,  freedom  exists  only  from  the 
position  of  a  subject  that  is  exercising  it.  This  is  how,  as  Kant  put  it,  one  comes  to  regard  oneself 
as  an  intelligence  not  belonging  to  the  world  of  sense  but  to  the  world  of  understanding.  My 
development  of  this  constitutivist  argument  is  that  we  must  formulate  evaluations  of  self 
constitution  within  the  same  context  that  we  can  understand  self  constitution  itself.  Self 
constitution,  the  constitutive  activity  of  freedom,  must  be  understood  from  the  position  of  the 
subject  and  so  it  must  be  evaluated  in  that  context  too.  Or,  at  least,  it  must  be  evaluated  in  a 
manner  that  can  explain  the  nature  of  the  activity  in  the  same  context  in  which  the  activity  exists. 
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Evaluations  of  our  performance  at  the  task  of  self  constitution  are  only  complete  when  they 
include  those  kinds  of  evaluations  that  follow  from  the  same  context  in  which  the  thing  we  are 
evaluating  exists.  So,  because  self  constitution  exists  in  the  context  of  a  subject  that  is  making  a 
decision,  exercising  their  freedom,  any  examinations  of  self  constitution  can  only  be  complete  if 
they  include  what  is  required  to  examine  it  in  that  context.  This  is  where  the  relationship 
between  the  different  formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative,  which  is  developed  in  §  3.7,  are 
impacted  by  the  point  that  self  constitution  is  scalar  from  the  position  of  the  agent  undertaking 
the  task  of  self  constitution.  The  full  story  of  normativity,  including  any  judgements  about  a 
subject’s  performance  at  the  task  of  normativity,  cannot  be  told  without  including  the  nature  of 
normativity  in  the  context  in  which  it  exists. 
 
Developing  my  argument  further  requires  examining  the  nature  of  the  activity  of  self  constitution 
as  presented  by  Korsgaard  and  Velleman.  These  two  Kantian  constitutitivsts  reveal  that 
normativity  is  derived  from  the  activity  that  is  constitutive  of  agency  and  that  this  activity  is 
something  that  exists  in  the  position  of  a  subject  undertaking  it.  An  examination  of  how  they 
establish  this  point  is  required  for  me  to  explain  how  Kantian  constitutivism  entails  that  self 
constitution  must  be  understood  as  an  ongoing  pursuit  from  the  perspective  of  the  subject 
pursuing  it.  However,  prior  to  this  examination  I  should  qualify  the  argument  I  am  giving  and 
point  out  two  problems  that  arise. 
 
The  qualifier  I  need  to  attach  to  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology  is  that  it  performs  better  as 
an  argument  that  scalar  deontology  is  possible  than  it  does  as  an  argument  that  deontology  is 
67  James  Dreier  (1997)  raises  a  concern  I  consider  to  be  similar  in  “Humean  Doubts  about  the  Practical 
Justification  of  Morality”  where  he  argues  that  norms  which  are  impossible  to  violate  do  not  make  sense 
(p.  91).  His  point  is  that  there  is  at  least  some  sense  in  which  violating  norms  appears  to  make  sense,  but 
Kantian’s  argue  that  violating  norms  is  incoherent.  This  tension  can  be  resolved  by  pointing  out  that  both 
parties  are,  in  a  sense,  correct:  it  is  incoherent  to  violate  the  moral  law,  but  because  our  coherence  is 
scalar  the  incoherence  of  violating  the  moral  law  is  not  absolute.  
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necessarily  scalar.  In  §  3.0  I  explained  that  I  am  arguing  that  Kantian  constitutivism  entails  that  a 
scalar  deontology  is  possible,  but  when  explaining  the  argument  in  detail  I  do  so  in  terms  of 
deontology  necessarily  being  scalar.  This  is  because  when  my  argument  deals  in  the  manner  in 
which  we  understand  our  own  freedom  it  is  dealing  in  necessary  elements  of  the  nature  of  a 
subject.  Presenting  such  an  argument,  founded  in  the  nature  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  subject,  results 
in  presenting  an  argument  that  the  conclusion  is  necessary,  when,  in  a  sense,  the  conclusion  is 
contingent  upon  the  reliability  of  our  own  access  to  the  relevant  elements  of  our  nature.  This  is  a 
result  of  the  argument  I  am  providing  for  scalar  deontology  utilising  core  elements  of  Kantian 
constitutivism,  elements  that  are  themselves  developments  of  Kant’s  philosophy.  The  primary 
point  I  am  utilising  for  this  argument  regards  the  nature  of  freedom  and  its  relationship  with 
morality.  This  is  supplemented  by  assertions  regarding  the  nature  of  apperception  (the  ability  to 
examine  the  nature  of  consciousness  and  derive  knowledge  from  that  access  to  the  structure  of 
one’s  own  mind).  These  elements  of  Kantian  constitutivism  are  extensions,  by  Korsgaard  and 
Velleman,  of  the  Kantian  tradition  and  are  defended  and  developed  by  the  philosophers  utilising 
them.  My  point  is  that  any  problems  with  the  analysis  of  the  nature  of  agency  undertaken  by 
Korsgaard  and  Velleman  are  likely  to  be  inherited  by  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology.  In  this 
sense,  my  argument  is  better  understood  as  an  argument  that  scalar  deontology  is  possible; 
although,  it  is  best  presented  as  an  argument  that  deontology  must  necessarily  be  scalar 
(because  the  argument  depends  on  premises  that  might  turn  out  to  be  false,  see  the  two 
paragraphs  below). 
 
For  the  same  reason  that  I  must  add  this  qualifier  I  need  to  identify  two  problems  that  arise  from 
my  argument  for  scalar  deontology.  By  dealing  in  the  necessary  nature  of  subjects  my  argument 
requires  claims  about  the  necessary  nature  of  our  freedom  and  the  access  we  have  to 
knowledge  about  that  nature.  The  first  assumption  that  might  be  challenged  is  that  this  entails 
particular  claims  about  the  nature  of  freedom.My  argument  entails  the  Kantian  theory  of 
freedom.  Kant  (1785)  explains  that  we  must,  when  in  the  position  of  the  subject  making  a 
choice,  regard  ourselves  as  having  free  will  (4:452-5:453).  It  is  this  claim  that  leads  me  to  argue 
that  we  must  understand  the  activity  of  self  constitution  in  the  same  context  that  freedom  exists 
and  this  is  a  claim  about  the  nature  of  freedom  and  how  it  relates  to  morality.  So,  my  argument 
for  scalar  deontology  will  inherit  whatever  problems  stem  from  this  claim  -  if  Kant  is  wrong  about 
freedom  and  the  foundations  for  morality,  then  scalar  normativity  fails  alongside  the  Kantian 
moral  project. 
 
The  second  assumption  that  that  warrants  identification  (as  something  that  might  be  challenged) 
is  that  my  argument  does  not  successfully  disambiguate  between  establishing  that  deontology  is 
indeterminate  and  establishing  that  it  is  scalar.  If,  as  I  argue,  we  must  evaluate  self  constitution 
in  a  manner  that  acknowledges  it  exists  as  an  activity  a  subject  is  doing  (that  is,  as  something 
ongoing)  then  one  might  point  out  that  it  follows  that  self  constitution  is  never  finished  and 
therefore  can  never  be  accomplished.  This  is  not  a  problem  for  my  argument  insofar  as  it  entails 
that  we  can  be  closer  to,  or  further  away  from,  self  constitution.  However,  it  might  instead  entail 
that  self  constitution  is  fundamentally  indeterminate  -  that  is,  there  is  no  fact  of  the  matter  about 
whether  we  are  correctly  constituted  or  not.  The  potential  problem  is  that  my  claim  that  self 
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constitution  must  be  regarded  as  something  ongoing  requires  that  it  cannot  be  evaluated  at  all 
because  it  can  never  be  finished.  At  least,  it  cannot  be  simultaneously  finished  and  understood 
from  the  same  position  in  which  it  exists,  because  you  are  only  finished  self  constituting  when 
you  die,  but  at  that  point  your  obligation  to  yourself  is  finished  and  so  the  context  in  which  scalar 
deontology  can  be  understood  is  gone.  Unlike  the  first  problem,  I  am  unable  to  address  this 
concern  in  depth.  Except,  that  is,  to  point  out  that  the  finished  status  of  one’s  self  constitution  is 
indeed  indeterminate  -  but  that  does  not  prevent  the  ongoing  status  of  one’s  self  constitution 
from  being  scalar.  I  don’t  think  this  is  indeterminate,  but  false.  At  most  one  is  fully  integrated  at  a 
time .  So,  yes  it  is  the  case  that  you  are  never  ‘finished  self  constituting’,  but  it  is  also  the  case 
that  you  always  (so  long  as  you  continue  to  be  yourself)  have  the  aim  of  becoming  more 
coherently  self  constituted.  The  potential  indeterminacy  relates  to  self  constitution  as  a 
completed  task  in  need  of  evaluation,  while  the  scalar  nature  of  deontology  relates  to  the  task  in 
its  ongoing  sense.  
 
While  Kant  argues  that  the  subject  must  regard  itself  as  belonging  to  the  world  of  understanding 
Kantian  constitutivists  make  this  point  by  explaining  that  when  we  are  in  the  position  of  making 
decisions  about  our  actions  we  must  regard  ourselves  as  the  cause  of  our  own  choices.  The 
idea  is  that  it  is  a  necessity  of  making  a  choice  that  you  regard  yourself  as  the  cause  of  the 
decision  that  is  made.  It  is  this  sense  in  which  we  necessarily  understand  ourselves  to  be  free 
and,  because  of  that  freedom,  to  have  agency.  This  is  the  context  within  which  we  discover  the 
source  of  normativity,  the  activity  of  self  constitution.  So,  this  is  also  the  context  from  which  I  am 
attempting  to  derive  the  scalar  nature  of  that  activity  and,  with  that  aim  in  mind,  my  argument 
requires  an  examination  of  how  the  nature  of  this  activity  is  established.  This  examination  will  be 
accomplished  with  an  analysis  of  how  Korsgaard  and  Velleman  establish  this  point.  The  aim  of 
this  analysis  is  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  common  point  being  made  by  both  of  these 
Kantian  constitutivists,  that  this  point  relates  to  what  they  are  deriving  from  Kant’s  philosophy, 
and  that  how  this  point  is  established  requires  regarding  the  activity  of  self  constitution  as  an 




3.7  Korsgaard  on  freedom,  agency,  and  normativity 
Kantian  constitutivism  entails  scalar  deontology  because  of  how  it  derives  normativity  from  our 
nature.  Scalar  deontology  is  derived  from  the  same  place  as  Kantian  constitutivism  derives 
normativity:  the  necessary  and  constitutive  elements  of  the  self.  The  compatibility  between 
these  two  projects,  scalar  deontology  and  Kantian  constitutivism  more  broadly  understood,  is 
best  explained  with  reference  to  how  the  constitutivist  project  is  undertaken  by  neoKantians.  For 
this  reason  this  section  examines  how  Korsgaard  grounds  normativity  in  freedom  and  explain 
why  this  is  compatible  with  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology  (in  §  3.8  I  provide  the  analysis  of 
Velleman’s  constitutivism  by  examining  how  he  derives  the  objectivity  of  his  normative  theory 
from  our  own  engagement  with  our  own  project  of  making  ourselves  intelligible).  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism  derives  normativity  from  the  process  of  self  constitution.  She  does  this  by 
establishing  a  relationship  between  the  nature  of  autonomy,  agency,  freedom,  and  normativity. 
This  relationship  is  established,  argues  Korsgaard,  by  explaining  that  all  of  these  elements,  of 
what  we  are,  must  be  understood  in  the  context  of  a  subject  who  is  undertaking  the  activity  of 
making  a  decision  and,  in  doing  so,  exercising  their  autonomy  which,  if  they  do  so  successfully, 
makes  them  free  and  requires  them  to  endorse  their  own  agency.  Her  argument  is  that  the 
standpoint  of  autonomy,  the  subject  undertaking  the  activity  of  making  a  decision,  is  what  makes 
autonomy,  agency,  freedom,  and  normativity  real.  My  argument  is  that  the  same  standpoint  is 
what  makes  normativity  scalar.  These  two  arguments  are  compatible  because  they  are  part  of 
the  same  project,  they  are  both  part  of  the  derivation  of  the  nature  of  normativity  from  the 
necessary  constitutive  elements  of  being  a  subject  (that  is,  of  being  what  you  are).  
 
Korsgaard  (1996b)  argues  that  there  is  no  tension  between  freewill  and  determinism  by 
supporting  Kant’s  argument  that  freedom  is  derived  from  the  necessity  of  the  subject  regarding 
itself  as  in  control  of  its  own  decisions  when  it  is  in  the  position  of  having  to  make  a  decision  (p. 
94).  Korsgaard  presents  the  supposed  tension  between  determinism  and  freedom  as  arising 
from  the  notion  that  freedom  entails  that  a  subject  might  have  been  able  to  do  other  than  what 
they  have  done.  The  idea  is  that  freedom  requires  that  the  subject  exercising  their  freedom 
could  have  chosen  to  act  in  a  different  manner  than  they  did:  it  can  be  stated  as  the  claim  that 
‘you  were  only  free  if  you  could  have  done  other  than  you  did’.  This  results  in  a  tension  between 
the  possibility  of  freedom  and  the  (purported)  deterministic  nature  of  the  universe  because,  if 
our  actions  were  determined  by  the  state  of  the  universe  preceding  the  moment  of  the  decision, 
it  is  not  the  case  that  you  could  have  done  other  than  you  did  -  what  you  did  was  determined. 
By  utilising,  and  then  developing  further  in  her  explanation  of  agency,  Kant’s  theory  of  freedom 
Korsgaard  presents  the  key  observation  that  allows  the  development  of  scalar  deontology  - 
which  is,  that  the  nature  of  freedom  is  such  that  its  existence  must  be  understood  in  the  context 
of  the  subject  in  the  position  of  exercising  that  freedom. 
 
Korsgaard  (1996b)  attempts  to  establish  this  claim  by  pointing  out  that  “[i]t  is  because  of  the 
reflective  character  of  the  mind  that  we  must  act,  as  Kant  put  it,  under  the  idea  of  freedom”  (p. 
94).  This  is  a  solution  to  the  supposed  problem  of  incompatibility  between  determinism  and 
freedom  because  it  explains  the  sense  in  which  freedom  exists.  Freedom  does  not  exist  as  the 
type  of  thing  that,  somehow,  makes  it  the  case  that  you  could  have  done  otherwise;  rather, 
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freedom  exists  in  the  sense  that  it  describes  the  position  of  the  subject  while  it  is  making  a 
decision.  The  idea,  which  Korsgaard  is  deriving  from  Kant  and  refining,  is  that  freedom 
describes  the  structure  of  the  process  of  rational  decision  making .  By  the  process  of  rational 68
decision  making  I  mean  the  process  of  using  your  faculty  of  reason  to  reflect  on  a  decision  (a 
choice  you  are  making)  and  then,  as  the  result  of  that  reflection,  endorsing  the  decision.  So, 
according  to  Korsgaard’s  development  of  Kant’s  theory  of  freedom,  freedom  is  reflective 
endorsement.  That  is  to  say,  you  are  in  the  position  of  being  free  when  you  are  undertaking  the 
process  of  reflective  endorsement  and,  for  that  reason,  you  are  free  insofar  as  you  are  making 
your  choices  according  to  the  process  of  reflective  endorsement.  This  is  how  Korsgaard  justifies 
the  existence  of  freedom,  explains  why  freedom  is  compatible  with  determinism,  and  how  she 
connects  freedom  and  agency. 
 
Korsgaard’s  explanation  of  freedom  connects  freedom  and  agency  by  explaining  that  freedom  is 
the  same  activity  that  is  constitutive  of  agency.  The  structure  of  the  reflective  mind  justifies  the 
existence  of  freedom  because  it  is  the  structure  of  the  subject  in  the  process  of  making  a 
decision,  which  is  the  context  in  which  freedom  exists.  This  justification  arises  from  the  reflective 
nature  of  the  mind  of  a  rational  subject  which,  as  Korsgaard  (1996b)  explains,  is  evident 
because  of  the  nature  of  the  structure  of  our  own  minds:  
[T]he  human  mind  is  self-conscious  in  the  sense  that  it  is  essentially  reflective.  I’m  not 
talking  about  being  thoughtful ,  which  of  course  is  an  individual  property,  but  about  the 
structure  of  our  minds  that  makes  thoughtfulness  possible.  A  lower  animal’s  attention  is 
fixed  on  the  world.  It  is  engaged  in  conscious  activities,  but  it  is  not  conscious  of  them. 
That  is,  they  are  not  the  objects  of  its  attention.  But  we  human  animals  turn  our  attention 
on  to  our  perceptions  and  desires  themselves,  on  to  our  own  mental  activities,  and  we 
are  conscious  of  them.  That  is  why  we  can  think  about  them.  (p.  93)  
So,  for  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism,  the  nature  of  freedom  is  that  it  exists  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a 
necessary  element  of  what  it  is  to  be  an  agent.  Freedom  is  the  reflection  and  the  endorsement 
of  decisions  we  make  using  the  reasoning  that  is  the  reflective  process.  This  is  the  same 
element  of  our  nature  that  Korsgaard  argues  is  the  source  of  normativity  and  that  she  develops 
into  the  source  of  moral  law.  This  common  source  is  important  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  because 
by  deriving  normativity,  morality,  and  freedom  from  the  structure  of  our  reflective  minds  she  has 
derived  her  theory  from  a  necessary  element  of  our  agency  and,  because  of  this  necessity, 
established  the  objectivity  of  her  theory.  Secondly,  as  I  shall  explain,  because  this  relationship 
between  normativity,  morality  (the  moral  law),  and  the  necessary  element  of  our  agency  is  the 
same  relationship  between  our  agency  and  the  reason  that  deontology  is  scalar.  
 
68  One  might  object  that  this  does  not  appear  to  address  the  issue  of  free  will  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not 
explain  how  we  are  free  from  deterministic  causes.  One  might  point  out  that  if  free  will  is  merely  acting 
rationally  in  the  sense  Kant  and  Korsgaard  describe  then  it  is  not  free  in  an  important  sense:  rather  than 
explaining  how  we  are  free  to  choose,  they  argue  that  we  are  ‘free’  when  we  obey  the  demands  of 
reason.  While  this  might  be  a  relevant  concern,  I  want  to  clarify  that  neither  Kant  nor  Korsgaard  are  trying 
to  establish  the  type  of  freedom  that  would  provide  such  an  explanation.  Freedom  in  this  context  is  not 
intended  to  have  any  connotations  beyond  what  the  Kantian  conception  of  a  free  will  entails. 
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Deontology  is  scalar  because  we  must  regard  our  freedom  as  an  ongoing  activity,  something  we 
are  engaged  in  rather  than  something  we  have  engaged  in.  This  is  the  same  context  in  which 
the  human  mind  is,  as  Korsgaard  argues,  essentially  reflective  and  the  same  context  in  which 
freedom  exists.  Regarding  our  freedom  in  this  manner  entails  treating  reflective  endorsement, 
freedom,  as  something  we  are  always  attempting  to  accomplish,  a  problem  we  are  always  trying 
to  solve.  The  problem  we  are  always  trying  to  solve  is  the  problem  of  making  the  right  decision 
(that  is,  the  constitutive  problem  of  our  nature  -  trying  to  constitute  ourselves).  In  this  context  our 
failures,  the  times  we  failed  to  make  the  correct  decision,  are  not  understood  as  instances  in 
which  we  were  not  free  but,  instead,  they  are  properly  understood  as  factors  that  contribute  to 
our  ability  to  be  free  now.  The  times  that  we  succeeded  in  making  the  correct  decision  are  the 
same  and  this  is  true  for  all  of  the  factors  contributing  to  our  ability  to  engage  in  the  activity  of 
freedom,  reflective  endorsement.  When  understood  in  the  context  of  something  we  are  doing, 
something  ongoing,  the  contributing  factors  to  that  task  are  factors  that  either  aid  or  hinder  our 
ability  to  undertake  the  aim  of  the  task.  It  is  this  sense  in  which  deontology  is  scalar,  the  sense 
in  which  the  contributing  factors  relevant  to  our  ability  to  fulfil  our  obligations,  obey  the  moral 
law,  do  so  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree.  
 
The  contributing  factors  relevant  to  our  ability  to  fulfil  our  obligation  to  ourselves  contribute  to  a 
greater  or  lesser  degree  when  compared  to  their  alternatives.  For  example,  if  I  am  at  a  store 
and  deciding  whether  or  not  to  rob  the  owner  my  past  interactions  with  storekeepers  would 
contribute  to  my  ability  to  make  the  right  choice  (in  this  case,  not  steal  anything  and  leave 
peacefully)  in  proportion  to  the  degree  that  they  help  me  make  the  right  choice  now.  To  explain 
further,  if  I  had  failed  to  do  the  right  thing  in  an  earlier  decision  by  stealing  from  a  local  store  it 
would  contribute  more  to  my  ability  to  do  the  right  thing  at  the  current  moment  than  if  I  had  done 
something  worse  during  my  earlier  attempt,  such  as  harming  the  shopkeeper  as  well  as  stealing 
their  property.  My  point  is  that  the  degree  of  our  failures  and  successes  at  self  unification  can 
contribute  to  my  ability  to  unify  in  the  future  to  the  extent  that  past  decisions  become  a  part  of 
the  forces  in  play  when  I  am  undertaking  the  process  of  reflective  deliberation  and  using  my 
faculty  of  reason  to  make  a  decision.  An  alternative  example  might  help  here:  when  I  am 
deciding  what  to  do  one  of  the  ways  I  might  represent  what  I  am  trying  to  do  is  by  asking  myself 
what  decision  would  make  me  into  the  type  of  person  I  ought  to  be  (which  I  might  phrase  as 
‘what  would  make  me  into  who  I  aspire  to  be?’  or,  perhaps,  ‘what  would 
Spock(Piccard/Jesus/etc.)  do?’).  
 
This  manner  might,  on  the  face  of  it,  appear  unKantian  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not  appear  to 
describe  the  reflective  process  as  an  appeal  to  the  categorical  imperative.  However,  the  process 
of  deciding  what  to  do  by  deciding  what  type  of  person  one  ought  to  be  is  faithful  to  the  Kantian 
tradition  because  it  is  a  way  of  describing  the  pursuit  of  self  constitution  as  the  construction  of 
the  self  into  the  type  of  person  one  ought  to  be.  The  idea  is  that,  when  I  ask  myself  what 
decision  will  make  me  into  the  type  of  person  I  ought  to  be,  I  am  appealing  to  the  notion  that 
there  is  an  array  of  options  before  me  regarding  who  I  might  be  and  that  I  have  control  over 
which  of  them  I  become.  That  is  to  say,  I  am  identifying  that  there  are  many  ways  in  which  I 
might  constitute  myself,  as  I  make  the  decision  before  me,  and  some  are  better  than  others. 
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Assuming  that  Kantian  constitutivism,  broadly  speaking,  correctly  explains  the  nature  of 
normativity,  then  some  are  better  than  others  in  the  sense  that  they  are  more  conducive  of 
coherent  self  constitution  (to  use  Korsgaard’s  terminology)  or  more  conducive  of  making  one 
intelligible  to  oneself  (to  use  Velleman’s  terminology).  This  is  a  scalar  notion  to  the  extent  that 
we  can  understand  that  some  of  these  options,  the  options  of  who  I  might  become,  are  more  or 
less  helpful  than  others  to  my  pursuit  of  the  aim  of  self  constitution  (making  myself  coherent  or 
intelligible).  My  point  is  that,  while  there  is  a  sense  in  which  some  of  the  decisions  will  be 
coherent  (intelligible)  and  the  others  not,  from  the  position  of  the  subject  engaged  in  making  the 
decision,  it  does  make  sense  to  describe  the  options  before  the  subject  as  being  more  or  less 
helpful  to  the  aim  they  are  pursuing  (the  ongoing  aim  of  self  constitution).  So,  when  Korsgaard 
defends  the  existence  of  freedom,  as  well  as  morality  (the  moral  law),  in  the  context  of  a  subject 
in  the  position  of  exercising  that  freedom  she  is  deriving  the  existence  of  freedom  from  the  same 
context  in  which  one  can  view  the  various  options  they  face  as  being  more  or  less  helpful  in 
their  pursuit  for  the  aim  of  their  freedom  (that  is,  the  aim  of  their  agency  -  self  constitution).  
 
The  relationship  between  how  Korsgaard  establishes  that  freedom  exists  and  the  nature  of 
agency  justifies  my  claim  that  self  constitution  is  scalar  because  it  is  scalar  in  the  same  context 
in  which  freedom  exists.  To  develop  this  claim  I  need  to  explore  how  Korsgaard  explains  the 
nature  of  agency  in  order  to  identify  why  the  connection  between  the  existence  of  freedom  and 
the  source  of  normativity  entails  understanding  self  constitution  in  the  context  of  the  subject 
making  a  decision  (that  is,  undertaking  the  activity  of  agency  -  exercising  their  freedom  to 
constitute  themselves).  Before  I  undertake  this  further  development,  I  need  to  explain  the 
relationship  between  the  structure  of  our  minds,  the  necessary  structure  Korsgaard  appeals  to 
in  order  to  explain  the  nature  of  freedom  and  agency,  and  the  examples  I  have  just  used  to 
demonstrate  that  the  decisions  we  face  are  scalar.  Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  our  minds  are 
necessarily  reflective,  what  she  means  is  that  we  must  have  the  ability  to  reflect  in  order  to  be 
thinking  at  all.  At  least,  we  must  have  this  ability  in  order  to  be  thinking  in  the  sense  that  an 
agent  thinks.  I  intend  to  invoke  the  same  type  of  necessity  in  the  examples  I  have  just  provided. 
My  point  is  that  these  examples  relate  to  necessary  elements  of  the  self. 
 
This  is  a  development  of  the  point  made  by  Kant  (1781/1787/1996)  who  argues  that  the  prefix  “I 
think”  must  be  attachable  to  all  thoughts,  even  those  pertaining  to  necessary  claims  (B132). 
Kant’s  point,  and  Korsgaard’s  too,  is  that  even  when  claims  pertain  to  necessities  the  subject 
still  plays  a  role  in  their  presentation.  When  regarding  necessary  claims,  such  as  the  nature  of 
reason  or  the  essential  elements  of  the  subject,  the  self  still  plays  a  role  by  providing  the  context 
in  which  the  necessary  elements  were  presented.  The  idea  is  that  because  the  subject  is 
necessary  for  there  to  be  thoughts  at  all,  the  necessity  of  those  elements  of  the  subject  that  are 
themselves  necessary  to  present  them  as  such  (as  necessary)  is  established.  So,  it  is 
necessary  for  a  thinking  subject  (an  agent,  or  whatever  term  used  to  denote  a  being  with  an 
abstract  understanding  of  the  universe)  to  be  reflective  because  being  reflective  is  necessary  to 
understand  those  elements  of  thought  (reason  and  so  on)  that  are  themselves  necessary. 
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One  might  point  out  that  it  appears  as  though  I  have  identified  contingent  matters  of  psychology 
in  the  examples  I  provided  of  subjects  regarding  the  decisions  they  face  in  a  scalar  manner.  In 
my  example  of  the  subject  deciding  whether  to  rob  a  store  or  leave  peacefully  I  claimed  that 
past  decisions  (past  interactions  with  himself)  can  provide  a  scalar  contribution  to  his  ability  to 
make  the  right  decision  in  the  current  instance.  In  the  other  example,  where  one  is  deciding 
what  type  of  person  they  want  to  be  and  matching  that  to  the  decision  they  want  to  make,  I 
claimed  that  they  can  regard  decisions  as  being  more  or  less  conducive  to  developing  them  into 
the  type  of  person  they  aim  to  be.  In  both  of  these  cases  it  appears  that  I  am  making  a 
psychological  claim  about  how  these  decisions  will  affect  the  actions  and  conception  of  the  self 
(self-concept)   for  the  individual  in  question.  If  this  were  true  then  my  examples  would  not  reveal 
anything  about  what  Korsgaard  is  deriving  freedom  from,  because  she  is  deriving  freedom  from 
necessary  rather  than  contingent  elements  of  subjects,  I  would  instead  have  provided  examples 
that  relate  to  empirical  psychology  rather  than  the  nature  of  reason  and  normativity.  So,  I  need 
to  clarify  that  my  point  is  not  that  such  manner  of  self  conception  will  in  fact  provide  the  subject 
with  aid  (to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent)  towards  their  aim  (of  self  constitution).  What  impact  our 
past  or  current  behaviour  has  on  our  own  understanding  of  ourselves  and  the  actions  we  take 
now  and  in  the  future  is  a  matter  of  psychology.  Rather,  my  point  is  that  the  position  of  the 
subject  when  they  make  a  decision  entails  that  they  can  understand  the  choices  they  face  as 
being  more  or  less  helpful  towards  the  aim  of  their  reflective  process  (self  constitution). 
 
The  idea  is  that  it  makes  sense  to  understand  the  choices  you  face  when  making  a  decision 
(when  exercising  your  freedom)  as  more  or  less  helpful  to  the  aim  you  are  in  pursuit  of  during 
the  decision  making  process.  Strictly,  it  makes  sense  to  understand  them  this  way  from  the 
position  of  the  subject  and  in  the  context  of  exercising  their  freedom .  Whether  the  decision 
actually  resulted  in  the  individual  acting  in  a  particular  way  is  something  that  may  in  principle  be 
measurable   externally,  either  after  the  fact  or  perhaps  in  real  time  via  external  observation  of 
brain  states,  and  is  a  contingent  matter  of  psychology.  The  necessary  part,  the  point  that 
establishes  scalar  deontology  and  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism,  is  how  these  choices  are 
understood  from  the  position  of  the  subject  as  they  undertake  the  task  of  self  reflection.  From 
that  position,  the  position  of  the  subject ,  the  choices  faced  during  the  decision  making  process 
can  be  understood  as  having  a  scalar  value  in  relation  to  the  aim  of  their  decision  making 
process  for  the  same  reason  that  freedom  exists  from  that  position  -  the  subject  must 
understand  them  in  this  manner.  That  is,  the  subject  must  understand  themselves  as  being  in 
control  of  the  choice  they  make  (free)  and  must  regard  the  choices  they  face  as  valuable  in 
proportion  to  the  extent  to  which  they  aid  the  aim  of  their  reflection.  I  should  clarify  that  the 
subject  must  understand  themselves  in  this  manner  if  they  are  to  understand  themselves 
coherently  -  many  of  us,  in  practice,  do  not  understand  ourselves  and  our  freedom  in  this 
manner.  
 
Deontology  is  scalar  because  the  same  context  that  Korsgaard  establishes  that  freedom  exists 
within,  the  position  of  the  subject  making  a  decision,  is  one  which  allows  the  subject  to  value  the 
choices  they  make  as  more  or  less  helpful  in  their  pursuit  of  their  ongoing  aim  of  self 
constitution.  Given  that  the  relationship  between  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  and  scalar 
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deontology  is  at  this  foundational  level,  the  level  at  which  the  existence  of  freedom  and  agency 
is  established,  one  might  wonder  why  scalar  deontology  is  not  already  present  in  her  theory.  In 
a  limited  sense  it  already  is,  in  the  sense  that  the  foundations  of  scalar  deontology  are  utilised 
by  Korsgaard  to  establish  the  nature  of  agency  and  the  existence  of  freedom;  this  is  why  they 
are  compatible  and  will  be  explored  further  after  I  explain  why  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  as  she 
presents  it  is  not  scalar.  Korsgaard  does  not  establish  a  scalar  theory  because  of  how  she 
establishes  the  necessity  of  morality  from  the  existence  of  freedom.  Korsgaard  derives  the 
necessity  of  morality  in  the  form  of  moral  laws  that  demand  coherence  and  then  identifies  one’s 
moral  obligation  as  the  adherence  to  those  laws.  This  is  not  a  scalar  moral  theory  because  one 
is  either  adhering  to  the  moral  law  or  not. 
 
Korsgaard  derives  the  moral  laws  form  the  nature  of  freedom  by  arguing  that  because  freedom 
is  self  determination  it  must  have  a  law  giving  nature.  She  argues  this  by  explaining  that  the 
nature  of  reason  is  to  undertake  the  process  of  reflection  (deciding  what  to  do)  by  constructing 
laws  that  govern  the  decisions  we  make.  Her  point  is  that:  “‘Reason’  means  reflective  success. 
So  if  I  decide  that  my  desire  is  a  reason  to  act,  I  must  decide  that  on  reflection  I  endorse  that 
desire.”  (Korsgaard,  1996b,  p.  97).  The  nature  of  reason,  as  the  control  we  have  over  our  own 
actions,  poses  a  problem  because  it  is  not  clear  how  we  achieve  reflective  success;  that  is  to 
say,  if  she  claims  reason  means  success  at  the  process  of  deciding  what  to  do  (reflection)  then 
she  is  required  to  explain  what  the  success  criteria  for  that  process  are.  Korsgaard  (1996b) 
solves  this  problem  by  explaining  that  it  is  the  nature  of  the  freedom  itself  that  solves  this 
problem;  her  argument  is  that  freedom  is  the  control  of  one’s  own  decision  and  that  control 
takes  the  form  of  prescribing  rules: 
Kant  …  described  this  problem  in  terms  of  freedom.  He  defines  a  free  will  as  a  rational 
causality  which  is  effective  without  being  determined  by  any  alien  cause.  Anything 
outside  of  the  will  counts  as  an  alien  cause,  including  the  desires  and  inclinations  of  the 
person.  The  free  will  must  be  entirely  self-determining.  Yet,  because  the  will  is  a 
causality,  it  must  act  according  to  some  law  or  other.  Kant  says:  ‘Since  the  concept  of  a 
causality  entails  that  of  laws  .  .  .  it  follows  that  freedom  is  by  no  means  lawless  .  .  .’  69
Alternatively,  we  may  say  that  since  the  will  is  practical  reason,  it  cannot  be  conceived 
as  acting  and  choosing  for  no  reason.  Since  reasons  are  derived  from  principles,  the 
free  will  must  have  a  principle.  But  because  the  will  is  free,  no  law  or  principle  can  be 
imposed  on  it  from  outside.  Kant  concludes  that  the  will  must  be  autonomous:  that  is,  it 
must  have  its  own  law  or  principle.  (pp.  97-98) 
Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  our  autonomy,  freedom,  is  control  over  our  own  decisions  and  that  this 
control  is  exercised  by  prescribing  the  laws  that  we  follow.  Prescribing  the  laws  that  we  follow  is 
accomplished  reflecting  on  the  choices  before  us  and  determining  which  we  should  endorse 
based  on  the  relevant  reasons  -  that  is  the  process  of  law  making,  the  activity  of  the  will.  This  is 
how  she  establishes,  utilising  Kant’s  argument,  that  morality  takes  the  form  of  the  moral  law; 
that  is,  morality  is  based  on  laws  because  that  is  the  nature  of  freedom.  
 
69  Korsgaard  is  citing  “The  Groundwork  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals”  4:447. 
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With  the  nature  of  freedom  established,  as  the  control  over  one’s  actions  via  the  authorship  of 
the  laws  we  endorse  through  the  process  of  reflection,  Korsgaard  still  needs  to  justify  and 
explain  the  particular  set  of  rules  that  make  up  morality  as  such.  Her  argument  that  freedom 
takes  the  form  of  prescribing  our  own  laws  does  not  entail  a  particular  set  of  laws  and  it  does 
not  establish  the  necessity  of  any  of  the  laws  that  we  might  prescribe.  Korsgaard’s  aim  is  to 
establish  objective  moral  laws  and  to  accomplish  this  she  must  establish  not  just  that  morality 
takes  the  form  of  laws  but  also  that  there  is  a  particular  set  of  laws  that  are  the  success  criteria 
for  the  process  of  law  creation.  The  solution  to  this  problem  is  to  establish  that  the  correct  laws 
for  any  given  subject  to  construct  is  the  categorical  imperative.  Kant  puts  forward  this  argument 
by  explaining  that  the  nature  of  our  lawmaking  faculty  obligates  us  to  prescribe  laws  that  are 
categorical  (1785/2011  4:447-448).   The  idea  is  that  controlling  one’s  actions  via  the 70
construction  of  laws  is  only  accomplished  when  those  laws  are  coherent.  Attempting  to 
prescribe  laws  that  are  not  coherent  is  failing  to  prescribe  laws  at  all  (they  are,  due  to  their 
incoherence,  not  laws  of  reason);  hence,  the  success  criterion  for  being  free,  controlling  your 
choice  by  authoring  your  own  laws,  is  to  prescribe  coherent  laws.  By  coherent  laws,  I  mean 
laws  that  are  consistent  with  the  project  of  self  constitution  (so,  laws  that  will,  when  legislated, 
coherently  constitute  the  subject  legislating  them).  This  entails  the  categorical  imperative 
because  that  is  what  the  categorical  imperatives  are  -  the  laws  it  is  coherent  to  prescribe.  The 
connection  between  coherence  and  the  categorical  imperative  is  easiest  to  explain  in  relation  to 
the  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  as  the  universalizability  of  the  laws  you  prescribe. 
This  is  the  formula  of  universal  law  as  presented  by  Kant  (1785/2011):  
[T]he  principle  of  every  human  will  as  a  will  giving  universal  law  through  all  its  maxims, 
provided  it  is  otherwise  correct,  would  be  very  well  suited  to  be  the  categorical 
imperative  by  this:  that  just  because  of  the  idea  of  giving  universal  law  it  is  based  on  no 
interest  and  therefore,  among  all  possible  imperatives,  can  alone  be  unconditional ;  or 
still  better,  by  converting  the  proposition,  if  there  is  a  categorical  imperative  (i.e.,  a  law 
for  every  will  of  a  rational  being)  it  can  only  command  that  everything  be  done  from  the 
maxim  of  one’s  will  as  a  will  that  could  at  the  same  time  have  as  its  object  itself  as  giving 
universal  law;  for  only  then  is  the  practical  principle,  and  the  imperative  that  the  will 
obeys,  unconditional,  since  it  can  have  no  interest  as  its  basis.  (4:432)  
Kant’s  point  is  that  authoring  laws  to  control  our  choices  requires  that  those  laws  are  coherent 
and  in  order  for  those  laws  to  be  coherent  they  have  to  be  consistent  with  the  laws  we  would 
have  others  author  for  themselves.  In  short,  given  that  there  is  no  relevant  difference  between 
myself  and  others,  broadly  speaking,  I  must  author  those  laws  I  would  also  endorse  for  others  to 
follow,  because  to  not  do  so  would  be  incoherent.  I  must  treat  others  in  the  same  manner  I  treat 
myself,  because  they  are  the  same  as  me  in  the  relevant  sense,  and  that  means  controlling 
myself  in  the  same  manner  I  would  have  them  control  themselves.  
 
Korsgaard  develops  Kant’s  argument  further  when  establishing  normativity  in  her  constitutivist 
theory.  She  argues  that  the  subject  is  obligated  (duty  bound)  to  the  categorical  imperative  when 
70  Korsgaard  provides  an  explanation  of  Kant’s  argument  that  morality  and  freedom  are  one  and  the  same 
in  “Creating  the  Kingdom  of  Ends”  (1996a)  p.  162-167. 
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they  regard  themselves  as  a  member  of  the  kingdom  of  ends  (1996b,  pp.  98-102).  What 
Korsgaard  means  is  that  the  demand  for  coherence  in  the  laws  we  prescribe  becomes  the  moral 
law.  It  becomes  the  categorical  imperative  in  the  sense  intended  by  Kant  when  we  acknowledge 
that  I  am  in  a  particular  relation  to  other  moral  agents.  This  is  a  development  of  the  notion 
underlying  Kant’s  claims  that  coherence  demands  that  we  legislate  universalizable  laws 
because  it  is  not  coherent  to  treat  others  differently  than  we  treat  ourselves.  Korsgaard  (1996b) 
considers  this  a  development,  rather  than  a  clarification,  of  Kant’s  theory  because  it  does  not 
follow  that  we  must  endorse  others  in  the  same  manner  we  endorse  ourselves  until  it  is 
established  that  we  have  the  right  type  of  relation  to  others  (p.  99).  So,  according  to  Korsgaard, 
we  must  acknowledge  that  coherence  demands  we  treat  ourselves  as,  in  some  sense, 
constructing  a  society  (the  kingdom  of  ends)  with  others  before  we  are  obligated,  merely  on  the 
grounds  of  coherence,  to  regard  them  in  the  same  manner  we  regard  ourselves.  This  can  be 
established,  Korsgaard  argues,  by  pointing  out  that  we  must  endorse  ourselves  by  identifying 
the  same  element  of  ourselves  that  is  possessed  by  others  -  as  beings  that  decide  what  to  do 
by  reflecting  on  their  actions,  as  moral  agents  (pp.  101-102).  Her  argument  is  that  when  we 
undertake  the  process  of  reflecting,  choosing  what  choice  to  endorse,  we  are  undertaking  the 
process  of  being  a  moral  agent  and  acknowledging  this  entails  acknowledging  that  we  are  the 
same  as  other  beings  that  undertake  this  process.  Acknowledging  that  this  is  what  I  am  when 
undertaking  the  process  of  reflecting  puts  me  in  a  relation  with  other  beings  that  also  undertake 
this  process,  in  the  sense  that  coherence  demands  I  regard  them  in  the  same  manner  as  I 
regard  myself.  That  is  to  say,  when  I  endorse  myself  on  the  grounds  of  my  autonomy  I  obligate 
myself  to  endorse  the  autonomy  of  others.  
 
This  is  how  Korsgaard’s  Kantian  constitutivism  develops  a  theory  of  agency  that  entails  scalar 
deontology.  She  argues  that  it  is  because  of  the  relationship  we  have  with  ourselves,  the 
manner  in  which  we  endorse  our  own  autonomy  and  because  of  the  nature  of  freedom,  that  we 
are  obligated  to  adhere  to  the  categorical  imperative.  Freedom  is  adhering  to  the  categorical 
imperative,  because  to  be  free  is  to  control  yourself  by  reflectively  endorsing  your  choices 
according  to  laws  you  prescribe,  and  the  process  of  prescribing  those  laws  is  pursued  by 
obeying  the  demand  for  coherence  that  is  placed  upon  you  by  the  same  faculty  of  reason  that 
enables  you  to  reflect  on  the  decisions  you  make.  This  is  a  relationship  with  yourself  because  it 
requires  acknowledging  your  law-giving  nature,  your  freedom  (moral  agency),  to  engage  in  the 
process.  This  leads  Korsgaard  (2009a)  to  describe  agency  as  a  relation  to  oneself,  in  the  sense 
that  you  are  engaged  in  the  ongoing  constitution  of  oneself: 
[R]espect  for  humanity  is  a  necessary  condition  of  effective  action.  It  enables  you  to 
legislate  a  law  under  which  you  can  be  genuinely  unified,  and  it  is  only  to  the  extent  that 
you  are  genuinely  unified  that  your  movements  can  be  attributable  to  you,  rather  than  to 
forces  working  in  you  or  on  you,  and  so  can  be  actions.  So  the  moral  law  is  the  law  of 
the  unified  constitution,  the  law  of  the  person  who  really  can  be  said  to  legislate  for 
himself  because  he  is  the  person  who  really  has  a  self.  It  is  the  law  of  successful 
self-constitution.  …  It  is  simply  that  every  person  interacts  with  others  as  he  interacts 
with  himself,  and  in  this  the  good  person  is  no  different.  A  person  who  cannot  keep  a 
promise  to  himself  cannot  keep  a  promise  to  another.  A  person  who  is  prepared  to  sell 
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himself  for  a  little  money  is  prepared  to  sell  others  as  well.  A  servile  person  lacks  respect 
for  his  own  rights  and  so  for  the  rights  of  others.  Inward  and  outward  justice  go  together. 
(p.  206,  see  also  pp.  131,  202-203) 
Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  the  purpose  of  reflection,  the  process  of  utilising  your  faculty  of  reason 
to  make  a  decision,  is  to  constitute  yourself  coherently  (unify  yourself).  This  is  the  relationship 
between  freedom,  agency,  self  constitution,  and  normativity.  
 
The  idea,  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism,  is  that  freedom  is  constituting  yourself  properly 
(constituting  yourself  coherently  -  unifying  oneself)  because  it  is  by  constituting  yourself  that  you 
enact  your  freedom.  In  this  sense  your  freedom  is  your  ability  to  constitute  yourself,  to  unify 
yourself  and  become  coherent,  and  this  informs  the  nature  of  what  it  is  to  be  an  agent.  Her  point 
is  that  agency  needs  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the  practical  standpoint:  agency  means 
understanding  ourselves  as  active  beings  in  control  of  our  actions.  Korsgaard  (1996a)  explains 
that  understanding  ourselves  as  agents  means  understanding  ourselves  in  the  context  of 
exercising  our  control  over  our  own  decisions  (our  freedom): 
As  thinkers  and  choosers  we  must  regard  ourselves  as  active  beings,  even  though  we 
cannot  experience  ourselves  as  active  beings,  and  so  we  place  ourselves  among  the 
noumena ,  necessarily,  whenever  we  think  and  act.  According  to  this  interpretation,  the 71
laws  of  the  phenomenal  world  are  laws  that  describe  and  explain  our  behavior.  But  the 
laws  of  the  noumenal  world  are  laws  which  are  addressed  to  us  as  active  beings;  their 
business  is  not  to  describe  and  explain  at  all,  but  to  govern  what  we  do.  (p.  204) 
Her  point  is  that  when  we  regard  ourselves  as  free  (at  least,  when  we  do  so  accurately)  we  do 
so  in  a  particular  sense  and  that  is  by  explaining  the  position  a  subject  is  in  when  making  a 
decision.  The  notion  underlying  this  claim,  which  is  crucial  to  Korsgaard’s  conception  of  agency 
as  something  understood  from  the  position  of  the  subject  in  the  activity  of  exercising  their 
autonomy,  is  that  explaining  a  subject’s  behaviour  (what  they  did  and  why  they  did  it)  is  distinct 
from  explaining  the  activity  of  making  a  decision.  
 
There  is,  according  to  Kant  and  Korsgaard,  one  sense  in  which  we  can  understand  a  person’s 
behaviour  as  something  that  can  be  explained  and  described  according  to  the  observed 
phenomena.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  we  might  offer  a  psychological  or  sociological 
explanation  of  why  someone  acted  in  a  particular  way.  This  is  not  the  sense  in  which  freedom 
can  be  understood  and  not  the  context  in  which  agency  exists.  There  is  a  different  sense  in 
which  a  person’s  decision  can  be  judged  (in  a  moral  sense,  as  the  autonomous  action  of  an 
agent)  and  that  is  the  sense  in  which  an  agent’s  freedom  can  be  understood.  This  second  sense 
71  In  this  context  noumena  means  things  that  cannot  be  understood  within  the  restrictions  of  our  senses 
and  the  particular  presentation  of  the  world  that  is  our  experience  of  it  (that  is,  our  phenomena).  Kant 
(1781/1787/1996)  uses  the  term  noumena  to  describe  those  objects  that  cannot  be  understood  with 
reference  to  what  our  senses  present  to  us  (our  sense  data)  and  are  instead  understood  as  things  that 
exist  independently  of  sense  data  (A236-260,  B295-315).  The  point  is  that  noumenal  objects  are 
understood  in  a  particular  way  and,  that  is,  not  with  reference  to  the  phenomena  (sense  data  or 
experience)  related  to  them  or  any  other  potential  phenomena.  Noumena  must  be  understood  without 
reference  to  any  particular  or  potential  phenomena  because  noumena  means  things  as  they  are 
independently  from  phenomena. 
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is  the  person's  position  as  a  subject  actively  involved  in  the  process  of  making  a  decision,  of 
exercising  their  freedom.  Korsgaard  (1996a)  explains  that  these  two  senses  are  both  required  to 
explain  the  world  and  our  relationship  with  it: 
The  two  worlds,  or  the  two  views  of  the  world  we  get  from  the  two  standpoints,  may 
seem  strangely  incongruent,  but  it  is  important  to  see  that  there  is  no  contradiction.  The 
incongruity  simply  follows  from  the  fact  that  we  stand  in  two  very  different  relations  to  our 
actions:  we  must  try  to  understand  them,  but  we  must  also  decide  which  ones  to  do.  (p. 
205) 
Korsgaard’s  point  is  that  our  control  over  our  actions  exists  in  the  standpoint  within  which  we 
can  understand  freedom  and  that  is  the  position  of  the  subject  that  is  making  a  decision.  
 
Korsgaard  (1996a)  argues  that  when  understanding  the  actions  of  people  we  are  required  to 
understand  and  explain  the  world  in  a  manner  that  requires  using  both  of  these  standpoints  (pp. 
206-212).  We  must  use  both  of  these  standpoints,  explains  Korsgaard,  because  accurate 
judgement  of  others  requires  both  understanding  the  situation  they  are  in  (that  is,  their 
psychological  state)  and  the  manner  in  which  they  exercised  their  control  over  themselves.  In 
this  sense  we  must  simultaneously  understand  that  the  people  we  judge  could  have  acted  no 
differently,  because  they  acted  in  accordance  with  their  psychology,  and  were  in  control  of  their 
actions,  at  least  insofar  as  they  made  the  decisions  that  led  to  their  actions.  This  is  also,  argues 
Korsgaard  (in  the  form  of  an  interpretation  of  Kant),  why  we  hold  ourselves  responsible  even  if 
we  acknowledge  that  we  could  not  have  done  otherwise:  “[w]hen  we  enter  into  relations  of 
reciprocity,  and  hold  one  another  responsible,  we  enter  together  into  the  standpoint  of  practical 
reason”  (p.  212).  The  point  is  that  understanding  someone’s  behaviour  requires  understanding 
both  their  psychology  and  their  control  -  both  standpoints  are  required.  My  point,  in  agreement 
with  Korsgaard,  is  that  this  is  not  just  the  position  of  the  subject  undertaking  the  activity  of 
making  a  decision  that  provides  the  context  within  which  we  can  understand  freedom,  it  is  also 
the  position  that  provides  the  context  within  which  we  can  understand  normativity. 
 
With  Korsgaard’s  explanation  of  the  existence  of  freedom  and  its  relationship  with  agency 
established,  I  am  able  to  explain  how  her  constitutivism  is  compatible  with  my  argument  for 
scalar  deontology.  It  is  compatible  because  she  derives  normativity  from  the  same  place  that 
scalar  deontology  can  be  derived:  the  standpoint  from  which  we  are  able  to  understand 
freedom.  The  context  in  which  we  can  understand  normativity,  according  to  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism,  is  derived  from  our  autonomy  and  that,  in  turn,  is  derived  from  our  control  over 
ourselves,  our  freedom.  The  activity  of  self  constitution  and  the  activity  of  controlling  oneself  are 
the  same  thing  in  the  sense  that  self  constitution  is  the  aim  of  your  control.  This  is  the  same 
relationship  between  self  constitution,  freedom,  and  scalar  deontology.  Scalar  deontology  is  the 
appreciation  of  the  aim  of  your  control  from  the  perspective  of  exercising  that  control.  This  is 
why  scalar  deontology  and  Kantian  constitutivism  are  fundamentally  intertwined:  scalar 




The  categorical  imperative  can  be  explained  in  multiple  different  ways  in  the  same  manner  that, 
as  Korsgaard  explains,  our  behaviour  can  be  explained  from  different  standpoints.  When 
examining  our  obligation  to  adhere  to  the  categorical  imperative  in  the  context  of  a  specific 
decision  we  can  do  so  by  appealing  to  the  formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative  presented 
by  Kant,  such  as  the  formula  of  universal  law,  and  when  doing  so  we  are  able  to  derive  our 
obligation  in  the  context  of  that  decision.  This  type  of  presentation  of  the  categorical  imperative 
does  not,  and  cannot,  tell  the  full  story  of  our  obligation  to  ourselves  because  the  context  of  a 
particular  decision  abstracted  in  this  manner  is  not  the  context  in  which  our  obligation  exists. 
Our  obligation  to  ourselves  exists  in  the  same  context  we  can  understand  our  control  over  our 
own  actions  (our  freedom).  This  context  is  the  position  of  a  subject  exercising  their  rational 
faculties  which,  remember,  is  where  our  obligation  is  derived  from.  Our  obligation  needs  to  be 
understood  in  the  context  of  a  subject  exercising  their  rational  faculties  because  this  is  the 
context  in  which  its  foundations  must  be  understood.  My  point  is  that  self  constitution,  the  aim  of 
our  control,  is  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  because  it  is  an  explanation  of  the  aim 
of  your  freedom:  self  constitution  is  an  explanation  of  what  you  ought  to  do.  Furthermore,  the 
context  in  which  self  constitution  and  our  freedom  (our  autonomy  and  the  aim  of  it)  exists,  and 
can  be  understood,  is  necessary  for  a  full  understanding  of  the  categorical  imperative  for  the 
same  reason  that  it  is  necessary  to  understand  our  control  over  our  actions.  So,  normativity  is 
derived  from  our  control  over  our  own  actions  and,  for  that  reason,  the  categorical  imperative 
must  be  understood  in  the  same  context  that  our  control  requires:  our  control  over  ourselves  is, 
after  all,  the  reason  we  are  obligated  to  adhere  to  the  categorical  imperative  and  that  obligation 
exists  in  the  context  of  the  existence  of  that  control.  
 
I  will  develop  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology  from  self  constitution  as  a  formulation  of  the 
categorical  imperative  to  scalar  deontology  in  §  3.9  after  establishing  that  Velleman’s  Kantian 
constitutivism  is  also  compatible  with  my  argument.  In  summary,  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  is 
compatible  with  my  argument  for  scalar  deontology  because  it  derives  normativity  from  her 
conception  of  agency,  freedom,  and  autonomy.  This  conception  of  agency,  freedom,  and 
autonomy  explains  that  they  must  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the  position  of  a  subject 
making  a  decision;  that  is  to  say,  freedom  exists  in  the  activity  of  agency  (exercising  our 
autonomy).  This  is  the  same  position  that  I  am  deriving  scalar  deontology  from.  My  point  is  that 
when  Korsgaard  derives  normativity  from  the  activity  of  agency  she  posits  a  theory  which  is 
compatible  with  my  argument  that  from  the  standpoint  of  agency  (the  position  of  a  subject 
making  a  decision)  our  obligation  is  scalar.  These  two  arguments  are  compatible  because  they 
are  both  deriving  normativity  (or  aspects  of  the  nature  of  normativity)  from  the  same  source. 
Korsgaard’s  source  of  normativity,  the  source  of  our  obligation  to  constitute  ourselves 




3.8  Velleman  on  our  obligation  to  ourselves  and  the  source  of  its  authority 
Velleman’s  Kantian  constitutivism  entails  scalar  deontology  because  he  derives  normativity  from 
our  engagement  in  the  process  of  making  ourselves  intelligible  to  ourselves.  The  significance  of 
this  process  is  explained  by  Velleman’s  argument  that  our  engagement  in  this  process  makes 
the  answer  to  normative  questions  objective  within  our  own  frame  of  reference.  Velleman 
argues  that  normativity  is  objective  despite  also  positing  a  relativist  foundation  for  morality.  The 
reason  for  this  apparent  dichotomy  is  related  to  the  reason  his  constitutivism  is  compatible  with 
scalar  deontology.  Velleman  argues  that  objectivity  is  relative  to  the  frame  of  reference  of 
normativity  and  that  normativity  is  objective  because  it  is  an  inescapable  part  of  the  particular 
frame  of  reference  we,  as  particular  types  of  subjects,  occupy.  My  argument  for  scalar 
deontology  is  that  the  scalar  element  of  deontology  follows  from  the  same  element  of  our 
nature,  and  therefore  our  frame  of  reference,  that  Velleman  derives  the  objectivity  of  normativity 
from.  
 
Velleman,  like  Korsgaard,  relates  the  source  of  normativity,  and  the  foundations  of  his  theory,  to 
the  nature  of  freedom  as  it  relates  to  the  nature  of  our  agency.  Velleman  (2000)  argues  in  The 
Possibility  of  Practical  Reason  that  we  are  free  in  an  epistemic  sense.  His  point  is  that  we  are 
free,  in  a  sense,  from  determinism  when  making  particular  knowledge  claims  (pp.  32-44). 
Velleman  (2000,  p.  33)  is  arguing  in  support  of  an  explanation  of  free  will  first  made  by  David 
Hume  (1738/2007)  in  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  where  Hume  explains  that  in  the  process  of 
reflecting  upon  our  actions  (deciding  what  to  do)  we  are  aware  of  a  type  of  looseness  in  passing 
from  one  mental  state  to  another  (2.3.2.2,  p.  262).  What  Hume  means  is  that  the  forces 
governing  our  mental  processes,  the  empirically  tractable  principles  of  association  that  are 
fundamentally  similar  to  the  causal  forces  governing  nature,  do  not  appear  to  match  the 
phenomena  (the  experience)  of  making  decisions.  Being  in  the  position  of  a  subject  means  that 
“[w]e  feel  that  our  actions  are  subject  to  our  will  on  most  occasions,  and  imagine  we  feel  that  the 
will  itself  is  subject  to  nothing”  (Hume,  1739,  2.3.2.2,  p.  262).  Like  Korsgaard,  and  Kant,  the 
point  is  that  freedom,  insofar  as  it  exists,  is  understood  in  the  position  of  the  subject.  Velleman 
develops  this  point,  further  than  Hume  does,  into  an  argument  that  freedom  is  something  that 
exists  as  a  type  of  knowledge  (that  is,  a  way  of  understanding  the  world). 
 
Epistemic  freedom,  argues  Velleman,  is  the  point  at  which  the  “conceptual  problem  of  freedom 
…  becomes  intertwined  with  the  phenomenological  problem”  of  freedom  (2000,  p.  33).  The 
phenomenological  problem  of  freedom  is  that  the  experience  we  have  of  being  free  appears  to 
be  incompatible  with  the  deterministic  nature  of  our  psychology.  The  conceptual  problem  of 
freedom  is  that  our  deterministic  psychology  appears  to  be  incompatible  with  moral 
responsibility:  if  we  cannot  have  acted  other  than  we  did  act,  because  our  actions  are 
determined  by  the  preceding  events,  then  it  appears  unjust  (or,  at  least,  unfair)  to  hold  us 
responsible  for  not  acting  other  than  we  did  because  being  blamed  for  failure  to  act  differently  is 
being  blamed  for  not  doing  the  impossible.  Velleman  attempts  to  solve  these  problems  at  the 
same  time  by  arguing  that  the  process  of  making  our  actions  our  own,  in  a  moral  sense,  both 
explains  why  the  phenomena  of  freedom  exists  and  why  we  are  responsible  (in  a  moral  sense) 
for  (at  least  some  of)  our  choices. 
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The  process  of  making  choices  our  own,  argues  Velleman,  is  practical  reasoning.  Practical 
reason  is  essential  to  making  choices  our  choices  because  it  explains  the  process  of  reasoning 
that  we  undertake  to  become  responsible  for  them,  as  Velleman  (2009)  explains: 
I  believe  that  the  process  of  improvisational  self-enactment  constitutes  practical 
reasoning,  the  process  of  choosing  an  action  on  the  basis  of  reasons.  Why  do  I  think 
that  the  self-enactor  chooses  his  action?  Because  it  is  his  idea,  which  he  puts  into  action 
in  preference  to  other  ideas  that  he  might  have  enacted,  if  this  one  hadn’t  made  more 
sense.  Why  do  I  think  that  he  chooses  for  reasons?  Because  he  chooses  his  action  in 
light  of  a  rationale  for  it,  which  consists  in  considerations  in  light  of  which  the  action 
makes  sense.  (p.  18). 
The  point  is  that  this  process,  practical  reason,  is  understood  in  a  particular  context  and  that 
context  is  the  position  of  a  subject  undertaking  the  activity  of  making  a  choice.  Velleman’s  point 
is  that  the  role  of  the  self  in  the  process  of  practical  reason  is  crucial  for  understanding  the 
nature  of  that  process.  
 
Notice  that  this  is  the  same  point  that  allows  Korsgaard  to  develop  her  theory  of  freedom  by 
arguing  that  it  exists  from  the  position  of  the  subject  who  is  in  the  activity  of  making  a  decision 
and  must  be  understood  in  that  context.  Korsgaard  derives  both  normativity  and  freedom  from 
this  point,  the  role  and  perspective  of  the  subject,  which  is  what  makes  her  theory  compatible 
with  scalar  deontology.  Velleman’s  constitutivism  is  compatible  with  scalar  deontology  for  the 
same  reason:  normativity  is  derived  from  the  position  of  the  subject  making  a  decision;  the  role 
of  practical  reason  requires  that  normativity  be  understood  by  contextualising  crucial  claims 
about  the  nature  of  normativity  from  the  position  of  a  subject  who  is  making  a  decision.  It  is  this 
context  that  allows  us  to  understand  our  obligation  to  our  own  constitution,  our  duty,  as 
something  we  are  fulfilling  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  in  our  ongoing  project  of  self  constitution 
(that  is,  as  scalar).  
 
Despite  this  similarity,  there  is  an  important  difference  between  how  Korsgaard  and  Velleman 
utilise  this  claim.  Korsgaard  is  providing  a  transcendental  argument  which  utilises  the  necessity 
of  the  position  of  the  subject,  for  any  knowledge  to  exist  at  all,  to  establish  the  necessity  of  the 
normativity  she  is  deriving  from  the  nature  of  that  position.  In  this  manner  Korsgaard  is  pursuing 
a  Kantian  strategy  of  establishing  the  objectivity  of  her  claim,  the  objectivity  of  normativity,  by 
establishing  the  necessity  of  the  claim.  In  the  §  1.6  I  provide  a  Kantian  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  that  is  compatible  with  core  tenets  of  Velleman’s  theory  and,  in  doing  so,  demonstrate 
that  core  elements  of  Velleman’s  theory  are  compatible  with  the  type  of  Kantian  strategy 
Korsgaard  pursues  to  provide  the  foundations  for  Kantian  constitutivism:  if  such  an  alteration  to 
Velleman’s  theory  is  made,  his  constitutivism  is  compatible  with  scalar  deontology  for  the  same 
reason  that  Korsgaard’s  is.  However,  Velleman’s  theory,  as  such,  does  not  provide  a 
transcendental  argument  in  the  same  sense  as  Korsgaard,  which  means  that  establishing  that 
Velleman  derives  normativity  from  the  same  place  that  I  derive  scalar  deontology  from  is  not 
sufficient  to  establish  their  compatibility.  Velleman  is  not  utilising  the  necessity  of  the  position  of 
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the  subject  in  the  same  sense  as  Korsgaard  and  Kant,  but  he  is  using  the  position  of  the  subject 
in  a  manner  that  remains  compatible  with  scalar  deontology. 
 
Velleman,  like  Korsgaard  and  Kant,  argues  that  the  objectivity  of  normativity  is  derived  from 
necessary  elements  of  the  position  of  the  subject.  However,  unlike  Korsgaard  and  Kant, 
Velleman  (2013)  argues,  in  Foundations  for  Moral  Relativism ,  that  the  objectivity  of  moral  norms 
is  relative  to  particular  frames  of  reference  (pp.  47-53).  What  he  means  is  that  norms  are 
objective  within  the  frame  of  reference  of  what  makes  that  norm  true;  so,  within  the  particular 
context  (say,  a  particular  society)  that  makes  a  specific  norm  true  that  norm  is  objectively  true. 
He  attempts  to  establish  this  by  arguing  that  the  reasons  that  support  norms  must  be 
understood  in  the  context  of  the  subject  and  the  particular  frame  of  reference  they  are  in 
because  it  is  this  context  that  makes  them  reasons  at  all  (that  is,  that  makes  them  provide 
support  for  taking  one  action  over  another). 
 
This  argument,  that  reasons  support  norms  in  the  context  of  a  particular  frame  of  reference,  is 
informed  by  his  theory  of  epistemic  freedom  which  posits  that  we  can  understand  a  subject  as 
free  to  do  one  thing  or  another  (rather  than  being  determined  to  do  one  thing  over  another) 
when  we  understand  them  as  a  subject  who  is  in  the  position  of  making  a  decision.  This  is  the 
same  approach  to  establishing  the  existence  of  freedom  that  Korsgaard  takes  insofar  as  it  rests 
on  the  claim  that  freedom  is  understood  within  the  context  of  the  position  of  practical  reason 
(that  is,  the  position  of  a  subject  who  is  making  a  decision).  Velleman  (2000)  argues  that  the 
nature  of  knowledge  is  affected  by  occupying  the  position  of  a  subject  that  is  making  a  decision 
and  that  this  entails  peculiar  things  for  what  it  means  to  know  something  or  to  claim  that 
something  is  true: 
Epistemic  freedom  is  the  freedom  to  affirm  any  one  of  several  incompatible  propositions 
without  risk  of  being  wrong.  We  sometimes  have  this  freedom,  strange  as  it  seems,  and 
our  having  it  sheds  some  light  on  the  topic  of  free  will  and  determinism.  (p.  32) 
Velleman’s  point  is  that  knowledge  itself,  the  nature  of  what  makes  a  claim  true  or  objective, 
takes  on  a  particular  quality  in  the  context  of  a  subject  who  is  making  a  decision  and  that  this 
particular  quality  enables  us  to  understand  the  nature  of  free  will. 
 
The  special  nature  of  knowledge  in  the  context  of  a  subject  making  a  decision,  that  Velleman  is 
referring  to,  is  the  same  point  that  Korsgaard  makes  when  she  argues  that  freedom  exists  in  this 
context,  in  particular,  and  must  be  understood  in  that  context.  The  idea  is  that  we  can  make  a 
peculiar  type  of  claim  in  this  context,  that  is,  in  the  context  of  the  position  of  a  subject  making  a 
decision,  which  simultaneously  appears  obviously  true  and,  just  as  obviously,  impossible.  This 
claim  takes  the  form  of  claiming  that  oneself,  or  another  subject  in  the  relevant  context,  could  do 
either  one  thing  or  another.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  this  is  a  false  claim,  because  it  is  not  true 
that  I  could  do  either  one  thing  or  another.  It  is  true,  in  such  cases,  that  I  am  deciding  what  to  do 
and  that  my  decision  is  between  one  option  or  another.  However,  it  does  not  follow  from  my 
being  in  the  position  of  making  this  decision  that  it  is  true  that  I  could  do  either  one  thing  or  the 
other:  I  can  only  make  the  decision  that  my  phenomenon  combined  with  the  preceding  events 
dictates.  It  appears  that  any  claim  made  of  the  form  ‘I  can  decide  one  way  or  the  other’  is 
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incorrect  in  the  sense  that  I  can  only  decide  the  way  that  the  relevant  factors  determine. 
Velleman  argues  that  such  claims  are  not  incorrect  because,  even  granting  that  it  is  true  that  I 
can  only  decide  the  way  that  the  relevant  factors  determine,  from  the  position  of  the  subject  in 
particular  such  claims  are  true  because  they  accurately  describe  the  situation  the  subject  is  in. 
They  accurately  describe  the  situation  that  the  subject  is  in  by  accurately  describing  what  it 
means  to  be  a  subject  that  is  deciding  what  to  do.  
 
It  is  because  we  can  make  such  claims  that  we  are,  as  Velleman  describes,  epistemically  free. 
The  idea  is  that,  when  understood  in  the  specific  context  of  a  subject  undertaking  the  activity  of 
making  a  decision,  it  is  true  that  the  subject  in  question  can  either  do  one  thing  or  another. 
Velleman  (2000)  describes  freedom  as  the  sense  in  which  it  is  true  from  the  perspective  of  the 
subject  that  they  can  do  one  thing  or  another  and  explains  this  by  comparing  freedom  to  the 
phenomena  of  colour: 
[I]f  my  explanation  for  the  phenomena  of  freedom  is  correct,  then  metaphysical  freedom 
is  like  a  secondary  quality,  such  as  color.  And  in  that  case,  compatibilism  can  take  its 
cue  from  a  projectivist  account  of  secondary  qualities,  an  account  that  interprets 
ascriptions  of  those  qualities  as  systematically  false  and  yet  instrumentally  justifiable.  (p. 
53) 
Velleman’s  claim  is  that  freedom  is  not  about  our  ability  to  make  a  decision  that,  in  some 
manner,  defies  a  deterministic  understanding  of  the  universe.  His  claim  is  that  freedom 
describes  an  aspect  of  being  in  the  position  of  making  a  decision  -  that  is,  the  decision  of  a 
subject  using  practical  reason.  
 
The  idea  is  that  freedom  is  like  colour,  it  is  true  to  claim  that  it  exists  but  only  in  the  same  sense 
that  it  can  be  true  for  me  to  claim  that  I  am  seeing  the  colour  red.  Velleman’s  (2000)  argument  is 
that  freedom  describes  part  of  the  nature  of  what  it  is  to  be  in  the  position  of  a  subject: 
I  believe  that  metaphysical  freedom  is  a  secondary  property  in  the  same  sense  [as  the 
phenomena  of  seeing  colour].  It’s  a  property  that  we  experience  as  being  in  the  world, 
but  only  because  we  project  it  onto  the  world,  by  projecting  a  property  of  our  predictions 
onto  the  actions  predicted,  thereby  mistaking  epistemic  [freedom]  for  metaphysical 
freedom.  (p.  53)  
It  is  important  to  notice  that  Velleman’s  point  is  that  we  do  have  freedom  despite  not  having  the 
metaphysical  freedom  we  might  be  tempted  to  ascribe  to  ourselves.  
 
One  might  be  tempted  to  think  that  Velleman  is  merely  pointing  out  that  freedom  is  an  illusion 
resulting  from  our  perception  of  the  world,  and  his  point  is  closely  related  to  this  type  of  claim 
which  makes  this  a  tempting  mistake  to  make.  Velleman’s  (2000)  theory  of  epistemic  freedom 
does  claim  that  our  experience  of  freedom  is  projected  into  the  world,  by  our  process  of 
experiencing  it,  but  this  does  not  entail  that  it  is  merely  an  illusion  and  nothing  more: 
The  metaphysical  freedom  that  we  consequently  experience  our  actions  as  having 
[because  of  our  projection  of  freedom  into  the  world],  I  want  to  say,  is  the  property  that 
we  ascribe  to  those  actions  when  we  call  them  free.  Hence  our  ascriptions  of  freedom, 
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like  our  ascriptions  of  color,  are  systematically  false:  no  action  has  the  property  that  it  is 
felt  to  have  when  it  feels  free  or  that  it  is  said  to  have  when  it  is  called  free.  (p.  53). 
The  point  is  that  freedom  accurately  describes  the  world  when  we  use  it  in  the  context  of 
describing  the  position  of  the  subject  exercising  that  freedom.  In  that  sense,  accurately 
describing  the  world  in  that  context,  it  is  true  that  there  is  freedom.  Like  Korsgaard,  and  Kant, 
the  claim  is  about  the  context  and  sense  in  which  freedom  exists.  It  exists  and  must  be 
understood  in  the  particular  context  in  which  it  exists,  but  that  does  not  make  it  merely  an 
illusion  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot  truthfully  and  accurately  describe  something  (in  this  case,  the 
nature  of  decision  making  as  an  agent  exercising  practical  reason). 
 
Velleman’s  theory  of  epistemic  freedom  depends  on  the  argument  that  freedom  truthfully 
describes  the  use  of  practical  reason  in  the  same  sense  that  colour  truthfully  describes 
perceiving  the  world.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  neither,  colour  or  freedom,  accurately  describes 
the  world  as  it  exists  but  there  is  also  a  sense  in  which  claims  about  either  can  be  true.   That  is 72
to  say,  it  is  true  that  I  can  make  either  one  decision  or  another  in  the  same  sense  that  it  is  true 
that  I  can  see  that  leaves  on  a  tree  are  green.  So,  epistemic  freedom  is  the  freedom  to  describe 
the  world,  in  a  particular  context,  according  to  how  practical  reason  works.  Velleman  is 
describing  the  same  point  as  Korsgaard,  that  freedom  needs  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of 
the  position  of  the  subject  using  it,  but  he  describes  it  in  terms  of  the  nature  of  particular 
knowledge  claims  while  Korsgaard  describes  it  in  terms  of  existence. 
 
Although  their  approaches  to  freedom  are  similar,  there  is  a  crucial  difference  between  the 
foundations  of  Velleman  and  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theories.  For  Velleman  this  freedom  can 
be,  in  relevant  senses,  different  from  one  person  to  another.  While  Korsgaard  argues  that  there 
are  necessary  elements  to  our  faculty  of  reason,  from  which  she  derives  our  obligations  to 
ourselves  and  therefore  normativity,  Velleman  argues  that  those  necessary  elements  are 
necessary  from  the  perspective  of  the  subject  that  has  those  elements .  This  is  what  leads 
Velleman  to  endorse  both  relativism  and  objectivity.  I  think  this,  apparently  contradictory,  use  of 
terminology  is  the  result  of  Velleman’s  disagreement  with  Enoch  on  the  nature  of  normativity. 
Velleman  (2009)  explains,  in  response  to  Enoch’s  shmagency  problem  as  discussed  in  §§  1.4 
and  1.5,  that  his  theory  of  normativity  establishes  objectivity  in  a  particular  sense:  
Asking  whether  agency  rather  than  shmagency  is  objectively  correct  would  be  like 
asking  whether  a  telephone  is  correct  rather  than  a  tree.  Agency  or  shmagency  can  be 
objectively  correct  as  the  solution  to  a  determinate  problem,  or  as  the  answer  to  a 
determinate  question;  but  then  the  problem  or  question  will  invoke  the  criterion  implicit  in 
agency  or  the  criterion  implicit  in  shmagency  (or  some  third  criterion),  by  which  one  or 
the  other  can  qualify  as  a  correct  solution  or  answer.  The  idea  that  there  must  be  a 
correct  criterion  to  invoke,  and  that  its  correctness  must  be  objective  in  a  sense  that 
72  I  appreciate  the  difficulty  in  describing  things  ‘as  they  exist’,  given  the  role  of  the  noumena  in  Kant’s 
description  of  freedom.  In  this  context  I  think  it  is  a  helpful  method  of  describing  Velleman’s  point,  given 
how  he  phrases  it.  To  clarify,  by  things  ‘as  they  exist’  I  mean  the  same  point  made  by  Korsgaard,  that 
freedom  can  only  be  accurately  understood  when  contextualised  in  the  position  of  the  subject  that  is 
exercising  it. 
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invokes  no  criterion  whatsoever  -  that  idea  is  nonsense,  like  the  idea  of  objective 
correctness  in  a  telephone  or  tree.  (p.  145) 
Velleman’s  point  is  that  objectivity,  as  such,  is  relative  to  the  scope  of  the  question.  He  applies 
this  to  normativity  by  arguing  that  it  is  our  nature  that  makes  particular  norms,  and  the  normative 
claims  that  result  from  them,  true. 
 
The  idea,  according  to  Velleman  (2009)  is  that  questions,  including  normative  questions,  come 
packaged  with  crucial  elements  of  their  answer: 
A  question  must  establish  criteria  for  what  can  count  as  a  correct  answer;  if  it  fails  to 
establish  criteria  for  an  answer,  then  it  is  not  a  fully  constituted  question.  If  “Why  be  an 
agent?”  isn’t  about  a  choice  or  a  shmoice  or  any  third  thing  for  which  there  is  a  criterion 
of  correctness,  then  you  aren’t  owed  an  answer,  because  you  haven’t  yet  asked  a 
question.   (p.  144) 73
Velleman’s  argument  is  that  questions,  if  they  are  legitimate  questions  in  the  sense  that  they 
make  sense  (are  “fully  constituted”),  provide  the  criteria  for  a  correct  answer.  Providing  the 
criteria  for  the  correct  answer  means  that  the  question  itself  only  warrants  an  answer  when 
understood  in  a  particular  frame  of  reference.  The  idea  is  that  questions  are  asked  within 
particular  contexts  that  provide  the  criterion  for  the  correct  answer  to  that  question.  
 
In  Kantian  terms,  and  in  contrast  to  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism,  Velleman’s  argument  is 
dismissing  the  possibility  of  the  categorical  imperative,  in  the  sense  that  he  is  dismissing  the 
possibility  of  a  necessary  imperative  that  always  applies.  His  argument  is  that  there  are 
imperatives  that  arise  in  particular  contexts ,  but  that  they  are  always  relative  in  the  sense  that 
those  contexts  are  not  necessary.  Velleman  (2009)  describes  this  approach  as  a  “Kinda  Kantian 
strategy”  (p.  149)  and  the  same  claim  underlies  his  argument  for  moral  relativism  (2013,  pp. 
47-53).  He  is  not  attempting  to  establish  objective  norms  in  the  sense  that  the  norms  are 
universally  necessary,  however  this  does  not  mean  that  Velleman  (2009)  is  not  trying  to 
establish  that  there  are  answers  to  normative  questions  in  a  particular  sense: 
In  the  modesty  of  its  ambitions,  this  [Kinda  Kantian]  strategy  resembles  the  philosophy  of 
science.   Philosophers  of  science  do  not  aspire  to  show  that  anyone  seeking  the  truth 74
empirically,  by  reasoning  from  observed  phenomena,  must  inevitably  arrive  at  Newton’s 
laws  of  motion;  rather,  they  show  how  the  exigencies  of  theorizing  about  the  phenomena 
favored  adoption  of  Newton’s  theory  -  how  theoretical  reasoning  about  the  actual  world 
turned  out  to  be  pro-Newtonian.  Just  as  reasoning  in  pursuit  of  the  truth  has  been 
73  Velleman’s  example  might  appear  odd  if  you  are  not  familiar  with  the  shmagency  problem,  which  is 
explained  in  the  context  of  Velleman’s  constitutivism  §§  1.1,  1.4,  and  1.8.  The  point  of  Velleman’s 
example  is  that  questions  that  don’t  contain,  in  the  way  the  question  is  formed,  the  context  of  the  answer 
are  flawed.  For  example,  asking  how  much  someone  weighs  is  not  a  properly  formed  question  unless  it 
contains  the  (explicit  or  implicit)  context  in  which  they  are  to  be  weighed.  So,  merely  asking  ‘how  much  do 
you  weigh,  objectively  speaking  and  in  no  context  in  particular’  is  not  a  properly  formed  question  and 
does  not  warrant  an  answer  while  asking  ‘how  much  do  you  weigh,  in  kilograms  on  the  planet  earth’  is  a 
properly  formed  question  because  it  includes  the  frame  of  reference  (that  is,  it  includes  a  sufficient 
description  of  what  an  answer  will  look  like  -  a  measurement  of  kilograms  on  earth).  
74  Velleman’s  Kinda  Kantian  strategy. 
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pro-Newtonian  when  applied  to  the  phenomena  of  this  world,  I  believe,  so  reasoning  in 
pursuit  of  self-understanding  has  been  pro-moral  when  applied  to  the  human  condition. 
In  other  words,  practical  reasoning  has  favored  morality  without  requiring  or 
guaranteeing  it.  (p.  149) 
Restated  in  Kantian  terms  Velleman’s  argument  becomes:  the  imperatives,  norms,  are 
hypothetical,  rather  than  categorical,  in  the  sense  that  they  arise  from  contexts  (frames  of 
reference)  that  are  contingent  (rather  than  necessary).  The  idea  is  that  normative  questions  are 
only  properly  constituted,  and  therefore  questions  that  warrant  an  answer,  when  understood  in  a 
specific  context  that  is  provided  by  the  question  itself  and  so  normative  questions  are, 
necessarily,  relative  to  the  context  that  they  provide.  75
 
This  relativism  is  why  Velleman’s  theory  required  an  alternative  solution  to  the  shmagency 
problem,  which  I  provide  in  §  1.6,  in  order  to  provide  a  Kantian  reply  to  Enoch.  Velleman  is  not 
attempting  to  establish  the  objectivity  of  normativity,  at  least  not  in  the  Kantian  sense  of 
objectivity  (or,  to  clarify  in  the  context  of  my  argument  in  §  1.6,  in  Enoch’s  robust  realist  sense  of 
objectivity).  Velleman  is  attempting  to  establish  the  objectivity  of  answers  in  the  relevant  frame 
of  reference.  This  is  why  Velleman  puts  forward  both  an  argument  for  relativism  yet  also  argues 
that  the  answers  to  normative  questions  can  be  objective:  the  answers  to  normative  questions, 
according  to  Velleman,  can  be  objective  in  the  particular  context  in  which  they  are  asked .  This 
context  is  the  same  context  that  the  normative  questions  themselves  provide  (at  least,  when 
such  questions  are  properly  constituted  and  so  worth  answering).  Notice  that  this  does  not 
preclude  the  necessity  of  the  answer,  at  least  in  the  sense  that  it  can  be  necessary  within  the 
relevant  context.  So,  I  could  ask  a  normative  question  about  what  I  ought  to  do  in  the  context  of 
being  a  particular  type  of  subject  (perhaps,  as  Velleman  discusses  (2013)  p.  47-53,  including  a 
particular  culture  or  society)  and  the  answer  to  that  question  might  be  necessary  in  the  sense 
that  given  what  makes  me  this  type  of  subject  a  particular  prescription  must  be  given.  This  is  not 
a  Kantian  argument  to  the  fullest  extent,  like  the  argument  Korsgaard  provides,  because  it  does 
not  derive  the  answer  from  a  necessary  element  of  the  subject  (that  is,  something  that  the 
subject  must  be  if  it  is  to  be  a  subject  at  all).  The  norm,  the  answer  to  the  normative  question, 
can  be  necessary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  required  for  the  type  of  subject  in  question  but  this  does 
not  entail  anything  about  whether  the  type  of  subject  in  question  is  itself  necessary.  
 
Normative  questions,  according  to  Velleman,  provide  our  nature  as  the  frame  of  reference.  So, 
when  I  am  asking  about  what  I  should  do,  I  am  asking  what  a  particular  type  of  subject,  such  as 
I  am,  ought  to  do.  Given  that  the  scope  of  the  question,  if  the  question  is  to  be  properly 
constructed,  provides  the  type  of  subject  that  I  am  as  the  criteria  for  the  correct  answer,  I  can 
discern  the  answer,  in  part,  by  deriving  norms  from  my  own  constitution.  So,  people  such  as 
75  It  might  be  fair  to  read  Velleman  as  arguing  that  all  questions  of  all  types  are  relative  in  this  manner. 
However,  it  is  not  necessary  to  establish  whether  Velleman  is  bound  to  this  wider  claim  to  engage  with  his 
position  in  the  context  of  normativity  in  particular.  It  might  be  the  case  that  Velleman’s  wider  stance  on  the 
nature  of  objectivity,  and  his  epistemic  theory  in  general,  is  untenable  -  but,  whether  or  not  this  is  the 
case,  my  aim  is  to  establish  that  scalar  deontology  is  compatible  with  the  foundational  claims  of  his 
theory. 
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ourselves  must  constitute  ourselves  intelligibly  because  of  the  way  subjects  such  as  ourselves 
are  constituted.  While  there  is  nothing  necessary  in  any  absolute  sense  about  the  way  subjects 
such  as  ourselves  are  constituted  the  question  only  makes  sense  at  all  if  asked  within  the  scope 
of  such  subjects  (or  we  are  asking  an  entirely  different  question  and  that  different  question  must, 
according  to  Velleman,  assume  a  different  type  of  subject  anyway).  So,  the  questions  that  we 
ask  about  norms  are,  because  of  the  nature  of  normative  questions,  questions  about  what 
human  creatures  such  as  ourselves  should  do. 
 
Scalar  deontology  is  compatible  with  Velleman’s  model  of  normativity  and  the  objectivity  of 
answers  to  normative  questions  because  the  same  approach  that  Velleman  took  to  adopting  the 
Kantian  strategy  into  his  Kinda  Kantian  strategy  can  be  taken  with  the  foundations  of  scalar 
deontology.  Korsgaard’s  constitutivist  theory  is  compatible  with  scalar  deontology  because  the 
same  necessary  element  of  the  perspective  of  the  subject  that  she  argues  is  the  source  of 
normativity  is  also  the  source  of  the  scalar  nature  of  our  obligation  to  ourselves.  Velleman  also 
argues  that  particular  elements  of  this  perspective  is  the  source  of  normativity,  but  he  does  not 
argue  that  the  elements  in  question  are  necessary  and,  to  match  this  change  into  a  Kinda 
Kantian  strategy,  the  same  claim  can  be  made  about  the  elements  of  the  perspective  of  the 
subject  that  is  the  source  of  the  scalar  nature  of  our  obligation  to  ourselves.  So,  because  scalar 
deontology  comes  from  those  same  elements  of  ourselves  (the  perspective  of  the  subject 
engaged  in  practical  reason)  it  remains  compatible  with  Velleman’s  Kinda  Kantian  strategy 
because  the  element  that  he  alters  from  the  Kantian  strategy  is  the  same  element  that  is  the 
source  of  scalar  deontology.  That  is  to  say,  the  same  alterations  Velleman  makes  to  the  Kantian 
foundations  in  order  to  establish  his  relativist  theory  of  objective  normativity  can  also  be  made 
(and  in  the  same  manner)  to  the  foundational  claims  of  scalar  deontology  because  the  scalar 
nature  of  our  obligation  to  ourselves  is  derived  from  the  nature  of  exercising  practical  reason 
(which  is  the  same  place  Velleman  derives  the  objectivity  of  norms  from).  So,  in  the  context  of 
Velleman’s  Kinda  Kantian  constitutivism  scalar  deontology  becomes  relativist,  while  being 
objectivist  in  the  relevant  frame  of  reference,  just  like  Velleman’s  normative  theory. 
 
My  argument  for  scalar  deontology  is  that  our  obligation  to  ourselves,  our  duty  to  constitute 
ourselves  properly,  is  scalar  when  understood  in  the  context  of  a  subject  using  their  practical 
reason.  In  the  case  of  Korsgaard’s  constitutivism  this  means  that  our  obligation  to  ourselves  is 
derived  from  the  same  necessary  element  of  our  constitution  as  normativity.  The  necessity  of 
that  element  of  our  constitution  is  an  element  of  Korsgaard’s  (and  Kant’s)  theory.  The  point  of 
my  argument  for  scalar  deontology  is  not  that  this  element  of  our  constitution  is  necessary, 
rather,  the  point  is  that  it  is  the  same  element  that  normativity  itself  is  derived  from  and  needs  to 
be  understood  in  the  same  context.  That  is  to  say,  our  obligation  is  scalar  because  our 
understanding  of  our  own  project  of  self  constitution  is  scalar  when  it  is  understood  in  the 
context  of  a  subject  undertaking  that  project  by  using  their  practical  reason.  So,  in  the  context  of 
Velleman’s  theory,  where  the  element  of  our  constitution  that  normativity  is  derived  from  is  not 
necessary,  the  same  argument  for  scalar  deontology  works  even  though  the  necessity  of  the 
element  of  our  constitution  that  is  the  source  of  normativity  is  no  longer  present.  Regardless  of 
whether  this  element  of  our  constitution  is  necessary,  my  argument  is  that  scalar  deontology  is 
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derived  from  the  same  element  understood  in  the  same  context  as  normativity  itself.  Hence, 
scalar  deontology  is  compatible  with  Kantian  constitutivism  even  when  that  Kantian 
constitutivism  is  altered,  by  Velleman,  into  Kinda  Kantian  constitutivism  (by  altering  the  nature  of 
objectivity  in  question). 
 
To  summarise,  and  ensure  the  clarity  of  my  point,  I  can  restate  Velleman’s  argument  to  ensure 
the  clarity  of  my  point,  by  restating  Velleman’s  argument  that  the  frame  of  reference  for 
normativity  is  our  nature,  so  that  it  includes  scalar  deontology.  Velleman  argues  that  questions 
must  contain  the  criteria  for  a  correct  answer  and  that  normative  questions  provide  elements  of 
our  own  nature  as  this  criteria.  Our  nature  is  provided  as  these  criteria  because,  according  to 
Velleman’s  constitutivism,  that  nature  is  the  frame  of  reference  within  which  normative  questions 
are  asked.  His  point  is  that  when  we  ask  normative  questions  we  are  asking  about  what  we  as 
people  with  a  particular  type  of  nature  (and  in  specific  contexts)  should  do  and  this  is  why 
providing  an  answer  to  normative  questions  that  are  true  in  the  context  of  that  nature  (our 
constitution)  is  the  appropriate  method  of  answering  normative  questions.  So,  because 
normative  questions  are  about  the  actions  of  people  it  is  appropriate  to  utilise  the  constitution  of 
people  to  answer  them;  that  is  to  say,  the  answer  is  relative  to  our  nature  because  the  question 
is  relative  to  our  nature.  Velleman’s  argument  is  that  our  nature  provides  the  frame  of  reference 
for  normativity  and,  therefore,  it  is  the  source  of  normativity.  My  argument  is  that  our  nature 
provides  the  frame  of  reference  for  scalar  deontology  and,  therefore,  the  scalar  nature  of  our 
obligation  to  ourselves  is  derived  from  the  same  source  as  constitutivism  derives  normativity 
from.  Restated  to  include  both  of  these  arguments  as  one  claim  it  becomes:  our  nature  provides 
the  frame  of  reference  for  normativity  and  the  scalar  nature  of  our  obligation  to  ourselves  and, 
therefore,  it  is  the  source  of  normativity  and  the  scalar  qualities  of  normativity.  Notice  that 
Velleman’s  argument,  that  normativity  is  derived  from  our  nature,  is  already  committed  to  the 
claim  that  our  nature  determines  the  qualities  of  normativity,  because  it  posits  that  normativity  as 
such  is  derived  from  our  nature  and  that  the  source  of  normativity  determines  what  norms  are 
true  and  what  it  means  for  a  norm  to  be  true.  My  argument  for  scalar  deontology  is  not  altering 
the  foundational  claims  of  Velleman’s  theory,  it  is  merely  pointing  out  that  deriving  normativity 
from  how  we  are  constituted  (our  nature)  entails  that  our  obligation  to  ourselves  is  scalar 
because  that  is  what  follows  from  the  same  elements  of  our  constitution  that  Velleman  is  already 
asserting  as  the  frame  of  reference  for  normative  questions.  In  the  context  of  Velleman’s  theory 




3.9  Formulating  the  categorical  imperative  and  scalar  deontology 
Scalar  deontology  describes  how  you  understand  the  aims  of  your  actions  from  the  same 
position  that  you  understand  your  freedom.  It  explains  why  your  obligation  to  yourself,  the 
obligation  to  constitute  yourself  coherently  with  the  deepest  elements  of  your  nature,  is 
something  you  can  pursue  and  fulfill  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent.   Like  freedom  itself  this  does 76
not  entail  the  claim  that  the  scalar  quality  of  normativity  is  understandable  in  all  contexts,  rather 
it  explains  the  particular  sense  in  which  it  does  make  sense  to  describe  your  duty,  your 
obligation  to  yourself,  as  scalar.  To  explain  the  point  in  relation  to  Kantian  moral  theory,  scalar 
deontology  is  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  an  explanation  of  the 
qualities  of  the  overriding  obligation  of  reason.  Like  other  formulations  of  the  categorical 
imperative,  scalar  deontology  explains  what  this  obligation  looks  like  in  a  particular  context  and 
is  compatible  with  other  formulations  that  explain  what  it  looks  like  in  different  contexts. 
 
Kant  (1785/2011)  explains  that  categorical  imperatives  are  possible  because  the  nature  of 
freedom  requires  that  we  regard  ourselves  as  bound  to  the  laws  of  our  understanding:  
All  my  actions  as  only  a  member  of  the  world  of  understanding  would  therefore  conform 
perfectly  with  the  principle  of  autonomy  of  the  pure  will;  as  only  a  part  of  the  world  of 
sense  they  would  have  to  be  taken  to  conform  wholly  to  the  natural  law  of  desires  and 
inclinations,  hence  to  the  heteronomy  of  nature.  (The  former  would  rest  on  the  supreme 
principle  of  morality,  the  latter  on  that  of  happiness.)  But  because  the  world  of 
understanding  contains  the  ground  of  the  world  of  sense  and  so  too  of  its  laws,  and  is 
therefore  immediately  lawgiving  with  respect  to  my  will  (which  belongs  wholly  to  the 
world  of  understanding)  and  must  accordingly  also  be  thought  as  such,  it  follows  that  I 
shall  cognize  myself  as  intelligence,  though  on  the  other  side  as  a  being  belonging  to  the 
world  of  sense,  as  nevertheless  subject  to  the  law  of  the  world  of  understanding,  that  is, 
of  reason,  which  contains  in  the  idea  of  freedom  the  law  of  the  world  of  understanding, 
and  thus  cognize  myself  as  subject  to  the  autonomy  of  the  will;  consequently  the  laws  of 
the  world  of  understanding  must  be  regarded  as  imperatives  for  me,  and  actions  in 
conformity  with  these  as  duties.  (4:454) 
The  argument,  as  Kant  explains,  is  that  our  freedom  is  our  ability  to  legislate  our  own  laws 
according  to  the  laws  of  reason  (understanding)  and  so,  because  our  freedom  comes  from 
reason,  we  are  bound  to  obey  the  laws  of  reason.  The  idea  is  that  when  the  laws  of  reason 
apply  to  the  decisions  we  make,  by  using  our  practical  reason  in  the  position  of  a  subject  that  is 
making  a  decision,  they  are  categorical  because  the  nature  of  the  faculty  that  is  making  the 
decision  binds  that  faculty  to  the  laws  of  reason .  The  laws  of  reason  are  categorical  because 
they  always  apply  when  utilising  our  freedom  because  they  are  our  freedom;  that  is  to  say,  we 
are  free  because  we  are  bound  to  the  laws  of  reason.  This  is  crucial  in  understanding  why  the 
categorical  imperative  has  different  formulations  when  understood  in  different  contexts,  because 
the  categorical  imperative  is  the  explanation  of  what  the  laws  of  reason  are  binding  us  to  do  in 
76  Kantian’s  should  read  ‘deepest  elements  of  your  nature’  as  referring  to  the  necessary  elements  of  your 
nature  while  kinda  kantians  should  read  this  as  those  elements  of  your  nature  that  make  you  human.  Both 
groups  should  read  this  as  referring  to  those  same  elements  of  our  constitution  that  normativity  is  derived 
from. 
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the  context  in  question.  The  categorical  imperative  is  the  demand  of  coherence:  the  obligation 
that  we  have  to  be  coherent  because  it  is  a  fundamental  demand  of  reason.  This  is  why 
Korsgaard  and  Velleman  present  their  constitutivist  theories  as  coherence  and  intelligibility,  they 
are  both,  at  their  core,  extensions  of  the  categorical  requirement  of  coherence.  
 
It  might  help  to  think  of  freedom  as  describing  what  we  are  free  from  rather  than  what  we  are 
bound  by.  Understanding  it  in  this  manner  explains  why  our  duty  is  both  the  law  that  binds  us 
and  the  reason  we  are  free.  We  are  not  free  from  reason,  because  using  our  mental  faculties  to 
reason  about  anything  binds  us  to  the  laws  of  reason  (in  particular  -  the  demand  of  coherence) 
because  we  must  obey  those  laws  in  order  to  be  reasoning.  But  we  are  free  from  our  decisions 
being  determined  by  other  elements  of  our  constitution  (Kant  describes  this  as  the  part  of  our 
nature  determined  by  the  natural  law).  Except,  of  course,  we  are  not  actually  free  from  being 
determined  by  other  elements  of  our  constitution  because  the  decisions  we  make  can  be 
explained,  externally,  by  the  psychology  and  other  causal  factors  in  play  in  the  making  of  that 
decision.  Rather,  the  point  is  that  from  the  position  of  the  subject  that  is  engaged  in  exercising 
their  freedom  they  undertake  that  process  of  decision  making  as  though  they  are  free  from  their 
decision  being  determined  by  anything  except  their  own  will;  they  must  engage  in  their 
reasoning  as  though  it  is  not  yet  determined,  because  having  control  is  a  feature  of  the  activity 
of  making  a  decision.  So,  because  freedom  itself  is  bound  to  this  particular  perspective  the 
categorical  imperative  is  too.  The  laws  of  reason  both  bind  us  to  our  obligation  to  them  and 
make  us  free  from  other  elements  of  our  nature,  but  this  description  is  only  accurate  when 
describing  the  perspective  of  a  subject  making  a  decision. 
 
Kant  (1785/2011)  develops  this  point  by  arguing  that  it  is  freedom  which  binds  us  to  our  duty, 
the  categorical  imperative,  by  committing  us  to  the  rules  of  reason  at  the  same  time  that  it 
places  us  in  the  world  of  understanding  instead  of  the  world  of  sense: 
And  so  categorical  imperatives  are  possible  by  this:  that  the  idea  of  freedom  makes  me 
a  member  of  an  intelligible  world  and  consequently,  if  I  were  only  this,  all  my  actions 
would  always  be  in  conformity  with  the  autonomy  of  the  will;  but  since  at  the  same  time  I 
intuit  myself  as  a  member  of  the  world  of  sense,  they  ought  to  be  in  conformity  with  it[.] 
(4:454) 
Kant’s  point  is  that  the  laws  of  reason  become  an  obligation,  something  you  ought  to  do  rather 
than  something  you  always  do,  because  the  position  of  the  subject  requires  being  in  both  the 
world  of  sense  and  the  world  of  understanding  at  the  same  time.  We  are  simultaneously 
creatures  of  reason  that  can  understand  the  world  in  an  abstract  manner  and  creatures  bound 
to  the  dictates  of  our  desires  and  other  elements  of  our  psychology.  
 
It  is  this  same  position  of  being  in  both  the  world  of  sense  and  the  world  of  understanding  that 
explains  the  scalar  quality  of  our  obligation.  Of  course,  our  obligation  is  in  a  sense  absolute:  that 
is,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  categorical  that  we  always  ought  to  fulfil  it  absolutely.  But  in  the  position 
of  the  subject  who  is  engaged  in  the  ongoing  project  of  their  own  self  constitution  our  obligation 
is  something  that  we  can  pursue  and  fulfil  to  varying  levels  of  success.  Our  duty  takes  on  this 
quality  because  the  obligation  we  have  is  an  ongoing  project  that  involves  the  construction  of 
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the  deepest  element  of  our  own  identity.  We  are,  according  to  Kantian  constitutivism, 
constituting  ourselves  when  we  exercise  our  freedom,  by  engaging  in  the  activity  of  decision 
making,  and  by  doing  so  we  are  altering  elements  of  what  we  are,  which  is  a  process  that  takes 
place  gradually  over  time.  So,  from  the  perspective  of  the  subject  engaged  in  the  activity  of  self 
constitution  (decision  making),  fulfilling  our  obligation  is  not  something  that  happens  in  one 
particular  instance  and  which  we  succeed  or  fail  at,  it  is  something  that  takes  place  over  time 
and  involves  multiple  decisions  all  of  which  contribute  to  the  extent  to  which  we  are  failing  or 
succeeding  at  doing  our  duty.  It  is  this  perspective  that  scalar  deontology  describes  -  it 
describes  how  you  understand  the  aims  of  your  actions  from  the  same  position  that  you 
understand  your  freedom. 
 
Notice  that  this  means  the  scalar  nature  of  your  obligation  can  only  be  understood  from  the 
same  position  that  you  can  understand  your  own  freedom  (that  is,  the  same  position  in  which 
your  freedom  exists).  Scalar  deontology  describes  how  you  understand  the  aims  of  your  action 
from  the  same  position  that  you  understand  your  freedom.  In  this  position,  according  to  Kantian 
constitutivism,  the  categorical  imperative  is  formulated  as  your  obligation  to  constitute  yourself 
coherently  or  intelligibly.  It  is  also  in  this  position  that  understanding  your  constitution  as 
something  you  are  in  control  of  means  understanding  your  scalar  nature,  which  means,  to 
understand  yourself  and  your  constitution  as  an  ongoing  project,  to  fulfil  your  obligation  to 
yourself,  that  can  be  furthered  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  by  the  particular  decisions  you  make. 
Your  ongoing  pursuit  of  the  categorical  imperative,  your  own  constitution,  is  the  extent  to  which 
you  can  be  more  or  less  coherently  constituted  -  because  you  can  be  pursuing  that  goal  more  or 
less  successfully. 
 
Formulated  without  reference  to  your  ongoing  aim  of  self  constitution  the  categorical  imperative 
does  not  appear  scalar  because  when  your  obligation  is  applied  to  a  particular  problem,  in 
isolation,  the  solution  is  not  scalar.  When,  for  example,  determining  what  law  one  should 
prescribe  in  any  particular  case  the  solution  is  that  one  should  prescribe  the  law  that  one  would 
have  others  follow  in  relevantly  similar  cases.  When  formulated  like  this,  as  the  formula  of 
universal  law,  the  categorical  imperative  depicts  your  obligation  to  be  coherent  as  an  obligation 
to  act  as  you  would  have  others  act  and  applies  it  to  the  particular  decision  being  made.  It  is  not 
scalar  in  the  sense  that  there  is  one  answer,  do  what  you  would  have  everyone  do,  because 
that  is  what  is  coherent  in  the  sense  that  it  is  what  treating  yourself  as  the  same  as  other  agents 
requires.  However,  when  considering  what  you  should  do  in  the  context  of  self  constitution  the 
decision  does  become  scalar  because  what  you  ought  to  do  is  determined  by  the  effect  it  has 
on  the  constitution  of  the  subject  in  question.  Notice  that  your  obligation  to  do  as  you  would 
have  others  do  has  not  changed.  It  is  still  the  case  that  you  should  legislate  your  own  action  in 
the  same  manner  that  you  would  have  others  legislate  their  actions,  but  the  situation  under 
consideration  has  changed  by  taking  on  a  new  element.  The  new  element  of  consideration  is 
the  impact  of  the  decision  on  the  agent  in  question,  specifically  on  their  constitution,  and  this 
element  exists  because  of  the  control  of  the  self  (the  constitution  of  their  deepest  identity)  that 
the  subject  has.  This  control  exists  in  the  form  of  freedom  and,  for  that  reason,  must  be 
179 
understood  from  the  position  of  a  subject  who  is  making  a  decision  (that  is  -  constituting 
themselves). 
 
In  §§  3.0-3.8,  and  in  this  section  (§  3.9),  I  have  developed  and  clarified  my  argument  for  scalar 
deontology  alongside  an  analysis  which  demonstrates  that  core  elements  of  Velleman  and 
Korsgaard’s  Kantian  constitutivist  theories  are  compatible  with  scalar  deontology.  In  summary,  I 
have  clarified  why  the  theories  of  freedom  put  forward  by  Velleman,  Korsgaard,  and  Kant  entail 
scalar  deontology.  In  doing  so  I  have  defended  scalar  deontology  by  identifying  that 
understanding  our  obligation  to  our  own  self  constitution  entails  a  formulation  of  the  categorical 
imperative  that  can  be  understood  from  the  same  perspective  that  is  required  to  understand 
freedom.  The  argument  for  scalar  deontology  is  that  formulating  the  categorical  imperative  so 
that  it  can  be  understood  in  the  context  of  a  subject  who  is  undertaking  the  ongoing  activity  of 
self  constitution  entails  that  our  obligation  to  ourselves  is  scalar.  Normativity  is  derived  from  our 
autonomy  in  the  sense  that  our  autonomy  is  derived  from  the  same  necessary  elements  of  our 
constitution  that  Kantian  constitutivists  use  as  the  foundations  for  their  constitutivist  approach. 
As  Korsgaard,  Velleman,  and  Kant  argue  our  autonomy  is  found  in  the  control  over  our  own 
decisions  and  actions  provided  to  us  by  our  faculty  of  reason.  Because  of  its  use  of  reason  this 
control  obligates  us  to  be  coherent  and  that  obligation  is  formalised  as  the  formulations  of  the 
categorical  imperative.  Because  the  categorical  imperative  is  derived  from  our  autonomy  it  must 
be  capable  of  being  formulated  in  the  same  context  that  is  required  in  order  to  understand  our 
autonomy:  one’s  understanding  of  one’s  autonomy  and  the  categorical  imperative  must  be 
compatible  because  one  is  derived  from  the  other.  Formulating  the  categorical  imperative  in  the 
context  in  which  our  control  over  our  own  actions  can  be  understood  requires  a  formulation  in 
the  context  of  a  subject  who  is  engaged  in  the  activity  of  attempting  to  constitute  themselves 
coherently.  In  this  context  the  pursuit  of  coherence  is  an  ongoing  pursuit  that  is  not  something 
one  has  entirely  succeeded  or  failed  at,  rather  it  is  something  that  one  is  attempting  to  pursue 
more  or  less  successfully:  in  this  sense  our  obligation  to  be  coherent  is  scalar. 
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4.0  Overview  of  thesis 
In  this  thesis  I  defended  the  claim  that  Kantian  constitutivism  can  derive  objective  normativity 
from  necessary  elements  of  the  constitution  of  agency  or  action,  and  demonstrated  that  the 
constitutivist  approach  can  be  utilised  to  provide  new  developments  in  the  Kantian  moral 
tradition.  I  demonstrate  that  Kantian  constitutivism  can  establish  objective  normativity  by  solving 
the  shmagency  problem  for  Christine  Korsgaard’s  and  David  Velleman’s  Kantian  constitutivist 
theories.  I  do  this  by  developing  a  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  in  defence  of  Velleman’s 
theory  without  deviating  from  the  roots  of  the  Kantian  tradition  and  deriving  a  reply  to  the 
shmagency  problem  from  Korsgaard’s  solution  to  a  different  critique  of  her  theory.  I  demonstrate 
the  ability  of  Kantian  constitutivism  to  advance  the  Kantian  tradition  by  utilising  the  constitutivist 
approach  in  conjunction  with  the  Kantian  strategy  to  develop  a  new  formulation  of  the 
categorical  imperative  that  facilitates  a  scalar  deontology. 
 
In  the  concluding  sections  that  follow  I  synthesise  and  summarise  key  elements  of  my 
arguments  and  conclusions  from  throughout  this  thesis.  In  §  4.1  explain  why  Kantian 
constitutivism  is  able  to  solve  the  shmagency  problem  by  deferring  it  to  the  Kantian  tradition. 
Kantian  claims  about  the  nature  of  objectivity  justify  the  constitutivist  approach  of  deriving 
objective  normativity  from  the  constitution  of  agency  provided  the  constitutive  elements  utilised 
for  this  purpose  are  necessary  for  rational  understanding  of  the  world.  This  means  that  the 
shmagency  problem  is  a  critique  of  the  Kantian  tradition  rather  than  a  critique  of  the 
constitutivist  approach  as  such.  In  §  4.2  I  explain  why  the  Kantian  tradition  is  able  to  justify 
crucial  claims  utilised  by  Kantian  constitutivists  to  derive  normativity  from  the  constitution  of 
agency.  Our  rational  faculties  are  necessary  for  both  understanding  the  world  and  explaining  our 
role  in  it.  Reason  enables  us  to  develop  a  conceptual  understanding  of  the  world  and  to  control 
the  decisions  we  make  and  the  actions  we  take.  This  is  how  reason  is  both  the  source  of 
fundamental  epistemic  claims  regarding  the  nature  of  knowledge  (and  our  role  in  the  creation  of 
our  experience  of  the  world)  and  the  source  of  our  autonomy.  Because  autonomy  is  used  to 
derive  normativity,  by  Kantian  constitutivists  and  in  traditional  Kantian  moral  theory,  the 
constitutive  elements  of  the  self  utilised  by  Kantian  constitutivists  are  the  same  elements  of  the 
subject  utilised  by  the  Kantian  tradition  to  establish  key  metaphysical  and  epistemic  claims.  In  § 
4.3  I  explain  how  Kantian  constitutivism  facilitates  the  development  of  scalar  deontology. 
Kantian  constitutivism  derives  normativity  from  what  is  constitutive  of  agency  and  this  requires 
understanding  our  autonomy.  Understanding  autonomy  can  only  be  done  from  the  perspective 
of  a  subject  that  is  using  their  faculty  of  reason  to  control  the  decisions  they  make  and  the 
actions  they  take.  From  this  perspective,  agency  has  the  ongoing  aim  of  self-constitution 
(making  oneself  coherent  or  intelligible  to  oneself).  Formulating  the  categorical  imperative  as 
this  ongoing  aim  facilitates  the  development  of  a  scalar  deontology  by  establishing  that  our 
obligation  to  be  coherent  is  an  aim  we  are  in  constant  pursuit  of  whenever  we  exercise  our 
agency.  When  formulated  as  an  aim  we  are  in  ongoing  pursuit  of,  coherence  is  something  we 
are  achieving  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  rather  than  something  we  have  succeeded  or  failed 




4.1  Solving  the  shmagency  problem  and  Kantian  constitutivism 
Kantian  constitutivism  solves  the  shmagency  problem  by  referring  to  the  metaphysical  and 
epistemic  claims  of  the  Kantian  tradition.  This  is  accomplished  by  explaining  that  the  necessity 
of  agency  entails  that  we  must  endorse  the  normativity  that  follows  from  agency.  In  §§  1  and  2,  I 
demonstrate  that  Kantian  constitutivism  can  solve  the  shmagency  problem  by  appealing  to  the 
necessity  of  agency.  Necessary  elements  of  agency  establish  the  objectivity  of  normativity  on 
the  grounds  of  a  transcendental  deduction.  This  transcendental  deduction  establishes  the 
objectivity  of  normativity  by  deriving  it  from  necessary  elements  of  our  cognitive  faculties.  The 
necessity  of  these  elements  of  our  cognitive  faculties  is  suitable  grounding  for  the  objectivity  of 
normativity  because  if  our  cognitive  faculties  are  necessary,  then  everything  entailed  by  those 
faculties  is  also  necessary.  Kantian  constitutivism  solves  the  shmagency  problem  by  pointing 
out  that  we  must  be  agents,  which  entails  that  we  must  also  endorse  the  normativity  that  is 
derived  from  agency. 
 
As  I  explain  in  §§  1.6  and  2.7,  Kantian  constitutivism  establishes  the  necessity  of  endorsing  the 
normativity  that  is  derived  from  agency  by  arguing  that  the  nature  of  the  necessity  of  agency  is 
such  that  not  endorsing  agency  is  nonsensical.  Kantian  constitutivism  argues  that  you  must 
endorse  your  rational  faculties  in  order  to  make  any  knowledge  claims  at  all  and  endorsing 
those  rational  faculties  entails  an  endorsement  of  the  normativity  derived  from  them.  Remember 
that  by  “rational  faculties”  I  refer  to  our  ability  to  reason  in  a  manner  that  allows  us  to  understand 
the  world.  In  this  manner,  as  I  explain  in  §§  1.7,  1.8,  2.5,  and  2.7,  the  shmagency  problem  is 
deferred  to  the  Kantian  underpinnings  of  Kantian  constitutivism.  The  argument  is  that  we  are 
required  in  an  epistemic  sense  to  be  agents  and  that  requirement  entails  that  we  must  endorse 
the  normativity  derived  from  agency.  Hence,  the  Kantian  constitutivist  reply  to  the  shmagency 
problem  can  be  synthesized  as:  endorsing  one’s  rational  faculties  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  to 
engaging  in  rational  deliberation,  discussion,  and  the  pursuit  of  knowledge,  and,  hence,  one 
must  endorse  those  rational  faculties  and  whatever  is  entailed  by  those  faculties. 
 
Explaining  why  the  Kantian  constitutivist  argument  is  a  transcendental  argument  exposes  how 
the  shmagency  problem  can  be  solved  by  deferring  its  critique  to  a  critique  of  the  Kantian  claims 
underpinning  Kantian  constitutivism.  This  is  a  transcendental  argument,  as  I  explain  in  §§  0.2 
and  2.1,  because  it  establishes  the  conclusion  by  deducing  it  from  an  established  element  of  our 
experience  of  the  world.  The  established  element  of  our  experience  of  the  world  is  our  rational 
faculties  and  the  conclusion  is  normativity.  By  “established  element”  I  mean  an  element  of  our 
experience  of  the  world  that  is,  in  its  own  right,  an  accepted  fact.  The  accepted  fact  about  our 
experience  of  the  world  that  is  used  to  establish  normativity,  according  to  Kantian  constitutivism, 
is  the  necessity  of  the  elements  of  our  rational  faculties  that  entail  normativity.  So,  our 
experience  of  the  world  establishes  the  claim  that  we  must  endorse  our  rational  faculties  in 
order  to  engage  in  the  activity  of  reasoning  at  all  (which,  in  turn,  is  required  to  make  knowledge 
claims  or  undertake  reflective  deliberation)  and  those  rational  faculties  entail  normativity,  as  I 
explain  in  §§  0.2,  1.2,  2.1,  3.2,  and  3.3.  In  this  manner,  Kantian  constitutivists  have  derived 
normativity  from  an  element  of  what  we  provide  to  the  process  of  experience  creation,  our 
rational  faculties,  and,  hence,  have  transcended  the  apparent  limits  of  experience  by  deriving 
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normativity  from  this  element  of  experience.  By  “transcended  the  apparent  limits  of  experience”  I 
mean  that  Kantian  constitutivism’s  derivation  of  normativity  from  elements  of  our  rational 
faculties,  that  are  themselves  established  from  how  we  construct  our  experience  of  the  world,  is 
a  method  of  establishing  a  claim  on  grounds  that  might  not  appear  suitable  until  the 
transcendental  argument  has  been  brought  to  bear.  
 
Notice  that  putting  forward  a  transcendental  argument  means  that  the  shmagency  problem  has 
now  been  deferred  to  the  basis  of  the  transcendental  argument  rather  than  solved.  This  is  how 
Kantian  constitutivism  ‘solves’  the  shmagency  problem  by  relying  on  the  Kantian  underpinnings 
to  demonstrate  that  the  constitutivist  approach  has  not  added  any  new  problems  to  the  Kantian 
moral  project.  As  I  explain  in  §§  0.5,  1.1,  and  2.2,  the  shmagency  problem  critique  asks  Kantian 
constitutivists  why  we  ought  to  endorse  agency  at  all.   Kantian  constitutivism’s  reply  is  that  you 77
must  endorse  agency  in  order  to  be  rational  at  all  because  endorsing  agency  is  how  you 
endorse  necessary  elements  of  your  rational  faculties  (at  least,  you  must  endorse  agency 
insofar  as  doing  so  means  endorsing  these  necessary  elements  of  your  rational  faculties,  as  I 
explain  in  §§  1.6  and  2.7).  This  raises  the  question,  as  explained  in  §§1.7,  2.5,  and  2.7,  of  why 
we  must  endorse  our  necessary  rational  faculties.  In  this  sense  the  shmagency  problem  has  not 
been  answered  because  the  question  ‘why  be  an  agent?’  is  still  on  the  table.  What  has 
happened  is  that  the  Kantian  constitutivist  has  explained  that  their  argument  is  a  transcendental 
argument,  which  means  that  the  question  ‘why  endorse  agency?’  is  answered  with  ‘because 
endorsing  agency  is  entailed  by  our  necessary  rational  faculties’  and  that  answer  leads  to  the 
question  ‘why  endorse  those  necessary  rational  faculties?’.  The  reply  to  this  final  question  is 
‘because  endorsing  those  necessary  rational  faculties  is  a  prerequisite  to  rational  deliberation’. 
Notice  that  this  final  reply  is  not  a  reply  from  Kantian  constitutivism  at  all!  Rather,  it  is  a  defense 
of  the  claim  that  the  necessity  of  our  rational  faculties  can  be  derived  from  our  role  in  the 
construction  of  our  experience  of  the  world.  By  appealing  to  the  necessity  of  agency  to  reply  to 
the  shmagency  problem,  Kantian  constitutivists  have  appealed  to  the  Kantian  underpinnings  of 
their  theory.  
 
The  resolution  of  the  shmagency  problem  for  Kantian  constitutivism  is  that  the  shmagency 
problem  never  targeted  Kantian  constitutivism,  as  such,  in  the  first  place:  rather,  it  targeted  the 
Kantian  tradition  more  broadly  understood.  Kantian  constitutivism  begins  with  the  endorsement 
77  The  shmagency  problem  applies  to  constitutivism  broadly  understood,  not  just  Kantian  constitutivists. 
However,  here  I  am  only  referring  to  the  shmagency  problem  as  it  applies  to  Kantian  constitutivism 
because  this  is  a  synthesis  of  my  findings  on  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  shmagency  problem.  For  an 
explanation  of  why  the  shmagency  problem  has  difficulties  applying  to  constitutivism  broadly  understood 
see  §§  1.4,  1.5,  and  1.8  where  I  explain  that  Enoch  has  a  different  understanding  of  what  objectivity 
means  than  Velleman.  The  difficulty  of  applying  the  shmagency  problem  to  constitutivism  broadly 
understood  is  that  it  is  not  clear  that  the  constitutivist  approach  is  an  attempt  to  establish  objective 
normativity  at  all.  The  shmagency  problem  is  a  critique  of  constitutivism’s  ability  to  deliver  objective 
normativity  which  means  that  the  problem  is  simply  not  an  issue  for  any  constitutivist  that  is  not 
attempting  to  deliver  this  type  of  conclusion.  This  is  why,  in  §  1.8,  I  conclude  that  the  shmagency  problem 
debate  between  Velleman  and  Enoch  results  in  the  two  philosophers  having  clarified  what  they  mean  by 
“objectivity”  rather  than  either  of  them  having  disproven  the  others  position  -  they  simply  meant  different 
things  by  “objectivity”.  
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of  agency  as  already  established  and  derives  objective  normativity  in  that  context.  I  synthesise 
my  findings  about  what  this  reveals  of  the  relationship  between  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the 
Kantian  tradition  in  §  4.2.  By  deferring  the  shmagency  problem  to  a  critique  of  the  Kantian 
underpinnings  of  Kantian  constitutivism,  the  constitutivist  approach  itself,  deriving  normativity 
from  what  is  constitutive  of  agency,  is  absolved  of  Enoch’s  claim  that  it  cannot  deliver  objective 
normativity.  This  is  the  result  of  the  defence  of  Kantian  constitutivism,  from  the  shmagency 
problem,  that  I  develop  in  §§  1.6  and  2.7.  The  defence  is  a  qualified  defence  in  the  sense  that  it 
has  deferred  the  problem  to  the  Kantian  tradition  rather  than  remove  it  completely.  It  is 
successful  in  the  sense  that  it  establishes  that  in  the  context  of  the  Kantian  tradition  Kantian 
constitutivism  does  not  introduce  any  new  problems.  The  challenge  of  establishing  that 
endorsing  our  rational  faculties  is  necessary  is  not  a  new  issue  for  the  Kantian  tradition: 
providing  these  foundations  is  the  purpose  of  Kant’s  transcendental  aesthetic.  The  success  of 
my  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem  is  that  I  have  demonstrated  that  Enoch’s  critique  is  a 





4.2  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  tradition 
Kantian  constitutivism  solves  the  shmagency  problem  by  deferring  it  to  the  epistemic  and 
metaphysical  claims  made  by  the  Kantian  tradition.  The  process  of  developing  this  reply  to  the 
shmagency  problem  required  exploring  the  nature  of  Kantian  constituitivism’s  use  of  the  Kantian 
tradition.  This  demonstrated  that  any  problems  found  in  the  foundations  of  the  Kantian  approach 
to  philosophy,  the  transcendental  approach,  risk  undermining  Kantian  constitutivism.  It  also 
revealed  that  the  constitutivist  derivation  of  normativity  from  agency  places  autonomy  in  a  subtly 
different  context  than  traditional  Kantian  moral  philosophy  and  this  difference  allows  for  the 
development  of  scalar  deontology,  which  I  explain  in  §  3.  The  relationship  between  Kantian 
constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  tradition  provides  both  the  solution  to  the  shmagency  problem 
and  the  foundations  for  developing  a  scalar  deontology.  
 
This  relationship  between  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  tradition  is  found  both  in  how 
Kantian  constitutivism  establishes  the  objectivity  of  the  normativity  it  derives  from  the 
constitution  of  agency  and  in  the  role  of  autonomy  in  establishing  this  normativity.  In  §§  0.3,  0.4, 
1.6,  2.1,  3.1,  and  3.3  I  explain  that  deriving  objective  normativity  from  how  we  are  constituted  is 
accomplished,  by  Kantian  constitutivists,  by  appealing  to  the  epistemic  and  metaphysical  claims 
of  the  Kantian  tradition.  This  is  the  relationship  I  refer  to  in  my  synthesis  of  my  results  regarding 
Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  shmagency  problem  in  §  4.1.  The  normativity  derived  from  the 
constitution  of  agency  by  Kantian  constitutivism  is  objective  normativity  because  the  elements  of 
our  constitution  that  it  is  derived  from  are  themselves  objective.  As  I  explain  in  §  0.3,  and 
develop  in  §§  2.1  and  3.1,  objectivity  in  this  context  refers  to  the  necessity  of  the  proposition  in 
question.  The  elements  of  our  constitution  that  Kantian  constitutivism  derives  normativity  from 
are  objective  in  the  sense  that  those  elements  are  necessary.  
 
In  §§  3.1  and  3.3  I  explain  that  the  derivation  of  normativity  from  necessary  elements  of  our 
constitution  is  how  Kantian  constitutivism  develops  on  Kant's  transcendental  approach  to 
philosophy.  This  approach  uses  the  necessity  of  our  faculty  of  reason  to  establish  the  objectivity 
of  the  normativity  derived  from  the  constitution  of  agency.  By  establishing  the  objectivity  of  the 
normativity  derived  from  our  constitution  with  this  type  of  transcendental  argument  (see  §§  2.1 
and  3.3)  Kantian  constitutivism  demonstrates  that  it  can  deliver  objective  normativity:  thus, 
solving  the  shmagency  problem.  I  explain  in  §§  1.4  and  1.5  that  Velleman  does  not  solve  the 
shmagency  problem  in  this  manner  and  by  doing  so  deviates  from  core  tenents  of  the  Kantian 
tradition.  This  is  why,  as  I  explain  in  §  1.8,  Velleman  does  not  attempt  to  establish  objective 
normativity  in  the  same  sense  that  the  shmagency  problem  is  deals  in.  This  is  why,  as  I  explain 
in  §  3.3,  Velleman’s  constitutivism  is  only  ‘Kinda  Kantian’.  In  §  1.5  I  explain  that  Velleman’s 
constitutivism  foregoes  the  Kantian  sense  of  objectivity,  which  derives  objectivity  from  the 
necessity  of  elements  of  our  constitution,  because  Velleman  does  not  argue  that  the  elements  of 
our  constitution  that  normativity  is  derived  from  are  necessary  (at  least,  not  in  the  same  sense 
that  the  Kantian  tradition  does).  In  §  1.6  I  explain  how  important  elements  of  Velleman’s 
constitutivist  theory  can  be  preserved  as  a  fully  fledged  form  of  Kantian  constitutivism  by 
providing  an  alternative  reply  to  the  shmagency  problem  that  does  appeal  to  the  same  type  of 
objectivity  that  the  Kantian  tradition  deals  in. 
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The  element  of  our  constitution  that  is  necessary,  and  the  element  that  Kantian  constitutivism 
derives  normativity  from,  is  our  faculty  of  reason.  I  explain  why  this  element  of  our  constitution  is 
the  focus  of  Kantian  constitutivism’s  derivation  of  normativity  in  §§  0.4,  1.6,   2.7,  and  3.5.  The 
idea  is  that  our  faculty  of  reason  is  necessary  in  the  special  sense  that  it  is  required  to 
understand  the  world  and  this  entails  that  we  must  endorse  our  faculty  of  reason  in  order  to 
undertake  rational  deliberation  and,  hence,  we  must  endorse  our  faculty  of  reason  in  order  to 
endorse  anything  at  all.  That’s  the  Kantian  claim  utilised  by  Kantian  constitutivists  and  they  then 
develop  this  by  deriving  normativity  from  the  same  elements  of  our  constitution.  By  developing 
on  this  claim  with  the  constitutivist  approach  (see  §§  0.2  and  3.2)  Kantian  constitutivists  provide 
their  claim  with  the  same  type  of  objectivity  the  Kantian  tradition  establishes  for  reason  itself. 
So,  the  link  between  Kantian  constitutivism  and  the  Kantian  tradition  is  that  the  Kantian  tradition 
establishes  the  necessity,  and  therefore  objectivity,  of  our  rational  faculties  and  Kantian 
constitutivism  then  derives  normativity  from  those  same  faculties.  
 
So,  this  relationship  between  the  necessity  of  our  rational  faculties  and  the  derivation  of 
normativity  from  them  reveals  how  Kantian  constitutivism  establishes  the  objectivity  of 
normativity.  It  also  reveals  how  the  role  of  autonomy  in  Kantian  constitutivism  is  related  to  its 
underlying  Kantian  claims.  In  §§  3.7  and  3.8  I  explain  the  relationship  between  Kant’s  theory  of 
autonomy  and  freedom  and  those  developed  by  Korsgaard  and  Velleman  alongside  their 
Kantian  constitutivist  theories.  The  relationship  is  that  autonomy  is  also  derived  from  our  rational 
faculties  and  in  this  manner  the  nature  of  freedom  (as  the  use  of  our  autonomy)  and  normativity 
is  fundamentally  linked  in  both  the  Kantian  tradition  and  Kantian  constitutivism.  
 
Kant,  Korsgaard,  and  Velleman  explain  the  nature  of  autonomy  and  freedom  in  different  ways 
but  with  a  common  claim  (see  §§  3.7  and  3.8)  that  entails  a  particular  assertion  about  the  nature 
of  normativity.  The  underlying  claim  about  freedom  and  autonomy  is  that  our  autonomy  is  the 
result  of  our  ability  to  control  our  own  decisions  and  actions,  our  freedom  is  the  exercising  of 
that  control.  The  assertion  that  this  claim  entails  about  the  nature  of  autonomy  is  that  our 
obligation  to  act  in  a  particular  way,  our  duty,  is  an  obligation  to  ourselves  that  arises  from  the 
control  we  have  over  our  own  decisions  and  actions  (see  §§  3.3  and  3.9).  We  have  the  ability  to 
control  our  own  decisions  and  actions  because  we  provide  the  faculty  of  reason  to  the  process 
of  decision  making  and  this  faculty  of  reason  is  the  use  of  the  laws  of  reason  to  become  the 
cause  of  our  decisions  and  actions  (see  §§  3.4  and  3.5).  The  role  of  our  faculty  of  reason  in 
becoming  this  cause  obligates  us  to  act  and  make  decisions  in  a  particular  way  because  of  the 
laws  that  govern  this  faculty.  The  laws  of  reason  entail  that  we  are  obligated  to  be  coherent, 
because  without  being  coherent  we  would  not  be  following  the  laws  of  reason  at  all:  in  this 
sense  coherency  is  fundamental  to  the  use  of  our  rational  faculties.  From  this  obligation  the 
categorical  imperatives,  the  laws  of  normativity  and  morality  as  such,  are  derived  (see  §  3.9). 
Hence,  our  obligation  to  what  follows  from  the  nature  of  our  rational  faculties  is  also  our 
obligation  to  morality:  our  control  over  our  own  actions  is  provided  by  our  faculty  of  reason  and 
the  faculty  of  reason  requires  that  we  are  coherent  -  this  requirement  that  we  are  coherent  is  our 
obligation  to  ourselves  and  it  entails  the  categorical  imperative.  
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Our  rational  faculties  provide  us  control  over  our  own  decisions  and  actions  in  the  sense  that 
they  provide  laws  that  we  can  use  to  direct  the  process  of  making  decisions  and  taking  action. 
This  is  why  Korsgaard  identifies  our  rational  faculties  with  our  deepest  personal  identity,  which 
she  describes  as  practical  identity  (see  §  3.7).  In  this  sense  our  freedom  comes  from  acting  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  reason  and,  hence,  we  are  free  insofar  as  we  do  so.  Notice  that, 
according  to  this  Kantian  account  of  autonomy,  freedom  is  compatible  with  determinism 
because  freedom  is  found  within  a  law  governed  domain  -  reason.  This  is  how  our  autonomy 
and  normativity  arise  from  the  same  Kantian  claim  about  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  our 
access  to  it.  Reason  itself  is  necessary  and  we  derive  its  necessity  from  what  we  provide  to  the 
creation  of  our  experience  of  the  world.  Reason  is  also  how  we  control  our  own  actions  and  the 
decisions  we  make:  it  is  how  our  will  is  free.  Hence,  the  necessity  of  reason  translates  into  the 
necessity  of  our  autonomy  (see  §  3.8  where  I  explain  why  Velleman  describes  this  as  a  type  of 
epistemic  freedom).  
 
In  §  3.9  I  explain  that  Kantian  moral  philosophy  derives  our  obligation  to  be  coherent  in  the  form 
of  the  categorical  imperative  (in  all  of  its  formulations).  The  idea  is  that  the  requirement  that  we 
are  coherent  entails  that  we  treat  other  people  as  the  equals  of  ourselves  (in  a  particular  sense) 
because  to  do  otherwise  would  not  be  coherent.  Hence,  placing  value  on  my  own  life  requires 
that  I  place  value  on  the  lives  of  others  because  coherence  demands  this.  Coherence  demands 
this  because  I  am,  after  all,  no  different  from  others  in  regards  to  why  I  think  my  own  life  has 
value:  I  think  I  am  valuable  because  I  experience  and  participate  in  the  world  and  therefore  I 
must  value  others  because  they  also  experience  and  participate  in  the  world.  This  line  of 
reasoning  is  developed  into  the  categorical  imperatives  in  their  various  formulations.  I  should  act 
as  I  would  have  others  act  in  similar  situations  because  I  am  not  relevantly  different  from  others 
(universal  law).  I  should  participate  in  society  in  the  same  manner  as  I  would  have  others  do 
because  I  am  a  member  of  the  society  in  the  same  sense  they  are  (kingdom  of  ends).  I  should 
treat  other  people  as  ends  in  their  own  right  because  I  treat  myself  in  this  manner  and  they  are 
an  end  in  the  same  sense  that  I  am  (value  of  humanity  and  treating  people  as  ends).  These 
formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative  are  formulations  of  the  demands  of  our  own  rational 
faculties  and,  hence,  they  are  an  obligation  placed  upon  us  by  the  fundamental  nature  of  what 
we  are.  In  §  4.3  I  explain  how  this  obligation  relates  to  my  development  of  a  scalar  deontology 
as  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  that  demonstrates  one  of  the  prospects  for  the 
Kantian  tradition  that  is  facilitated  by  the  employment  of  the  constitutivist  approach. 
 
Deriving  the  categorical  imperative  from  the  obligation  of  coherence  placed  upon  us  by  our 
rational  faculties  is  how  the  Kantian  tradition  and  Kantian  constitutivism  are  fundamentally 
connected.  Our  reason  obligates  us  to  acknowledge  the  necessity  of  endorsing  our  own  faculty 
of  reason  in  order  to  understand  the  world.  Endorsing  these  faculties  entails  an  obligation  to  be 
coherent  in  our  use  of  them,  because  of  the  laws  that  those  faculties  provide.  This  obligation  to 
be  coherent  underwrites  all  uses  of  our  faculty  of  reason  and,  hence,  its  imperatives  are 
categorical.  This  is  how  the  formulations  of  the  categorical  imperative  in  Kantian  moral  theory 
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are  derived  from  our  rational  faculties  and  it  is  the  same  process  that  Kantian  constitutivism 




4.3  Scalar  deontology  and  the  prospects  of  Kantian  constitutivism 
Scalar  deontology  is  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  that  demonstrates  the  prospects 
provided  to  the  Kantian  tradition  by  the  constitutivist  approach.  As  I  explain  in  §§  3.0  and  3.4 
scalar  deontology  refers  to  the  obligation  we  have  to  ourselves  to  act  coherently  and  explains 
why  that  obligation  is  scalar  in  nature.  In  §  3.9  I  explain  that  because  scalar  deontology  is 
derived  from  our  obligation  to  be  coherent  it  is  a  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative.  This 
formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  shows  that  our  obligation  to  be  coherent  is  an 
obligation  that  we  have  to  ourselves.  This  obligation  exists  from  the  same  perspective  that  our 
control  over  own  decisions  and  actions  exists:  the  perspective  of  an  agent  that  is  in  the  process 
of  making  a  decision  by  utilising  their  rational  faculties  (see  §§  3.7  and  3.8).  From  this 
perspective  our  obligation  to  be  coherent  is  something  that  we  are  in  a  constant  state  of 
pursuing  because  it  is  always  the  underlying  aim  of  our  rational  faculties  in  the  sense  that  when 
reasoning  we  are  trying  to  be  coherent  (see  §§  3.5  and  3.6).  In  the  perspective  of  a  subject  that 
is  exercising  their  rational  faculties  to  control  their  decisions  and  actions  the  obligation  to  be 
coherent  is  not  something  that  they  either  complete  or  fail  at.  This  obligation  is  an  ongoing 
pursuit  that  they  are  achieving  more  or  less  well  and,  hence,  is  a  scalar  obligation. 
Our  rational  faculties  provide  us  with  both  control  over  our  actions  and  an  obligation  to  use  that 
control  in  a  coherent  manner.  As  I  summarize  in  §  4.2  this  is  how  reason  is  simultaneously  the 
source  of  our  autonomy  (our  ability  to  control  our  own  actions  and  decisions)  and  our  moral 
obligations.  This  is  how  Kantian  constitutivists  establish  the  objectivity  of  normativity  by  deriving 
it  from  the  objectivity  of  reason.  This  link  between  objectivity  and  normativity  is  provided  by  the 
Kantian  tradition.  The  constitutivist  approach,  as  I  explain  in  §§  3.3  and  3.5,  provides  an 
examination  of  the  role  of  the  subject  in  the  derivation  of  normativity  from  the  constitution  of 
agency.  Normativity  is  derived  from  autonomy,  in  both  the  Kantian  tradition  and  for  Kantian 
constitutivists  (see  §§  3.5,  3.6,  and  3.7),  and  the  constitutivist  approach  provides  an 
examination  of  what  that  means  for  the  role  of  the  subject  regarding  the  source  of  normativity. 
Normativity  is  derived  from  the  constitution  of  the  subject,  in  particular  the  constitution  of  their 
agency,  and  this  means  that  the  categorical  imperative  must  be  capable  of  being  formulated  in 
the  same  context  that  the  constitution  of  the  subject  needs  to  be  understood  within  (see  §  3.6). 
Understanding  our  autonomy  requires  understanding  the  position  of  the  subject  that  is  in  the 
process  of  exercising  their  autonomy  and  formulating  the  categorical  imperative  in  this  context 
requires  a  formulation  that  expresses  the  categorical  imperative  as  an  ongoing  aim.  Formulating 
the  categorical  imperative  as  an  ongoing  aim  underlying  the  use  of  our  faculty  of  reason  is  how  I 
develop  scalar  deontology  (see  §  3.5). 
 
As  I  explain  in  §§  3.6,  3.7,  and  3.8  understanding  autonomy  requires  the  context  of  a  subject 
that  is  exercising  that  autonomy.  Korsgaard  explains  this  requirement  to  understand  autonomy 
in  the  context  of  a  subject  that  is  exercising  that  autonomy  in  terms  of  the  existence  of  freedom 
(see  §  3.7).  She  argues  that  freedom  exists  in  the  sense  that  a  subject  that  is  utilising  their 
faculty  of  reason  to  make  a  decision  becomes  the  cause  of  their  decision  or  action.  Velleman 
describes  this  requirement  as  epistemic  freedom  which  means  that  the  control  over  our  own 
decisions  and  actions  granted  by  our  rational  faculties  provides  us  with  license  to  understand 
and  discuss  our  own  actions  as  though  they  are  not  predetermined  (see  §  3.8).  I  think  either  of 
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these  explanations  is  a  suitable  development  of  Kant’s  theory  of  freedom  (see  §§  3.6,  3.7,  3.8, 
and  3.9).  I  explain  this  requirement  as  the  necessity  of  understanding  the  context  of  the  subject 
in  the  role  of  autonomy  and  its  place  the  derivation  of  normativity  (see  §3.5).  These  claims 
about  the  role  of  autonomy  in  the  constitutivist  derivation  of  normativity  can  be  synthesised  as 
the  assertion  that  understanding  our  autonomy  and  understanding  the  nature  of  normativity 
must  be  compatible.  We  must  be  able  to  do  both  in  the  same  context  because  normativity 
requires  autonomy.  Hence,  because  autonomy  must  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the  subject 
that  utilising  its  faculty  of  reason  to  control  its  decisions  and  actions  normativity  must  be 
formulated  such  that  can  be  understood  in  that  context  too. 
 
In  §§  3.5,  3.6,  and  3.9  I  demonstrate  that  formulating  normativity  such  that  it  can  be  understood 
in  the  context  of  a  subject  exercising  its  faculty  of  reason  to  control  its  own  decisions 
(autonomy)  facilitates  the  development  of  a  scalar  deontology.  In  the  context  of  a  subject  that  is 
exercising  its  autonomy  agency  is  something  with  an  underlying  aim  that  the  subject  is  in  the 
ongoing  pursuit  of.  This  aim  is  the  aim  of  self-constitution  identified  by  Kantian  constitutivists 
(see  §§  1.2  and  3.8  for  Velleman’s  explanation  of  this  aim  and  §§  2.1  and  3.7  for  Korsgaard’s). 
The  ongoing  pursuit  of  this  aim  is  the  obligation  placed  upon  us  by  our  faculties  of  reason  and, 
hence,  pursuit  of  this  aim  is  the  categorical  imperative  (see  §  3.9).  Formulating  this  aim,  the 
categorical  imperative,  in  this  context  means  formulating  it  as  an  ongoing  pursuit  because 
agency  itself  is,  in  this  context,  an  ongoing  pursuit.  This  is  how  the  categorical  imperative  is 
formulated  as  the  ongoing  pursuit  of  coherence.  As  an  ongoing  pursuit  of  coherence  success 
and  failure  at  the  aim  of  the  pursuit  is  understood  as  the  extent  to  which  the  agent  is  succeeding 
or  failing  to  constitute  themselves  coherently:  this  is  why  the  obligation  is  scalar  (see  §§  3.5,  3.6 
and  3.9).  Understanding  the  purpose  of  your  agency  as  the  ongoing  aim  of  self-constitution 
entails  understanding  your  success  in  that  pursuit  as  something  you  are  in  the  process  of 
accomplishing,  to  a  greater  or  lesser  efficacy,  rather  than  understanding  it  as  something  you 
have  either  failed  or  succeeded  at. 
 
Notice  that  the  constitutivist  approach  was  the  crucial  element  which  allowed  the  formulation  of 
the  categorical  imperative  as  a  scalar  obligation  to  oneself  in  §  3.9.  The  focus  on  the  role  of  the 
subject  and  its  constitutive  features  prompted  an  examination  of  the  foundations  of  normativity 
which  involved  both  the  Kantian  tradition  and  the  constitutivist  approach.  The  key  observation 
that  facilitated  the  development  of  this  argument  was  the  role  of  the  subject  in  the  context  of  the 
ongoing  activity  of  agency.  The  ongoing  activity  of  agency  is  the  activity  of  self-constitution  and 
it  is  the  constitutivist  approach  that  identified  the  need  to  focus  on  this  point.  This  is  how  Kantian 
constitutivism,  rather  than  the  Kantian  tradition  or  the  constitutivist  approach  in  either  of  their 
own  right,  allowed  the  development  of  scalar  deontology.  This  appreciation  of  the  role  of  the 
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